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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to assess whether English defamation law strikes an 
appropriate balance between the conflicting interests in reputation and freedom of 
speech in cases involving corporate, as opposed to individual, claimants. 
The interests in corporate reputation and the freedom to criticize companies and 
their activities are explored by reviewing both the academic literature and the 
relevant case law, on the basis of which it is argued that the law should afford less 
weight to the reputational interests of corporate claimants than is given to the 
individual interest in reputation; and that defendants’ speech typically warrants 
enhanced protection from companies’ defamation claims in light of the public 
interest value of critical statements about corporate activities. 
In s 1(2) of the Defamation Act 2013, Parliament responded to the widespread 
concerns that had been raised about corporate defamation law by introducing a 
threshold requirement of ‘serious financial loss’ which claims brought by for-profit 
companies must meet in order to succeed. This thesis contains the most detailed 
critical assessment of that reform to date, which scrutinizes the cases in which the 
s 1(2) test has been interpreted and applied since it came into force. That analysis 
concludes that the provision will not resolve the problems with the pre-existing law, 
in part because the courts have interpreted it too favourably to claimants, and in part 
because Parliament’s decision to focus on financial loss fails to address other 
fundamental issues with corporate defamation litigation. 
In light of that assessment of the 2013 reforms, the thesis considers a range of 
alternative reforms that might be made, either to the substantive law, to the remedies 
awarded to successful claimants, or to the procedures used to resolve claims. A 
number of potentially beneficial reforms are identified, but it is argued that none of 
them would offer a complete response to the problems caused by corporate 
defamation claims. Instead, the thesis proposes that the right to sue in defamation 
should be removed entirely from corporate claimants. 
In contrast to most other literature in which a similar approach is proposed, this 
thesis recommends removing the right to sue from all non-human claimants, rather 
than targeting only larger companies or those trading for profit. The benefits of a 
rule with a clearly defined scope are argued to outweigh the limited interests that 
charities and smaller companies have in retaining the right to sue in defamation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A. Context and research question 
The purpose of defamation law is to protect the claimant’s reputation against false 
allegations published by the defendant. Because liability attaches to the publication 
of statements, a defamation claim brought to protect the claimant’s reputation will 
necessarily also implicate the defendant’s freedom of speech. The core challenge 
of defamation law therefore consists of finding an appropriate balance between 
freedom of speech and the right to reputation.1 This central conflict between the 
interests in speech and reputation is also present where the claimant is a corporate 
entity rather than an individual, but the appropriate balance between the two is not 
necessarily the same in this context. The purpose of this thesis is to assess whether 
English defamation law appropriately balances the interests at stake in cases 
involving corporate claimants. The argument presented is that it does not. 
In April 2013, Parliament passed the Defamation Act 2013, with the overall 
intention of rebalancing the law so as to better protect freedom of speech.2 One of 
the principal ways in which it sought to achieve this goal was by introducing a 
threshold test, in s 1 of the Act, that would require defamation claimants to show 
‘serious harm’ to their reputations in order to sue successfully.3 The treatment of 
corporate claimants was a ‘key battleground’ in the ping-pong stages of 
parliamentary debate on the Bill.4 The pre-existing law was criticized on two broad 
grounds. Firstly, it was argued that the reputational interests that corporate 
defamation claimants sought to protect were financial in nature, and that as such 
                                                 
1 Matthew Collins, Collins on Defamation (OUP 2014) para 1.01. 
2 Ministry of Justice, Draft Defamation Bill: Consultation (Cm 8020, 2011) 5. 
3 Ibid, para 4. 
4 James Price and Felicity McMahon, Blackstone’s Guide to the Defamation Act 2013 (OUP 2013) 
para 1.32. 
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these claimants should be required to prove financial loss as a prerequisite of 
liability.5 Secondly, it was argued that corporations frequently used the threat of 
defamation litigation to silence legitimate criticism of their activities; and, more 
generally, that the law had an unacceptable ‘chilling effect’ on speech about 
companies.6 
The government initially resisted including any reforms in the 2013 Act specifically 
targeted at corporate claimants,7 but eventually settled on a ‘compromise’8 by 
which the s 1 ‘serious harm’ threshold would be modified by a requirement to show 
‘serious financial loss’ in claims brought by for-profit companies.9 As a result, s 1 
as a whole reads as follows: 
(1) A statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is 
likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, harm to the reputation of a body that 
trades for profit is not “serious harm” unless it has caused or is likely to 
cause the body serious financial loss. 
As the first statutory amendment to English defamation law to be targeted 
specifically at corporate claimants, the ‘serious financial loss’ threshold in s 1(2) of 
the Defamation Act 2013 is naturally important to this thesis. As such, the provision 
is subjected to a sustained and careful critique, both to examine how it is being 
interpreted and applied in the courts, and to assess its suitability as a response to the 
complaints raised about corporate defamation law during the reform debates. This 
analysis reaches the conclusion that the serious financial loss test will not be 
sufficient to address the significant problems with English corporate defamation 
law, particularly in relation to its effects on freedom of speech. In light of this 
assessment of s 1(2), the thesis also discusses various alternative options for 
reforming corporate defamation law, drawing on approaches taken in other 
jurisdictions, and on proposals made during debate on the 2013 Act and in the 
                                                 
5 Ibid, para 2.12. The House of Lords had declined to develop the common law so as to impose such 
a requirement in Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL [2006] UKHL 44. 
6 eg Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Press Standards, Libel and Privacy: Report (HC 361-I 
2010) paras 164-76 (‘CMS Committee Report’). 
7 Ministry of Justice, Consultation (n 2) paras 136-45; Defamation Bill Deb 26 June 2012, col 206 
(Jonathan Djanogly MP); HL Deb 5 February 2013, vol 743, col 174 (Lord Ahmad); HC Deb 16 
April 2013, vol 561, col 269 (Helen Grant MP). 
8 Price and McMahon (n 4) para 1.36. 
9 HL Deb 23 April 2013, vol 744, cols 1365-84; HC Deb 24 April 2013, vol 561, cols 913-22. 
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academic literature. The overall argument presented in the thesis is that the right to 
sue in defamation should be removed entirely from corporate claimants. 
B. Contribution to existing literature 
A number of commentators have addressed questions about how defamation law 
ought to apply in cases involving corporate claimants, either tangentially to a 
broader discussion of defamation law,10 or as the central focus of their research. In 
particular, this thesis builds on previous work on this subject by (in alphabetical 
order) Gary Chan,11 Peter Coe,12 Jan Oster,13 David Rolph,14 and Hilary Young.15 
The overall conclusion reached in this thesis – that the right to sue in defamation 
should be removed from (at least some16) corporate claimants – has also been 
reached by other commentators.17 The thesis contributes to the existing literature in 
the following ways. 
                                                 
10 eg David Howarth, ‘Libel: Its Purpose and Reform’ (2011) 74(6) Modern Law Review 845, 873-
75; Gavin Phillipson, ‘The “Global Pariah”, the Defamation Bill and the Human Rights Act’ (2012) 
63(1) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 149; 185-86; Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, ‘Something 
Rotten in the State of English Libel Law? A Rejoinder to the Clamour for Reform of Defamation’ 
(2009) 14(6) Communications Law 173, 179-80; ‘Reframing Libel: Taking (All) Rights Seriously 
and Where it Leads’ (2012) 63(1) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 5, 18, 21. 
11 Gary K Y Chan, ‘Corporate Defamation: Reputation, Rights and Remedies’ (2013) 33(2) Legal 
Studies 264. 
12 Peter Coe, ‘The Value of Corporate Reputation and the Defamation Act 2013: A Brave New 
World or Road to Ruin?’ (2013) 18(4) Communications Law 113; ‘The Defamation Act 2013 and 
CPR 3.4 and 24: A Sting in Causation’s Tail’ (2014) 25(3) Entertainment Law 93; ‘The Defamation 
Act 2013: We Need to Talk about Corporate Reputation’ (2015) 4 Journal of Business Law 313; ‘A 
Comparative Analysis of the Treatment of Corporate Reputation in Australia and the UK’ in András 
Koltay and Paul Wragg (eds), Research Handbook on Comparative Defamation and Privacy Law 
(forthcoming, Edward Elgar 2020) (on file with author – I am grateful to Pete Coe for providing a 
copy of this chapter, and for granting me permission to cite it and quote from it in this thesis). 
13 Jan Oster, ‘The Criticism of Trading Corporations and their Right to Sue for Defamation’ (2011) 
2(3) Journal of European Tort Law 255. 
14 David Rolph, ‘Corporations’ Right to Sue for Defamation: An Australian Perspective’ (2011) 
22(7) Entertainment Law Review 195. 
15 Hilary Young, ‘Rethinking Canadian Defamation Law as Applied to Corporate Claimants’ (2013) 
46(2) University of British Columbia Law Review 529; ‘Adding Insult to Injury in Assessing 
Damages for Corporate Defamation’ (2013) 21 Tort Law Review 127; ‘Public Institutions as 
Defamation Plaintiffs’ (2016) 39(1) Dalhousie Law Journal 249. 
16 Some commentators have reached this conclusion only in respect of for-profit trading 
corporations: see text to notes 37-39. 
17 eg J A Weir, ‘Local Authority v Critical Ratepayer – A Suit in Defamation’ (1972) 30 Cambridge 
Law Journal 238; Fiona Patfield, ‘Defamation, Freedom of Speech and Corporations’ (1993) 3 
Juridical Review 294; David Howarth (n 10); Young, ‘Rethinking Canadian Defamation Law’ (n 
15). 
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Most importantly, it situates the argument for removing the corporate right to sue 
in the context of the law of defamation applicable in England and Wales after the 
commencement of the Defamation Act 2013, which as noted included provision for 
corporate claimants specifically. Most of the existing literature on English corporate 
defamation law referred to above was published during the debates leading to the 
2013 reforms,18 with some older literature having been published before the turn of 
the millennium.19  
The analysis of corporate defamation law in this thesis includes the most thorough 
critical examination to date of the serious financial loss test in s 1(2) of the 
Defamation Act 2013, and its interpretation and application in the courts since the 
Act came into force.20 This analysis of the relevant case law informs the assessment 
of the 2013 reforms as a response to the criticisms of the pre-existing law that have 
been raised in other academic and official literature. The most significant 
contributions to the academic literature on English corporate defamation law since 
the 2013 Act came into force have been Peter Coe’s.21 My analysis of the interests 
at stake in corporate defamation cases, and my conclusions as to how those cases 
ought to be dealt with, differ significantly from the position taken by Coe,22 who is 
                                                 
18 eg Chan (n 11); Rolph (n 14). 
19 eg Weir (n 17); Patfield, ‘Defamation, Freedom of Speech and Corporations’ (n 17); Fiona 
Patfield, ‘The Origins of a Company’s Right to Sue for Defamation’ (1994) 45(3) Northern Ireland 
Legal Quarterly 233. 
20 There is, of course, detailed discussion of s 1(2) and relevant case law in Richard Parkes and 
others, Gatley on Libel and Slander (12th edn, 2nd supp, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) paras 2.8, 3.7, 
26.21, 32.3 (‘Gatley’). But the examination of the provision in Gatley is primarily intended for 
practitioners, and is therefore a descriptive, rather than normative, exercise; the text has also not yet 
been updated to reflect the impact of the Supreme Court judgment on s 1(1) in Lachaux v 
Independent Print Ltd [2019] UKSC 27: see Ch3.A.iv., text to notes 60-77. 
21 See note 12. Other relevant literature since the 2013 Act primarily includes commentary on 
specific cases (eg Hugh Tomlinson, ‘Brett Wilson LLP v Persons Unknown, Corporate Damages 
and Injunction against Unknown Operators of Website’ (2016) 27(1) Entertainment Law Review 
22; Jennifer Agate, ‘The High Cost of Dating – Tereza Burki v Seventy Thirty Ltd’ (2019) 30(1) 
Entertainment Law Review 32; Thomas D C Bennett, ‘An Inferential House of Cards – Serious 
Financial Loss under section 1(2) Defamation Act 2013: Burki v Seventy Thirty Ltd’ (2019) 24(1) 
Communications Law 34); and relatively brief and general commentary on the likely effect of the 
Act on corporate claimants (eg David Rolph, ‘A Critique of the Defamation Act 2013: Lessons For 
and From Australian Defamation Law Reform’ (2016) 21(4) Communications Law 116; Thomas 
Rudkin, ‘Things Get Serious: Defining Defamation’ (2014) 25(6) Entertainment Law Review 201). 
22 As indicated by our discussion of the subject in The Media Law Podcast, ‘Episode 11: Corporate 
Defamation’ at <https://soundcloud.com/user-568422299/episode-11-corporate-defamation>. 
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in favour of retaining the corporate right to sue in defamation and has argued that 
the s 1(2) test may restrict companies’ ability to sue too much.23 
Other existing literature analyses the law of corporate defamation that applies in 
other common law jurisdictions, such as the United States,24 Australia,25 or 
Canada.26 There are similarities between the law in these jurisdictions and English 
law, but there are also significant differences in their approaches to the task of 
finding an appropriate balance between the competing interests in corporate 
reputation and freedom of speech. In particular, the approach to corporate 
defamation law in England assessed in this thesis, as embodied in s 1(2) of the 
Defamation Act 2013, diverges from the approaches taken to similar problems in 
each of those other jurisdictions both in substance and in scope.27  
Removing companies’ right to sue in defamation was one of the reform options 
proposed during the debate prior to the 2013 Act,28 but Parliament instead opted to 
introduce the serious financial loss threshold in s 1(2).29 Parliament’s approach 
appears to have been motivated in part by the perception that denying companies 
the right to sue in defamation might be incompatible with the European Convention 
on Human Rights (‘the Convention’).30 This interpretation of the Convention has 
also been adopted in some academic literature on English corporate defamation 
                                                 
23 eg Coe, ‘Need to Talk’ (n 12) 333. 
24 eg Arlen W Langvardt, ‘A Principled Approach to Compensatory Damages in Corporate 
Defamation Cases’ (1990) 27 American Business Law Journal 491; D Mark Jackson, ‘The Corporate 
Defamation Plaintiff in the Era of SLAPPs: Revisiting New York Times v Sullivan’ (2001) 9(2) 
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 491; Laura A Heymann, ‘The Law of Reputation and the 
Interest of the Audience’ (2011) 52 Boston College Law Review 1341. 
25 Perry Herzfeld, ‘Corporations, Defamation and General Damages: Back to First Principles’ (2005) 
Media & Arts Law Review 135; Matt Collins, ‘Protecting Corporate Reputations in the Era of 
Uniform National Defamation Laws’ (2008) 13 Media & Arts Law Review 447. 
26 Young, ‘Rethinking Corporate Defamation Law’ (n 15). 
27 See eg Rolph, ‘A Critique of the Defamation Act 2013’ (n 21) 118-19. 
28 eg Index on Censorship and English PEN, Free Speech is Not For Sale (2009) 10. 
29 David J Acheson, ‘Corporate Reputation under the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
(2018) 10(1) Journal of Media Law 49, 49-50. 
30 eg Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill, Report (2010-12, HL 203, HC 930-I) paras 112-
14 (‘Joint Committee Report’); Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill, Oral and Associated 
Written Evidence Volume II (2010-12, HL 203, HC 930-II) 18-19, 381-86 (‘Joint Committee 
Evidence vol II’). 
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law;31 it is rejected in this thesis, which argues that a company does not have a 
Convention right to protect its reputation in domestic defamation law.32 
The conceptual analysis of the corporate interest in reputation in Chapter 1 is 
distinguished from most other analyses in the literature because it does not rely on 
the conceptions of reputation as property, honour, and dignity described by Robert 
Post.33 While most commentators on corporate defamation law have adopted Post’s 
theory as a suitable framework within which to conceptualize corporate 
reputation,34 I argue that it is not as useful as its influence on the subsequent 
literature would suggest. That argument is based on a critique of Post’s theory as a 
whole, which differs from the approach taken by most other commentators, who 
have tended to critique each of Post’s conceptions individually while assuming the 
validity of his theory overall.35 The conceptual discussion in Chapter 1 also rejects 
some other arguments that are commonly found in the existing literature, including 
the claim that corporate reputation is a form of property, or that companies are only 
capable of having financial interests in reputation.  
Finally, the thesis directly addresses the standing of corporate claimants other than 
trading companies, such as charities and other not-for-profit entities, and argues that 
they should be treated in the same way as for-profit business corporations.36 Most 
existing literature either argues for differential treatment of these bodies relative to 
trading companies;37 considers a specific kind of entity separately from corporate 
                                                 
31 Chan (n 11) 269; Oster (n 13) 263.  
32 This interpretation of the ECtHR’s case law is set out at Ch1.C.i., text to notes 230-255 (Art 8); 
Ch1.B.ii., text to notes 129-150 (A1P1); Ch4.C.iv., text to notes 331-343 (Art 6); and in full at 
Acheson, ‘Corporate Reputation under the ECHR’ (n 29). 
33 Robert C Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution’ 
(1986) 74(3) California Law Review 691. 
34 eg Chan (n 11) 268-70; Coe, ‘Need to Talk’ (n 12) 315-18; Herzfeld (n 25) 139-40; Oster (n 13) 
259-60; Young, ‘Rethinking Canadian Defamation Law’ (n 15) 540-45. 
35 eg David Rolph, Reputation, Celebrity and Defamation Law (Ashgate 2008) 41; Dario Milo, 
Defamation and Freedom of Speech (OUP 2008) 26-42. 
36 See Ch5.C., text to notes 262-306. 
37 eg Herzfeld (n 25) 179. cf Chan (n 11) 286-87. 
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claimants in general;38 or does not address the issues raised by their ability to sue 
in defamation.39  
C. Chapter structure and methodological approach 
The central question that this thesis addresses is whether the English law of 
defamation is appropriate as applied in cases involving corporate, as opposed to 
individual, claimants. This question involves both descriptive and normative 
elements; that is, it entails a comparison between what the law is and what the law 
ought to be. The second of these elements is also reform-oriented, in that it involves 
considering what the law could be. As such, the thesis as a whole adopts a 
combination of methodological approaches to address these various aspects of the 
central research question. 
Chapters 1 and 2 discuss, in turn, the competing interests at stake in corporate 
defamation cases: corporate reputation and freedom of speech. Chapter 1 consists 
primarily of a critical review of existing legal and socio-legal research 
conceptualizing the interest in corporate reputation protected in defamation law. It 
draws on literature from a range of different disciplinary perspectives, such as 
business, marketing, finance, and economics, to demonstrate the value of reputation 
to companies;40 but argues overall that corporate claimants’ reputational interests 
are more limited than those of individual claimants. Chapter 1 also uses a standard 
doctrinal methodology41 to defend the proposition that the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights does not establish a right to reputation for companies under 
the Convention, in contrast to the protection given to individual reputation under 
                                                 
38 eg Young, ‘Public Institutions as Defamation Plaintiffs’ (n 15); Raymond Youngs, ‘Should Public 
Bodies Be Allowed to Sue in Defamation?’ (2011) 16(1) Communications Law 19; Jill Cottrell, 
‘Can a University Sue in Defamation?’ (1999) 7(1) Asia Pacific Law Review 45. 
39 eg Oster (n 13) fn 3, excluding ‘Public corporations, unincorporated groups, … and non-trading 
organisations such as religious communities, political parties and non-profit organisations’ from the 
scope of his analysis; Young, ‘Rethinking Canadian Defamation Law’ (n 15) 539, whose argument 
‘focus[es] on medium to large for-profit corporations’. 
40 This methodology is broadly comparable to that outlined in Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns, 
‘Legal Research as Qualitative Research’ in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research 
Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press 2017) 42 (arguing that ‘the identification of relevant 
legislation, cases and secondary materials in law can be seen as analogous to a social science 
literature review’). 
41 eg Martha Minow, ‘Archetypal Legal Scholarship – A Field Guide’ (2013) 63(1) Journal of Legal 
Education 65. 
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the Article 8 right to privacy; and argues that, in light of the principles underlying 
its Art 8 jurisprudence, the Court ought to declare positively that companies do not 
have a Convention right to reputation. 
Chapter 2, similarly, engages in a critical examination of relevant case law and 
academic literature to explore the speech interests at stake in corporate defamation 
cases, and in particular the public interest in speech about companies and their 
activities. It argues that there is some significant public interest in the speech at 
issue in a large majority of corporate defamation cases; that the English courts in 
practice almost always recognize that public interest; and that the few types of case 
in which there is little public interest in critical speech about companies are of 
limited importance to the overall design of corporate defamation law. In addition to 
this examination of the speech at issue in corporate defamation cases dealt with by 
the courts, Chapter 2 also reviews the literature on the law’s wider impact on 
speech, discussing arguments about its chilling effect on different speakers, and 
highlighting the important role that those arguments played in shaping the debate 
about corporate defamation reform prior to the Defamation Act 2013. The chapter 
concludes that the range of pernicious effects which corporate defamation law has 
on speech on matters of public interest, combined with the narrower reputational 
interests of corporate claimants identified in Chapter 1, presented a compelling case 
to Parliament that it was necessary to reform the law as it applied to corporate 
claimants specifically. 
Chapter 3 focuses on s 1(2) of the Defamation Act 2013, which was Parliament’s 
response to these calls for reform. It aims to ‘analyse, criticise, sift, and 
synthesise’42 the relevant case law to further understand how the provision has been 
interpreted to date, whether and how it has influenced the outcomes of corporate 
defamation cases, and how it will continue to affect this area of law going forward. 
The analysis of the interpretation and application of s 1(2) is informed by a close 
reading of all publicly available judgments in which the provision has been applied 
or discussed, identified through searches on Westlaw and Lexis Library. This 
doctrinal analysis is supplemented by reference to critical academic literature, 
because the intention of the chapter is not only to understand how the s 1(2) test 
                                                 
42 Peter Birks, ‘The Academic and the Practitioner’ (1998) 18(4) Legal Studies 397, 399. 
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will be applied in the courts, but also to assess its suitability as a response to the 
criticisms of the pre-existing law that were explored in Chapters 1 and 2.43 The 
chapter concludes that s 1(2) is likely to have a relatively limited impact, especially 
because of the courts’ claimant-friendly interpretation of the provision to date; and 
that the reform fails to address fundamental problems with corporate defamation 
law that were identified in the debates on the 2013 Act.  
Chapters 4 and 5 are ‘reform-oriented’;44 having argued that the Defamation Act 
2013 will not be sufficient to address the problems with English corporate 
defamation law, Chapter 4 discusses whether there are alternative reform options 
that would more effectively address those problems. It considers approaches taken 
in other jurisdictions, proposals that were rejected by Parliament in the debate 
leading to the 2013 Act, and suggestions made in the academic literature. The 
chapter explores three broad categories of potential reform: alterations to the 
substantive law that would make it more difficult for corporate claimants to succeed 
with defamation claims; restrictions on the remedies available to successful 
corporate defamation claimants; and procedural reforms aimed at reducing the cost 
and complexity of litigation. The overall argument presented in Chapter 4 is that, 
while some of the reforms discussed may be beneficial if adopted in English law, 
none of them would adequately address the problems with the law.  
Chapter 5 argues that the preferable approach would be to remove companies’ right 
to sue in defamation entirely. The argument is again supported primarily by a 
critical review of relevant academic literature and case law. It is acknowledged that 
denying corporate claimants standing in defamation would lead to some cases in 
which companies have no adequate remedy for the harm caused by false allegations; 
however, it is argued that this would only be true in a small number of cases, and 
that, notwithstanding those cases, the benefits of removing the right to sue from 
companies would outweigh the costs of doing so. The final part of the chapter 
addresses the scope of the proposed reform; that is, which claimants should be 
precluded from suing in defamation. It draws on rules applied in corporate 
                                                 
43 eg Dobinson and Johns (n 40) 31. 
44 Terry Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (4th edn, Thomson Reuters 2018) 7, citing 
Pearce Committee, ‘Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the Commonwealth 
Tertiary Education Commission, Vol 3’ (1987) 17. 
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defamation cases in the US and Australia, as well as Parliament’s decision to limit 
the serious financial loss threshold in s 1(2) of the 2013 Act to claims brought by 
‘bod[ies] that trade[] for profit’, to argue that the preferable approach would be to 
remove the right to sue from all claimants other than human beings, rather than to 
attempt to target only some categories of corporate claimant. In other words, the 
part – and the thesis as a whole – argues that the right to sue in defamation should 
be available exclusively to individual human beings. 
As noted, some parts of the thesis, particularly in Chapters 4 and 5, discuss 
approaches taken to corporate defamation law in other jurisdictions. The 
jurisdictions discussed in most detail are Australia and the United States, where 
companies’ ability to sue in defamation is restricted relative to English law. These 
parts of the thesis do not attempt to use a ‘comparative’ legal research methodology, 
which requires a deeper and more extensive analysis of the legal cultures and 
histories of the relevant jurisdictions than it would be possible to undertake in the 
context of this thesis.45 I do not suggest that the experiences with alternative 
approaches to corporate defamation law in other jurisdictions would necessarily be 
replicated if those approaches were to be adopted in English law.46 The material is 
relevant and valuable because it helps to identify the range of options available for 
reform, and to anticipate potential problems with those options; and because 
academic literature discussing the law in other jurisdictions can provide insights 
that do translate more directly into the context of English law which is the primary 
focus of the thesis.47 
Some parts of the argument presented in this thesis are based on or supported by 
the results of previously published research that adopted a more empirical 
methodology, which involved systematically studying all judgments handed down 
in English corporate defamation cases between 2004 and 2013.48 The methodology 
                                                 
45 Geoffrey Samuel, ‘Comparative Law and Its Methodology’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton 
(eds), Research Methods in Law (Routledge 2013). 
46 See eg the discussion of David Rolph’s argument in relation to the availability of pre-publication 
injunctions in injurious falsehood actions in Australia, at Ch5.B.i., text to notes 130-137. 
47 See eg Jan M Smits, The Mind and Method of the Legal Academic (Edward Elgar 2012) 76-77 
(describing other jurisdictions as ‘laboratories’ for potential solutions to legal problems). 
48 David J Acheson, ‘Empirical Insights into Corporate Defamation: An Analysis of Cases Decided 
2004-2013’ (2016) 8(1) Journal of Media Law 32. 
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used in that research is explained and justified in the journal article in which the 
results of the study are reported.49 
D. Overview of relevant law 
The aim of this part is to give a broad outline of the basic principles of English 
defamation law, in particular as it applies to corporate claimants, to provide the 
necessary context for the discussion and analysis in the body of the thesis. The 
description of the law below is by no means comprehensive; further detail or nuance 
will be provided where necessary throughout the thesis.  
The cause of action in defamation is only available in respect of statements that are 
‘defamatory’ of the claimant. To decide whether a statement is defamatory, 
however, it is first necessary to determine its meaning. The common law rule is that 
a given statement must be attributed a single meaning.50 Given the variety of 
potential meanings that any statement could be understood to bear, the meaning 
attributed to a statement for the purposes of a defamation claim is determined by 
reference to what a hypothetical ‘ordinary reader’ would understand the statement 
to mean,51 taking into account the context in which it was published.52  
A defamatory statement is one that tends to ‘lower the [claimant] in the estimation 
of right-thinking members of society generally’;53 expose him to ‘hatred, contempt, 
or ridicule’;54 or ‘affect[] in an adverse manner the attitude of other people towards 
him’.55 A statement may be defamatory of a trader (or trading corporation56) if it 
‘impute[s] lack of qualification, knowledge, skill, capacity, judgment or efficiency 
in the conduct of [the claimant’s] trade or business or professional activity’.57  
                                                 
49 Ibid, 34-39. 
50 Slim v Daily Telegraph [1968] 2 QB 157 (CA). 
51 See Jeynes v News Magazines Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 130, [14].  
52 Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1995] 2 AC 65 (HL) 70-71. 
53 Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237 (HL) 1240 (Lord Atkin). 
54 Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 6 M & W 105, 108 (Parke B). 
55 Thornton v Telegraph Media Group [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB) [96] (Tugendhat J). A number of 
other definitions might also be used: see Berkoff v Burchill [1996] 4 All ER 1008 (CA) 1011-13. 
56 The treatment of corporate claimants in defamation law is described below, at text to notes 66-81. 
57 Drummond-Jackson v British Medical Association [1970] 1 All ER 1094 (CA) 1104 (Lord 
Pearson). 
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The claimant must also prove that the statement complained of referred to, and was 
defamatory of, him personally. He need not be named specifically; the test is 
‘whether the words are such as would reasonably lead persons acquainted with the 
[claimant] to believe that he was the person referred to.’58 The claimant is also 
responsible for proving that the statement was published by the defendant to a third 
party or third parties, although in most cases the fact that the statement has been 
published, and the defendant’s responsibility for publishing it, will not be disputed. 
The Defamation Act 2013, s 1, introduced an additional requirement, referred to 
above, for the claimant to show that the statement complained of ‘has caused or is 
likely to cause serious harm’ to his reputation; in the case of for-profit corporate 
claimants, this harm must have caused or be likely to cause ‘serious financial loss’. 
Those thresholds will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  
Although a defamatory statement must technically be published with malice in 
order to be actionable, malice is presumed and this presumption cannot normally 
be rebutted by the defendant.59 Defamation is therefore effectively a strict liability 
tort, except for in the operation of various defences, such as qualified privilege, 
where proof of malice will rebut the defence.60 Nevertheless, defamation remains, 
at core, a tort that ‘looks at the tendency and consequences of the publication rather 
than the motive or intention of the publisher.’61 The falsity of the statement 
complained of is also presumed, although this presumption can be rebutted through 
the defence of truth.62 If the veracity of the statement is in issue, therefore, the onus 
is on the defendant to prove that the defamatory imputation it conveys is 
‘substantially’ true.63 Other than the defence of truth, the main substantive defences 
to a claim in defamation are ‘[reasonable] publication on [a] matter of public 
interest’,64 and ‘honest opinion’.65 
                                                 
58 Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116 (HL) 119 (Viscount Simon LC). 
59 E Hulton & Co v Jones [1910] AC 20 (HL). 
60 Wright v Woodgate (1835) CM & R 573, 577. 
61 Gatley (n 20) para 1.8. 
62 Defamation Act 2013, s 2. 
63 Belt v Laws (1882) 51 LJQB 359. 
64 Defamation Act 2013, s 4. 
65 Ibid, s 3. 
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Legal persons as well as natural persons have standing to sue in defamation. This 
includes corporations,66 partnerships,67 and charitable and other not-for-profit 
organizations.68 All that is required for a corporate entity to have standing is that, 
at the time the statement complained of is published, it has a trading or business or 
other relevant reputation in the jurisdiction that is capable of being damaged by a 
defamatory statement.69 However, an unincorporated association, having no 
separate legal personality, cannot sue in its own right;70 and governmental bodies 
are precluded from suing on policy grounds.71 
The basic approach taken to defamation claims brought by corporate, as opposed to 
individual, claimants stems from Lord Esher’s declaration, in South Hetton Coal 
Company Ltd v North-Eastern News Association Ltd,72 that ‘the law of libel is one 
and the same as to all plaintiffs’.73 There are few significant exceptions to this 
principle, other than the ‘serious financial loss’ test referred to above. There may 
be some imputations that would be defamatory of an individual claimant but which 
would be incapable of defaming a company,74 such as an allegation of infidelity, 
which would be nonsensical if directed at a corporate entity.75 A trading corporation 
may only sue over an imputation that has ‘a tendency to damage it in the way of its 
business.’76 Similarly, a not-for-profit organization may sue in respect of 
imputations that ‘impair its ability to carry on its charitable [or other] objects.’77 
However, a statement still needs to be ‘defamatory’ according to one of the common 
law tests noted above in order to be actionable: the test is whether an imputation 
tends to injure the claimant’s business reputation, not whether it tends to injure the 
claimant’s business.78 In common with all defamation claimants, general damages 
                                                 
66 South Hetton Coal Co Ltd v North-Eastern News Association Ltd [1894] 1 QB 133 (CA). 
67 Electrical, Electronic, Technical and Plumbing Union v Times Newspapers Ltd [1980] 1 QB 585, 
595. 
68 Jameel (n 5) [125] (Lord Scott). 
69 Atlantis World Group of Companies NV v Grouppo Editoriale L’Espresso SpA [2008] EWHC 
1323 (QB) [49]. 
70 North London Central Mosque Trust v Policy Exchange [2009] EWHC 3311 (QB). 
71 Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] AC 534 (HL). 
72 South Hetton (n 66). 
73 Ibid, 138. 
74 Multigroup Bulgaria Holding AD v Oxford Analytica Ltd [2001] EMLR 28 (QB). 
75 Paul Mitchell, The Making of the Modern Law of Defamation (Hart 2005) 46; Hilary Young, 
‘Rethinking Canadian Defamation Law’ (n 15) 534. 
76 Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] AC 534 (HL) 546 (Lord Keith). 
77 Ibid, 547. 
78 Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16 (Aus) [32]-[36]. 
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for corporate claimants that succeed with their claims are ‘at large’, in the sense that 
they are not restricted to compensating for specific, quantified financial losses.79 
However, unless a corporate claimant provides evidence of actual loss, the amount 
of general damages awarded would typically be smaller than the amount that would 
be awarded to an individual claimant in a comparable case.80 Companies are also 
not permitted to recover aggravated damages, which are awarded for distress or 
humiliation caused by the defendant’s conduct of the lawsuit.81 
E. Notes on terminology 
The area of law referred to as ‘defamation’ is comprised of the torts of libel and 
slander. Both torts serve the same basic purpose of protecting the claimant’s 
reputation against false statements to her discredit, and in most respects they are 
identical. The distinction between the two is that the cause of action in libel arises 
in respect of statements published in a permanent or semi-permanent form, whereas 
the cause of action in slander arises in respect of transient publications, typically 
spoken words.82 Actions for slander are further separated into those that fall under 
the general rule of being actionable only on proof of special damage, and those that 
fall into one or other of the two exceptions to that general rule,83 and which are 
therefore actionable per se (subject to the Defamation Act 2013, s 184). Where proof 
of special damage is required in order to ground an action in slander, the damage in 
question must be pecuniary in nature,85 and cannot include injury to reputation.86 
                                                 
79 South Hetton (n 66). 
80 Jameel (n 5) [27]. 
81 Collins Stewart Ltd v The Financial Times Ltd [2005] EWHC 262 (QB). 
82 Words spoken in the course of a television, radio, or other broadcast are treated as libel: 
Broadcasting Act 1990, s 166(1). 
83 Statements alleging the commission of a criminal offence for which the defendant could be 
punished ‘corporally’ (Webb v Beavan (1883) 11 QBD 609); statements ‘calculated to disparage the 
claimant in any office, profession, calling, trade or business’ (Defamation Act 1952, s 2). The term 
‘calculated’ in this context relates to the likelihood of disparagement, rather than the defendant’s 
intention to disparage: Andre v Price [2010] EWHC 2572 (QB) [97]. 
84 The effect of s 1 on the principle that defamation is actionable per se is discussed at Ch3, text to 
notes 60-67. 
85 Chamberlain v Boyd (1883) 11 QBD 407 (CA). 
86 See James Edelman, Jason Varuhas and Simon Colton (eds), McGregor on Damages (20th edn, 
2nd supp, Sweet & Maxwell 2019) para 46-002. The ‘serious harm’ and ‘serious financial loss’ 
thresholds in s 1 of the 2013 Act are discussed in Ch3.A. (text to notes 7-77) and Ch3.B. (text to 
notes 78-301) respectively. 
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Since actions for slander are considerably less common than those for libel,87 
references to ‘defamation’ in this thesis should be understood as referring to libel 
unless otherwise stated. 
While the title of this thesis refers to ‘corporate’ claimants, and the same term is 
frequently used throughout, the right to sue in defamation is not restricted to bodies 
that have formally incorporated; for example, a partnership may sue in its own name 
even if not incorporated as an LLP.88 The term ‘corporate claimant’ is used to refer 
to all potential claimants other than natural persons (ie human beings). 
A wide variety of different entities are in principle entitled to sue in defamation.89 
Corporate claimants may differ in their form (eg limited liability companies, public 
companies, partnerships, and so on); or in their objects (eg trading companies, 
management or holding companies, charitable organizations, hybrid ‘social 
enterprise’ forms,90 and so on). A substantial majority of corporate defamation 
claimants are for-profit business corporations,91 and the discussion in this thesis 
tends to use the term ‘corporate claimant’ (and similar terms) to refer to entities of 
this kind, except where the context indicates otherwise. There are two parts of the 
thesis in which different kinds of corporate claimant are discussed more directly: 
not-for-profit entities are considered in most detail in Chapter 5, Part C, section iii.; 
but there is also some discussion of the reputational interests of corporate claimants 
other than trading companies in Chapter 1, Part B, section ii.  
                                                 
87 Of the 54 corporate defamation claims that were the subject of a reported judgment between 2004 
and 2013 (see Acheson, ‘Empirical Insights’ (n 48)), only four were claims in slander rather than 
libel (Citation plc v Ellis Whittam Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 155; Club La Costa (UK) plc v Gebhard 
[2008] EWHC 2552 (QB); Howe & Co v Burden [2004] EWHC 196 (QB); Jeeg Global Ltd v Hare 
[2012] EWHC 773 (QB)). A further three involved claims in both libel and slander (Cooper v Turrell 
[2011] EWHC 3269 (QB); Lonzim plc v Sprague [2009] EWHC 2838 (QB); Marathon Mutual Ltd 
v Waters [2009] EWHC 1931 (QB)). 
88 Gatley (n 20) para 8.26. 
89 Joint Committee Report (n 30) para 118. 
90 eg Nina Boeger, ‘The New Corporate Movement’ in Nina Boeger and Charlotte Villiers (eds), 
Shaping the Corporate Landscape: Towards Corporate Reform and Enterprise Diversity (Hart 
2018). 
91 Acheson, ‘Empirical Insights’ (n 48) 40. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
CORPORATE REPUTATION 
 
 
Introduction 
The defamation torts, libel and slander, provide the principal mechanism in English 
law with which a claimant can defend her reputation against false allegations 
published by the defendant.1 If protecting the claimant’s reputation is the ‘raison 
d’être of defamation law’,2 then the justification for its existence lies in the 
reputational interests that might be harmed by false allegations. But those interests 
are not the same for corporate and individual claimants. This results in ‘a vexed 
issue at the core of [corporate] defamation law’3 centring on questions as to 
‘whether corporations have the type of reputation which should be protected by 
defamation law.’4 This chapter discusses the nature of the corporate interest in 
reputation, and the justifications that have been offered for using defamation law to 
protect that interest. I argue that companies have some legitimate interests in 
protecting their reputations, but that their reputational interests are more limited 
than those of individuals. As such, the law should offer less protection to corporate 
reputation than to individual reputation. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Part A identifies the lack of consensus in the 
academic literature as to how defamation law ought to conceptualize the interest in 
corporate reputation, or the interest in reputation more generally. The most 
influential contribution to that literature has been the theory developed by Robert 
                                                 
1 Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1995] 2 AC 296 (HL) 323; Joyce v Sengupta [1993] 1 WLR 
337 (CA) 341. 
2 Hilary Young, ‘Rethinking Canadian Defamation Law as Applied to Corporate Claimants’ (2013) 
46(2) University of British Columbia Law Review 529, 539. 
3 David Rolph, ‘Corporations’ Right to Sue for Defamation: An Australian Perspective’ (2011) 22(7) 
Entertainment Law Review 195, 197. 
4 Ibid. See also Gary K Y Chan, ‘Corporate Defamation: Reputation, Rights and Remedies’ (2013) 
33(2) Legal Studies 264, 268. 
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Post, which describes three conceptions of reputation as property, honour, and 
dignity. I argue that Post’s theory does not provide a helpful framework for 
assessing the law; instead, focusing on the value of reputation to claimants is a 
clearer way to conceptualize the different reputational interests that might be at 
stake in defamation cases.  
On this basis, the bulk of the chapter is split between Part B and Part C which, 
respectively, discuss the reputational interests that are valuable to corporate 
claimants as well as individual claimants, and the reputational interests that are not 
valuable to corporate claimants despite their value to individual claimants. The 
discussion in Part B of interests that companies do have in their reputations focuses 
primarily on the financial value of corporate reputation. But it also rejects some 
claims that are frequently made in discussions of companies’ financial interests in 
reputation: firstly, the claim that corporate reputation is a form of property, or that 
it might be protected as a ‘possession’ under Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights; and secondly, the claim that the value of reputation 
to corporate claimants is exclusively financial in nature. 
Part C identifies the interests in reputation that can only be enjoyed by human 
claimants, and not by companies. It explains that these interests have had a crucial 
influence on the European Court of Human Rights case law establishing a right to 
reputation under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The fact 
that companies’ interests in reputation cannot sensibly be conceptualized in these 
terms means that corporate defamation claimants have no Convention right to 
reputation. This is in contrast to the interests at stake both for individual defamation 
claimants and for all defamation defendants, whose Convention rights to reputation 
and freedom of speech respectively are affected by the outcomes of defamation 
cases.  
Finally, Part D briefly discusses the arguments that have been put forward in 
support of the claim that there is a public interest in protecting companies’ 
reputations in defamation law. The discussion is brief because those arguments are 
not considered to be plausible. 
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A. Conceptualizing reputation in defamation law 
Considering that the proposition that defamation law exists to protect the claimant’s 
reputation has been described as ‘axiomatic’,5 there have historically been 
surprisingly few attempts to explore the nature of the interest, or to analyse the 
potential justifications for offering it legal protection.6 The most prominent account 
of the interest in reputation in the academic literature is that put forward by Robert 
Post.7 Post’s article ‘The Social Foundations of Defamation Law’ is ‘one of the 
most widely cited analyses of the nature of reputation’,8 and has been described as 
‘probably the most influential academic discussion of the concept of reputation’.9 
Most commentators who have explored the concept of reputation in defamation law 
have used Post’s theory as the starting point of their analysis.10 In the specific 
context of corporate defamation law, Post’s theory has been relied on to support 
arguments for restricting companies’ ability to sue relative to individual claimants 
in one way or another.11 Because of its influence on the subsequent literature, any 
discussion of the interest in reputation protected by defamation law would be 
incomplete without making at least some reference to Post’s analysis. However, as 
I will explain after briefly outlining the theory below, in my view it does not offer 
a useful framework within which to consider normative questions about which 
                                                 
5 Lawrence McNamara, Reputation and Defamation (OUP 2007) 1. The view is not, however, 
universally accepted: eg Allan Beever, ‘What Does Tort Law Protect?’ (2015) 27 Singapore 
Academy of Law Journal 626, 628-31. 
6 Eric Barendt, ‘What is the Point of Libel Law?’ (1999) 52 Current Legal Problems 110, 114; David 
Rolph and others, Media Law: Cases, Materials and Commentary (2nd edn, OUP 2015) 152. 
7 Robert C Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution’ 
(1986) 74(3) California Law Review 691. 
8 Young (n 2) 540.  
9 Cameron Doley and Alastair Mullis, Carter-Ruck on Libel and Privacy (6th Edn, LexisNexis UK 
2010) 22. Post’s article has been described as ‘seminal’ by several commentators: McNamara (n 5) 
20; Jan Oster, ‘The Criticism of Trading Corporations and their Right to Sue for Defamation’ (2011) 
2(3) Journal of European Tort Law 255, 259; Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, ‘Silencing John Doe: 
Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace’ (2000) 49(4) Duke Law Journal 855, fn 158. 
10 See eg Barendt (n 6); Tom Gibbons, ‘Personality Rights: The Limits of Personal Accountability’ 
in Eric Barendt (ed), The Yearbook of Media and Entertainment Law 1997/98 (OUP 1998); David 
Howarth, ‘Libel: Its Purpose and Reform’ (2011) 74(6) Modern Law Review 845; Oster (n 9) 255; 
Chan (n 4); David Rolph, Reputation, Celebrity and Defamation Law (Ashgate 2008) Part I. 
11 eg Oster (n 9) 278; D Mark Jackson, ‘The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff in the Era of SLAPPs: 
Revisiting New York Times v Sullivan’ (2001) 9(2) William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 491, 511-
14; Arlen W Langvardt, ‘A Principled Approach to Compensatory Damages in Corporate 
Defamation Cases’ (1990) 27 American Business Law Journal 491, 518-20; Perry Herzfeld, 
‘Corporations, Defamation and General Damages: Back to First Principles’ (2005) Media & Arts 
Law Review 135, 139-42; Young (n 2) 549-50. 
19 
 
reputational interests the law ought to protect, or whether certain aspects of the law 
should be reformed. 
Post describes three conceptions of reputation – as property, honour, and dignity – 
which he considers to have had the greatest influence on the development of 
defamation law. The theory is built on the claim that, since reputation is a social 
phenomenon arising from people’s interaction with one another, the kinds of 
reputation that the law protects will reflect implicit assumptions about how people 
should interact with one another.12 As such, Post explains that each of his 
conceptions of reputation ‘corresponds to an image of the good and well-ordered 
society.’13  
The conception of reputation as property corresponds to an image of society in 
which ‘individuals are connected to each other through the institution of the 
market.’14 Reputation is earned in the marketplace through an individual’s conduct, 
and has measurable pecuniary value,15 determined by the market.16 The reputational 
harm caused by a defamatory publication ‘deprive[s] individuals of the results of 
their labors of self-creation, and the ensuing injury can be monetarily assessed’.17 
Reputation as honour, in contrast, corresponds to a hierarchical, or ‘deference’,18 
society: Post identifies it as having influenced the early development of defamation 
law in feudal England.19 Under this conception, reputation is not earned through 
conduct, but is ascribed to an individual on the basis of his social position,20 on the 
expectation that he will conform to the ‘normative characteristics’ of the role he 
occupies.21 A person cannot acquire the honour accorded to a king (the example 
Post uses) simply by acting like a king – that honour can only be given to the person 
who actually occupies that position. But if the king fails to act as a king should, he 
                                                 
12 Post (n 7) 692-93. 
13 Ibid, 693. 
14 Ibid, 695. 
15 Ibid, 693-94, citing Thomas Starkie, A Treatise on the Law of Slander, Libel, Scandalum 
Magnatum, and False Rumours (Collins and Hannay 1832) xx. 
16 Post (n 7) 694. 
17 Ibid, 695. 
18 Ibid, 702. 
19 Ibid, 701-03. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid, 699-700. 
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will no longer be granted the honour that attaches to his role.22 As such, reputation 
as honour cannot be earned by an individual, but can be lost.23 
Post’s explanation of reputation as dignity is less clear, but I understand it as 
follows. It corresponds to what Post calls a ‘communitarian’ image of society, in 
which individual members are bound together by a shared moral code.24 Within this 
code are norms by which ‘respect’ is given and received through interaction 
between members of the community – Post calls these norms ‘rules of civility’ 
when they are ‘embodied in speech’.25 Since the community is defined by its shared 
norms, a person cannot be a full member unless she is recognized as conforming to 
those norms. Each individual’s identity is in part constituted by her relationships 
with others, and relies on her being given the respect she is owed as a full member 
of the community.26 The ‘dignity’ that warrants protection in this type of society, 
according to Post, is the ‘respect (and self-respect) that arises from full membership 
of society’.27 A defamatory statement in this context is an imputation that an 
individual has ‘violate[d] the norms which constitute the community’,28 and 
therefore deserves disrespect or ostracism. If the community believes the allegation, 
then the victim will be ‘subject to “exclusion from belonging as a respected and 
responsible” member of society’,29 and will thereby suffer a loss of dignity.  
Most existing critiques of Post’s theory focus on each of these conceptions more or 
less independently of one another;30 there has been no significant attempt to critique 
the theory as a unified whole. The individual conceptions developed by Post do 
offer some insight into how the interest in reputation has been conceptualized in 
defamation law at various points in its development. But the structure of his overall 
theory limits the extent to which it can provide a useful framework for addressing 
                                                 
22 Ibid, 700. 
23 Ibid, 701. 
24 Ibid, 711. 
25 Ibid, 710.  
26 Post cites Erving Goffman to support these arguments: Erving Goffman, Interaction Ritual: 
Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior (Penguin 1967): Post (n 7) 709. 
27 Ibid, 711. 
28 McNamara (n 5) 32. 
29 Post (n 7) 711, quoting Kenneth L Karst, ‘Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural 
Identity’ (1986) 64(2) North Carolina Law Review 303, 323. 
30 eg Rolph, Reputation, Celebrity and Defamation Law (n 10) 41; Dario Milo, Defamation and 
Freedom of Speech (OUP 2008) 26-42. 
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normative questions about how the law ought to conceptualize the interest in 
reputation, and how (or whether) it ought to protect different aspects of that interest. 
As Post describes it, his intention is to ‘sketch three distinct concepts of reputation 
that the common law of defamation has at various times in its history attempted to 
protect’, to ‘analyse the concepts, and to demonstrate their influence on common 
law defamation.’31 The conceptions he develops are Weberian ‘ideal types’:32 they 
are abstractions that, by accentuating particular features of reality, help us to 
understand it.33 Although Post’s theory is initially presented as descriptive, he also 
makes proposals for reform, designed to make the law internally coherent on the 
basis of the conceptions of reputation he has already identified.34 As explained 
above, the central assumption of Post’s theory is that the conceptions of reputation 
that have influenced the development of the law correspond to ‘image[s] of how 
people are tied together, or should be tied together, in a social setting.’35 Post 
acknowledges that ‘Our own social world contains important elements of both 
market and communitarian societies’, corresponding to the property and dignity 
conceptions of reputation.36 He argues that to conceive of reputation as a unified 
concept in a society containing these tensions would make the task of protecting it 
‘at once too enormous and too diffuse.’37 To resolve this problem, he proposes 
establishing ‘distinct doctrinal structures’ to protect reputation as property and 
reputation as dignity.38  
But Post gives no explanation or justification for believing that the analytical level 
he uses to distinguish between each conception at the descriptive stage of his theory 
– the level of ‘image[s] of the good and well-ordered society’39 – is an appropriate 
level on which to differentiate conceptions of reputation that it would be more 
realistic for the law to protect. If a claimant’s reputation exists in a social world that 
                                                 
31 Post (n 7) 693. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Max Weber, ‘The “Objectivity” of Knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy’ in Hans 
Henrik Bruun and Sam Whimster (eds), Max Weber: Complete Methodological Writings (Routledge 
2012) 125. 
34 Post (n 7) 721, 741. 
35 Ibid, 693. 
36 Ibid, 721. 
37 Ibid, 719. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid, 693. 
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contains elements of the ideal societies underlying both the property and dignity 
conceptions, then it is not clear why it would be useful to her for two causes of 
action to exist, each of which protects a conception of reputation that corresponds 
to the ideals of a non-existent society.40  
This point is illustrated by David Howarth’s argument that the conception of 
reputation as property should be abandoned as an influence on defamation law, in 
part because the idea of a society in which individuals are connected by the 
marketplace is ‘grimly atomistic, distancing and manipulative.’41 This indicates the 
problem with applying Post’s analytical framework to normative questions about 
what reputational interests the law should protect: the implication of Howarth’s 
argument seems to be that the law should ignore the financial value of a claimant’s 
reputation42 because of the morally objectionable features of an idealized market 
society that does not actually exist.43 
Instead, it seems more sensible to delineate between conceptions of reputation that 
the law might treat differently on the basis of the different interests claimants have 
in protecting various aspects of their reputations. This may be why, although he 
occasionally refers to ways in which defamation law might promote broader 
interests in a claimant’s reputation,44 Post often seems to focus on the value of 
                                                 
40 Milo (n 30) 42: Although he argues that ‘A coherent theory of reputation must recognise that our 
social world contains important elements of both market and communitarian societies’, Milo does 
not seem to see this as conflicting with Post’s analysis. 
41 Howarth (n 10) 853. See also David S Ardia, ‘Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the 
Social Foundations of Defamation Law’ (2010) 45 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 
261, 291-92. 
42 Except in the assessment of damages, when a claimant suffers financial loss as a consequence of 
the harm caused to her social relationships by a defamatory statement: Howarth (n 10) 872. 
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quoting from Robert N Bellah, ‘The Meaning of Reputation in American Society’ (1986) 74(3) 
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reputation under each conception to the claimant herself.45 Certainly, most 
subsequent commentary based on Post’s theory has described it in terms that 
emphasize claimants’ interests in the various kinds of reputation more than each 
conception’s relationship with a particular ideal type of society. It is much easier to 
see the importance of the former than the latter for assessing the approach that 
defamation law takes to protecting different reputational interests. The discussion 
below will therefore focus on the various different interests in reputation from the 
claimant’s perspective, rather than attempting to maintain Post’s original 
distinctions between conceptions of reputation considered worthy of protection in 
different types of society. There will, however, be some overlap between the 
reputational interests identified and the conceptions of reputation described by Post 
(especially the property and dignity conceptions) because of the way in which 
Post’s theory has been interpreted in subsequent literature. 
B. Reputational interests that companies do have 
i. The financial value of corporate reputation 
The most obvious interests that companies have in protecting their reputations are 
financial: a company can derive significant financial benefits from having a good 
reputation, and an injury to a company’s reputation can cause significant financial 
loss. The potential for defamatory statements to cause claimants economic loss has 
historically been an important part of the justification for the existence of libel 
laws.46 In Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Co Ltd v Hawkins, Pollock CB thought 
that it was ‘clear that a corporation at common law may maintain an action for libel 
by which its property is injured’, arguing that it ‘would be very odd if a corporation 
had no means of protecting itself against wrong; and if its property is injured by 
slander it has no means of redress except by action.’47 Similar arguments were made 
in South Hetton Coal Co Ltd v North-Eastern News Association Ltd,48 which firmly 
established the principle that corporations were entitled to sue in defamation 
                                                 
45 Laura A Heymann, ‘The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the Audience’ (2011) 52 Boston 
College Law Review 1341, 1343. 
46 Paul Mitchell, The Making of the Modern Law of Defamation (Hart 2005) 33. 
47 Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Co Ltd v Hawkins (1859) 4 H & N 87, 90 
48 South Hetton Coal Co Ltd v North-Eastern News Association Ltd [1894] 1 QB 133 (CA). 
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without needing to prove any specific financial loss.49 For example, Kay LJ argued 
that a trading corporation’s ‘property or its business may be injured by defamatory 
statements’ against its ‘trading character’.50 A century and a half after the decision 
in Hawkins, English courts continue to stress the financial value that reputation can 
have, and consider that there is ‘nothing repugnant in the notion that this is a value 
which the law should protect.’51 In Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL 
(‘Jameel’), Lord Scott endorsed the rule set down in South Hetton, saying that the 
‘reputation of a corporate body is capable of being, and will usually be, not simply 
something in which its directors and shareholders may take pride, but an asset of 
positive value to it.’52 
Literature from other academic disciplines supports these assertions about the 
financial value of corporate reputation. There is ‘a large body of research 
demonstrating the effects of firm reputations on firm performance’.53 The potential 
benefits of a good reputation are such that it has been described as ‘the single most 
valued organizational asset.’54 Charles Fombrun, whose work on corporate 
reputation is well-cited in the business literature, identifies various different ways 
in which a positive reputation (for credibility, reliability, trustworthiness, and 
responsibility in particular) can offer a financial advantage.55 He argues that:  
‘…well-regarded companies generally: 
• command premium prices for their products, 
• pay lower prices for purchases, 
• entice top recruits to apply for positions, 
• experience greater loyalty from consumers and employees, 
• have more stable revenues, 
• face fewer risks of crisis, and 
• are given greater latitude to act by their constituents.’56 
                                                 
49 Mitchell (n 46) 46. 
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The ability to command higher prices for goods and services, and thereby to 
increase revenue, is the most direct benefit of a positive corporate reputation. Carl 
Shapiro’s classic economic analysis argued that, when consumers only have 
imperfect information about product quality, firms with reputations for having 
produced high quality products in the past are able to charge a premium for their 
products.57 This effect has been confirmed by subsequent research demonstrating 
that ‘People prefer to buy products from high reputation companies’.58  
The reason is that, although ‘Consumers expect to pay more for a higher quality 
product or service’,59 it is not always possible to accurately assess that quality 
directly (for example, to predict the durability or long-term reliability of a product 
before purchase). Reputation can help to address this problem, because it ‘allows 
us to make assessments about individuals and entities that we cannot directly 
observe.’60 One heuristic that can be expected to provide reasonably reliable 
information about the future quality of a company’s goods or services is the 
consumer’s perception of the quality of similar goods or services produced by the 
same company in the past (whether that perception is based on personal experience 
or on reports from others). A company’s reputation in these areas, if it is positive, 
‘promises patrons a high standard of quality and reliability, for which they are 
prepared to pay.’61 As such, compared to competitors with weaker reputations for 
quality, a company with a good reputation in this respect is able to ‘charge a higher 
price for what is objectively an equivalent (or poorer) product or service’,62 
although it risks damaging its reputation if the actual quality it provides falls too far 
below consumers’ expectations.63 
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A reputation for selling goods or services of a high standard makes it easier for 
companies to attract new customers,64 because it ‘reduces [consumers’] insecurity 
about how well … products will perform’ by ‘signal[ling] their implicit quality.’65 
A positive reputation can also promote loyalty among existing customers, reducing 
the probability that a company will lose custom to a competitor. This helps the 
company to secure ongoing revenue; and customer loyalty can also reinforce the 
effect of reputation on attracting new customers, as positive evaluations spread 
through informal social networks: ‘customers are more likely to stay with, 
recommend and be committed to, a higher reputation company.’66 
Research suggests that aspects of a company’s reputation that are not directly 
related to its provision of goods or services, such as its reputation for social 
responsibility, can also affect demand from consumers. Although there is mixed 
evidence as to whether customers are willing to reward a firm with a positive social 
reputation by paying higher prices, and any such effect is more modest than the 
impact of the firm’s reputation for quality, there is clearer evidence showing that 
consumers penalize firms with negative social reputations by demanding lower 
prices, or by withdrawing their custom altogether.67 A similar effect can be seen in 
consumer responses to corporate tax strategies: while companies seen as 
responsible tax-payers are not able to charge higher prices for their products or 
services, consumers will penalize companies they consider to have irresponsible or 
unethical tax arrangements.68 
A good reputation does not only help attract and retain customers: it also makes a 
company more desirable to prospective employees,69 allowing it to hire better 
                                                 
64 William P Rogerson, ‘Reputation and Product Quality’ (1983) 14 RAND Journal of Economics 
508. 
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68 Inga Hardeck and Rebecca Hertl, ‘Consumer Reactions to Corporate Tax Strategies: Effects on 
Corporate Reputation and Purchasing Behavior’ (2014) 123 Journal of Business Ethics 309. 
69 Robert D Gatewood, Mary A Gowan and Gary J Lautenschlager, ‘Corporate Image, Recruitment 
Image, and Initial Job Choice Decisions’ (1993) 36(2) Academy of Management Journal 414; Daniel 
27 
 
quality staff at lower cost.70 This is true both of its reputation as an employer, and 
of its reputation for social responsibility overall, which ‘may attract potential 
applicants by serving as a signal of working conditions in the organization.’71 And 
positive corporate reputation can also help to keep an existing workforce happy, 
motivated, and productive.72  
In addition to reducing the costs associated with its workforce, a well-regarded 
company can lower its outgoings – and thereby improve its profit margins – in its 
dealings with suppliers.73 This is because ‘Suppliers would prefer to negotiate 
supply contracts with credible companies, companies unlikely to renege on 
orders.’74 A positive reputation can also help a firm to attract financial investment.75 
This is most obviously true for companies with a strong reputation for financial 
performance, which signals to investors the prospect of strong future returns on 
their investments, but good reputation more broadly can also create a beneficial 
perception that investors face a lower risk of losses on their investments being 
caused by the company behaving badly.76 Conversely, it has been shown that firms 
that have suffered reputational damage have less success when attempting to attract 
investment by issuing new shares onto the market.77 As well as investment from 
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capital markets, good reputation can also help firms to secure loans from financial 
institutions.78 
A company with a positive reputation, especially in respect of its contributions to 
the communities in which it operates its business, may face a lower risk of protests 
against its expansion into new communities, or may weaken the threat posed by 
such protests by encouraging those communities to be open to the potential benefits 
of the company’s presence as well as the potential costs.79 And strong corporate 
social performance can act as a kind of ‘reputation insurance’ for corporations.80 If 
an adverse event happens that is linked to the firm’s behaviour, the degree of its 
perceived culpability amongst stakeholders will depend in part on its prior 
reputation, and thus firms with a good reputation (described by Fombrun as a 
‘reservoir of goodwill’81) are perceived to be less blameworthy, and stand to lose 
less and recover more quickly, if and when things do go wrong.82  
As illustrated by the discussion above, reputation can have significant financial 
value to companies. But that fact does not justify either of two related claims often 
found in the literature on corporate reputation: firstly, that corporate reputation is a 
kind of property; or, secondly, that corporations’ only interest in reputation is in its 
financial value. The sections below address each of these claims in turn. 
ii. Corporate reputation is not ‘property’ 
A company’s interest in its reputation is frequently characterized as a property 
interest in the literature on corporate defamation law. In this section I argue that this 
view is mistaken: a reputation, even that of a corporate claimant, cannot 
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meaningfully be characterized as ‘property’. This is true in a theoretical sense, in 
English defamation law, and under the Article 1, Protocol 1 right to property in the 
European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’), all for similar reasons. 
This view of corporate reputation does make sense within the constraints of Post’s 
theoretical framework. Post’s claim that the corporate right to sue is only explicable 
under the property conception83 has been endorsed by several subsequent 
commentators. For example, Eric Barendt echoes Post closely in his claim that the 
‘concept of reputation as property may explain ... why corporations can sue to 
protect their good name, an entitlement which is much harder to justify if reputation 
is considered in terms of personal honour or dignity.’84  
Jan Oster makes a similar claim about the proprietary nature of corporate reputation, 
which is based in part on Post’s theory. After noting that companies can make no 
sensible claim to honour or dignity, Oster concludes that ‘it is a distinctive feature 
of a company’s suit for defamation that it may exclusively be explained by the 
conception of reputation as property.’85 But the fact that a corporation has no claim 
to dignity or honour only leads to the conclusion that its reputation can exclusively 
be conceptualized as property if one accepts, as Oster appears to, that Post’s theory 
is coherent and exhaustive. Post himself did not claim that his conceptions were 
exhaustive;86 and, as explained above,87 to the extent that his theory is coherent 
overall, the way in which the conceptions of reputation are distinguished from one 
another means that it is not particularly helpful as a framework with which to assess 
the law.  
Perry Herzfeld also relies on Post’s theory, to support his assertion that ‘a 
corporation’s business reputation is entirely described as a tradable commodity’.88 
Herzfeld is correct to say that under the property conception as originally explained 
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by Post the corporate interest in reputation is wholly financial; that is, it is reducible 
entirely to a money value. But that says nothing about the nature of a company’s 
reputation. It is a consequence of Post’s decision to derive his conceptions of 
reputation from ideal types of society, and the property conception in particular 
from an ideal ‘market’ society. In this ideal society, every injury that the law 
recognizes is ultimately commensurable with money.89 We do not live in such a 
society. 
A key component of Post’s description of reputation as property90 is John Locke’s 
‘labour-desert theory’,91 which ‘focuses on the right of self-determination and the 
acquisition of property through the investment of labor.’92 Jacob Rowbottom argues 
that the financial benefits of reputation do not in themselves justify legal protection, 
but that ‘One possible argument for protection is that the way the resource is 
acquired warrants safeguards from its unfair depletion.’93 This is the essence of the 
labour-desert theory: that the individual effort that goes into generating a positive 
reputation justifies protecting that reputation as a kind of property. The notion that 
developing a good reputation requires an investment of resources over time is 
reflected in the business literature on corporate reputation. For example, in 
Fombrun’s definition, a company’s reputation is to some extent shaped by its 
conduct: it ‘comes into being as constituents struggle to make sense of a company’s 
past and present actions.’94 There are many more examples in the business literature 
of emphasis being placed on the importance to companies of proactively investing 
in reputation, to improve their chances of reaping the financial rewards discussed 
above.95 
                                                 
89 Margaret Radin, ‘Market-Inalienability’ (1987) 100(8) Harvard Law Review 1849, 1859-63. 
90 Eric J Mitnick, ‘Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-Invention’ (2009) 
43 UC Davis Law Review 79, 103. See also Rolph, Reputation, Celebrity and Defamation Law (n 
10) 42; Heymann (n 45) 1342. 
91 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, II (Peter Laslett ed, Cambridge University Press 1988) 
ch 5. 
92 Julie E Cohen, ‘Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object’ (2000) 52 
Stanford Law Review 1373, 1380. 
93 Jacob Rowbottom, Media Law (Hart 2018) 40-41. 
94 Fombrun, Reputation (n 55) 72. 
95 eg Fombrun and Shanley, ‘What’s in a Name?’ (n 76); John Martin, William Petty and James 
Wallace, ‘Shareholder Value Maximization – Is There a Role for Corporate Social Responsibility?’ 
(2009) 21(2) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 110, 115-17. The financial benefits of corporate 
reputation are described at text to notes 53-82 above. 
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If the reason for protecting reputation in defamation law is to safeguard the 
claimant’s investment of labour, then one would expect a strong causal link between 
the ‘labour’ – the behaviour of the claimant – and the resulting reputation. But the 
reality is not so simple.96 As an assessment made by third parties, a person’s 
reputation is shaped to a significant extent by what other people think, say, and do:  
‘… reputation is not something we create ourselves. It is socially 
constructed. We cannot have a reputation except insofar as it is produced in 
cooperation with others and relative to our relationships with them. … We 
may be able to influence, to a limited extent, the information others use to 
assess our reputation, but the ultimate opinions that others hold of us are 
outside our control.’97 
As a result, according to Tom Gibbons, reputation is ‘socially contingent’.98 Given 
its dependence on the opinions of others,99 Gibbons argues that it is not possible for 
the law to protect reputation ‘where that suggests a special claim to a particular 
conclusion about a person’s status.’100 If reputation consists of the perceptions of 
third parties, then the characterization of reputation as property suggests that one 
might be able to ‘own’ another person’s mental processes, which is surely absurd.101  
But the main problem with the labour-desert theory as a basis for treating corporate 
reputation in particular as property is that Locke’s theory of property is ultimately 
based on the premise of individual self-ownership:  
‘… every Man has a Property in his own Person[,] … The Labour of his 
Body, and the Work of his Hands … . Whatsoever then he removes out of 
the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour 
with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his 
Property.’102 
                                                 
96 Cameron Anderson and Aiwa Shirako, ‘Are Individuals’ Reputations Related to their History of 
Behavior?’ (2008) 94(2) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 320. 
97 Ardia (n 41) 267-68 (citations omitted). 
98 Thomas Gibbons, ‘Defamation Reconsidered’ (1996) 16(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 587, 
592. 
99 Ibid, 592. 
100 Ibid, 593 (emphasis added). 
101 See eg Steven J Heyman, ‘Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of 
Freedom of Expression’ (1998) 78(5) Boston University Law Review 1275, 1338-39; Murray N 
Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (originally published 1982, New York University Press 1998) 126; 
Richard S Murphy, ‘Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy’ 
(1996) 84 Georgetown Law Journal 2381, 2384. 
102 Locke (n 91) para 27, pp 287-88. 
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The Lockean view of property that underpins Post’s property conception, therefore, 
is ‘tied to the notion of human beings as masters of themselves;’ it is ‘intimately 
related to the development of the human personality, to the exercise of independent 
thought and creative powers.’103 This premise is obviously not applicable to 
corporations, which are by definition owned and controlled by others. Even if the 
labour-desert theory can justify treating individual reputation as a property right, it 
cannot justify treating corporate reputation in the same way.  
Some commentators rely instead on the nineteenth-century case Dixon v Holden104 
to support the claim that reputation is a form of property, or that it is treated as such 
in English defamation law.105 In that case, Malins VC had described the claimant’s 
reputation as ‘his property, and, if possible, more valuable than other property.’106 
Post cites this statement as a supposed example of the courts treating reputation as 
property.107 But the case needs to be seen in context. Malins VC characterized 
reputation as ‘property’ in order to justify awarding a pre-publication injunction, 
and he was criticized soon after for having ‘strained’ the concept of property to do 
so108 (in a case which Vanessa Wilcox astutely observes – unlike Dixon – involved 
a corporate claimant109). The Court of Appeal later entirely disavowed the statement 
when it was cited in support of an argument that a trade union did not have standing 
to sue in defamation. The Court ruled that the fact that the union was precluded by 
law from holding property was ‘irrelevant’ because ‘The claim in the action is not 
a claim to property.’110 Put simply, the decision in Dixon ‘conceived reputation as 
… property … for perverse reasons’,111 and does not reflect any particular 
                                                 
103 Laura S Underkuffler, ‘On Property: An Essay’ (1990) 100 Yale Law Journal 127, 138. 
104 Dixon v Holden (1869) LR 7 Eq 488. 
105 eg Peter Coe, ‘The Defamation Act 2013: We Need to Talk about Corporate Reputation’ (2015) 
4 Journal of Business Law 313, 318-19; Chan (n 4) 269; Gary Chan Kok Yew, ‘The Right to a Good 
(Business) Reputation and Truth: Re-examining the Declaration of Falsity’ (2016) 23 Torts Law 
Journal 163, fn 52. 
106 Dixon (n 104) 492. 
107 Post (n 7) 696. 
108 Prudential Assurance Co v Knott (1875) LR 10 Ch App 142, 146-47; Milo (n 30) 28, fn 105. 
109 Vanessa Wilcox, A Company’s Right to Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss (Cambridge 
University Press 2016) 118, fn 201. 
110 National Union of General and Municipal Workers v Gillian [1946] 1 KB 81 (CA) 88 (Uthwatt 
J). 
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conceptualization of reputation in English defamation law, either at the time it was 
handed down or now.112 
One objection to viewing reputation as a property interest, put forward by David 
Rolph, is that reputation does not meet all of the criteria by which ‘property’ is 
commonly defined.113 In particular, it does not meet the criterion of alienability,114 
the capacity for ownership to be transferred from one person to another, which has 
been described as the ‘raison d’être of property’.115 Robert Stevens explains that:  
‘… the right to a reputation is not a property right properly so-called. It is 
inalienable, and although the subject matter of the right may be exploited 
and ‘sold’, for example through celebrity endorsements, it cannot be 
transferred.’116 
This understanding of ‘property’ aligns with the view expressed by Lord 
Wilberforce in National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth that a property right must 
be ‘definable, identifiable by third parties, capable in its nature of assumption by 
third parties, and have some degree of permanence or stability.’117 Since reputation 
cannot be assumed by third parties, because it is ‘uniquely referenced to a specific 
person’,118 it cannot be a property right by this definition. This applies equally to 
companies’ reputations. The Australian courts have acknowledged that ‘the 
reputation of a business cannot be severed from the business itself … each is 
inevitably intertwined with the other.’119 The only way for a company’s reputation 
to be bought or sold is with the company itself.120  
                                                 
112 William Cornish and others, The Oxford History of the Laws of England: Volume XIII: 1820-
1914 Fields of Development (OUP 2010) 850, fn 11. 
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Arguably, however, reputation’s inalienability does not in itself prevent it from 
being treated as a property interest. Inalienability has been accepted by the House 
of Lords as a feature of goodwill in the context of passing off: ‘goodwill has no 
independent existence. It cannot subsist by itself. It must be attached to a 
business.’121 The fact that goodwill is still typically considered to be property in 
that tort suggests that inalienability is not an absolute barrier to characterizing an 
interest as property.  
The treatment of goodwill as a property interest is, in fact, commonly pointed to in 
support of the claim that reputation is a form of property.122 Although the precise 
relationship between reputation and goodwill is complicated, it is clear that the two 
interests are closely related.123 Reputation is usually seen as ‘a core element of the 
constellation of intangible assets that collectively comprise a corporation’s 
goodwill.’124 The argument is that, if goodwill is property, and reputation is a part 
of goodwill, then reputation itself must be property. 
But the fact that corporate reputation is a component of goodwill, a property 
interest, does not mean that corporate reputation is itself property. In English law, 
not all aspects of a company’s reputation count as goodwill.125 For example, the tort 
of passing off protects goodwill as a property interest, but ‘mere reputation … does 
not by itself constitute … property’ in that context.126 Even the characterization of 
goodwill more broadly as property in passing off has been described as 
‘controversial’.127 Regardless, the treatment of goodwill as property in a distinct 
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area of law should not lead to the conclusion that it is appropriate to conceptualize 
corporate reputation as a property right in the context of defamation law.128 
The ‘right to property’ in A1P1, ECHR does not protect corporate reputation 
The relationship between reputation and goodwill is also the main reason some 
commentators have claimed that corporate reputation might engage the right to 
property under Article 1 of Protocol 1 (‘A1P1’) to the European Convention on 
Human Rights. In my view, it does not.129 The relevant part of A1P1 reads as 
follows:  
‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law …’ 
There is uncertainty in the case law of both the European Court of Human Rights 
(‘ECtHR’) and the English courts as to whether corporate reputation qualifies as a 
‘possession’ that could be protected by the A1P1 right to property. In Firma EDV 
Für Sie, EfS Elektronische Datenverarbeitung Dienstleistungs GmbH v Germany, 
the European Court of Human Rights left open the possibility that it does, but did 
not conclusively decide the issue.130 The relevant English case law is also 
inconclusive. Tugendhat J suggested in Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd 
that defamatory imputations harming corporate claimants’ reputations ‘may engage 
… their commercial or property rights (which are Convention rights, if at all, under 
[A1P1]).’131 A similar observation – that A1P1 ‘might apply’ – was made in 
Building Register Ltd v Weston with respect to a corporate claimant.132 However, 
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in a malicious falsehood case, the existence of an A1P1 right to reputation has been 
described as ‘doubtful’ by the Court of Appeal.133 
The ECtHR has ruled in several cases that the goodwill of a professional practice,134 
or of a ‘business engaged in commerce’,135 can be a possession. Oster argues that 
the interest in corporate reputation ‘neatly fits’ with these cases, and could therefore 
be protected under A1P1.136 Similarly, Alastair Mowbray claims that A1P1 can 
protect ‘non-material commercial interests such as … goodwill (ie the financial 
value of a company’s reputation)’.137 On closer inspection, however, this line of 
cases does not support the view that corporate reputation itself constitutes a 
‘possession’. 
In Van Marle v The Netherlands, the Court held that the ‘right to goodwill’ claimed 
by the applicants ‘may be likened to the right of property’ in A1P1, because ‘by 
dint of their own work, the applicants had built up a clientele; this had in many 
respects the nature of a private right and constituted an asset and, hence, a 
possession’.138 But the Court’s jurisprudence identifying goodwill as a possession 
seems to be in conflict with a related line of cases in which it has held that a loss of 
future income will not engage A1P1,139 because that Article ‘does not … guarantee 
the right to acquire property’.140 For example, in Ian Edgar (Liverpool) Ltd v UK, 
the Court ruled that the applicant’s claim to property in goodwill ‘based upon the 
profits generated by the business’ was in substance a complaint of a ‘loss of future 
income’, and therefore fell outside the scope of A1P1.141  
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Because the financial value of a company’s reputation lies mainly in its effect on 
future earnings,142 and expectations of future income are not ‘possessions’,143 
reputation should not be considered a ‘possession’ under A1P1. In Moses LJ’s 
judgment in R (Malik) v Waltham Forest NHS Primary Care Trust, the lack of A1P1 
protection for future income precluded reputation from falling within the Article’s 
scope:  
‘[Reputation] has no economic value other than being that which a 
professional man may exploit in order to earn or increase his earnings for 
the future. If the principle that the ability to earn future income is not a 
possession within [A1P1] is to be maintained, it must follow that if the 
element of goodwill which has [been] or may be damaged is reputation, or 
the loyalty of past clients, that element is not to be identified as a 
possession.’144  
There is a further reason that corporate reputation should not be protected under 
A1P1 on the basis of the ECtHR’s goodwill jurisprudence. On one interpretation of 
that jurisprudence, the Court has not been protecting goodwill per se as a 
possession, but the contribution it makes to the value of a distinct asset. If this 
interpretation is correct, it is doubtful whether a company could be considered to 
‘own’ any possession whose value might be affected by an injury to the company’s 
reputation. 
The Court first appeared to treat goodwill as a possession in cases brought by 
individual applicants in respect of a loss of goodwill in their professional 
practices.145 The Court has since described its decisions in these cases as 
establishing that ‘goodwill may be an element in the valuation of a professional 
practice’.146 In Malik v UK,147 it stated that these decisions ‘tended to regard as a 
“possession” the underlying business or professional practice in question.’148 In 
other words, when apparently identifying ‘goodwill’ as a possession, the Court has 
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in fact been identifying its contribution to the value of a distinct possession – a 
business or professional practice – owned by the applicant.  
Where goodwill in that sense is injured, the result is a fall in the value of the relevant 
asset, which can sensibly be described as an interference with the applicant’s 
property in that asset. In contrast, whenever a corporate applicant has complained 
of a loss of its own goodwill, the Court has rejected its application on the basis that 
it amounted to a complaint of loss of future income, which does not engage A1P1.149 
The reputation of a company attaches to the company itself; any value that it has 
contributes to the value of the company, not to any of the company’s assets. As 
such, a fall in the value of a company’s reputation ultimately manifests itself as a 
fall in the value of the company itself. This cannot represent a diminution of the 
value of an asset owned by the company, because the company cannot own itself.150 
Since a claim in libel can only properly be brought to protect the reputation of the 
claimant, not of the claimant’s assets,151 on this interpretation of the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence the corporate interest in reputation protected in defamation law 
cannot constitute a possession under A1P1. 
Describing reputation as ‘property’ does not justify protecting the interest in 
defamation law 
Commentary that describes reputation as a property right or interest often seems to 
be using that terminology as little more than shorthand for the idea that a person’s 
or company’s reputation can have financial value. There is also a strand of business 
literature which, in a comparable way, describes reputation as an ‘asset’ that 
companies ‘own’. Like their counterparts in legal academia, ‘Most authors who 
make the case for organizational reputation being defined as an asset do so by 
detailing reputation’s positive [financial] outcomes for the firm’.152 In both 
disciplines, characterizing corporate reputation as property on this basis ‘seems to 
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make the idea of organizational reputation as asset more of a description of the 
consequences of the concept than a definition of the concept’.153 
But, as Lawrence McNamara argues, the fact that reputation often has financial 
value reveals nothing about its essential character.154 McNamara’s view that ‘it is 
neither appropriate nor necessary to stretch the concept of property so far that 
reputation is to be a form of property simply because it carries material 
consequences’155 is entirely reasonable.  And the fact that courts and commentators 
sometimes appear to treat reputation as if it were property does not necessarily mean 
that reputation is in fact property.156 Reputation is not property in any sense in 
which property is normally conceptualized.157  
Arguably, this debate about whether reputation should be conceptualized as a 
property interest somewhat misses the point, in that it often seems to assume that, 
if reputation can be described as property, then this alone justifies offering it similar 
legal protection to that given to other kinds of property. These descriptions of 
reputation as property seek to draw on the fact that ‘The concept of property has 
powerful, rhetorical force’.158 But, as Ernest Weinrib points out, ‘property is itself 
merely the label for that crystallized bundle of economic interests which the law 
deems worthy of protection.’159 That is, an interest should not qualify for legal 
protection because it fits some abstract definition of ‘property’,160 or because it 
shares characteristics with existing property rights. If corporate reputation is worthy 
of legal protection, there must be a distinct justification for that protection. 
Characterizing a company’s reputation as its ‘property’ adds nothing to the 
argument that it has financial value. 
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iii. Companies’ non-financial interests in reputation 
The fact that a company’s reputation can have significant financial value is also one 
reason for the widely held view that the benefits enjoyed by companies with good 
reputations are exclusively financial, and therefore that the only harm that 
companies can suffer as a result of reputational injuries must also be financial. In 
this section I will argue that, like the claim that corporate reputation is a form of 
property, this view is slightly over-simplistic. Companies’ reputational interests 
may, in some cases, be somewhat broader than this. 
Among many potential examples of this view is Tony Weir’s assertion that ‘The 
only kind of harm’ that a corporate defamation claimant can suffer is ‘harm to its 
commercial relations’.161 Nessa Moll contends that ‘A corporation’s interest in 
protecting its good name, often referred to as its goodwill, is solely economic.’162 
In Canada, David Lepofsky argues that ‘For a corporation, especially a large, 
widely held corporation, the only value which is truly at stake in the defamation 
context is purely economic.’163 The same claim is made by Arlen Langvardt in the 
United States: ‘corporate reputation translates into monetary value, sometimes 
directly and other times indirectly, but such a translation is necessarily present in 
some form.’164  
This view of corporate reputation as an interest with purely financial value is 
sometimes supported with a citation to a statement made obiter by Lord Reid in 
Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd: ‘A company cannot be injured in its feelings, it can 
only be injured in its pocket. Its reputation can be injured by a libel but that injury 
must sound in money.’165 However, although fairly sweeping on its face, this 
statement was made in the context of a decision on a narrow point of law. The issue 
in question was the applicability in defamation of the rule established in the 
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negligence case British Transport Commission v Gourley,166 to the effect that 
general damages compensating a claimant’s loss of earnings must take into account 
the tax that the claimant would have been liable to pay on those earnings. Holding 
that defamation juries should be directed to take into account tax liability when 
awarding corporate claimants damages for lost income, Lord Reid held that ‘There 
can be no difference in principle between loss of income caused by negligence and 
loss of income caused by a libel … in so far as the company establishes that the 
libel has, or has probably, diminished its profits, … Gourley’s case is relevant.’167  
Despite his comment that ‘The position with regard to an individual plaintiff is 
rather different’, Lord Reid in fact reached the same conclusion in this respect, 
holding that any portion of general damages awarded to compensate loss of income 
should take into account the tax that would be payable on that income.168 He went 
on to identify some categories of general damages available to corporate claimants 
which would not need to be reduced in this way, including damages compensating 
a general loss of goodwill.169 The rule is similarly inapplicable to vindicatory 
damages,170 which can permissibly be awarded to corporate claimants as well as to 
individuals.171  
When read in its original context, therefore, Lord Reid’s comment is little more 
than a restatement of the principle that individual claimants may be awarded general 
damages for types of injury which cannot be suffered by companies, such as hurt 
feelings or distress. I would argue that it is over-reading the statement to suggest 
that it should have implications for corporate defamation law beyond the 
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assessment of damages.172 It does not support the view that the law of defamation 
only recognizes companies’ reputational interests when they are financial in nature, 
much less that companies are only capable of having reputational interests of that 
kind.  
At times this view of corporate reputation seems to reflect a particular conception 
of the nature of corporations more generally.173 For example, Lord Hoffmann 
expressed a similar sentiment in Jameel,174 arguing in the minority for the removal 
of the presumption of harm in respect of corporate claimants:  
‘In the case of an individual, his reputation is a part of his personality, the 
“immortal part” of himself … But a commercial company has no soul and 
its reputation is no more than a commercial asset, something attached to its 
trading name which brings in customers.’175 
Lord Hoffmann’s reasoning in this passage is described by Ailbhe O’Neill as 
follows: 
‘It appears that the rationale for his approach relates to his view that the only 
interests companies have in this context are interests in property. Implicit in 
this approach is the idea that the company’s only purpose is profit 
maximisation thus the only function of defamation law as regards a 
company is to protect property.’176 
On this view, it is not that corporate reputation is an exclusively financial interest. 
It is that, if corporations exist for exclusively financial purposes, then corporate 
interests in general must be exclusively financial.  
But a broader view of the nature and purpose of corporate entities is reflected in the 
judgments of the majority in Jameel. Lord Hope took the view that Lord Reid’s 
comment in Lewis simply reflected the principle that defamation law only protects 
corporate claimants from ‘false statements which reflect on the way they conduct 
themselves [and] affect the reputation on which they rely to perform their 
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objects.’177 Where, as in most cases, the claimant is a trading corporation with 
objects relating to the pursuit of profit, this means that the law will protect its 
reputation only insofar as it ‘affects [the claimant’s] business as a trading 
company.’178 But that does not mean that the law will not, in an appropriate case, 
recognize the effect of an injury to a corporate claimant’s reputation on its ability 
to pursue any non-financial objects it might have. Corporate entities can have a 
range of other purposes the pursuit of which might be frustrated by reputational 
harm caused by defamatory statements. In each case, Lord Scott argued that: 
‘If the remarks in question were indeed defamatory, damaging to the 
reputation of the company and apt to damage its ability to pursue its trading 
or charitable or other objects, I can see no reason of principle why the long-
standing rule of law enabling the company to pursue a remedy in a 
defamation action without the need to allege or prove actual damage should 
be changed.’179 
English company law, embodied in the Companies Act 2006, does not restrict 
companies to pursuing financial objects.180 In practice, ‘companies incorporated 
under the Companies Acts may be used for carrying on not-for-profit businesses, 
or for purposes which can be only doubtfully characterised as business at all.’181 
The Explanatory Notes to the 2006 Act explicitly acknowledge the possibility of 
even for-profit companies having non-financial interests, by stating that s 172(2): 
‘… addresses the question of altruistic, or partly altruistic, companies. 
Examples of such companies include charitable companies and community 
interest companies, but it is possible for any company to have “unselfish” 
objectives which prevail over the “selfish” interests of members.’182 
Since ‘Nothing in the basic legal framework of business firms mandates a particular 
orientation to making money over all other possible values’, any conception of 
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corporations or their interests in which such an orientation is inherent will not be 
universally applicable.183  
Both Gary Chan184 and Peter Coe185 suggest that Post’s conception of reputation as 
honour186 might justify protecting a company’s reputation for its ‘charitable and 
social causes’,187 as opposed to its trade or business. Chan argues that: 
‘… we should not totally foreclose the avenue for a corporation to pursue 
legitimate claims against defamatory allegations that strike at the 
corporation’s non-business reputation and which may not always be 
translatable to a loss of goodwill or customers.’188 
It could be argued in response that a company’s incentive to engage in socially 
beneficial activities is, ultimately, that such activities are expected to generate long 
term financial benefits by enhancing the company’s goodwill with its customers.189 
Coe acknowledges that corporate social responsibility initiatives ‘are used to 
increase market value and financial performance’.190 To say that this is the sole 
reason for companies to pursue such activities is also something of an over-
simplification. A range of factors drive companies’ non-trading activities:191 they 
‘may be motivated by a moral duty or by self-interest and may be voluntary or in 
response to social pressure.’192  
However, it is important not to overstate the argument that corporate defamation 
claimants may in some cases have interests at stake that are not purely financial. 
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The reality is that it does not accurately reflect the vast majority of corporate 
defamation litigation in which, as Dario Milo points out, ‘the issues mainly concern 
the corporation’s standing in the business in which it is engaged, and how its 
reputation for honesty, credit, and other business characteristics affects its financial 
viability.’193 And even in the minority of cases in which a company might sue to 
protect an aspect of its reputation unrelated to its business, it is still the case that its 
interest in that part of its reputation is wholly instrumental to the ability to pursue 
its objects.194 Even in this context, a corporate entity cannot claim to have interests 
in its reputation that are as broad and significant as those at stake for an individual 
defamation claimant. The next section will discuss the various reputational interests 
that corporate claimants, unlike individuals, do not have. 
C. Reputational interests that companies do not have 
Along with Post’s conception of reputation as dignity, which was briefly discussed 
above,195 there are a number of theories in the literature which conceptualize 
reputation in relation to underlying interests such as dignity,196 autonomy,197 self-
worth,198 and other interests that companies cannot claim to enjoy. The discussion 
in this part will demonstrate that the interests which a corporate claimant might 
have at stake in a defamation case will generally be more limited than those at stake 
for an individual defamation claimant. The reputational interests that are unique to 
individual claimants are also significant because they provide the only convincing 
explanation for protecting the right to reputation under Art 8 ECHR. 
The most obvious sense in which corporate defamation claimants differ from 
individual claimants is that they have ‘no feelings which might [be] hurt and no 
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social relations which might [be] impaired’ by defamatory allegations.199 To the 
extent that the law addresses (directly or indirectly) either psychological injuries or 
harm to social relationships, then companies have no sensible claim to those 
interests. This is already reflected to some extent in English law,200 for example in 
the rule that, where there is no evidence of actual loss, general damages should 
normally be lower for corporate claimants than they would be for individual 
claimants.201  
One function of general damages in defamation is to compensate the claimant for 
distress; corporations are not entitled to damages under this head.202 On the same 
basis, corporations are not entitled to aggravated damages: 
‘… the defining characteristic of an award of aggravated damages is that its 
function is to provide a claimant with compensation … for injury to his or 
her feelings caused by some conduct on the part of the defendant … . If that 
be the correct analysis of the proper function of aggravated damages, it 
seems to me to follow that aggravated damages are in principle not available 
to a corporate claimant.’203 
But although one aim of the remedies awarded to claimants is to compensate for 
psychological injuries, that does not mean that protecting claimants from such 
injuries is the central purpose of defamation law. The nature of the cause of action 
demonstrates that it is not centrally concerned with psychological harm, because 
insult is not actionable in its own right.204 Without publication to a third party, a 
defamatory statement is not actionable, regardless of the distress it causes the 
claimant.205 The capacity for defamatory statements to hurt the feelings of their 
victims is reflected in the remedies available to successful claimants, but only 
parasitically, when it results from injury to the claimant’s reputation.206 
Corporations’ inability to suffer psychological or emotional harms should not be 
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overlooked, because it puts obvious limits on the potential justifications for 
protecting corporate, as compared to individual, reputation. However, its 
importance should not be overstated either: the capacity for emotional suffering is 
not a prerequisite of the right to protect one’s reputation, at least not as English law 
conceptualizes that right.  
David Howarth’s ‘sociality’ theory offers another way of conceptualizing 
reputation that focuses on harms that cannot be suffered by corporations.207 The 
theory is significant in this context because Howarth uses it to support his argument 
that the corporate right to sue in defamation should be removed.208 Howarth argues 
that the most convincing reason for the law to protect a claimant’s reputation is its 
importance to her ‘interest in the formation and maintenance of social 
relationships’;209 and that the principal harms with which defamation law ought to 
be concerned are ‘social isolation and rejection’, and ‘the pain of the threat’ 
thereof.210 Howarth’s view is that, if his argument as to the purposes of defamation 
law is accepted, then ‘it is questionable that pure economic loss in defamation, that 
is loss entirely unrelated to sociality or the pain of fearing the loss of social 
relationships, should be actionable at all.’211 This leads him to the conclusion that 
companies should not have standing to sue: ‘in the case of corporations, the 
economic losses are all “pure”. They are never consequential on social harm, since 
corporations, being not human or sentient, have no social relations.’212 Although 
Howarth’s theory is intuitively attractive, in my view it is not entirely convincing 
as a complete account of the interest in reputation, particularly because the 
connection between claimants’ interests in sociality and reputation is not always 
clear.213 Nevertheless, the sociality theory highlights another important aspect of 
the individual interest in reputation which is inapplicable to corporate claimants.  
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Companies’ lack of social relationships was also raised by Tony Weir in one of the 
first significant academic criticisms of the corporate right to sue in defamation,214 
written in response to the judgment in Bognor Regis UDC v Campion,215 in which 
it was held that the local authority claimant had a ‘“governing” reputation’ that it 
was entitled to protect through a claim in defamation.216 Weir took issue not only 
with the decision that a governmental corporation had standing to sue, but with the 
prior case law establishing that any corporation had such standing. He argued that 
the question whether a corporate claimant could sue ‘in defamation’, in essence, 
asked whether ‘an institution should enjoy the benefit of all the legal rules offered 
to the human being for the protection of his esteem in his own eyes and others’.’217 
Weir questioned whether it was appropriate for corporations to benefit from the 
claimant-friendly features of defamation law in the same way as individuals, and in 
particular the presumption of damage.218 In his view, that presumption existed in 
respect of two harms, namely that the claimant ‘will feel bad and others will think 
badly of him’.219 The presumption could be justified because ‘the first need not be 
proved and the second cannot be.’220 But a corporate claimant, Weir contended, 
could not suffer either of these presumed harms, and therefore the presumption 
should not exist in its case.221  
Less than a decade before the 2013 Act was passed, the House of Lords was given 
the opportunity, in Jameel,222 to overturn the long-standing precedent permitting 
companies to sue in defamation without proof of special damage.223 Baroness Hale 
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cited Weir’s arguments with approval, and argued that removing the presumption 
of loss in corporate defamation ‘would achieve a proper balance between the right 
of a company to protect its reputation and the right of the press and public to be 
critical of it.’224 Conceptions of the individual interest in reputation that are 
inapplicable to corporate claimants were also reflected in the passage of Lord 
Hoffmann’s judgment in Jameel discussed above,225 in which the reputational 
interests of companies were described in contrast to the value of reputation to an 
individual claimant as ‘the “immortal part” of himself’.226 Partly because of that 
contrast, Lord Hoffmann ruled in favour of the defendants’ argument that the 
presumption of loss should be abolished for corporate defamation claimants. But 
Lord Hoffmann and Baroness Hale were in the minority on that issue; by 3 to 2, the 
Law Lords refused to abolish the presumption. As a result of that decision, the 
proposal to require proof of financial loss in defamation claims brought by 
companies could only realistically be acted upon by Parliament. 
As will be explained in Chapter 3, Parliament took this step in the Defamation Act 
2013, by introducing a requirement for corporate defamation claimants to show 
‘serious financial loss’.227 Although the initial draft of the Defamation Bill did not 
include any provisions specific to corporate claimants,228 in its report on the Bill, 
the parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights recommended the addition of 
a clause that would require those claimants to show financial loss.229 The 
Committee pointed out that English defamation law must take into account the 
protection of individual reputation under Art 8 ECHR which, as the section below 
will explain, does not apply to corporate claimants.230  
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i. Reputation under Art 8 ECHR 
Dignity-based conceptions of reputation are particularly significant because of their 
prominence in the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights,231 
which influences English defamation law through the Human Rights Act 1998.232 
The Court will sometimes protect applicants’ reputational interests under the 
Article 8 right to privacy, even though it does not explicitly refer to reputation: 
‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence.’ 
English courts have not interpreted Art 8 to guarantee companies, as opposed to 
individuals, a right to reputation.233 In Euromoney Institutional Investor Plc v 
Aviation News Ltd, Tugendhat J stated plainly that ‘in the context of a defamation 
claim, a corporate claimant does not have relevant rights under ECHR Art 8.’234 
Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott consider this point to be ‘uncontroversial’, stating 
that it is ‘a commonplace that corporations do not possess Article 8 rights of this 
type.’235 It is typical for corporate defamation claimants to accept that Art 8 does 
not protect their reputations.236 But, as with the status of companies’ reputational 
interests under A1P1,237 there is some uncertainty in the ECtHR’s case law as to 
whether the Art 8 right to private life can be engaged by an injury to corporate 
reputation. In a small number of recent decisions, the Court has either left open the 
                                                 
231 This section is derived in part from an article published in the Journal of Media Law on 19 April 
2018, copyright Taylor & Francis, available online: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/17577632.2018.1464536. Acheson, ‘Corporate Reputation 
under the ECHR’ (n 129). 
232 See Ch2.B.i., text to notes 32-38. 
233 See Gatley (n 205) para 2.3. 
234 Euromoney (n 202) [20]. See also Hays plc v Hartley [2010] EWHC 1068 (QB) [25]; Ronaldo v 
Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 2710 (QB) [58]. 
235 Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, ‘The Swing of the Pendulum: Reputation, Expression and the 
Re-Centring of English Libel Law’ (2012) 63(1) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 27, 46. 
236 Hays (n 234) [25]; Building Register Ltd v Weston [2014] EWHC 784 (QB) [19]; Global Torch 
Ltd v Apex Global Management Ltd [2013] EWHC 223 (Ch) [73]-[75]. Cf the defendant’s 
submission, not commented upon by Eady J, in Metropolitan International Schools Ltd v 
Designtechnica Corp [2009] EWHC 1765 (QB) [46]. 
237 See text to notes 129-132. 
51 
 
question whether a company’s reputation can be protected under Art 8,238 or 
presumed without affirmatively deciding that it could.239  
The ECtHR’s attempts to explain the relevance of individual reputation to Art 8 
have not been entirely clear. It has, for example, claimed that the right to ‘private 
life’ under Art 8 extends to interests in ‘personal identity’,240 or ‘psychological 
integrity’,241 or that it protects ‘the right to establish and develop relationships with 
other human beings’.242 It has also linked the right to reputation with the underlying 
Convention value of human dignity.243 The lack of clarity and consistency in the 
Court’s jurisprudence means that the precise link (or links) between the interest in 
reputation and the rights protected under Art 8 remains unclear.244  
But whichever of the ECtHR’s vague justifications for protecting reputation under 
Art 8 is preferred, it is inapplicable to corporations on a conceptual level:245 
companies have no ‘personal identity’, no ‘psychological integrity’,246 no 
‘relationships with other human beings’,247 and no personal autonomy.248 Nor do 
corporations have dignitary interests of the kind highlighted by Judge Loucaides in 
his concurring opinion in Lindon v France, which was one of the Court’s first 
attempts to explain the rationale for protecting individual reputation under Art 8.249 
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Companies have no meaningful claim to ‘dignity’,250 which the Court itself 
recognized in the Art 10 case Uj v Hungary: 
‘… there is a difference between the commercial reputational interests of a 
company and the reputation of an individual concerning his or her social 
status. Whereas the latter might have repercussions on one’s dignity, … 
interests of commercial reputation are devoid of that moral dimension.’251 
As such, there is no good theoretical reason for the Court to extend the protection 
of reputation under Art 8 to corporate applicants.252 This is particularly significant 
in relation to the status of corporate claimants in domestic defamation law; although 
these claimants do share some reputational interests with individual claimants, it is 
precisely the interests that companies do not share which elevate individual 
reputation to the status of a Convention right under Art 8.253 Given the lack of clarity 
in the Court’s case law on the Convention status of corporate interests in 
reputation,254 and the confusion on this issue that was evident in the debate on 
corporate defamation reform in 2013,255 the Court should take its earliest 
opportunity to unambiguously declare that companies do not have a right to 
reputation under the ECHR. 
D. Public interest arguments for protecting corporate 
reputation 
The justifications for protecting reputation discussed above focus on its value to the 
claimant. But reputation can also be seen as having some value to parties other than 
the claimant, including to the public at large. It has been argued that, rather than 
conceptualizing reputation exclusively in terms of its value to individual claimants, 
‘a more complete theory of reputation would take into account … the interests of 
communities in forming and using the reputations of others, whether individual or 
                                                 
250 Post (n 7) 740; Herzfeld (n 11) 140; Langvardt (n 11) 518. 
251 Uj v Hungary App no 23954/10 (ECtHR, 19 July 2011) para 22. See also MTE (n 238) para 84; 
Kharlamov v Russia [2015] ECHR 860, para 29. 
252 Acheson, ‘Corporate Reputation under the ECHR’ (n 129) 59-68. 
253 As such, corporate reputation is relevant to the Convention only under Art 10(2), as a potential 
justification for restricting defendants’ freedom of speech: Ch2.A., text to notes 2-18. 
254 See text to notes 129-132 (A1P1); 238-239 (Art 8). 
255 Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill, Report (2010-12, HL 203, HC 930-I) paras 112-
14 (‘Joint Committee Report’). 
53 
 
corporate.’256 The classic judicial exposition of the public interest in individual 
reputation was offered by Lord Nicholls in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd:257 
‘Reputation … forms the basis of many decisions in a democratic society 
which are fundamental to its well-being: whom to employ or work for, 
whom to promote, whom to do business with or vote for. … [I]t should not 
be supposed that the protection of reputation is a matter of importance only 
to the affected individual and his family. Protection of reputation is 
conducive to the public good. … In the political field, in order to make an 
informed choice, the electorate needs to be able to identify the good as well 
as the bad.’258 
Decisions about ‘whom to employ or work for,’ or ‘whom to do business with’, are 
no less significant when the choice is between companies rather than individuals. 
In this context, too, it is important ‘to be able to identify the good as well as the 
bad.’ It might therefore be argued that corporate reputation, and its protection in 
defamation law, is ‘conducive to the public good.’ 
It should be emphasized that, on its own, an audience or public interest in a 
company’s ability to protect its reputation cannot justify the company’s right to sue 
in defamation. That requires the company itself to have relevant interests in its 
reputation, otherwise there is no injury to be redressed through a defamation claim. 
The interests of third parties in corporate reputation can therefore only add weight 
to a pre-existing justification for the corporate right to sue. The brief discussion in 
the remainder of this section argues that, even used in this more limited way, most 
of the arguments purporting to identify a public interest in protecting corporate 
reputation are not particularly convincing. 
One sense in which it has been claimed that there may be a public interest in 
protecting corporate reputation is that the losses caused by defamatory allegations 
against a company can have knock-on effects on other groups or on society as a 
whole. The most prominent example of an argument along these lines was set out 
                                                 
256 Heymann (n 45) 1376. 
257 eg Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, ‘Something Rotten in the State of English Libel Law? A 
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by the European Court of Human Rights in Steel v UK.259 Holding that the 
claimant’s status as a multinational company should not necessarily deprive it of 
the ability to protect its reputation against defamatory statements, the Court stated 
that: 
‘… in addition to the public interest in open debate about business practices, 
there is a competing interest in protecting the commercial success and 
viability of companies, for the benefit of shareholders and employees, but 
also for the wider economic good.’260 
The Court’s argument has been echoed in the academic literature. For Mullis and 
Scott, the proposal261 to allow corporations to sue only when they can demonstrate 
financial loss ‘seriously underestimates the value to any economy of the corporate 
sector’.262 Coe suggests that companies’ financial performance, in which corporate 
reputation plays a vital role, ‘directly impacts upon the condition of the wider 
economy, the socio-economic mobilisation of communities, the environment, 
education and sustainability.’263  
But, even presuming that the reduced financial performance of a company that has 
suffered reputational harm would not be counter-balanced by an increase in the 
performance of its competitors, the implication that the strength of the corporate 
sector and the ‘wider economic good’ might be significantly affected by a 
restriction on companies’ right to sue in defamation seems far-fetched.264 Large 
companies in the United States have faced significant barriers to successfully suing 
in defamation since the 1960s;265 that does not seem to have had any effect on the 
performance of US companies, or the US economy overall, in that period. 
A related, but slightly narrower, argument focuses on the effects that injuries to 
corporate reputation can have on specific groups of individuals, rather than on the 
                                                 
259 Steel and Morris v UK [2005] ECHR 103. The ECtHR’s decision in this case marked the 
culmination of the McLibel litigation, which I will discuss at Ch2.C.iv., text to notes 266-274. 
260 Steel (n 259) para 94. This passage of the Court’s judgment is discussed further at Ch2.B.i., text 
to notes 20-26. 
261 In Lord Lester’s Private Member’s Bill: Defamation HL Bill (2010-12) 3. 
262 Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, ‘Lord Lester’s Defamation Bill 2010 – A Distorted View of 
the Public Interest?’ (2011) 16(1) Communications Law 6, 14. 
263 Coe, ‘Brave New World or Road to Ruin?’ (n 185) 119. 
264 This implication is made explicit in Coe, ‘Need to Talk’ (n 105) 333. 
265 Described at Ch4.A., text to notes 7-16, 24-26, and 46-47. 
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public more broadly. The two particular groups that were identified by the ECtHR 
in Steel – shareholders and employees – have also been mentioned in academic 
literature. For example, Mullis and Scott note that ‘many thousands of people may 
depend [on a company] for their jobs’.266 The suggestion here is that, without 
recourse to defamation law to recover losses caused by a libel, companies may be 
forced to cut employment costs by making employees redundant; those employees 
are unlikely to be able to protect their interests by suing in their own names, because 
they will not themselves have been defamed.267 To the extent that this is a plausible 
possibility, it is unfortunate. However, the same consequences might be felt by, for 
example, the employees of a publishing company held strictly liable for another 
company’s losses;268 in either case, the derivative interests of employees do not 
seem to add much to the central issue, which is whether the claimant company’s 
financial interests in its reputation ought to take precedence over the defendant’s 
freedom of speech. 
A company’s shareholders are also sometimes claimed to be at risk from the knock-
on effects of defamatory statements about the company.269 A libel may have a 
significant impact on the share price of a company,270 resulting in a depreciation in 
the value of each investor’s shareholding, which shareholders are unable to recover 
through their own claims.271 The share price of a company does not only impact on 
its shareholders: in his evidence to the House of Commons Culture, Media and 
Sport Select Committee during its 2010 investigation into press standards, privacy, 
and libel, Jack Straw MP noted that ‘bodies corporate do have reputations and on 
their reputations depend the livelihoods of, in large corporations, thousands of 
people and their share price, in which your pension fund or mine might be 
invested.’272 The proliferation of institutional investors means that many people’s 
finances rely to some extent on the continued performance of a small number of 
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large publicly traded companies. The implication of Straw’s comment is that 
protecting corporate reputation through defamation law can go some way to 
safeguarding this performance.273 But, given that fund managers spread risk across 
a portfolio of investments, the implication that changes to corporate defamation law 
might meaningfully affect the security of pension investments seems untenable. 
More generally, shareholders assume a risk of loss when they invest in a company’s 
shares; the purpose of defamation law is not to minimize that risk, or at least not to 
do so at any cost to the interests of parties more directly affected by defamation 
litigation. 
The significant financial value of reputation may give rise to another kind of public 
interest in offering companies some legal protection against baseless allegations, if 
it produces an incentive for companies to compete with one another in ways that 
benefit the public. A company can gain a reputational advantage with consumers, 
and the financial rewards that follow, either by enhancing its own reputation or by 
devaluing the reputation of its competitors. Defamation law makes the second of 
those options riskier and less likely to be effective, and thereby ‘serves the social 
function of ensuring robust economic markets through competition based on price 
and quality rather than on denigration of [another] trader’s conduct’.274 It allows 
firms to invest in their reputations ‘without fear that [they] will be penalized by 
negative misinformation’,275 whether from competitors or other parties. But to the 
extent that there is a public interest in incentivizing genuine competition over 
denigration of competitors, it seems likely that it can be secured through the law of 
malicious falsehood, and therefore that there is no real need to also use defamation 
law for the same purpose.276 The cause of action in malicious falsehood as a 
potential alternative to defamation for corporate claimants will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 5.277 
Another way in which a company might seek to gain a reputational advantage over 
its competitors is by engaging in socially beneficial activities not directly related to 
                                                 
273 See also Ministry of Justice, Consultation (n 228) para 137. 
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its business.278 Corporate reputation, according to this view, is an important 
mechanism through which consumers and other stakeholders are able to regulate 
the social behaviour of companies, and to incentivize them to engage in activities 
which benefit the public.279 It might be argued that, if a company is unable to protect 
the reputation it would gain by acting altruistically, both the incentive of a good 
reputation and the disincentive of a bad reputation are weakened. A company’s 
investment in improving its reputation becomes more risky when it will have no 
effective response if a libel threatens the return on that investment; and the financial 
disadvantage of a bad reputation may be diluted when a company’s competitors are 
vulnerable to unwarranted reputational harm.280  
But the converse is also true: too much legal protection for corporate reputation 
reduces both the risk of socially harmful behaviour and the comparative advantage 
that can be gained by investing in corporate social responsibility. For example, 
levels of corporate charitable giving correlate positively with the degree of public 
scrutiny experienced by a particular company.281 Coverage in the media has been 
found to be the most effective form of scrutiny for increasing corporate social 
performance.282 Without the ‘important oversight mechanism’ provided by 
‘consumer supervision of corporate activity’,283 the reputational gains provided by 
altruistic behaviour would not be valuable. If corporate defamation laws have a 
chilling effect on public discourse about how companies behave, then it ‘may erode 
the possibility that consumers may supervise and control corporate activity through 
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the exercise of their freedom of expression’.284 Companies often have substantial 
opportunities to influence their reputations;285 and their incentive in doing so will 
be to enhance their value, not their accuracy.286 The public interest, in contrast, is 
in companies having accurate reputations, not necessarily good reputations.287 It is 
possible that providing companies with strong legal mechanisms with which to 
protect their reputations, such as the right to sue their critics in defamation, in fact 
harms this public interest by ceding too much control over companies’ reputations 
to companies themselves. Some degree of protection for speech about corporate 
activity may therefore have a beneficial effect on corporate social performance. To 
adapt the words of Lord Nicholls in Reynolds, for corporate reputation to 
incentivize companies to do good, the public ‘needs to be able to identify the bad 
as well as the good.’ 
Conclusion 
The material discussed in this chapter shows that companies place great value on 
cultivating and maintaining a positive reputation with their stakeholders, and that 
there are good financial reasons for them to do so. A positive reputation can offer a 
company enormous benefits. Conversely, an injury to a company’s reputation 
caused by a defamatory allegation could have significant negative consequences on 
its financial performance. The fact that corporate reputation can be of financial 
value does not mean that it should be characterized as a form of property; but, 
historically, the protection of reputation in English defamation law has been 
justified partly on the basis of its economic value. This rationale for protecting 
reputation is equally applicable whether the claimant is an individual or a corporate 
entity. In some cases, albeit a minority, companies may also have reputational 
interests that relate to their non-financial objects, and to some extent the courts have 
recognized that companies are entitled to protect these broader reputational interests 
by suing in defamation. 
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But there are a number of justifications for protecting the reputations of individual 
defamation claimants that are by nature inapplicable to corporate claimants. This 
means that the interests at stake in companies’ defamation claims are narrower and 
less compelling than those at stake in cases involving individual claimants. 
Importantly, while individual claimants’ reputational interests will in many cases 
engage their privacy rights under Art 8 ECHR, companies do not have a Convention 
right to reputation, whether under Art 8, or under the A1P1 right to property. It may 
therefore be appropriate to offer less extensive protection against defamatory 
allegations to corporate, as compared to individual, reputation. In the next chapter, 
I discuss the competing interests against which the claimant’s reputation must be 
balanced in a corporate defamation case: the defendant’s – and the public’s – 
interests in freedom of speech. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
SPEECH ABOUT COMPANIES 
 
 
Introduction 
The need to find an appropriate balance between claimants’ interests in reputation 
and defendants’ freedom of speech arises both in the context of individual 
defamation cases, and in designing the law as a whole to ensure that its broader 
effects are not disproportionately unfavourable to one or the other of those 
interests.1 In Chapter 1, I argued that, in the overall balance that the law strikes 
between speech and reputation, corporate reputation should be given less weight 
than individual reputation. In this chapter, I will argue that the interest in speech 
should be given greater weight when it comes into conflict with corporate, as 
compared to individual, interests in reputation. These two arguments reinforce one 
another, and suggest that defamation law should be more protective of speech, and 
less protective of reputation, when the claimant is a corporation than when the 
claimant is an individual. 
Part A builds on the argument presented in Chapter 1 that companies do not have a 
right to reputation either under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, or under Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention. It explains that, in 
contrast, defendants in corporate defamation cases do have a Convention right at 
stake: the Article 10 right to freedom of expression. This is significant in the context 
of domestic defamation law because defendants’ Convention rights to freedom of 
speech are presumed to have priority over corporate claimants’ non-Convention 
interests in reputation, and a convincing argument is therefore required to justify 
interfering with the former to protect the latter.  
                                                 
1 Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge University Press 1982) 135.  
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In Part B, I argue that it should be presumed that the statements at issue in corporate 
defamation cases are on matters of public interest. The limited amount of English 
corporate defamation cases in which public interest defences have been raised 
reveal that the courts almost always recognize this public interest; and their 
justifications for doing so are amply supported by arguments put forward in the 
relevant academic literature. The few cases in which it could be argued that there is 
little public interest value in critical statements about companies fall into a small 
number of narrow categories, none of which is important enough to affect the 
balance between reputation and speech that ought to be struck in corporate 
defamation law overall. 
My argument in Part B is not that the public interest in speech about companies is 
necessarily more important than the public interest that might exist in the speech at 
issue in other cases (for example, in defamatory statements relating to the official 
conduct of an elected politician). It is simply that it can and should be presumed 
that there is some significant public interest in the speech at issue in all defamation 
claims brought by companies. This means that it may be appropriate to protect the 
public interest in criticism of corporations with reforms that would apply in all cases 
brought by corporate claimants, rather than reforms that would only protect 
defendants’ speech when it is identified as being on a matter of public interest on 
the particular facts of an individual case.  
Then, in Part C, I argue that corporate defamation law has a range of pernicious 
effects on this public interest speech, both in specific cases and more broadly. The 
risk of being sued for defamation deters the publication of important information 
about companies by a range of different speakers; and the cost and complexity of 
litigation means that those brave enough (or foolish enough) to criticize powerful 
corporations can suffer consequences that are entirely disproportionate to any harm 
their statements might cause. The chilling effect of corporate defamation law was 
one of the most important factors in the debates leading to the Defamation Act 2013. 
Given the often significant public interest in the subject matter of the speech that is 
chilled by companies’ threats to sue, there was a compelling case that reform to the 
law applicable to corporate claimants in particular was necessary. 
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A. Protection of corporate reputation as a permissible 
reason to restrict speech under Art 10(2) ECHR 
I argued in Chapter 1 that, while companies do have some interests in their 
reputations which might be used to justify a legal right to protection against 
defamatory falsehoods, those interests do not fall within the scope of either Article 
8 or Article 1, Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’).2 
In other words, neither Article guarantees companies a substantive right to 
reputation which the United Kingdom would, as a signatory to the Convention, be 
under an obligation to protect in domestic defamation law.3 This means that, in 
terms of the Convention, the reputational interests in a company’s defamation claim 
are only relevant to Art 10(2),4 which sets out the permissible justifications a 
member state can offer for restricting the right to freedom of expression guaranteed 
by Art 10(1), including ‘for the protection of the reputation … of others’. The 
European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) has unambiguously held that the 
protection of corporate as well as individual reputation can be a legitimate reason 
to restrict speech. In Steel v UK,5 the applicants complained that the English courts’ 
handling of a defamation suit brought against them by the McDonald’s corporation 
had violated their Art 10 rights.6 The Court found that ‘the English law of 
defamation, and its application in this particular case, pursued the legitimate aim of 
“the protection of the reputation or rights of others”’.7 
The fact that the interests of corporate defamation claimants do not engage their 
Convention rights has significant implications for domestic law. To be Convention-
                                                 
2 Ch1.C.i., text to notes 230-255 (Art 8); Ch1.B.ii., text to notes 129-151 (A1P1). These arguments 
are developed in more depth, and presented together, in David J Acheson, ‘Corporate Reputation 
under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2018) 10(1) Journal of Media Law 49. 
3 In Chapter 4, I will briefly explain why companies are also unable to claim a Convention right to 
reputation by relying on the Art 6 right to a fair trial (Ch4.C.iv., text to notes 331-343). The argument 
that removing the corporate right to sue in defamation ‘would be a breach of Article 6 read with 
Article 14’ (which prohibits discrimination in the protection of Convention rights) was made to the 
Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill by Lord Lester: Joint Committee on the Draft 
Defamation Bill, Oral and Associated Written Evidence Volume II (2010–12, HL 203, HC 930-II) 
19 (‘Joint Committee Evidence vol II’).  
4 Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, ‘The Swing of the Pendulum: Reputation, Expression and the 
Re-Centring of English Libel Law’ (2012) 63(1) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 27, 46. 
5 Steel and Morris v UK [2005] ECHR 103. 
6 McDonald’s Corp v Steel (No 1) [1995] 3 All ER 615. This case is discussed in more detail below, 
at text to notes 266-274. 
7 Steel (n 5) para 86. 
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compliant, a restriction on expression imposed for a purpose other than the 
protection of another Convention right must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’,8 
which entails that it addresses a ‘pressing social need’ and is ‘proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued’.9 The necessity of the restriction ‘must be convincingly 
established’ by the state if it is challenged in Strasbourg;10 and the Court’s analysis 
of its permissibility will start from the presumption that defendants’ Art 10 rights 
have priority.11  
This contrasts with the approach taken to assessing the permissibility of a restriction 
on speech intended to protect another party’s substantive Convention rights,12 as 
described by Lord Steyn in Re S (a child).13 In this context, the court must engage 
in a balancing exercise, weighing the relative importance of the competing rights in 
the circumstances of the case, from an initial position of presumptive parity between 
those rights.14 As explained in Chapter 1, the reputational interests of individual 
defamation claimants will often engage the Convention right to privacy under Art 
8. Companies’ claims will not; therefore, where defendants’ speech interests are 
otherwise of equal importance, they will be entitled to greater weight relative to 
corporate, as opposed to individual, claimants’ interests in reputation. 
The fact that corporate reputation is not protected under the Convention also means 
that a company’s ‘right’ to reputation cannot give rise to any Convention duties. As 
such, protecting the interest in domestic defamation law is permissible but not 
required.15 This can be seen in the ECtHR’s judgment in Steel. Holding that a 
member state ‘enjoys a margin of appreciation as to the means it provides under 
domestic law to enable a company to challenge the truth, and limit the damage, of 
allegations which risk harming its reputation’,16 the Court said: ‘If … a State decides 
to provide such a remedy to a corporate body’, then defendants’ Art 10 rights 
                                                 
8 ECHR, Art 10(2). 
9 Sunday Times v UK (No 2) [1991] ECHR 50, para 50. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Jan Oster, ‘The Criticism of Trading Corporations and their Right to Sue for Defamation’ (2011) 
2 Journal of European Tort Law 255, 263; Mullis and Scott, ‘Swing of the Pendulum’ (n 4) 34. 
12 See Lindon v France [2007] ECHR 836, concurring opinion of Judge Loucaides, p 40. 
13 [2004] UKHL 47. 
14 Ibid, [17]. 
15 David Howarth, ‘Libel: Its Purpose and Reform’ (2011) 74(6) Modern Law Review 845, 874; 
Oster (n 11) 264. 
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require ‘a measure of procedural fairness’ in the operation of that remedy.17 Based 
on the word ‘if’ in this passage, Lord McNally suggested to the Joint Committee on 
the Draft Defamation Bill (‘Joint Committee’) that the Court could be interpreted 
as having ruled that the state’s margin of appreciation ‘extends as far as deciding to 
offer no remedy’.18 This interpretation must be correct. Article 1 of the Convention 
imposes an obligation on member states to ‘secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in … this Convention’; there is no 
obligation to protect interests, such as corporate reputation, that do not fall within 
the scope of a Convention right. 
B. The public interest in speech about companies 
Unlike the interest in corporate reputation, which I argued in Chapter 1 is typically 
of value only to the claimant company itself,19 the individual interests of defendants 
in corporate defamation cases are often supplemented by a public interest in their 
speech. In this part, I will first explain why the existence of a public interest in 
speech is legally significant. Then, in section ii., I will argue that the speech at issue 
in corporate defamation claims is almost always on a matter of public interest. In 
section iii, I will argue that the limited exceptions to this general public interest in 
defamatory speech about corporations should not prevent us accepting that, as a 
general principle, such speech warrants the enhanced protection offered to public 
interest speech in defamation law. 
i. Why a public interest in speech is significant under Art 10 
As discussed in Chapter 1,20 the following passage of the ECtHR’s decision in Steel 
is sometimes invoked in support of laws allowing companies to protect their 
reputations against false allegations: 
‘It is true that large public companies inevitably and knowingly lay 
themselves open to close scrutiny of their acts and … the limits of 
acceptable criticism are wider in the case of such companies. However, in 
addition to the public interest in open debate about business practices, there 
                                                 
17 Ibid, para 95 (emphasis added). 
18 Joint Committee Evidence vol II (n 3) 385.  
19 Ch1.D., text to notes 256-287. 
20 Ch1.D., text to notes 259-268. 
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is a competing interest in protecting the commercial success and viability of 
companies, for the benefit of shareholders and employees, but also for the 
wider economic good.’21 
However, when the context of these observations is taken into account, it is apparent 
that they were not intended as an argument in support of offering strong protection 
to corporate reputation in domestic defamation law. The Court was assessing 
whether the interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression resulting from 
a defamation claim brought against them by corporate claimants was permissible 
under Art 10(2). It recognized the particular importance of ‘promoting the free 
circulation of information and ideas about the activities of powerful commercial 
entities’.22 The Court’s claim that ‘large public companies inevitably and 
knowingly lay themselves open to close scrutiny’ draws directly on the language it 
had used in its seminal Lingens v Austria decision to explain why Art 10 requires 
member states to ensure that critical statements about politicians are given greater 
protection from defamation claims relative to statements about private 
individuals.23 By declaring that ‘the limits of acceptable criticism are wider’ where 
that criticism is of large companies (again adopting language directly from Lingens) 
the Court in Steel made clear that the public interest24 similarly mandates enhanced 
Art 10 protection for critical statements about corporations.25 It is not plausible to 
argue that the Court was purporting to identify ‘an equally strong public interest in 
allowing companies to protect their commercial assets.’26 
To the contrary, the existence of a public interest in information about a particular 
subject is typically seen as a reason to give statements on that subject more 
                                                 
21 Steel (n 5) para 94 (citations omitted).  
22 Steel (n 5) para 89. 
23 Lingens v Austria [1986] ECHR 7, para 42. 
24 Factors other than the public interest may also influence the Court in the direction of stronger 
protection for speech in this context, particularly the idea that (some) corporations ‘knowingly lay 
themselves open to close scrutiny’ or, in other words, that they consent to or assume some risk of 
heightened public criticism. While this argument often goes hand in hand with arguments from the 
public interest in speech, strictly speaking it is not itself a ‘public interest’ argument. 
25 cf Predota v Austria App no 28962/95 (ECtHR, 18 January 2000) p12 (finding that criticisms of 
the applicant’s employer, published in breach of his contract of employment, ‘did not contribute to 
a discussion on issues of interest to the general public but harshly and publicly criticised the services 
and performance of [the applicant’s] employer in terms which were likely to harm the latter’s 
reputation in the eyes of its customers.’). 
26 Peter Coe, ‘The Defamation Act 2013: We Need to Talk about Corporate Reputation’ (2015) 4 
Journal of Business Law 313, 323. 
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protection from civil claims such as defamation.27 Speech on matters of public 
interest will be given greater weight when being balanced against conflicting 
interests such as reputation; and the greater the public interest, the more the 
protection of speech will be enhanced.28 This is in fact the effect that a public 
interest in the subject matter of speech has on its status under the Convention. When 
assessing the permissibility of a restriction on expression under Art 10(2), the 
ECtHR case law dictates that ‘regard must be had to the public-interest aspect of 
the case.’29 If defendants’ statements are on matters of public interest, then any 
justification for restricting or penalizing their publication must be subject to the 
‘most careful scrutiny’;30 the Court has declared that Art 10(2) provides ‘little scope 
… for restrictions on debate on questions of public interest’.31 
This ECtHR case law influences the protection of speech in English defamation 
law. As a result of the Human Rights Act 1998, which requires English courts to 
act compatibly with litigants’ Convention rights,32 and in doing so to ‘take into 
account’ relevant ECtHR decisions interpreting those rights,33 domestic defamation 
law ‘is susceptible of change under the direct or indirect impact of the 
Convention.’34 For example, in Culnane v Morris,35 Eady J declined to follow a 
Court of Appeal authority that would otherwise have been binding,36 because to do 
so would have been inconsistent with the relevant Art 10 jurisprudence.37 The 
importance of the public interest in speech is also reflected in statutory provisions 
in English law. Most obviously, this is illustrated by the defence for ‘Publication 
                                                 
27 Dario Milo, Defamation and Freedom of Speech (OUP 2010) 154. 
28 Ibid, 94-95. 
29 Bladet Tromsø v Norway [1999] ECHR 29, para 62 (emphasis added). 
30 Ibid, para 64; Independent News and Media v Ireland (2006) 42 EHRR 46, para 114. 
31 Heinisch v Germany [2011] ECHR 1175, para 66. 
32 Human Rights Act 1998, s 6. 
33 Ibid, s 2(2). 
34 Berezovsky v Forbes Inc (no 2) [2001] EWCA Civ 1251, [10] (Sedley LJ). Additionally, s 12(4) 
of the HRA requires courts considering whether to restrict journalistic expression to take into 
account ‘the extent to which … it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be 
published.’ Gavin Phillipson notes that this provision ‘suggests parliamentary acceptance of the 
notion that, in assessing the legal weight to be given to journalistic speech in particular, its 
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Andrew T Kenyon (ed), Comparative Defamation and Privacy Law (Cambridge University Press 
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35 [2005] EWHC 2438 (QB). 
36 Plummer v Charman [1962] 1 WLR 1469. 
37 Culnane (n 35) [27]. See also O’Shea v MGN Ltd [2001] EWHC 425 (QB) [47]. 
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on [a] matter of public interest’ in s 4 of the Defamation Act 2013, which will be 
discussed below.38 
The ‘enhanced protection’ of public interest speech referred to above is not meant 
to specify any particular mechanism or level of protection. There are a number of 
ways in which the law could give greater protection to defendants’ speech interests: 
for example, a higher standard of fault could be required to establish defendants’ 
liability;39 the burden of proving falsity could be shifted to claimants;40 or trial 
courts’ decisions could be subjected to a more stringent standard of appellate 
review.41 In particular, the presumption of a public interest in speech about 
corporations that I advocate in this Chapter does not necessarily justify granting 
defendants complete immunity from liability for publishing false statements about 
companies. But laws that restrict defendants’ freedom of speech, such as corporate 
defamation, should make more room for speech on matters of public interest in one 
way or another. 
ii. Protection of public interest speech in English law 
The emphasis given to the particular importance of ‘public interest’ speech in the 
case law of both the ECtHR and the English courts, as described above, means that 
‘the approach taken to the definition of “public interest” is pivotal to determining 
the weight of the [defendant’s] … free speech claim’42 under Art 10. This section 
discusses how the courts identify public interest speech, especially in the context of 
corporate defamation claims. It explores the principal mechanisms by which public 
interest speech is protected in English defamation law: the defence created in 
Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd,43 and the replacement for that defence in s 4 of 
                                                 
38 At text to notes 47-49. 
39 This is the mechanism most typically used in English law (see text to notes 43-49 below); it is 
also used in the US (Ch4.A., at text to notes 8-12 and 46-47). 
40 As in US defamation law: New York Times v Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964). 
41 As, again, in US law: see Susan M Gilles, ‘Taking First Amendment Procedure Seriously: An 
Analysis of Process in Libel Litigation’ (1998) 58 Ohio State Law Journal 1753. The European 
Court of Human Rights sometimes adopts a similar approach, by widening or narrowing the ‘margin 
of appreciation’ within which it allows member states to interpret and protect the right to freedom 
of expression depending on the kind of speech at issue: see TV Vest AS v Norway App no 21132/05 
(ECtHR, 11 December 2008) para 64. 
42 Paul Wragg, ‘A Freedom to Criticise? Evaluating the Public Interest in Celebrity Gossip after 
Mosley and Terry’ (2010) 2(2) Journal of Media Law 295, 298. 
43 Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL). 
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the Defamation Act 2013. I argue that, although there is no general principle in 
English law recognizing the public interest in defendants’ speech in corporate 
defamation cases, in practice the courts do recognize that public interest in almost 
all such cases; and, further, that their reasons for doing so would support a strong 
presumption that the statements complained of in corporate defamation cases will 
be on matters of public interest. 
The House of Lords decision in Reynolds was significant because it created, for the 
first time in English defamation law, what could reasonably be described as a 
general public interest defence.44 The new defence reflected the Lords’ recognition 
that the common law strict liability standard imposed too onerous a burden on 
speech about important subjects, and that it was necessary to relax that standard in 
some circumstances ‘to prevent defamation laws from chilling the dissemination of 
valuable knowledge.’45 The relaxed fault standard chosen was that of the 
‘responsible’ publisher. Lord Nicholls set out ten indicative factors for courts to 
consider when determining whether defendants had acted responsibly, including 
‘The nature of the information, and the extent to which the subject matter is a matter 
of public concern.’46  
In practice, the Reynolds defence was not always as useful to publishers as the Lords 
may have hoped,47 and concerns about its effectiveness led Parliament to replace it 
                                                 
44 Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] UKSC 11, [27] (Lord Phillips). The Reynolds defence was 
developed from the pre-existing ‘common law qualified privilege’, which exists in circumstances 
where a defendant is under a ‘legal, social, or moral’ duty to publish a defamatory statement, and 
the recipient has ‘a corresponding interest or duty to receive it’ (Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 (HL) 
334 (Lord Atkinson)). 
45 Jacob Rowbottom, ‘In the Shadow of the Big Media: Freedom of Expression, Participation and 
the Production of Knowledge Online’ (2014) Public Law 491, 498. The chilling effect is discussed 
in Ch2.C. below, at text to notes 154-335. 
46 Reynolds (n 43) 210. The full list of factors is as follows: ‘1. The seriousness of the allegation. 
The more serious the charge, the more the public is misinformed and the individual harmed, if the 
allegation is not true. 2. The nature of the information, and the extent to which the subject matter is 
a matter of public concern. 3. The source of the information. Some informants have no direct 
knowledge of the events. Some have their own axes to grind, or are being paid for their stories. 4. 
The steps taken to verify the information. 5. The status of the information. The allegation may have 
already been the subject of an investigation which commands respect. 6. The urgency of the matter. 
News is often a perishable commodity. 7. Whether comment was sought from the plaintiff. He may 
have information others do not possess or have not disclosed. An approach to the plaintiff will not 
always be necessary. 8. Whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiff’s side of the story. 9. 
The tone of the article. A newspaper can raise queries or call for an investigation. It need not adopt 
allegations as statements of fact. 10. The circumstances of the publication, including the timing.’ 
47 eg Andrew T Kenyon, Defamation: Comparative Law and Practice (Routledge 2006) 226; 
Andrew Scott, ‘The Same River Twice? Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL’ (2007) 12(2) 
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with a statutory defence of ‘Publication on [a] matter of public interest’ in the 
Defamation Act 2013.48 The revised defence, in s 4 of the Act, is as follows: 
(1) It is a defence to an action for defamation for the defendant to show that –   
(a) the statement complained of was, or formed part of, a statement on 
a matter of public interest; and  
(b) the defendant reasonably believed that publishing the statement 
complained of was in the public interest. 
The first element of the s 4 defence requires the court to assess the public interest 
in the subject of defamatory statements ‘hav[ing] regard to all the circumstances of 
the case.’49 This is comparable to the pre-existing Reynolds defence, which also left 
it to courts to determine as a matter of fact whether the speech at issue in a given 
case qualified for protection as ‘public interest’ speech. Looking at how the courts 
have applied these defences in cases involving corporate claimants may give a sense 
of the extent to which English defamation law recognizes a public interest in speech 
about companies.  
The Reynolds defence was pleaded in very few defamation cases involving 
corporate claimants, and the s 4 defence has been pleaded in none to date. 
Moreover, courts have generally adopted a broad conception of the ‘public interest’ 
when applying the defence, regardless of whether the claimant is a corporate or 
natural person.50 Nonetheless, it is tempting to see some significance in the fact that 
there does not appear to have been any case in which a court has rejected an 
assertion that a defamatory statement about a corporate claimant was on a matter of 
public interest. Instead, courts typically recognize that there is a public interest in 
critical statements about companies. I argue in the remainder of this section that the 
courts are right to recognize this public interest in individual cases: the limited case 
law in this area is supported by convincing arguments found in the relevant 
academic literature. However, I also argue that the law should go a step further and 
presume that there will be a public interest in the subject matter of the speech at 
                                                 
Communications Law 52, 54; David Tan, ‘The Reynolds Privilege Revisited’ (2013) 129 Law 
Quarterly Review 27, 27-28. See further Ch4.A.ii., text to notes 50-82. 
48 Defamation Act 2013, s 4(6). See eg HC Deb, 12 June 2012, vol 546, col 181 (Kenneth Clarke 
MP). 
49 Defamation Act 2013, s 4(2). 
50 Milo (n 27) 111. 
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issue in all cases brought by corporate claimants, without requiring examination of 
the particular circumstances of each case. 
Corporate power 
The House of Lords decision in Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL 
(‘Jameel’)51 was discussed a number of times in Chapter 1 because of its 
significance in relation to the presumption of loss in corporate defamation law.52 
But it is also significant in this context, because it is the only time that the House of 
Lords has considered the Reynolds public interest defence in a case involving a 
corporate claimant. The Supreme Court has not ruled on any corporate defamation 
cases since it replaced the House of Lords as England’s highest court in 2009.  
Baroness Hale’s Jameel judgment focused on the public interest in speech about 
companies. She drew heavily on the earlier decision in Derbyshire County Council 
v Times Newspapers Ltd, in which the House of Lords had denied a local 
government body standing to sue in defamation because of the importance of 
ensuring the freedom to criticize such bodies’ conduct.53 According to Baroness 
Hale, there was an analogous public interest in criticizing the conduct of private 
companies:  
‘These days, the dividing line between governmental and non-governmental 
organisations is increasingly difficult to draw. The power wielded by the 
major multi-national corporations is enormous and growing. The freedom 
to criticise them may be at least as important in a democratic society as the 
freedom to criticise the government.’54 
I will explain when I discuss the Derbyshire principle in more detail in Chapter 5 
why Baroness Hale’s argument for extending its scope to private companies was 
unconvincing.55 But her broader point – that the influence of corporations on 
modern society means that speech scrutinizing their activities should receive strong 
legal protection – is more convincing. Ailbhe O’Neill, commenting on Baroness 
Hale’s judgment, observed that ‘The concern that corporations are powerful and 
                                                 
51 Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL [2006] UKHL 44. 
52 Ch1., at text to notes 52 and 173-179. 
53 Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] AC 534 (HL). 
54 Jameel (n 51) [158]. 
55 Ch5.C.ii., at text to notes 209-214. 
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need to be curtailed is a commonplace in popular discourse’ and in academic 
scholarship.56 Literature across a range of disciplines identifies a trend towards the 
corporate sector having a greater influence over modern society.57 That trend means 
that it may no longer be appropriate to reserve the strongest legal protections for 
public interest speech to a narrowly defined category of ‘political speech’ limited 
to scrutiny of government bodies and elected officials. As Dario Milo puts it, ‘To 
limit the category of protection to political speech in modern circumstances, where 
there is no clear delineation between private and public power, is so under-inclusive 
as to pose a threat to freedom of expression.’58 
A number of commentators have made similar arguments in favour of enhanced 
protection for speech about corporations in defamation law, claiming that ‘the 
power of large companies and their influence in the community is such as to make 
it desirable that their activities be the subject of open discussion.’59 Because of the 
need to scrutinize this power, defamation law should restrict speech on the subject 
as little as possible: ‘The powerful, public, and political nature of corporations 
demands that we ensure an increased ability to speak about them.’60  
This argument from corporate power can only be applied to speech about a small 
proportion of business entities. As Parkinson points out, ‘The possession of power 
by companies is principally an attribute of size’;61 and companies large enough to 
exercise a degree of power comparable to governments are in a tiny minority. But 
examining the specific facts of Jameel, and the other case law on the Reynolds 
defence in corporate defamation claims, reveals strong reasons to treat speech about 
                                                 
56 Ailbhe O’Neill, ‘Corporate Reputation in the House of Lords’ (2007) 28(3) Company Lawyer 75, 
77 
57 eg John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Multinationals as Global Institution: Power, Authority and Relative 
Autonomy’ (2017) Regulation & Governance, 10. 
58 Dario Milo, ‘The Cabinet Minister, the Mail & Guardian, and the Report Card: The Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s Decision in the Mthembi-Mahanyele Case’ (2005) 122 South African Law Journal 
28, 36. 
59 Fiona Patfield, ‘Defamation, Freedom of Speech and Corporations’ (1993) 3 Juridical Review 
294, 300. See also Paul Mitchell, The Making of the Modern Law of Defamation (Hart 2005) 47, 
citing Patfield’s argument with approval. 
60 Deven R Desai, ‘Speech, Citizenry, and the Market: A Corporate Public Figure Doctrine’ (2013) 
98 Minnesota Law Review 455, 459. 
61 J E Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law 
(Clarendon Press 1993) 3-4. 
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a broader range of corporate defamation claimants as contributing to debate on 
matters of public interest. 
Corporate misconduct 
The specific publication complained of in Jameel was a report stating that Saudi 
Arabian authorities, ‘at the request of the United States Treasury, [were] monitoring 
the accounts of certain named Saudi companies [including the claimant company] 
to trace whether any payments were finding their way to terrorist organisations.’62 
Baroness Hale stated her view plainly that ‘If ever there was a story which met the 
[public interest] test, it must be this one.’63 Her colleagues agreed: Lord Bingham 
noted that ‘The subject matter was of great public importance’;64 Lord Scott, 
similarly, described the statements published by the defendant as ‘of very high 
public interest indeed.’65 Allegations of serious corporate misconduct or criminality 
are subjects of significant public interest; and it is well accepted that statements 
imputing claimants’ involvement with terrorist organizations are amongst the most 
serious allegations of this kind.66  
Public discussion of corporate activities, particularly in the media, can play an 
important role in uncovering misconduct, and also ‘in pressing for investigations of 
concerns that are raised and publicising the fact that wrongdoing has occurred’.67 
Damian Tambini notes that, in the financial sector, the regulatory bodies 
responsible for holding companies to appropriate standards ‘cannot regulate every 
aspect of corporate behaviour. They rely also on the public and the media working 
to expose wrongdoing and expose matters of public interest.’68 Where suspected 
criminal activity or other misconduct is already under investigation by public 
                                                 
62 Jameel (n 51) [37] (Lord Hoffmann). 
63 Ibid, [148]. 
64 Ibid, [35]. 
65 Ibid, [139]. 
66 eg Cooke v MGN Ltd [2014] EWHC 2831 (QB) [43]. 
67 David Lewis, ‘Whistleblowing and the Law of Defamation: Does the Law Strike a Fair Balance 
Between the Rights of Whistleblowers, the Media, and Alleged Wrongdoers?’ (2017) Industrial Law 
Journal, 25. 
68 Damian Tambini, ‘What Are Financial Journalists For?’ (2010) 11(2) Journalism Studies 158, 
160. 
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authorities, information about the existence and conduct of that investigation is also 
likely to be in the public interest.69 
There is also a public interest in scrutinizing how companies respond to allegations 
of misconduct. This is illustrated by the defendant’s attempt to rely on the Reynolds 
defence in James Gilbert Ltd v MGN Ltd,70 in which a rugby ball manufacturer sued 
in respect of the last in a series of three articles published in the Sunday Mirror. The 
first article had alleged that the claimant’s supply chain included an Indian company 
that used child labour to produce its balls; the second reported the claimant’s public 
announcement that it would send staff to investigate those allegations. The third 
article, in respect of which the claim was brought, was published one week after the 
second, and alleged that, contrary to its public statements, the claimant had not sent 
anyone to investigate the allegations against its sub-contractor.71 
In his judgment for the High Court, Eady J considered each of Lord Nicholls’ ten 
factors in turn.72 In relation to the second, concerning the ‘nature of the information, 
and the extent to which the subject matter was a matter of public concern’, Eady J 
commented as follows: 
‘… it would indeed be a matter of legitimate public interest if a business 
conducted within this jurisdiction was obtaining its goods as a result of 
exploitation of labour, particularly exploitation of child labour, within some 
foreign jurisdiction. But, of course, whether the claimants had in fact sent 
someone to investigate … by a certain date was itself of much less 
importance than the primary child labour allegations already published, 
although I accept that it was potentially itself a matter of some public 
interest.’73 
 
                                                 
69 As in Jameel (n 51). See also Seray-Wurie v Charity Commission [2008] EWHC 870 (QB) (in 
relation to investigations of charitable organizations). 
70 [2000] EMLR 680. 
71 Ibid, 687. 
72 See note 46. 
73 James Gilbert (n 70) 700 (emphasis removed). 
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However, these equivocal comments on the public interest in the subject matter of 
the statement complained of are at odds with the analysis of the ‘seriousness of the 
allegations’74 in the preceding passage of Eady J’s decision: 
‘The allegation … that the claimants have broken their promise would be 
serious in itself, but against the background of the gravity of the allegations 
contained in the [first two] articles … it assumes even more seriousness. It 
rather suggest that the claimants were being cavalier about the matter of 
their balls being prepared by child labour and, indeed, being dishonest in 
relation to their public stance on the matter.’75 
I would argue that the seriousness of an allegation suggesting that a company was 
‘being dishonest in relation to [its] public stance’ on the alleged use of child labour 
by its suppliers reflects the fact that it is an allegation of substantial public interest. 
Regardless, it is clear that Eady J was willing to recognize some degree of public 
interest in the subject matter of the statement complained of, regarding the extent 
to which the claimant had made good on its public commitment to address 
allegations of a more serious nature. Ultimately, the Reynolds defence failed in 
James Gilbert not because there was insufficient public interest in the allegations 
in question, but because the defendant failed to take a number of fairly basic steps 
to verify their accuracy and ensure that they were published responsibly.76 Eady J 
was right to recognize that the public interest in statements about companies will 
exist on a spectrum of seriousness; that is not inconsistent with a presumption that 
all such statements will implicate some meaningful public interest. 
Corporate business activities 
The successful use of the Reynolds defence in GKR Karate (UK) Ltd v Yorkshire 
Post Newspapers Ltd77 is also indicative of a broader public interest in defamatory 
criticism of trading companies’ business practices. In that case, the claimant 
company was alleged to have been mis-selling karate lessons which did not meet 
normal quality or safety standards.78 At the time of the judgment in GKR, the effect 
of the House of Lords’ decision in Reynolds was still not entirely settled, and this 
                                                 
74 The first factor on Lord Nicholls’ checklist: see note 46. 
75 James Gilbert (n 70) 700. 
76 Ibid, 701-03. 
77 [2000] EMLR 410. 
78 Ibid, 414-15. 
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is reflected in Sir Oliver Popplewell’s evaluation of the case in terms of the 
reciprocal duty/interest framework that governs qualified privilege at common 
law.79 This approach meant that his analysis of the public interest issue was 
restricted to identifying whether members of the public within the circulation area 
of the defendant local newspaper had an interest in receiving the statements 
complained of. To my mind, however, it was not necessary to narrow down the 
relevant ‘public’ in this way to support the finding that the publishees did in fact 
have an interest in receiving the defendant’s allegations.80 He accepted the 
defendant’s claim that the story in question was intended to be ‘a warning to the 
community about [the claimant’s] salesmen’;81 and that the journalist responsible 
for producing that story ‘was naturally concerned by the dangers, particularly to 
children, resulting from this organisation.’82 
The risk of harm that can be created when a company conducts its business illegally, 
unethically, or irresponsibly is such that there is a public interest in the ability to 
raise questions and concerns about actual or potential corporate misconduct. But 
there may also be a public interest in criticism of corporate conduct that does not 
rise to the level of criminality or failure to adhere to civil or regulatory obligations. 
South Hetton Coal Company Ltd v North-Eastern News Association Ltd,83 the 
primary common law authority for the corporate right to sue,84 is itself an example 
of a defamation case involving such a matter. The public interest in the statement 
complained of, a comment on the condition of housing provided by the claimant 
company for its workers, was recognized by all three Court of Appeal judges.85  
In the US, Michael Kent Curtis has argued that the level of protection given to 
speech scrutinizing a given claimant’s conduct should be determined according to 
the influence that their normal activities could have on the lives of others.86 On this 
logic, the fact that the carrying on of businesses has the potential to cause a wide 
                                                 
79 Ibid, 416-22. See note 44 on common law qualified privilege. 
80 Ibid, 422. 
81 Ibid, 425. 
82 Ibid, 429. 
83 [1894] 1 QB 133. 
84 Fiona Patfield, ‘The Origins of a Company’s Right to Sue for Defamation’ (1994) 45(3) Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly 233, 241; Mitchell (n 59) 46. 
85 South Hetton (n 83) 140 (Lord Esher MR), 143 (Lopes LJ), 144-45 (Kay LJ). 
86 Michael Kent Curtis, ‘Monkey Trials: Science, Defamation, and the Suppression of Dissent’ 
(1995) 4 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 507, 565-67. 
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range of harms to the public, such as ‘air pollution from cars or water pollution from 
industrial activity, … and defective products that produce broad injury’87 implies 
that the entities engaging in those activities should be scrutinized closely. Fred 
Magaziner argues that ‘If a product is defective, useless, dangerous, or harmful to 
the environment, dissemination of that fact is valuable to society … . In some cases 
it may be of greater value to society than information about public officials.’88 
Magaziner’s claim that the public interest in criticisms of corporate products or 
services extends to those that are ‘useless’ as well as those that have the potential 
to be harmful is, in my view, justified. Corporate businesses (at least in a large 
majority of cases) sell their products and services to the public by claiming that they 
offer some benefit, not merely that they are not harmful.89 If it is important that the 
public has access to sufficient (and sufficiently accurate) information about the 
market activities of companies, then contributions that reflect negatively on 
companies must be protected as well as those that would be beneficial to their 
interests. This public interest in informing consumers of suspicions that a 
company’s products or services are defective or sub-standard exists regardless of 
whether the company is at fault; the potential impact on members of the public is 
what grounds their interest in receiving such information.90 
The line between criticism of a business’s products or services and criticism of the 
business itself is often difficult to draw with precision. Although the two are 
conceptually separate, ‘The distinction between brand image and corporate image 
can be blurred, especially if the “brand” is a service or a range of products.’91 It is 
well-recognized in English law that statements that refer directly to products or 
services can, by implication, be defamatory of the company providing those 
products or services.92 Typically, the criticism of the claimant’s goods or services 
                                                 
87 Ibid, 566. 
88 Fred T Magaziner, ‘Corporate Defamation and Product Disparagement: Narrowing the Analogy 
to Personal Defamation’ (1975) 75 Columbia Law Review 963, 991 (citations omitted; emphasis 
added). 
89 See eg David Mangan, ‘Regulating for Responsibility: Reputation and Social Media’ (2015) 29(1) 
International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 16, 22-23 (criticizing an Employment 
Tribunal decision, Crisp v Apple Retail (UK) Ltd ET/1500258/11, for insufficiently recognizing the 
value of critical social media comments about Apple’s workplace and products). 
90 eg Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans [1985] QB 526 (CA) 538. 
91 D B Bromley, Reputation, Image and Impression Management (Wiley 1993) 159. 
92 Linotype Co Ltd v British Empire Typesetting Machine Co Ltd (1899) 15 TLR 524 (HL). 
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is said to impute some deficiency or malpractice in the claimant’s mode of doing 
business, an imputation which reflects on the company’s reputation more broadly 
than in relation to the specific product or service criticized.93 In these cases, there 
is likely to be a public interest in the statements complained of on the same grounds 
as described above.  
Ian Loveland criticized the decision in GKR for extending the scope of the Reynolds 
defence to non-political information about corporate activities, arguing that:  
‘… the audience interest in the sale of sub-standard goods and services – 
except in circumstances which pose an immediate threat to people’s health 
and safety – is not remotely comparable to that in knowing whether 
politicians are dishonest or corrupt. It may be important, but not sufficiently 
important to justify the risk that substantial amounts of false information be 
published.’94 
Loveland is right that members of the public have an interest in knowing about 
corporate activities that risk causing them harm. But his reference to ‘circumstances 
which pose an immediate threat to people’s health and safety’ conceives of the 
public interest too narrowly. Most corporations undertake business activities that 
involve some interaction with the public – usually the selling of products or 
services.95 The manner in which these activities are conducted will by definition 
have some effect on members of the public. There is clearly a public interest in 
facilitating open discussion about corporate business activities involving the 
public.96  
As Jan Oster puts it, ‘Criticism of companies … contributes to the marketplace of 
public perception’ about their reputations.97 The ability for consumers to ‘express 
their satisfaction or dissatisfaction’ with those companies is a ‘key element in the 
proper functioning of the marketplace’.98 This public interest in the ability to 
                                                 
93 eg South Hetton (n 83) 139 (goods); Jupiter Unit Trust Managers Ltd v Johnson Fry Asset 
Managers plc (QB, 19 April 2000) [15] (services). 
94 Ian Loveland, ‘Freedom of Political Expression: Who Needs the Human Rights Act?’ (2001) 
Public Law 233, 234. 
95 If a company’s business does not involve interaction with the public or a section of the public, 
then it is not clear what interest it has in protecting its reputation. 
96 eg Law Society v Kordowski [2011] EWHC 3185 (QB) [15]. 
97 Oster (n 11) 268. 
98 Susan Lott, Corporate Retaliation Against Consumers: The Status of Strategic Lawsuits Against 
Public Participation (SLAPPs) in Canada (Public Interest Advocacy Center 2004) 8, available at 
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challenge the public images cultivated by market participants was recognized in the 
breach of confidence case Woodward v Hutchins.99 Lord Denning argued that, if 
claimants:  
‘… seek publicity which is to their advantage, it seems to me that they 
cannot complain if a [defendant] afterwards discloses the truth about them. 
If the image which they fostered was not a true image, it is in the public 
interest that it should be corrected.’100 
The same public interest exists in the context of defamation law. As Oster concisely 
argues, ‘It is the purpose of every trading corporation to participate in the broader 
economic sphere by producing and selling goods or services. Therefore, companies 
operating in the market are per se public figures and as such subject to public 
interest.’101 Defamation laws that are too protective of corporate reputation 
undermine this public interest ‘by strangling or silencing the consumer’s ability to 
properly participate’ in the marketplace;102 the law should instead seek to ‘create an 
atmosphere which would encourage investigation and exposure of product defects 
and unethical business practices.’103  
iii. Exceptions to the general public interest in speech about 
companies 
Importantly, the circumstances in which it can be argued that defamatory statements 
about companies are not on matters of public interest mostly seem to fall into a 
small number of categories. I will argue below that these exceptions should not 
preclude the law from conclusively presuming a public interest in the speech at 
issue in all corporate defamation cases.  
                                                 
<https://www.piac.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/slapps.pdf>. See also Paul Milgrom and John 
Roberts, ‘Relying on the Information of Interested Parties’ (1986) 17(1) Rand Journal of Economics 
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99 [1977] 1 WLR 760 (CA). 
100 Ibid, 763-64. 
101 Oster (n 11) 269. 
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103 Lisa Magee Arent, ‘A Matter of “‘Governing’ Importance”: Providing Business Defamation and 
Product Disparagement Defendants Full First Amendment Protection’ (1992) 67 Indiana Law 
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Trivial criticisms 
There are some criticisms of corporate business activities in respect of which it 
would be difficult to claim any real public interest, on grounds of triviality. But 
such criticisms are also likely to be too trivial to found a claim in defamation. One 
example is the recent case Serafin v Malkiewicz,104 in which an individual claimant 
complained of a number of allegations relating to his management of several 
businesses. One of the statements complained of was held to mean ‘that the 
Claimant supplied on commercial terms frozen milk and bread which was close to 
its sell-by date from a source which he did not disclose.’105 It would be implausible 
to argue that there was a significant public interest in this information. But Jay J 
rightly held that the statement did not satisfy the ‘serious harm’ test in s 1 of the 
Defamation Act 2013; it seems unlikely that, on its own, it would even meet the 
‘threshold of seriousness’ required for a statement to be defamatory at common 
law.106  
Criticism of smaller companies 
The public interest in scrutinizing very large companies, which carry on businesses 
affecting many people’s lives, is likely to be particularly strong.107 However, there 
is still a meaningful public interest in scrutinizing companies’ activities even if they 
affect a more limited public: ‘a matter can be of “public interest” even if the number 
of individuals who are directly concerned with it is relatively small.’108 One 
example of this is the GKR Karate case discussed above,109 in which there was a 
public interest in allegations of misconduct by a company that operated regionally. 
Another relatively recent example can be seen in Culla Park Ltd v Richards.110 That 
case involved allegations that the claimant company and the individuals who 
managed it had been dumping toxic waste, which the judge considered ‘impl[ied] a 
serious disregard for the environment and the health and welfare of people living in 
                                                 
104 [2017] EWHC 2992 (QB); [2019] EWCA Civ 852. 
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the locality.’111 Allegations of conduct that poses a risk to public health are clearly 
in the public interest, even if the activities in question are confined to a relatively 
limited area.112 As was pointed out above, to have standing to sue in the English 
courts, a company must be carrying on business in the jurisdiction,113 which means 
that – by definition – a corporate defamation claimant’s activities will have some 
influence on the community or communities in which it operates. 
Confidential or ‘private’ information 
Jan Oster recognizes that even when an individual is considered to be a public 
figure, not all statements about that individual will necessarily be treated as ‘public 
speech’, which he defines as ‘speech that bears upon matters of public interest’.114 
He suggests that this can be explained by drawing a simple distinction between 
‘public’ and ‘private’: the kinds of statement that are not in the public interest are 
those that infringe individual public figures’ privacy interests. He contends that, ‘In 
contrast, a company has no private life that might be subject to private speech. 
Criticism of companies is therefore always a matter of public concern, hence public 
speech.’115 It is obviously the case that companies do not have many of the privacy 
interests that individuals have.116  
However, Oster’s argument seems to blur the distinction between two separate 
issues; namely, whether there is a public interest in the subject matter of a statement, 
and whether that statement relates to the public life or private life of the claimant. 
The two are not equivalent: there can be a public interest in divulging information 
about a person’s private life, or commercially confidential information, as made 
clear by the existence of public interest defences to claims in misuse of private 
information and breach of confidence.117  
                                                 
111 Ibid, [21]. 
112 As in GKR (n 77): see text to notes 79-80. 
113 Multigroup Bulgaria Holding AD v Oxford Analytica Ltd [2001] EMLR 28 (QB). 
114 Oster (n 11) 268. 
115 Ibid, 269. 
116 eg OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [118]; R v Broadcasting Standards Commission, ex p BBC 
[2001] QB 885 (CA) [17], [33], [48]; Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats 
Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199 (Aus) 226. 
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It is, though, plausible to argue that some limited categories of information about 
companies are of merely ‘private interest’ as opposed to public interest: for 
example, commercially confidential information; or information about the internal 
workings of a company that are unlikely to have any real effect on people outside 
the company itself. An illustration might be found in Doyle v Smith,118 one of the 
first cases in which a defendant has attempted to rely on the reformed public interest 
defence in s 4 of the Defamation Act 2013. The statements complained of in that 
case related in part to the claimant’s interactions with a private rugby club and its 
members. Warby J considered that: 
‘… the internal workings of a members’ club are intrinsically a private 
matter. It will not ordinarily be of legitimate interest to the wider public how 
the members of such a club decide to organise their affairs, or deal with their 
property … . The governance of public bodies is invariably a matter of 
public concern, but the governance of private clubs not so.’119 
Warby J did not consider any types of entity sitting somewhere on the spectrum 
between these two extremes. However, he did make clear his view that it would not 
invariably be the case that the decision-making processes of even a private club 
would fall outside the scope of the public interest:  
‘If … a private Club makes or contemplates a decision with significant 
effects on the outside world, and those who dwell in it – if it proposes some 
action with important ramifications for others in the wider community, then, 
as it seems to me, the position may well be different.’120  
In these circumstances, the internal process by which a private body makes its 
decision may be a matter of public interest: ‘because a section of the public had a 
proper interest in the public and outward consequences of the Club’s decision-
making, that same section of the public had a legitimate interest in the integrity of 
the internal, otherwise private process.’121 In practice, as argued above,122 most 
corporate activities do have potential consequences for the wider community or 
                                                 
118 Doyle (n 108). 
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public, and therefore the internal processes by which those activities are directed 
will implicate the same public interest. 
In some cases, the publication of statements in this category might be more 
appropriately dealt with under the law of breach of confidence rather than 
defamation. Although the applicability of breach of confidence law to false 
statements is unclear,123 statements falling into this category would, at best, harm 
some mixture of a claimant company’s interests in reputation and secrecy. It is not 
clear that the law of defamation should be concerned with injuries of this kind.  
Moreover, even if there is no public interest in defamatory statements relating to 
this ‘private’ sphere of a company’s activities, it remains the case that the right to 
freedom of expression is a fundamental right under Art 10 ECHR, whereas the 
corporate interests in reputation and commercial confidences are merely 
permissible justifications for restricting that right under Art 10(2).124 Even in cases 
involving statements of this kind, therefore, the balance of the law should favour 
the defendant’s right to publish, and that right should only be restricted in favour of 
the corporate claimant if it is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ to do so. 
Information about companies’ financial performance 
A fourth group of cases that might be considered an exception to the general 
position that defamatory statements about companies will be on matters of public 
interest involves imputations relating to companies’ creditworthiness, solvency, or 
financial performance, published to a general audience rather than to parties 
engaging directly in business with the claimant. English defamation law has 
historically offered substantial protection to claimants against allegations of this 
kind.125 
                                                 
123 Compare Interbrew SA v Financial Times Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 274, [27] with McKennitt v Ash 
[2005] EWHC 3003 (QB) [78] (Eady J); [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [78]-[80] (Buxton LJ), [85]-[86] 
(Longmore LJ). See generally R G Toulson and Charles Phipps, Confidentiality (3rd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2012) paras 3-093-98. 
124 Tanya Aplin, ‘Commercial Confidences after the Human Rights Act’ (2007) 29(10) European 
Intellectual Property Review 411, 418. 
125 eg Jones v Jones [1916] 2 AC 481 (HL) 507 (Lord Wrenbury): ‘The law, it appears, will take 
notice of the fact that solvency is so essential a factor in the existence of a trader that to speak of 
him as insolvent will necessarily “touch him in his trade”; it is an attack upon a necessary part of his 
trading equipment.’ See generally Richard Parkes and others, Gatley on Libel and Slander (12th edn, 
2nd supp, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) paras 2.30-2.31 (‘Gatley’); A H Hudson, ‘Defamatory Allegations 
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In FlyMeNow Ltd v Quick Air Jet Charter GmbH, the statements complained of 
warned publishees ‘that it would be financially unsafe to do business with the 
claimant’, based on allegations that the claimant had defaulted on payments owed 
to the defendant, and that this was because ‘the claimant was insolvent, being 
unable to pay all its debts as they fell due.’126 Rejecting a defence of common law 
qualified privilege,127 Warby J explained that ‘the authorities [on occasions of 
privilege] have taken a cautious approach to information about insolvency.’128 In 
many instances, this kind of information is published by commercial credit 
reference agencies and, as ‘commercial speech’, is subject to a wider margin of 
appreciation within which it can be restricted in compliance with the ECHR.129 But 
even where information regarding creditworthiness is shared for non-commercial 
purposes, the courts seem reluctant to treat it as being on a matter of public interest. 
While the provision of this kind of information by a trade association, in response 
to requests from its members, has been held to attract qualified privilege,130 ‘no 
authority [was] cited [in FlyMeNow] in which the court has upheld an argument that 
a volunteered communication by one private company about another is protected 
by qualified privilege, on any basis.’131 Warby J’s decision was strongly influenced 
by the extent of the publication: 
‘… little care was taken … to ensure that the audience … all had a genuine 
and present legitimate interest in knowing about the financial position and 
commercial dealings of the claimant. … It was inherently likely that this 
method [of choosing recipients] would bring the information to the attention 
of a substantial number of people with no existing or likely interest in 
learning about the claimant’s solvency or business conduct.’132  
The absence of a reciprocal interest in receiving the information prevented the 
defendant from being able to rely on common law qualified privilege in respect of 
publication to this section of the audience. This is undoubtedly the correct 
                                                 
of Insolvency’ (1990) 41(3) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 267. Cf Triaster Ltd v Dun & 
Bradstreet Ltd [2019] EWHC 3433 (QB). 
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127 See note 44. 
128 FlyMeNow (n 126) [116]. 
129 Hertel v Switzerland App no 25181/94 (ECtHR, 25 August 1998) para 47. 
130 London Association for Protection of Trade v Greenlands Ltd [1916] 1 AC 15 (HL) 25-26. 
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application of the law. However, it gives rise to the question whether any 
meaningful harm is likely to be caused by publishing statements of this nature to 
‘people with no existing or likely interest in learning about the claimant’s solvency 
or business conduct’, which presumably means people with no intention of doing 
business with or otherwise dealing with the claimant in the near future. It certainly 
seems unlikely that publication to this broader audience would be ‘likely to cause 
… serious financial loss’, as is now required if a for-profit company is to maintain 
a claim in defamation.133 By definition, a statement of this nature can only harm a 
company financially when it is published to people with a ‘genuine and present 
legitimate interest’ in receiving information about the company’s financial 
position.134 
It is also questionable whether publishees without any immediate intention to do 
business with a company really have no interest at all in information about its 
financial viability. The more plausible position is surely that expressed by Justice 
Brennan of the US Supreme Court, in his dissenting judgment in Dun & Bradstreet, 
Inc v Greenmoss Builders, Inc.135 Justice Brennan argued that the statement 
complained of in that case, a credit report imputing that the claimant had filed for 
bankruptcy, ‘falls within any reasonable definition of “public concern”’136 because: 
‘… an announcement of the bankruptcy of a local company is information 
of potentially great concern to residents of the community where the 
company is located; … And knowledge about solvency and the effect and 
prevalence of bankruptcy certainly would inform citizen opinions about 
questions of economic regulation.’137  
Justice Brennan pointed out that the public interest in scrutinizing corporate 
performance is reflected in laws that require companies to publicly report 
bankruptcies and other significant financial information.138 English law, similarly, 
                                                 
133 Defamation Act 2013, s 1(2). See further Ch3.B., text to notes 136-264. 
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imposes extensive obligations on companies to file financial reports that will be 
made publicly accessible.139  
Statements published by claimants’ business competitors 
Commercial speech such as advertising is still protected under Art 10 ECHR,140 and 
in principle it is capable of making a positive contribution to public discourse on 
important subjects.141 But there would seem to be little public interest in disparaging 
statements published about a company by one of its competitors,142 especially 
where those statements are intended to distort the market to the competitor’s 
advantage by misleading consumers.143 In most cases of this kind, however, 
malicious falsehood will be a more appropriate mechanism than defamation for the 
disparaged company to seek redress.144  
Admittedly, the need to prove falsity, malice, and special damage places a more 
onerous burden on claimants in malicious falsehood than that imposed in 
defamation,145 particularly in respect of proving malice (meaning intention to injure 
the claimant, or knowledge of or recklessness as to the statement’s falsity146). 
However, in the context of disputes between competitors, the burden on claimants 
to prove special damage is effectively set aside by s 3 of the Defamation Act 1952, 
by which statements are actionable per se if they are ‘calculated to cause pecuniary 
damage’ in respect of the claimant’s business.147 As Jonathan Parker J explained in 
Emaco Ltd v Dyson Appliances Ltd: 
‘… comparative advertising is by its nature calculated (in the sense of 
likely) to cause pecuniary damage to suppliers of the competing product, if 
only by reducing the market share of the competing product whilst 
                                                 
139 eg Companies Act 2006, pt 15, ss 380-474. 
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increasing that of the product which is the subject of the comparative 
advertising. That, after all, is the purpose of comparative advertising.’148 
Given that one of the most effective ways for companies to differentiate their 
products from their competitors’ (and one of the most beneficial for consumers) is 
by improving their comparative quality, there is clear value in allowing space for 
advertising that communicates the advantages of one product over another – and, 
in doing so, necessarily disparages the alternative. English law recognizes that ‘any 
trader is entitled to puff his own goods, even though such puff must, as a matter of 
pure logic, involve the denigration of his rival’s goods.’149  
Further, consumers are seen as being ‘used to the ways of advertisers and [to] expect 
a certain amount of hyperbole[,] … and the public are reasonably used to 
comparisons – “knocking copy” as it is called in the advertising world.’150 This does 
not mean that competing companies should have carte blanche to ‘knock’ each 
other’s products. But the line drawn in malicious falsehood seems to appropriately 
recognize the potential value of comparative advertising as well as not viewing 
consumers as unduly credulous: to be actionable, denigration of the claimant’s 
products must go beyond ‘idle puff’ of the defendant’s own business so that ‘a 
reasonable man would take the [disparaging] claim being made as a serious 
claim’.151 It is fair for a remedy to be available where one company knowingly 
makes a specific, provably false criticism of another that could reasonably be 
expected to be taken seriously by consumers, and is therefore likely to harm the 
other company’s business. But that remedy is available in malicious falsehood; an 
additional remedy in defamation is unnecessary.152  
Both the decisions made in the limited number of English corporate defamation 
cases in which a public interest defence has been pleaded, and convincing 
arguments made in the academic literature, suggest that almost all speech about 
                                                 
148 Emaco Ltd v Dyson Appliances Ltd [1999] ETMR 903 (Ch). 
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companies and their activities should be treated as public interest speech. It is 
therefore reasonable for the law to presume that the speech at stake in every 
corporate defamation case warrants protection in the public interest.153 The few 
categories of speech about companies that are less likely to implicate the public 
interest are not sufficient to preclude that presumption from being treated as 
conclusive: either the public interest in these kinds of speech has typically been 
underappreciated; or false statements falling within them are more appropriately 
addressed through an area of law other than defamation, or would be unlikely to 
ground a successful claim in defamation in the first place. If a public interest in the 
subject matter of defamatory statements about companies can be conclusively 
presumed to exist, then that public interest can be recognized and protected in the 
design of corporate defamation law overall, rather than only when defendants in 
individual cases raise the issue by pleading a public interest defence under s 4 of 
the Defamation Act 2013. 
C. The effect of corporate defamation law on speech 
about companies 
It may not be immediately obvious why the public interest in speech about 
companies described above should be a reason to protect statements on the subject 
from defamation claims specifically. Defamation law exists to remedy the 
reputational harm caused by false allegations, and it is often claimed that there is 
little, if any, public interest in the publication of falsehoods.154 The necessary 
consequence of protecting speech from defamation claims based on its subject 
matter, rather than its veracity, is that some defendants will avoid liability for 
publishing defamatory allegations that are false, or that cannot be proven to be 
true.155 The most convincing explanation for protecting public interest speech in 
defamation law even though it may be untrue is the ‘chilling effect’ theory, which 
asserts that imposing penalties on the publication of false speech can in practice 
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have an unintended and undesirable deterrent effect on the publication of true 
speech. 
As will be seen, the chilling effect is more complicated than it is sometimes made 
out to be. In reality, as Judith Townend has noted, ‘there is no one “chilling 
effect”.’156 Instead, the term is used to describe a range of related effects that the 
law can have on speech. Nonetheless, the overall argument presented in the 
remainder of this chapter is that the law does have pernicious effects on speech 
about corporations, and on speakers themselves. There is significant variation in the 
nature of these negative effects, and their impact on public discourse about the 
important subjects discussed above is inherently difficult to measure precisely; but 
arguments which appeal to the law’s effects on speech as a reason to restrict 
companies’ ability to sue in defamation are compelling regardless of these 
limitations. 
This part is structured as follows. Section i. gives a brief outline of the chilling 
effect theory, and explains why it supports reforms protecting some false or 
unproven speech from defamation claims. Section ii. highlights the important role 
that the cost, complexity, and uncertainty of litigation play in the chilling effect of 
defamation law. Section iii. discusses the different ways in which the law chills 
different types of speaker, and identifies a trend towards companies suing less 
wealthy critics, especially in respect of critical comments posted online. Section iv. 
demonstrates how factors such as the cost of litigation and the inequality of 
resources between parties give companies the opportunity to abuse threats of 
litigation to silence legitimate criticism of their activities. Finally, section v. 
explains the importance of arguments about the chilling effect of corporate 
defamation law in the debates that led to the Defamation Act 2013, which will be 
examined in detail in the following chapter. 
i. The chilling effect theory 
The chilling effect theory centres on the claim that laws intended to deter or remedy 
harmful speech, such as the law of defamation, can in practice deter harmless, or 
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even beneficial, speech.157 Of course, it is not always undesirable for the law to 
dissuade a person from publishing a defamatory statement. Commentators have 
noted the importance of distinguishing between the law’s deterrent effect on 
publications that would be unlawful, and its chilling effect on speech that would 
not.158 Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, for example, point out that ‘the creation 
of a “chilling effect” on freedom of expression is precisely the purpose of libel 
law.’159 If the risk of liability deters the publication of false and defamatory 
allegations, then the quality of public debate will be improved; deterrence ‘is 
undesirable only to the extent that it causes true and important information to be 
withheld from the public sphere.’160 
As a critique of defamation law, the chilling effect theory essentially combines an 
empirical claim with a normative claim. The empirical claim is that the law does in 
fact suppress speech that is true and important, and which therefore ‘should see the 
light of day’.161 Making the law more defendant-friendly to alleviate this effect 
would increase the risk that the victims of false allegations will be unable to remedy 
their reputational injuries through defamation claims.162 The normative claim 
therefore depends on an ‘ordering of values’163 in which the harm done by 
preventing the publication of true statements is believed to be greater than the harm 
done by failing to provide a remedy for damaging falsehoods. If this is so then, 
despite their lack of value in their own right, it is desirable for the law to offer false 
defamatory speech some ‘strategic protection’,164 in order to allow sufficient 
‘breathing space’165 for the publication of true speech, and thereby to ensure that 
society can obtain the benefit of that true speech.  
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ii. The perceived cost and uncertainty of litigation 
The chilling effect of defamation law is produced by a number of factors,166 but is 
driven in particular by the speaker’s uncertainty about the outcome of possible 
litigation, and by the potential costs that she might incur by defending a lawsuit.167 
There is evidence that some publishers, at least, view the cost of litigation as ‘much 
the most disturbing aspect of a defamation claim’.168 High litigation costs, and their 
effects on speech, were identified as a significant problem with English defamation 
law prior to the 2013 reforms, in academic commentary,169 in Parliamentary 
reports,170 and in the courts.171 
The actual cost of libel litigation relative to other areas of law is unclear. A study 
conducted in 2008 reported that the cost of defending a libel action in England was 
140 times the European average.172 This figure was reproduced in various sources 
during the debates leading to the 2013 reforms,173 but has been called ‘absurd’ by 
David Howarth, who argues that it was erroneously based on different cost 
reporting practices across countries.174 Questioning the portrayal of defamation 
costs more generally, Howarth contends that ‘a small number of very expensive 
cases [dominate] both the calculation of the average cost of cases and the 
headlines.’175 Although there is likely some truth to this claim, in the context of the 
chilling effect it makes little difference. The over-cautiousness induced in 
publishers by the fear of being sued for libel is driven by their perception of the 
expense of defending a claim more than by the likely costs that they would in fact 
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incur.176 Defamation litigation is widely regarded as expensive, and this is what is 
important.177  
The general approach to allocating legal costs between the parties to litigation 
allows for a significant shifting of costs from the winning party to the losing 
party.178 In theory this should alleviate the chilling effect for speakers confident of 
being able to defend a defamation claim successfully,179 but it also substantially 
increases the risk of an adverse court ruling. If unsuccessful, publishers may be 
liable not only for an award of damages and their own costs, but also for claimants’ 
litigation costs.180 Even successful defendants may only recover part of their actual 
expenditure through cost-shifting measures;181 and such measures cannot eliminate 
the non-financial costs of litigation, which can include, for example, ‘emotional 
trauma, lost wages, credit problems, loss of personal and business reputation, 
relationship troubles and even insurance cancellations’.182 These factors can make 
the decision to defend a lawsuit daunting even for a publisher who would be able 
to mount a strong defence.183 
Although in principle defamation law is only concerned with false allegations, the 
falsity of defendants’ statements is presumed. Another potential factor in the 
chilling effect is the practical difficulty that publishers expect to face in attempting 
to prove the truth of their statements in court.184 For example, admissible evidence 
may not be readily available, especially where there is a significant gap between 
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the trial and the events to which the statements complained of relate.185 These 
practical problems may be particularly likely to affect media companies’ ability to 
defend allegations of corporate misconduct, the reporting of which often relies on 
anonymous sources or confidential documents.186  
And publishers must also take into account the possibility of an unexpected or 
erroneous verdict from the court.187 There will always be some degree of 
unpredictability in the legal process by which defamation cases are adjudicated,188 
which ‘may stem from ambiguous rules or erroneous applications.’189 The 
complexity and fact-sensitivity of defamation litigation in particular aggravates this 
unpredictability.190 As a result of this combination of ‘risks and uncertainties’ in the 
litigation process, ‘a rule that penalizes factual falsity has the effect of inducing 
some self-censorship as to materials that are in fact true.’191  
iii. Chilling effects on different speakers 
Importantly, the extent to which the law has a chilling effect on speech about 
companies, and the nature of that effect, might differ significantly between different 
types of speaker. This is because the effect operates ‘through protagonists’ 
perception of the law and its effects; [and] this will vary depending on … the 
resources available to the publishers and their prior legal knowledge and 
experience.’192 It is sometimes claimed that arguments about the chilling effect of 
corporate defamation law need to take into account the fact that ‘defendants may at 
times include large media corporations’ with sufficient resources to defend 
themselves against companies’ defamation claims.193 These traditional media 
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companies may be less vulnerable to the financial threat of defamation litigation.194 
However, there is ample evidence that defamation law chills traditional reporting 
on companies in a variety of ways.195 
Based on the results of one of the most extensive studies of the effect of English 
libel law on the media, conducted in the 1990s, Eric Barendt and others 
differentiated between ‘direct’ and ‘structural’ chilling effects on media publishers. 
The former takes place when decisions relating to specific publications are unduly 
influenced by legal considerations. Most often, ‘this takes the form of omission of 
material the author believes to be true’ from a publication because of an 
‘unacceptable risk of legal action’.196 This ‘direct’ chilling effect on specific 
allegations can be ‘perceived at a variety of stages of the editorial process’.197 As 
Mullis and Scott explain, it ‘can bite either before publication to deter criticism, or 
after the fact to see defendants with solid cases capitulate.’198 Pre-publication, a 
story might be abandoned, certain allegations might be omitted from the published 
version, or changes might be made to the way it is presented in order to minimize 
the risk of the subject suing.199 Post-publication, a story might be withdrawn or 
amended, a correction or apology published, or a lawsuit settled to avoid trial.200 
Settlement might involve the publisher paying damages or costs to the claimant; 
admitting the falsity of the original allegation; or removing or amending archived 
versions of the story. For some publishers, ‘it is often not worth fighting a case even 
though the story is believed to be accurate’;201 one or more of these outcomes is 
seen as a preferable, or financially necessary, alternative. The possibility that even 
claimants with frivolous claims will be able to leverage the uncertainty of litigation 
to extract undeserved settlements from publishers has been described by the courts 
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as the ‘ransom factor’202 or ‘blackmailing effect’.203 If the cost of even successfully 
defending a lawsuit might override the perceived public interest in publishing 
allegations, that is obviously problematic. The House of Commons Culture, Media 
and Sport Committee (‘CMS Committee’) was right to say that a critic who honestly 
believes that his criticism of a company is justifiable, and would be defensible in 
court, ‘should not be forced into a settlement which entails him sacrificing justice 
on the grounds of cost.’204 
The ‘structural’ chilling effect influences the media’s decisions not about which 
specific allegations to publish, but about which subjects to investigate at all. There 
is evidence that publishers, especially those in the traditional media, base editorial 
decisions partly on the perceived litigiousness of the subject, being aware of 
‘individuals or groups or kinds of material where they or their newspaper “[have] 
to be extra careful”.’205 If certain individuals, companies, or topics are considered 
to be ‘no-go areas’ for journalists because they carry a particularly high risk of 
defamation litigation, then no publications are ‘directly’ chilled, ‘because nothing 
is written in the first place.’206 Barendt and others specifically mentioned 
‘exploitative employment practices by various large companies operating in the 
United Kingdom; [and] bribery and other corrupt practices by British companies 
bidding for overseas contracts’ as subjects in respect of which these dynamics are 
particularly ‘effective’ at preventing reporting.207  
In some cases, even large media companies might find themselves out-gunned in a 
defamation battle against a corporate claimant.208 While such companies will often 
have a significant advantage over individual claimants,209  
‘… corporate defamation actions can turn the economic tables on media 
defendants. Not only can the large corporate plaintiffs claim massive 
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amounts of damages … but they also have massive resources with which to 
pursue defamation claims. Indeed, their resources may dwarf those of many 
corporate media defendants.’210 
More importantly, as a result of increasing use of the internet, it seems that claims 
against well-resourced media companies are becoming less typical of corporate 
defamation litigation overall, and therefore a less appropriate way to think about 
potential reforms. Hilary Young, for example, warns against assessing corporate 
defamation law ‘with reference to powerful media defendants’, and argues that the 
law must take into account ‘the role that information technology has on broadening 
the range of defamation defendants’.211 The paradigm defamation case is becoming 
more likely to be brought against an ordinary individual rather than a traditional 
media publisher. The ease with which the internet allows individuals to exchange 
critical information about companies leaves ‘Disgruntled employees, dissatisfied 
investors, critical financial commentators, and others … potentially exposed’ to 
lawsuits for the content they post online.212  
While there is a dearth of reliable data on defamation litigation available from the 
Ministry of Justice or HM Courts and Tribunals Service,213 it is generally accepted 
that the claims being handled by the courts are increasingly brought against non-
media defendants.214 The results of a survey of judgments in corporate defamation 
cases between 2004 and 2013 lend some support to this perceived shift in the 
defendants these claims tend to be brought against: there were individual defendants 
in around four-fifths of the corporate claims that were the subject of a reported 
judgment in that period, and slightly less than half of all claims were brought 
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exclusively against individuals.215 Around half of the cases in that decade involved 
statements that were only published online rather than in physical form.216 The 
limited post-Act case law to date also seems to be consistent with this trend 
continuing: notably, all of the successful corporate claims reported since the Act 
came into force were brought against individual defendants,217 in respect of 
statements published online.218  
It is legitimate to be concerned about how these increasingly common claims are 
affecting online discourse. Some non-media speakers make valuable contributions 
to public debate, and are able to have a greater influence on that debate as a result 
of internet communications technology. For example, groups such as ‘“citizen 
journalist” bloggers and small NGOs’, according to Gavin Phillipson, ‘have 
increasingly important roles to play in public discourse’.219 In its Steel decision, the 
ECtHR highlighted the need to protect such non-media publishers’ ability to act as 
a ‘public watchdog’,220 a function normally ascribed to traditional news media.221 
More recently, the Court has extended its protection of the ‘watchdog’ role still 
further, to online speakers such as ‘bloggers and popular users of the social 
media’.222 
Further, online speech warrants protection not only because of the public interest in 
additional sources of information about powerful people and institutions, but also 
because of its value to individual speakers. While traditional media publications are 
typically valued for instrumental reasons, such as their contribution to well-
informed democratic deliberation,223 in contrast, individual expression on matters 
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of public interest is valuable ‘not solely because it informs the listener, but because 
it allows the individual to have his or her say.’224 As Lyrissa Lidsky argues, the 
internet ‘empowers ordinary individuals with limited financial resources to 
“publish” their views on matters of public concern’,225 democratizing influence 
over public debate on these subjects.226 The expansion of opportunity for 
individuals to communicate online is seen as particularly important to this ‘freedom 
to participate’ in public debate.227  
A number of commentators have highlighted the reputational risks companies face 
as a result of the increase in online discussion of their activities,228 and warned of 
‘an increasingly concerning tendency for defamatory allegations, originating from 
unreliable online sources, say overzealous but under-rigorous bloggers, to spread 
mushroom-like across the internet.’229 In recent years, lawmakers in the UK have 
increasingly recognized the harmful effects that the internet has had on public 
discourse as well as its benefits. But the concerns that have been raised in relation 
to the spread of mis- or dis-information on the internet have focused almost 
exclusively on the ways in which these problems can harm individuals online, or 
on the potential for online speech to undermine democratic institutions,230 rather 
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than on the harm to companies’ reputations that might be caused by the spread of 
false allegations online. 
Relatively little attention has been paid to whether the chilling effect theory can be 
applied to discourse on the internet as it has typically been understood to apply to 
the news media. For example, the ECtHR case law on the Art 10 rights of online 
speakers, which frequently refers to chilling effect arguments, has mainly 
developed in applications made by professional journalists or media companies.231 
In a third party intervention in Satakunnan Markkinapörssi OY v Finland,232 the 
Nordplus Law & Media Network requested that ‘The Court should further elaborate 
on whether the concept of “chilling effect” should be viewed differently in the new 
media environment.’233 However, the Court did not address the comment. 
As noted above, the way in which the law affects different speakers depends in part 
on their resources, and on their awareness and understanding of the legal risks of 
publishing certain material.234 By surveying independent online publishers, 
Townend has found that there is significant variation in the legal expertise and 
access to legal advice enjoyed by speakers on the internet.235 Many bloggers, even 
those who focus on writing about matters of public interest, have no formal 
journalistic or legal training, and rely for legal advice on informal support networks 
rather than paying for a lawyer’s expertise.236 Similarly, NGOs and citizen 
journalists, unlike traditional media companies, ‘generally cannot afford routine – 
or indeed any – access to libel lawyers’.237 Lidsky argues that, because of this lack 
of expertise and advice, ‘chilling-effect arguments have particular resonance in 
cases involving “nonmedia” defendants’,238 and that the complexity of defamation 
doctrine aggravates the problem: 
‘Defamation law … is so complex that it is almost impossible to state even 
the most basic proposition with certainty. Even for those relatively rare 
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Internet users who have the resources to defend against a defamation action 
and who contemplate in advance whether their postings will subject them to 
liability, [this uncertainty] may itself have a chilling effect’.239  
The risk of defamation liability will not always deter the dissemination of false 
content on the internet.240 As Lidsky implies, many individuals do not consider the 
legal implications of their online speech. For these speakers, the intricacies of 
defamation doctrine will make no difference in their publication decisions. 
Individual speakers are less likely to be constrained by professional or ethical 
commitments to verification, impartiality, objectivity, and balance than 
professional journalists,241 and have less ability, resources, or inclination to adopt 
the rigorous fact-checking methods typically used by journalists.242 In other words, 
the ‘structural’ chilling effect described by Barendt and others243 is less likely to 
inhibit contributions to online discussion about companies than it is to affect 
reporting on the corporate sector in traditional news media. 
However, because individual speakers tend to be less well-resourced than media 
publishers, and are likely to be less certain of the likely outcome of litigation 
because of a lack of legal expertise or access to lawyers, they are potentially more 
vulnerable after publication to threats of litigation, even when made by companies 
with meritless claims. Jonathon Penney describes these instances in which speech 
is chilled by specific legal threats against authors or publishers, rather than by a 
general awareness that criticizing a company might have unwanted legal 
consequences, as ‘personalized’ chilling effects.244 In this context, these effects 
might be better described as corporations’ ‘targeted’ chilling of critical speech. 
Penney argues that the chilling effect of targeted litigation threats is most effective 
when those threats are used against individual internet users who are unlikely to 
have much understanding of the law.245  
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In a small minority of cases, even a successful defamation claim may not be enough 
to deter the defendant from continuing to publish defamatory allegations about a 
company – and deterrence may be desirable if those statements are demonstrably 
false. It would make little sense to say that the law has a ‘chilling effect’ on these 
speakers. But it is still worth recognizing the potential for corporate defamation 
claims against individual defendants to have consequences that are disproportionate 
to the harm done by their statements, or their level of fault in continuing to publish 
them.246 As explained above, the ‘proportionality’ of interferences with expression 
is explicitly required by the ECtHR’s Art 10 jurisprudence.247 Several recent cases 
have involved defendants, typically self-represented, who have refused to stop 
publishing false allegations against companies, and seem incapable of recognizing 
or accepting the effects of judgments against them. These defendants can cause real 
harm to the companies they target,248 but it is questionable whether defamation law 
is the most appropriate tool with which to address the problem caused by this small 
number of cases. Tens of thousands of pounds are usually awarded against these 
individuals in damages, as well as injunctions, and in some cases committals for 
contempt and even imprisonment for failure to comply with those injunctions.249 It 
is not obvious that imposing consequences of this kind is a proportionate response 
to these defendants’ behaviour – especially given that none of them seems to have 
been effective in deterring them from continuing to publish their allegations.  
iv. Inequality of arms, abusive claims, and SLAPPs 
When the various aspects of the chilling effect phenomenon discussed above are 
combined together, they can lead to the most egregious examples of the pernicious 
effect of corporate defamation law on speech, in which companies exploit their 
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ability to sue by using the threat of litigation to silence legitimate criticism of their 
activities. Mullis and Scott explain that:  
‘The problem with libel has always been and remains the harm caused by 
threats and bullying in the shadow of the law. Such threats rely on the fear 
of the cost of embroilment in libel proceedings, not on the expectation that 
a case would necessarily be lost.’250  
The problems caused by the high cost of litigation come into focus most clearly 
where there is a disparity in resources between a large corporate claimant and a less 
well-resourced defendant. The so-called ‘inequality of arms’ that exists in such 
cases, again, featured prominently in the pre-2013 reform debates. For example, the 
CMS Committee declared that ‘It is clear that a mismatch of resources in a libel 
action, for example between a large corporation for which money may be no object 
and a small newspaper or NGO, has already led to a stifling effect on freedom of 
expression.’251 The Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill also stressed the 
importance of this issue, going as far as to say that ‘it is the inequality of financial 
means between the corporation and the publisher that is at the heart of the problem’ 
with the law’s chilling effect on speech about companies;252 and this view was 
echoed by the Government in its response to the Committee’s report.253 
As explained above,254 this tactic can be particularly effective when used against 
individual critics or small organizations without the resources necessary to defend 
their allegations in court. According to Fiona Donson:  
‘The idea is that most activists have too much to lose to become willing 
victims of a legal claim. The assumption is therefore that they will run away, 
agree to make whatever apology or undertaking is required, and be too 
scared ever again to indulge in business-bashing.’255 
These claims are primarily filed for the illegitimate purpose of intimidating critics 
into silence: Young claims that, ‘for many corporations, defamation law has 
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become a weapon in their brand management arsenal.’256 It should also be pointed 
out that, as well as having a more egregious impact on defendants, defamation 
claims brought by well-resourced companies will be more likely than other claims 
to target speech that implicates the particularly important public interest in 
scrutinizing powerful corporations to which Baroness Hale referred in Jameel.257 
The chilling effect of these lawsuits is most problematic when it affects speech on 
matters of public interest.258 
The term ‘Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation’ (‘SLAPP’) is sometimes 
used to describe this kind of abusive defamation suit. It was coined in the US by 
Penelope Canan and George Pring in the late 1980s to describe lawsuits targeted at 
critics exercising their right to petition government against the interests of corporate 
claimants.259 The concept and terminology are most often referred to in the US, but 
the idea has also gained traction in England and other common law jurisdictions,260 
where the term ‘SLAPP’ has generally been understood more broadly than in Canan 
and Pring’s original definition, ‘as a useful shorthand for intimidatory litigation.’261 
The focus of more recent literature is usually on ‘the paradigm case in which a 
meritless defamation lawsuit is filed by a business entity against an ordinary citizen 
who, on public interest grounds[,] has opposed the entity’.262 As explained by Susan 
Lott, ‘The key aspect of the SLAPP, to force individuals into costly litigation, 
suggests that overall success of a SLAPP does not necessarily require a legal victory 
but a political one: to intimidate and to suppress criticism.’263 Such lawsuits can be 
used as a form of ‘privatised regulation’ of the right to protest, often just as effective 
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as state regulation;264 and can encourage defendants to ‘self-censor their future 
contribution to the public sphere’265 with regard to the abusive claimant, as well as 
stopping the specific criticisms in respect of which the lawsuits are threatened. 
The classic example of a corporate defamation lawsuit involving a huge inequality 
in resources between claimant and defendant is the McLibel case.266 In September 
1990, McDonald’s Corporation and its UK subsidiary McDonald’s Restaurants Ltd 
sued two members of the protest group ‘London Greenpeace’, Helen Steel and 
David Morris, for their role in disseminating a leaflet entitled ‘What’s Wrong With 
McDonald’s?’.267 The criticisms of McDonald’s contained in the leaflet were wide-
ranging, including allegations that it knowingly sold food that could cause cancer; 
that it caused farmers to be evicted from their land in developing countries; that its 
advertising exploited children; and that its animal-rearing practices were cruel. The 
company’s claim that the criticisms in the leaflet were false and defamatory268 was 
reasonably successful at first instance: of thirteen broad allegations made in the 
leaflet, eight were not proved to be true by the defendants. Bell J awarded a total of 
£60,000 in damages to the two claimants,269 reduced to £40,000 on appeal.270  
But McDonald’s was widely criticized for its approach to the litigation, which 
included hiring private investigators to infiltrate the group.271 The company’s 
‘bullying tactics … were apparent to the public; furthermore, the inequality in 
financial and legal resources offended many people’s sense of fair play. The 
importance of free speech in a democracy was at issue and the corporation appeared 
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to be attempting to suppress a public right.’272 The McLibel case culminated in 
2005, when the ECtHR ruled that the ‘unacceptable inequality of arms’ between the 
litigants – exacerbated by the absence of legal aid – had meant that Morris and 
Steel’s right to a fair trial had been infringed.273 Further, the Court held that the 
‘lack of procedural fairness and the disproportionate award of damages’ had 
infringed the applicants’ Article 10 right to freedom of expression.274 The lack of 
specific reforms enacted in response to the Court’s judgment, however, meant that 
the potential for similar cases to be brought remained.275 
v. Chilling effect concerns as a catalyst for 2013 reforms 
The McLibel case prompted calls for reform while it was still ongoing;276 but also 
contributed to a growing recognition of the chilling effect of corporate defamation 
law. The theory has been an important driver behind the gradual trend over the last 
several decades towards greater protection for freedom of speech in English 
defamation law,277 including developments relating specifically to corporate 
claimants. For example, in his decision in Derbyshire denying the claimant local 
authority standing to sue in defamation,278 Lord Keith declared it ‘very important’ 
to recognize the potential chilling effect of libel actions on public interest speech.279 
In Jameel, Baroness Hale expressed support for the defendant’s argument that 
defamation claims brought by companies in particular could have ‘a 
disproportionately chilling effect upon freedom of speech.’280  
Similar arguments also had a significant impact on the reform process leading to 
the Defamation Act 2013. The concern about the capacity for corporate abuse of 
defamation claims that had been apparent in the wake of the McLibel trial was 
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revived by the publicity surrounding British Chiropractic Association v Singh.281 
In 2008, scientist and freelance journalist Simon Singh wrote a comment piece for 
the Guardian that was critical of the practice of chiropractors. Based on Singh’s 
previous research on alternative therapies,282 the piece asserted that the British 
Chiropractic Association (‘BCA’) made claims about the benefits of its members’ 
treatments for which there was ‘not a jot of evidence’, and that it ‘happily 
promote[d] bogus treatments.’283  
In response, the BCA – an incorporated company – sued Singh, but not the 
Guardian, for libel. Given that defamation claims can be expected to more 
effectively chill speech where there is a disparity in resources between the claimant 
and the defendant,284 this suggests that the BCA intended to exploit its comparative 
advantage against Singh, who would be less well-resourced, and have less access 
to the expertise of lawyers, than the Guardian itself. When the case reached the 
Court of Appeal, Lord Judge CJ noted that the decision to sue Singh alone, along 
with the BCA’s refusal of the Guardian’s offer to publish a response, gave rise to 
‘the unhappy impression … that this is an endeavour by the BCA to silence one of 
its critics.’285 
The Court of Appeal overruled Eady J’s decision at first instance that the statements 
complained of were assertions of fact, rather than expressions of opinion.286 
However, despite the BCA abandoning its claim after that Court of Appeal decision, 
Singh subsequently revealed that he had spent an estimated £200,000 of his own 
money – and two years – defending the lawsuit.287 He estimated that, had his 
defence been unsuccessful, his costs would have exceeded £500,000.288 As Lord 
Judge CJ observed, the result of both the length and cost of the litigation was 
‘almost certainly … a chilling effect on public debate which might otherwise have 
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assisted potential patients to make informed choices about the possible use of 
chiropractic.’289 That subject is one of obvious public interest, well-illustrated by 
recent coverage of the death of a man whose neck was broken during chiropractic 
treatment.290 
At around the same time as the Singh case, controversial corporate defamation 
claims were also being pursued against other scientists. Cardiologist Peter 
Wilmshurst was sued by NMT Medical, a US company that manufactured medical 
devices, in respect of concerns he had raised about one of the company’s products 
at an academic conference, which were republished by a third party on a US 
website. The suit was eventually withdrawn when the claimant company went into 
liquidation; but Wilmshurst claimed that his legal costs amounted to £300,000,291 
despite the fact that no court ever handed down a judgment on any aspect of the 
claim. Similarly, a defamation suit in respect of comments made at an academic 
conference and in an academic journal, filed in 2008 against radiologist Henrik 
Thomsen by another US corporation, General Electric Healthcare, and two 
subsidiary companies, never reached a court room, but still imposed a significant 
burden on its target.292 After settling the suit in 2010, Thomsen ‘vowed to refuse 
further speaking engagements in the United Kingdom’ for fear of going through a 
similar experience again.293 The potential for lawsuits such as these to chill 
contributions to scientific debate is clear. In 2011, Wilmshurst wrote that:  
‘… if one is sued for libel, the expedient course is to apologize (even when 
one is in the right) and offer a relatively small sum as compensation to the 
claimant. The alternative of fighting a libel case can lead to financial ruin, 
even if one wins.’294 
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These cases, along with other instances in which companies had brought or 
threatened defamation claims against scientists,295 were frequently referred to in the 
pre-2013 debates.296 Primarily in response to the Singh case, which was ‘widely 
regarded as one of the main drivers behind the Defamation Bill’,297 debate about 
defamation reform became ‘fashionable’ towards the end of the 2000s.298 The Libel 
Reform Campaign was formed (before the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Singh) 
by the non-profit organizations Index on Censorship and English PEN, and 
produced a report entitled Free Speech is Not For Sale (‘FSINFS’).299 The 
Index/PEN inquiry was also partly prompted by a July 2008 report of the UN 
Human Rights Committee that criticized English libel law for ‘discourag[ing] 
critical media reporting on matters of public interest, [and] adversely affecting the 
ability of scholars and journalists to publish their work’.300 The chilling effect 
argument became a ‘motif’ of the campaign for reform.301  
The argument shaped the development of that reform in Parliament. The FSINFS 
report was particularly influential in the early stages of the legislative process,302 as 
were broader concerns about companies’ ability to use defamation claims as a 
weapon with which to silence critics.303 The Joint Committee on the Draft 
Defamation Bill, for example, expressed concern that the chilling effect of these 
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claims ‘harms … wider public debate.’304 Ken Clarke MP, the Bill’s sponsor in the 
House of Commons, explained that the ‘first priority’ of the 2013 Act was ‘to 
reform the law so that trivial and unfounded actions for defamation do not 
succeed.’305  
These sentiments were echoed by academic commentators during the reform 
process. David Howarth, whose ‘sociality’ theory of reputation was discussed in 
Chapter 1,306 claimed that denying companies the right to sue in defamation would: 
‘… deal with many of the cases where manufacturers of products or 
professional associations sue scientists, or scientific journalists, for 
publishing work that calls into question the efficacy of the claimants’ 
products or profession. In most such cases, the claimant is not a natural 
human person.’307  
Similarly, Gavin Phillipson argued that the ‘impact libel law has had on serious 
journalism and scientific inquiry has been problematic’,308 and considered it 
‘notable that a large majority of the notorious cases of the misuse of libel laws to 
attack scientists or science writers have involved corporate claimants.’309 Phillipson 
did not go as far as adopting Howarth’s recommendation of abolishing the corporate 
right to sue; he instead suggested that the combination of two reforms proposed by 
the Joint Committee – the addition of a financial loss test for corporate claimants, 
and a requirement for such claimants to seek the court’s permission to pursue 
defamation claims310 – would ‘be a powerful bulwark against the fear of even 
unwinnable libel suits that allows corporations to “bully” scientists and writers.’311 
                                                 
304 Joint Committee Report (n 170) para 109. 
305 HC Deb 12 June 2012, vol 546, col 179. See also HL Deb 17 December 2012, vol 741, col 422 
(Lord McNally). 
306 Ch1.C., text to notes 207-213. 
307 Howarth, ‘Libel: Its Purpose and Reform’ (n 15) 875 (citations omitted). 
308 Phillipson, ‘Global Pariah’ (n 219) 150. 
309 Ibid, 185. Cf Jack Grove, ‘Are Legal Concerns Stifling Scientific Debate?’ Times Higher 
Education (7 November 2019) <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/are-legal-
concerns-stifling-scientific-debate> (describing a number of defamation claims brought against 
scientists or academic journals, all by individual claimants). 
310 Joint Committee Report (n 170) para 116. Discussed further in Ch4.C.ii., at text to notes 307-
311. 
311 Phillipson, ‘Global Pariah’ (n 219) 186 (emphasis removed). 
109 
 
The Joint Committee claimed that the abuse of litigation threats was ‘a widespread 
tactic’312 which was ‘routinely’ utilized by companies ‘using expensive lawyers to 
pursue every available method to silence … critical publisher[s].’313 But such 
sweeping claims were not universally accepted. Advocates of reform were 
occasionally criticized for relying on anecdotal evidence of abusive or trivial 
lawsuits to support their arguments for broad restrictions on the corporate right to 
sue. For example, the CMS Committee placed a great deal of emphasis on Tesco’s 
lawsuit against The Guardian in 2008 as an example of corporate abuse of the 
law,314 but this appears to have been almost entirely down to one of its members, 
Paul Farrelly MP. The case was discussed a number of times in the evidence heard 
by the Committee, but almost always at the instigation of Farrelly.315 The 
Committee’s willingness to make assertions about corporate defamation litigation 
based on limited evidence might be epitomized by a comment made by Farrelly 
while the Committee was hearing evidence. Farrelly stated that ‘many of the actions 
taken by large corporations in particular are not primarily about money’, and in 
support of this assertion cited two cases ‘where the avowed intention of the litigant 
was to drive the publisher out of business’316 – Goldsmith v Pressdram317 and Aitken 
v Guardian News & Media318 – only one of which involved a corporate claimant 
(which was not a for-profit company). 
The CMS Committee’s description of the ‘stifling effect’319 of corporate 
defamation law on freedom of speech was criticized by Magnus Boyd on the basis 
that it was ‘drawn from only two cases over the last eleven years’.320 However, the 
evidence relied on by those claiming that the problem was being exaggerated was 
no less anecdotal. Boyd, for example, went on to assert that the ‘vast majority of 
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corporate claimants’ have legitimate cases, and that it was ‘abundantly clear that 
the McLibel case was atypical’, without citing any further evidence of his own.321 
The fact that various contributions to the pre-2013 reform debates relied on chilling 
effect arguments without convincing supporting evidence reflects more on the 
nature of the chilling effect problem itself than it does on those invoking the theory 
in support of their arguments. From its origins in US constitutional law, the 
empirical evidence supporting the theory’s claims about the effect of the law on 
publishers has been limited.322 Frederick Schauer argues that the US Supreme 
Court’s judgment in New York Times v Sullivan,323 which will be discussed in 
Chapter 4,324 ‘was based on what was at best armchair economics and at worst 
casual speculation, not about the law itself, but about the newspaper industry, its 
organization, and the incentives of its inhabitants.’325 
There is a relatively small, but growing, body of empirical research examining the 
chilling effect of defamation laws in English-speaking jurisdictions,326 but none of 
this empirical literature focuses specifically on the chilling effect caused by 
corporate claims. This lack of empirical evidence mainly reflects the challenges 
inherent in obtaining reliable data on the chilling effect generally, rather than being 
a result of anything specific to the effect of corporate defamation law. David Mead 
simply observes that ‘Formal evidence is very hard to obtain.’327 In large part, this 
is because of the difficulty in systematically identifying instances of the chilling 
effect, given that by definition they involve a decision not to publish certain 
information. Attempts to measure the incidence of intimidatory lawsuits 
specifically face similar problems, because ‘the purpose of threatening a SLAPP 
suit will generally be to silence the critic.’328 If a threat is successful, the target will 
be intimidated into silence without the need for a lawsuit to be filed. This means 
that ‘focus[ing] only on SLAPPs that proceed to litigation or threatened SLAPPs 
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that are reported in some kind of public forum … may [lead to] significant 
underreporting of the phenomenon.’329 
Even where relevant cases can be identified, another significant problem is that the 
existing literature, which tends to be based on interviews conducted with journalists 
and media lawyers, is not able to provide much insight into whether the statements 
that are chilled would be socially beneficial if published.330 Surveys, similarly, may 
be affected by respondents’ self-reporting bias and therefore overstate the amount, 
or the public interest value, of chilled speech.331 Townend notes that trying to assess 
the extent to which the chilling effect suppresses publications that are both true and 
important using these methods would be ‘fruitless’, because the results would 
depend on publishers’ subjective assessments of the value of the statements that had 
been self-censored.332 
One study designed to avoid this reliance on publishers’ subjective assessments of 
the chilling effect provides some insight into corporate defamation law specifically. 
Chris Dent and Andrew Kenyon conducted a comparative analysis of the effects of 
US and Australian defamation law, by analysing the content of over 1400 
newspaper articles. Their results suggest that US newspaper articles contained 
potentially defamatory (not necessarily false) material almost three times as 
frequently as Australian articles, with a particularly significant difference in rates 
of critical reporting on corporations or their officers.333 The study may provide 
some insight into the likely effects of English corporate defamation law because the 
Australian law at the time the study was conducted was broadly equivalent to the 
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law that applied in England before 2013, as compared to the law in the US, which 
is significantly more favourable to defendants than English law.334  
It is clear that further empirical research investigating the chilling effect of English 
corporate defamation law would be valuable. However, as Leslie Kendrick has 
argued, ‘The fact that we cannot measure chilling effects accurately does not mean 
that they do not exist[, or] … that we should not care about them.’335 As 
demonstrated above, there is a good deal of anecdotal evidence showing that 
companies can and do abuse the right to sue in defamation to silence legitimate 
criticism. Further, given that much of the law’s chilling effect is driven by the 
perceived, rather than actual, risk of criticizing companies, the reluctance to publish 
such criticism reported by scientists like Henrik Thomsen and Peter Wilmshurst, 
among many others, shows that the fear of companies pursuing abusive defamation 
claims does suppress important speech on matters of public interest. Considering 
the difficulty of collecting reliable empirical evidence of this phenomenon, this 
anecdotal evidence should be sufficient to prove the existence of a genuine problem, 
which it is plausible to imagine might be addressed through reforms to the law. 
Parliament was justified in seeing the chilling effect of corporate defamation law as 
a significant problem to be addressed in the Defamation Act 2013. 
Conclusion 
Speech about companies is almost always public interest speech, which deserves 
special protection against the restrictions imposed by defamation claims. But 
corporate defamation claims in particular have a range of pernicious effects on 
speakers, and a tendency to chill critical speech on important subjects. In the 
debates leading to the Defamation Act 2013, the chilling effect that corporate 
defamation claims can have on public interest speech was perhaps the most 
significant argument put forward in favour of reforms specifically aimed at 
corporate claimants. Parliament’s response to those arguments was to include a 
provision in the 2013 Act that would require for-profit companies to show ‘serious 
financial loss’ in order to succeed with defamation claims. In the next chapter, I 
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will examine in detail the impact that provision has had since coming into force, 
with a view to assessing how effective it will be in addressing the criticisms of the 
pre-existing law described in Chapters 1 and 2. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE DEFAMATION ACT 2013 
 
 
Introduction 
The widespread concern about the effect of defamation law on freedom of speech 
that was discussed in the previous chapter was the most important catalyst for the 
reform process that culminated in the Defamation Act 2013.1 Free speech 
arguments were also heavily relied on by those advocating reforms specifically 
targeting corporate claimants.2 One of the most significant sections of the Act, and 
the only one in which corporate claimants are addressed directly, is section 1. That 
section was intended to ‘remove the scope for trivial and unfounded actions 
succeeding’3 by requiring claimants to show ‘serious harm’ to reputation. The 
specific provision relating to corporate claimants in sub-section (2), which further 
restricts companies’ right to sue by requiring them to also show ‘serious financial 
loss’, was mainly added to the Act in response to complaints about the chilling 
effect of corporate defamation claims.4 
In full, section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 provides that: 
(1) A statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is 
likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, harm to the reputation of a body that 
trades for profit is not “serious harm” unless it has caused or is likely to 
cause the body serious financial loss. 
The specific nature of the restriction on the corporate right to sue which Parliament 
chose to impose – a requirement to show financial loss – also reflected a recognition 
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of the limits of the corporate interest in reputation that were identified in Chapter 
1.5 Parliament viewed the burden imposed on speech by corporate defamation 
claims as particularly problematic in cases ‘where there is no realistic prospect of 
serious financial loss.’6 Put simply, with s 1(2), Parliament was attempting to 
prevent claimants in these cases from succeeding. By demanding that corporate 
claimants prove that they had suffered an injury to the kind of reputational interest 
most applicable to companies, ‘financial loss’, the intention was to limit corporate 
claims to those in which it was at least arguable that restricting defendants’ freedom 
of speech could be justified in light of claimants’ competing interests.  
Whether the reform will be successful in achieving its aims will depend on how the 
provision is interpreted and applied by the courts. This chapter will look at how the 
courts have interpreted s 1(2) to date, and how it is likely to be applied going 
forward. That discussion will inform my assessment of the provision as a response 
to the criticisms of the pre-existing law that were identified in Chapters 1 and 2. My 
conclusion will be that the additional hurdle imposed on corporate defamation 
claimants under s 1(2) has improved the law by making it more difficult for 
companies to succeed with trivial claims. However, that improvement will probably 
be relatively limited, because the courts have so far tended to interpret the provision 
in a way that is favourable to claimants. The serious financial loss test may also 
increase the cost and complexity of some litigation for defendants; and it does not 
resolve the fundamental problem of the effect of corporate defamation claims on 
freedom of speech. Overall, the 2013 Act does not adequately address the problems 
with corporate defamation law that it was intended to deal with.  
As will be explained shortly, the relationship between the ‘serious harm’ test in s 
1(1) of the 2013 Act and the ‘serious financial loss’ test in s 1(2) means that the 
reform targeted at corporate claimants specifically cannot be understood or assessed 
without an appreciation of the effect of the s 1 threshold on defamation law more 
generally. This chapter therefore begins, in Part A, by examining the effect of s 
1(1). That discussion provides the backdrop for the core of the chapter, which is the 
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analysis in Part B of the case law to date on the ‘serious financial loss’ test in s 1(2). 
Finally, Part C briefly discusses whether the limited data on defamation litigation 
that is made available by the courts can shed any light on whether s 1(2) has had 
any effect, not on how corporate defamation claims are handled in the courts, but 
on which corporate defamation claims are brought at all. 
A. Interpretation of the s 1(1) ‘serious harm’ test  
The ‘serious financial loss’ provision in s 1(2) ‘links explicitly to the serious harm 
test’ in s 1(1);7 and a ‘body that trades for profit’8 will need to satisfy both the 
‘serious harm’ test and the ‘serious financial loss’ test to successfully sue.9 The 
courts’ interpretation of s 1(1) has twice shifted significantly in the six years since 
the 2013 Act came into force on 1st January 2014,10 which means that the corporate 
defamation cases in which s 1(2) has been applied to date have been decided against 
the backdrop of this changing approach to s 1 overall.11 It is likely that the similar 
language used in sub-ss (1) and (2) will be given similar interpretation in the 
courts,12 and so the application of the s 1(2) test has been shaped, to some extent at 
least, by the leading interpretation of s 1(1) at the time each case was decided.13 As 
such, the impact of s 1(2) on corporate claimants cannot be understood without also 
considering the s 1(1) test that must be satisfied by all claimants. Part A explains 
the effect of s 1(1) on English defamation law, and how the courts’ interpretation 
of the serious harm test has developed since it came into force. 
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i. Preceding case law 
To understand the effect of s 1, it is necessary to briefly explain some features of 
the law as it existed prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act, and in particular 
the common law ‘presumption of harm’,14 which applied in cases involving 
corporate, as well as individual, claimants.15 The presumption of harm meant that a 
defamation claimant did not need to prove that the statement complained of had 
caused actual harm to her reputation. Instead, it was sufficient to show that the 
statement complained of had a tendency to harm the claimant’s reputation.16 That 
was determined based on the intrinsic quality of the statement itself, by reference 
to one of a number of tests of ‘defamatory’ meaning.17 This meant that the cause of 
action in defamation was complete at the point that the statement was published, 
and was not reliant on actual harm accruing as a consequence of its publication.18 
The common law position was criticized for allowing claimants to establish prima 
facie liability, and in doing so to put the burden on defendants to avoid liability, 
even when their claims were brought in respect of relatively trivial (but still 
technically defamatory) statements, or when publication was minimal or unlikely 
to actually harm the claimant’s reputation for some other reason.19 As noted above, 
the ‘serious harm’ test in s 1 of the 2013 Act was intended to reduce claimants’ 
ability to pursue these more trivial claims, in light of their effect on freedom of 
expression.20 The section was based on steps that the courts had already taken to 
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25(5) William & Mary Law Review 747, 751. The view that the categories of statement considered 
‘defamatory’ are those with an inherent tendency to harm the claimant’s reputation is a reasonable 
approximation, but it fails to explain some of the common law tests, particularly the ‘ridicule’ and 
‘shun or avoid’ tests: Lawrence McNamara, Reputation and Defamation (OUP 2007) chs 6-7. 
17 The main tests include whether the statement complained of tends to: ‘lower [the claimant] in the 
estimation of right-thinking members of society generally’ (Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237, 
1240); ‘expose the [claimant] to hatred, ridicule, or contempt’ (Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 6 M & 
W 104, 109); cause the claimant to be ‘shunned or avoided’ (Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Pictures Ltd (1934) 50 TLR 581); or ‘affect in an adverse manner the attitude of other people towards 
the claimant’ (Thornton v Telegraph Media Group [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB) [96]). 
18 Shevill v Presse Alliance SA [1996] AC 959 (HL) 983. 
19 eg Douglas W Vick and Linda Macpherson, ‘An Opportunity Lost: The United Kingdom’s Failed 
Reform of Defamation Law’ (1997) 49(3) Federal Communications Law Journal 621, 624-28. 
20 Ministry of Justice, Consultation (n 3) para 4. 
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address this problem in two cases decided in the preceding decade: Thornton v 
Telegraph Media Group Ltd (‘Thornton’),21 and Jameel v Dow Jones & Co Inc 
(‘Jameel’).22 Although Jameel was decided five years before Thornton, the cases 
are discussed in reverse chronological order below for reasons of clarity. 
The issue in Thornton was whether the statement complained of was capable of 
bearing a defamatory meaning.23 Tugendhat J held that, whichever definition of 
‘defamatory’ was applied to that question, it ‘must include a … threshold of 
seriousness, so as to exclude trivial claims.’24 The effect of that threshold is that a 
statement will only be defamatory if it has a tendency to ‘substantially’ harm the 
claimant.25 However, Tugendhat J made clear that ‘the claimant does not have to 
prove that there has in fact been an affect upon him.’26 The decision in Thornton 
therefore retained the common law principle that harm would be presumed based 
on the inherently harmful nature of the statement complained of, but ‘sought to 
confine the application of that principle to cases which reached an appropriate level 
of gravity.’27 
In Jameel, the Court of Appeal also declined to abolish the presumption of 
damage.28 But Lord Phillips MR ruled that a defamation claim could be struck out 
as an abuse of process, even though the statement complained of was presumed to 
have harmed the claimant’s reputation by virtue of its defamatory meaning, if the 
claimant’s reputation had in fact ‘suffered no or minimal actual damage’ as a result 
of its publication.29 Where, as in Jameel, the statements complained of had been 
published to very few people and there was no other evidence that the claimant had 
been harmed, any actual damage to the claimant’s reputation would be so minimal 
that ‘the game [would] not [be] worth the candle’.30 The cost of the litigation for 
the parties and for the court would be disproportionate to the vindication that the 
                                                 
21 Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB). 
22 Jameel v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2005] EWCA Civ 75. 
23 Thornton (n 21) [15]. 
24 Ibid, [90]. 
25 Ibid, [96] (emphasis in original). 
26 Ibid, [93] (emphasis added). 
27 Sir Brian Neill and others, Duncan and Neill on Defamation (4th edn, LexisNexis UK 2015) para 
4.04. 
28 Jameel (n 22) [41]. 
29 Ibid, [55]. 
30 Ibid, [57], [69]. 
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claimant could realistically hope to achieve if successful. If the litigation was not a 
necessary and proportionate means of protecting the claimant’s reputation, it would 
be a violation of the defendant’s Art 10 right to freedom of expression to allow it 
to continue. 
As Mathilde Groppo explains, these cases provided the courts with ‘two 
independent mechanisms to eliminate trivial claims.’31 Put simply, the distinction 
between them is that the Thornton test is relevant to whether the statement 
complained of is ‘defamatory’, determined at the point of publication by reference 
to the inherent tendency of the statement to cause harm; the Jameel test is relevant 
to whether the statement is actionable in a procedural sense, determined at the point 
the issue is tried by reference to extrinsic facts about the actual impact of the 
statement.  
The Explanatory Notes to the 2013 Act state that the ‘serious harm’ test in s 1 ‘raises 
the bar for bringing a claim’ compared to the thresholds established in Thornton 
and Jameel.32 But, while they acknowledge the distinction between the two tests to 
some extent,33 they do not differentiate between the effect that s 1 was intended to 
have on each. Nor do they explain precisely how, or to what extent, the threshold 
for succeeding with a defamation claim is raised by s 1. Those questions were left 
to the courts to answer. 
ii. Ambiguity in the statutory language of s 1 
One of the most significant problems with s 1 of the 2013 Act is the lack of clarity 
in its language.34 Parliament did not intend the serious harm test to be used as a 
definition of ‘defamatory’, either to supplement or to replace the established 
common law tests.35 So, to preserve the requirement for the claimant to show that 
a statement is defamatory at common law, but add on top of that a requirement to 
                                                 
31 Mathilde Groppo, ‘Serious Harm: A Case Law Retrospective and Early Assessment’ (2016) 8(1) 
Journal of Media Law 1, 3. 
32 Explanatory Notes to the Defamation Act 2013, para 11. 
33 Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2015] EWHC 2242 (QB) [50]. 
34 Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 1334, [62]: Davis LJ describing the 
‘conceptual impenetrability of s.1(1) as drafted.’ 
35 See Richard Parkes and others, Gatley on Libel and Slander (12th edn, 2nd supp, Sweet & Maxwell 
2017) para 2.1 (‘Gatley’): ‘The language adopted in the provision – that a publication “is not 
defamatory unless” – is simply not apt to create a new definition’. 
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show serious harm to reputation, the section uses the phrase ‘A statement is not 
defamatory unless…’. This has the unnecessarily confusing consequence that a 
defamation claimant must now show that the statement complained of is 
‘defamatory’ at common law; and then that the statement is not ‘not defamatory’ 
under s 1.  
The ambiguity of s 1 is more than a matter of clumsy language: the decision to make 
the serious harm requirement relevant to whether a statement is defamatory, rather 
than whether it is actionable, introduces conceptual confusion into the test.36 As 
explained above, at common law (including under the Thornton threshold) whether 
a statement is ‘defamatory’ is determined by reference to the nature of the statement 
itself, and can therefore be judged at the point of publication.37 But the language 
used in s 1, which requires that the publication of the statement complained of ‘has 
caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant’, seems 
to suggest ‘that serious harm must be empirically demonstrated’ by reference to 
evidence extrinsic to the statement itself.38 If the intention of s 1 is that claimants 
will need to provide evidence of actual harm to reputation, then the test appears to 
modify the determination of defamatory meaning by reference to events that happen 
after the point of publication. As a result, s 1(1) would have the effect of 
‘abrogat[ing], by necessary implication, the presumption of damage’ that arises as 
a result of a statement’s inherently harmful nature.39 But this ‘long-standing feature 
of the common law’ is not explicitly referred to in the Act, and no clear indication 
is given that Parliament intended to make ‘a profound change to defamation law’ 
by abolishing it.40 
 
                                                 
36 HC Deb 12 September 2012, vol 550, col 373 (Sir Edward Garnier MP); Descheemaeker, ‘Three 
Errors’ (n 1) 26-27. 
37 Text to notes 23-27. 
38 Northern Ireland Law Commission, Consultation Paper: Defamation Law in Northern Ireland 
(NILC 19, 2014) para 4.19. 
39 David Rolph, ‘A Critique of the Defamation Act 2013: Lessons For and From Australian 
Defamation Law Reform’ (2016) 21(4) Communications Law 116, 117. 
40 Ibid. Contrast, for example, the explicit abolition of common law defences in Defamation Act 
2013, sub-ss 2(4), 3(8), 4(6). 
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iii. Shifting interpretation of s 1: the Lachaux case 
These ambiguities were central to the most important case on s 1 to date, Lachaux 
v Independent Print Ltd (‘Lachaux’), which involved a preliminary dispute as to 
whether the claimant had satisfied the serious harm threshold. The High Court ruled 
on the issue in July 2015,41 followed by the Court of Appeal in September 2017,42 
and finally the Supreme Court in June 2019.43 Although all three courts ruled in 
favour of the claimant on the facts of the case, at each level of appeal the legal 
analysis shifted significantly. The Court of Appeal and Supreme Court judgments 
marked the first time each of those courts had considered s 1; and the High Court 
judgment was also effectively the leading authority on s 1 until it was superseded 
by the Court of Appeal’s analysis of the test.44  
The different analyses of s 1 at each stage of appeal turned mainly on the phrase 
‘has caused or is likely to cause’. Soon after the 2013 Act was passed, James Price 
and Felicity McMahon noted that this phrase was ‘potentially ambiguous: it may 
refer to the possibility of some future event occurring, or it may be used to describe 
the situation where the statement itself is of the nature that it is likely to cause 
serious harm.’45 In the High Court, Warby J opted for the first of these 
interpretations. His analysis of the effect of s 1 was as follows: 
‘… in enacting s 1(1) Parliament intended to do more than just raise the 
threshold for defamation from a tendency to cause “substantial” to “serious” 
reputational harm. The intention was that claimants should have to go 
beyond showing a tendency to harm reputation. It is now necessary to prove 
as a fact on the balance of probabilities that serious reputational harm has 
been caused by, or is likely to result in future from, the publication 
complained of.’46 
However, in the Court of Appeal, Davis LJ took a different view. He rejected the 
logical implication of Warby J’s analysis that Parliament had abolished the common 
                                                 
41 [2015] EWHC 2242 (QB) (‘Lachaux (QB)’). 
42 [2017] EWCA Civ 1334 (‘Lachaux (CA)’). 
43 [2019] UKSC 27 (‘Lachaux (SC)’). 
44 Groppo (n 31) 5. 
45 James Price and Felicity McMahon, Blackstone’s Guide to the Defamation Act 2013 (OUP 2013) 
para 2.34. See also para 2.52. 
46 Lachaux (QB) [46]. 
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law presumption of harm without explicitly acknowledging that it was doing so.47 
Warby J’s interpretation of s 1 would also mean that Parliament had ‘swept away 
[the] well-established common law principle … that in defamation the cause of 
action is complete when the defamatory statement is published’.48 Requiring 
extrinsic evidence of harm to the claimant’s reputation would mean that the cause 
of action in respect of a defamatory statement would be inchoate at the point of 
publication,49 and the claim may ‘drift in and out’ of actionability as the 
circumstances of the case change.50 This in turn would make it difficult to determine 
the point from which the one-year limitation period for bringing a claim would 
run.51  
According to Davis LJ’s interpretation, whether a claimant had satisfied the s 1(1) 
test could be assessed by reference only to the inherent tendency of the statement 
to cause ‘serious harm’ to the claimant’s reputation: 
‘Section 1(1) of the 2013 Act has the effect of giving statutory status to 
Thornton, albeit also raising the threshold from one of substantiality to one 
of seriousness: no less, no more but equally no more, no less. Thornton has 
thus itself been superseded by statute.’52 
The Court of Appeal judgment made the ‘serious harm’ test in s 1(1) substantially 
less demanding for claimants to satisfy than Parliament seems to have intended, and 
therefore weakened the protection that s 1 offered for freedom of speech.53 
Although Davis LJ asserted that on his interpretation the s 1 test had ‘superseded’ 
Thornton,54 the effect of his judgment was to read s 1 as doing little more than 
codifying the Thornton test.55 Similarly, if the test in s 1(2) could be satisfied by 
showing that the statement complained of had a tendency to cause serious financial 
                                                 
47 Lachaux (CA) [57]-[58]. 
48 Ibid, [63]. 
49 Lachaux (QB) [45]. 
50 Lachaux (CA) [60]. 
51 Ibid, [61]. 
52 Ibid, [82]. 
53 Mathilde Groppo, ‘Case Law: Lachaux v Independent Print, Supreme Court Abolished Common 
Law Presumption of Damage in Libel Cases’ (Inforrm, 13 June 2019) 
<https://inforrm.org/2019/06/13/case-law-lachaux-v-independent-print-supreme-court-abolished-
common-law-presumption-of-damage-in-libel-cases-mathilde-groppo/>. 
54 Lachaux (CA) [82]. 
55 Nicola Cain, ‘Seriously Limiting Serious Harm’ (12 September 2017) 
<https://www.rpc.co.uk/perspectives/data-and-privacy/seriously-limiting-serious-harm>. 
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loss,56 it would add little to the existing principle that a company can only sue in 
respect of statements that have ‘a tendency to damage it in the way of its business,’57 
subject to a threshold of seriousness,58 so that ‘adverse consequences for the 
claimant must be likely.’59 
iv. The Supreme Court’s Lachaux judgment 
The Court of Appeal’s analysis, according to which the common law presumption 
of damage was left ‘unaffected’ by s 1,60 was reversed on appeal to the Supreme 
Court. Delivering the Court’s unanimous verdict, Lord Sumption agreed with 
Warby J’s conclusion in the High Court61 that ‘the defamatory character of [a] 
statement no longer depends only on the meaning of the words and their inherent 
tendency to damage the claimant’s reputation.’62 Instead, s 1 introduced ‘a new 
threshold of serious harm which did not previously exist’:63  
‘… a statement which would previously have been regarded as defamatory, 
because of its inherent tendency to cause some harm to reputation, is not to 
be so regarded unless it “has caused or is likely to cause” harm which is 
“serious”.’64  
The serious harm threshold must be applied ‘by reference to the actual facts about 
[the statement’s] impact and not just to the meaning of the words.’65 That is not to 
say that the inherent tendency of a statement to harm the claimant’s reputation is 
irrelevant to the s 1 test; rather, that it cannot on its own be determinative of whether 
the serious harm threshold has been met. Whether a statement ‘has caused’ serious 
harm for the purpose of s 1:  
‘… is a proposition of fact which can be established only by reference to the 
impact which the statement is shown actually to have had. It depends on a 
                                                 
56 Although Davis LJ stated (at [82]) that the test in s 1(2) may ‘operate in a way rather different 
from s 1(1)’, that did not prevent the High Court from applying his analysis of s 1(1) directly to the 
s 1(2) test in cases involving corporate claimants: Seventy Thirty Ltd v Burki [2018] EWHC 2151 
(QB) [204]-[205]; Pirtek (UK) Ltd v Jackson [2017] EWHC 2834 (QB) [50]. 
57 Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] AC 534 (HL) 547. 
58 Thornton (n 21) [91]. 
59 Ibid, [56]. 
60 Lachaux (CA) [82]. 
61 Lachaux (QB) [60]. 
62 Lachaux (SC) [17]. 
63 Ibid, [13]. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid, [12]. 
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combination of the inherent tendency of the words and their actual impact 
on those to whom they were communicated.’66  
Lord Sumption explained that ‘the same must be true’ of the likelihood limb of the 
s 1 test, since ‘both past and future harm are being treated on the same footing, as 
functional equivalents. If past harm may be established as a fact, the legislator must 
have assumed that “likely” harm could be also.’67 But Lord Sumption also avoided 
the conflict between s 1 and the principle that the cause of action in defamation 
accrues at the point of publication, which had troubled Davis LJ in the Court of 
Appeal, by arguing that:  
‘The impact of the publication on the claimant’s reputation will in practice 
occur at [the] moment [of publication] in almost all cases, and the cause of 
action is then complete. If for some reason it does not occur at that moment, 
the subsequent events will be evidence of the likelihood of its occurring. In 
either case, subsequent events may serve to demonstrate the seriousness of 
the statement’s impact including, in the case of a body trading for profit, its 
financial implications. It does not follow that those events must have 
occurred before the claimant’s cause of action can be said to have accrued. 
Their relevance is purely evidential.’68  
Claimants will therefore need to refer to some facts extrinsic to the statement itself 
to show the ‘actual’ harm to reputation, or the likelihood of actual harm, necessary 
to surmount the threshold in s 1(1). However, the extrinsic evidence necessary to 
satisfy the serious harm test does not necessarily need to be direct evidence of harm 
to reputation. Lord Sumption allowed for the possibility that a claimant could 
demonstrate as a matter of fact that the statement complained of had caused or was 
likely to cause serious harm to her reputation by inviting the court to draw that 
inference from other circumstances of the case.69 A claimant will be ‘entitled to 
produce evidence from those who [have] read the statement[] about its impact on 
them’, but that does not mean that ‘his case must necessarily fail for want of such 
evidence.’70  
                                                 
66 Ibid, [14]. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid, [18]. 
69 The same is true in relation to the s 1(2) test: see further text to notes 180-200. 
70 Lachaux (SC) [21]. 
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There may be a risk, especially given these comments on the permissibility of 
drawing an inference of serious harm from the circumstances of publication, that 
difficulties will arise in the application of these principles by trial courts,71 similar 
to those that were faced with the Reynolds defence.72 The Lachaux decision could 
be seen as continuing an emerging trend of Supreme Court judgments in defamation 
cases (including Stocker v Stocker,73 and to some extent Flood v Times Newspapers 
Ltd74) that adopt a common-sense, uncomplicated perspective on the law, which 
contrasts quite sharply with the often over-elaborate analysis found in High Court 
defamation judgments.75 Clare Duffy and Jonathan Price note that both Lachaux 
and Stocker ‘overturn more complex Court of Appeal judgments in which a 
defamation expert (Sharp LJ) was sitting.’76 Whether High Court judges with 
defamation expertise will embrace the Supreme Court’s less legalistic approach to 
this area of law remains to be seen.77 
B. Interpretation of the s 1(2) ‘serious financial loss’ test 
Although the individual claimant in Lachaux did not need to satisfy the s 1(2) test 
that applies to corporate claimants, the Supreme Court judgment does include some 
discussion of s 1(2) specifically, because Lord Sumption’s interpretation of s 1(1) 
was partly influenced by its relationship to s 1(2).78  
 
                                                 
71 ‘Supreme Court Confirms Defamation Is No Longer Actionable Per Se’ (Brett Wilson Media Law 
Blog, 19 June 2019) <https://www.brettwilson.co.uk/blog/supreme-court-confirms-defamation-is-
no-longer-actionable-per-se/>. 
72 Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL). For further discussion, see Ch4.A.ii., 
text to notes 53-74. 
73 [2019] UKSC 17. 
74 [2012] UKSC 11. 
75 It is noteworthy that Lord Sumption began his judgment with a criticism of the complexity of 
defamation law: Lachaux (SC) [1]. 
76 Clare Duffy and Jonathan Price, ‘“No Revolution” Says the Supreme Court as it Rules on 
Defamation’ (UK Human Rights Blog, 17 June 2019) 
<https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2019/06/17/no-revolution-says-the-supreme-court-as-it-rules-on-
defamation/>. 
77 eg Chandler v O’Connor [2019] EWHC 3181 (QB): Nicklin J granting summary judgment for 
the claimant despite ‘no clear evidence of … damage to the claimant’ ([20]) and no ‘reliable 
evidence as to the extent of publication’ ([21]). See also the discussion of Al-Ko Kober Ltd v Sambhi 
at text to notes 216-226. 
78 Lachaux (SC) [15]. 
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In common with the serious harm test in s 1(1), the tendency of a statement to cause 
serious financial loss will not be enough to satisfy s 1(2), which: 
‘… necessarily calls for an investigation of the actual impact of the 
statement. A given statement said to be defamatory may cause greater or 
lesser financial loss to the claimant, depending on his or her particular 
circumstances and the reaction of those to whom it is published. Whether 
that financial loss has occurred and whether it is “serious” are questions 
which cannot be answered by reference only to the inherent tendency of the 
words.’79 
Unlike s 1(1), the provision relating specifically to corporate claimants in s 1(2) has 
not yet been the subject of a reported decision by an appellate court,80 although at 
the time of writing a Court of Appeal judgment in Seventy Thirty Ltd v Burki 
remains outstanding.81 There have also been a relatively small number of first 
instance decisions in which the courts have needed to apply the test. To date, four 
corporate claimants have succeeded in the High Court with defamation claims in 
which they have been required to meet the additional ‘serious financial loss’ hurdle 
imposed under s 1(2):  
• Brett Wilson LLP v Person(s) Unknown (‘Brett Wilson’);82  
• Pirtek (UK) Ltd v Jackson (‘Pirtek’);83  
• Seventy Thirty Ltd v Burki (‘Seventy Thirty’),84 since reversed on appeal;85 
and  
• Al-Ko Kober Ltd v Sambhi (‘Al-Ko Kober’).86  
Although a corporate claimant was also awarded damages in Oyston v Ragozzino,87 
judgment was entered for the claimant by consent, and therefore the judge assessing 
damages did not consider whether the claimant could satisfy the s 1(2) test.88 The 
                                                 
79 Ibid. 
80 In Euroeco Fuels (Poland) Ltd v Szczecin and Swinoujscie Seaports Authority SA [2019] EWCA 
Civ 1931, the Court of Appeal overturned Nicol J’s decision ([2018] EWHC 1081 (QB)) to decline 
jurisdiction (at [53]), but on grounds unrelated to his judgment on s 1(2) ([30]).  
81 On appeal from [2018] EWHC 2151 (QB). See Ministry of Justice Case Tracker for Civil Appeals, 
case ref A2/2018/2133, at <https://casetracker.justice.gov.uk/getDetail.do?case_id=20182133>. 
82 [2015] EWHC 2628 (QB). 
83 [2017] EWHC 2834 (QB). 
84 [2018] EWHC 2151 (QB). 
85 See note 81. 
86 [2019] EWHC 2409 (QB). 
87 [2015] EWHC 3232 (QB). 
88 Ibid, [8]. See text to notes 153-155. 
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same is true of the default judgment in favour of the corporate claimants in 
ReachLocal UK Ltd v Bennett (‘ReachLocal’).89  
There have been at least two other cases since the 2013 Act came into force in which 
corporate claimants have been awarded damages, but for which no judgment is 
publicly available. A successful claim heard at Liverpool Civil Justice Centre was 
reported by 5RB chambers in May 2017;90 the fact that no judgment is available in 
that case is unfortunate, because the claimant was awarded £100,000 in special 
damages and £75,000 in general damages, both of which are unusually large sums.91 
A default judgment and award of £80,000 to Privilege Wealth plc in respect of a 
claim against David Marchant, who alleged on his US-based ‘Offshore Alert’ 
website92 that the company was ‘a fraud’, was also reported in Private Eye in May 
2017.93  
As Tom Wright has noted, most of the cases on s 1(2) to date have involved 
‘unrepresented defendants or defendants not appearing at trial, exposing the 
proceedings to a one-sided, claimant-friendly interpretation of the subsection.’94 
This may limit the extent to which those cases can be used to predict how the courts 
will interpret and apply the serious financial loss standard going forward. For 
example, commenting on the judgment in Brett Wilson,95 Thomas Rudkin was 
careful to note that, because the claim was not defended, ‘The significance of the 
case should … not be overstated and more concrete analysis will be likely once 
further cases involving corporate claimants have been heard and properly 
contested.’96 The same applies to Pirtek, in which judgment was awarded by 
                                                 
89 ReachLocal UK Ltd v Bennett [2014] EWHC 3405 (QB). 
90 ‘Timeshare Company Wins Libel Damages’ (5RB, 18 May 2017) 
<http://www.5rb.com/news/timeshare-company-wins-libel-damages>. 
91 See further Ch4.B.i., text to notes 112-115. 
92 <http://www.offshorealert.com>. 
93 Slicker, ‘Libel Tourism’, Private Eye (issue 1443, 5 May 2017) 39-40. The claimant company 
subsequently went into administration owing creditors over £40m, although its failure does not 
necessarily prove that its business was fraudulent: ‘Privilege Wealth enters administration, £42 
million owed to investors and other creditors’ (Bond Review, 12 March 2018) 
<https://bondreview.co.uk/2018/03/12/privilege-wealth-enters-administration-42-million-owed-to-
investors-and-other-creditors/>. 
94 Tom Wright, ‘A Body that Trades for Profit v Somebody that Pays for Love’ (Tom Wright’s Blog, 
20 September 2018) <https://tjwrightuk.wordpress.com/2018/09/20/a-body-that-trades-for-profit-v-
somebody-that-pays-for-love>. 
95 Brett Wilson (n 82). 
96 Tom Rudkin, ‘Defamation Act 2013: You Cannot Be Serious’ (Inforrm, 3 March 2016) 
<https://inforrm.org/2016/03/03/defamation-act-2013-you-cannot-be-serious-tom-rudkin/>. See 
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default; and Al-Ko Kober, in which the claimants were granted summary judgment 
against a self-represented defendant. More broadly, as Rudkin also pointed out, and 
as is to be expected with major new pieces of legislation, ‘the Act remains in its 
early stages, inevitably meaning that the principles will develop further over 
time.’97  
Given the direct connection between the ‘serious harm’ test in s 1(1) and the 
‘serious financial loss’ test in s 1(2),98 the developing interpretation of the former 
will have implications for the ongoing application of the latter.99 Of the four 
successful corporate claims noted above, both Pirtek and Seventy Thirty were 
decided after the Court of Appeal’s ruling that s 1 could be satisfied by reference to 
the ‘tendency’ of the statement complained of to cause serious harm; Brett Wilson 
was decided after the High Court judgment, which was closer to the Supreme 
Court’s decision that the s 1 test relates to the ‘actual impact’ of the statement; and 
Al-Ko Kober was decided after the Supreme Court handed down that judgment. 
The following sections discuss the courts’ interpretation to date of the rule in s 1(2) 
that, where the claimant is a for-profit company, the harm to reputation that must 
be shown under sub-s (1) ‘is not “serious harm” unless it has caused or is likely to 
cause the body serious financial loss.’ Each section will discuss one component of 
this test, as follows: 
i. ‘has caused or is likely to cause’; 
ii. ‘serious’; 
iii. ‘financial loss.’ 
Finally, section iv. will summarize the effect of s 1(2) on corporate defamation 
claimants, as compared to the pre-existing law. 
                                                 
also Hugh Tomlinson, ‘Brett Wilson LLP v Persons Unknown, Corporate Damages and Injunction 
against Unknown Operators of Website’ (2016) 27(1) Entertainment Law Review 22, 24. In Seventy 
Thirty, HHJ Richard Parkes QC commented that Brett Wilson was decided ‘on [its] own facts, and 
[it is] of limited assistance’: Seventy Thirty (n 84) [208]. 
97 Tom Rudkin, ‘You Cannot Be Serious’ (n 96). 
98 Discussed at text to notes 7-13. 
99 For example, after the Court of Appeal handed down its judgment in Lachaux, it was suggested 
that the High Court’s interpretation of s 1(2) in Undre (see text to notes 110-116 and 122-124) ‘may 
be revisited’ to reflect the changing case law on the s 1(1) test (The Hon Mr Justice Blair and others 
(eds), Bullen & Leake & Jacob’s Precedents of Pleadings (18th edn, 1st supp, Sweet & Maxwell 
2017) para 37-03). 
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i. Causation 
The Supreme Court’s Lachaux judgment not only means that corporate defamation 
claimants will need to show actual financial loss, but also that they will need to 
show a causative link between that loss and the statements complained of. The 
common law presumption of harm, as well as absolving corporate claimants of the 
need to identify any loss, in effect acted as a presumption of causation.100 By 
removing the presumption of harm, s 1 has reintroduced the issue of causation into 
the core of defamation law. That may cause problems for some corporate claimants. 
The potential difficulty of proving that a particular loss was caused by the statement 
complained of, as opposed to some other factor, was one of the main objections to 
introducing a financial loss test for corporate claimants.101 According to Watts, 
Bateman, and Davies, ‘Establishing an unbroken chain of causation between the 
defamatory statement and a subsequent loss of income would be a high hurdle to 
overcome in many cases.’102 Peter Coe points to the problems faced by the claimant 
in Tesla Motors Ltd v BBC,103 a malicious falsehood case in which some damaging 
statements about the claimant’s business were actionable and some were not, to 
illustrate the uncertainty that might surround the issue of causation under s 1(2).104 
In his judgment for the Court of Appeal in Tesla, Moore-Bick LJ highlighted the 
difficulty ‘of establishing that any particular loss was caused by one or more of the 
actionable falsehoods rather than by one or more of the statements that are not 
actionable.’105 As a result of these ‘grave difficulties’, the claimant had no realistic 
prospect of success, and its claim was therefore struck out.106 
                                                 
100 Anderson, ‘Reputation, Compensation, and Proof’ (n 16) 764. 
101 eg Report of the Committee on Defamation (Cmnd 5909, 1975) para 336; Jameel v WSJ (n 15) 
[121]; Gary K Y Chan, ‘Corporate Defamation: Reputation, Rights and Remedies’ (2013) 33(2) 
Legal Studies 264, 285. 
102 Alan Watts, Anna Bateman and Cathy-Ann Davies, ‘Libel Law Reform: Focus on Corporate 
Defamation’ (UK Practical Law, 30 June 2010) at <https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/8-
502-6388>. 
103 [2013] EWCA Civ 152. 
104 Peter Coe, ‘The Defamation Act 2013 and CPR 3.4 and 24: A Sting in Causation’s Tail’ (2014) 
25(3) Entertainment Law 93; Peter Coe, ‘The Defamation Act 2013: We Need to Talk about 
Corporate Reputation’ (2015) 4 Journal of Business Law 313, 329. 
105 Tesla (n 103) [46]. 
106 Ibid, [47]-[49]. 
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Similar problems could be expected to arise with s 1(2) in cases involving 
defamatory statements published at around the same time as statements that are 
damaging but not actionable (equivalent to the circumstances in Tesla); where the 
defendant issues a prompt apology and correction of the defamatory statement;107 
where the defendant’s false allegation is corrected by a third party before any 
specific harm can be shown to have materialized;108 or where there were other 
factors that may have damaged the claimant’s business during the relevant time 
period.109 
Undre v London Borough of Harrow (‘Undre’) gives an indication of how some of 
these problems might affect a corporate claimant’s ability to satisfy the s 1(2) test. 
Warby J explained that in defamation cases involving alleged financial loss:  
‘… the issue of causation is often fraught with difficulty … . There are 
invariably competing candidates for causative factors, and confounding 
factors. It can be very difficult to prove that the alleged libel was the cause 
of any loss of profit or other financial loss that is established.’110 
The main problem with causation in Undre was that the statements complained of 
only directly referred to the individual who owned the claimant company. Warby J 
commented that the claimant company provided ‘scarcely any evidence that 
anybody thought badly of the restaurant on any basis other than its association with 
an individual convicted of neglecting animals.’111 The press release in respect of 
which the claimants had sued also contained other damaging allegations against the 
individual claimant which were not complained of;112 as had been the case in Tesla, 
there were difficulties in separating the impact of the statement complained of from 
the effect of related allegations that were either true or not defamatory. 
                                                 
107 eg Cooke v MGN Ltd [2014] EWHC 2831 (QB) [44]. 
108 eg McGrath v Bedford [2016] EWHC 174 (QB) [13]. 
109 eg Culla Park Ltd v Richards [2007] EWHC 1850 (QB) [34] (in which the opening of a new rival 
business at around the time of publication may have affected the claimant’s revenue); Oyston (n 87) 
[34] (in which the claimant’s business was already subject to boycotts and protests that were 
unrelated to the statements complained of: see further text to notes 153-155). 
110 Undre v London Borough of Harrow [2016] EWHC 931 (QB) [56] (Warby J). 
111 Undre (n 110) [63]. 
112 Ibid, [65]-[66]. 
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Other factors added to the company’s problems. The claimants’ business was 
already struggling financially,113 and appeared to have suffered financial losses 
which predated the press release in respect of which the claim was brought.114 
Moreover, there had been a change in the company that owned and operated the 
business, so that it was a ‘now-defunct’ company ‘that was operating the restaurant 
business at the time referred to’ in the press release,115 and it was not clear that the 
specific company that had sued had even existed at that time.116 
The concerns raised by commentators such as Coe about the possibility that 
deserving claimants will be unable to overcome these difficulties in proving 
causation are to some extent understandable, but they should not be overstated. 
When assessing special damages, requiring claimants to show that pleaded losses 
were caused by actionable statements rather than other factors is necessary ‘to 
ensure that an award for economic loss does not exceed what is actually caused by 
the false and defamatory portion of a publication’;117 similarly, if financial loss is a 
precondition of liability, then proof of causation is necessary to ensure that the 
statement complained of actually caused an injury of the kind that justifies imposing 
liability on the defendant for its publication. It is worth remembering that, in some 
cases at least, the reason claimants find it difficult to prove a causative link between 
defamatory statements and financial loss is that there is in fact no causative link 
between them; in those cases there is of course no justification for imposing 
liability. 
The structure of causation in s 1 as a whole 
The language of s 1 when read as a whole makes the causative structure of the 
serious financial loss test slightly more complicated than the above discussion 
suggests. During the parliamentary debates on the 2013 Act, Lord McNally told the 
House of Lords that s 1(2) ‘make[s] clear that a body trading for profit will satisfy 
the serious harm test only if it is able to show that the statement complained of “has 
                                                 
113 Ibid, [57]. 
114 Ibid, [62]. 
115 Ibid, [30]. 
116 Ibid.  
117 Thomas B Kelley and Steven D Zansberg, ‘Why Courts Should Require Plaintiffs Claiming 
Losses to Prove that Falsity Caused Them’ (1997) 15 Communications Lawyer 8, 14. 
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caused or is likely to cause the body serious financial loss”’.118 However, this is not 
quite what the 2013 Act says. Section 1, as a reminder, reads as follows: 
(1) A statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is 
likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, harm to the reputation of a body that 
trades for profit is not “serious harm” unless it has caused or is likely to 
cause the body serious financial loss. 
The phrasing of this section, intentionally or not, creates a test involving two 
causative stages. The ‘harm to … reputation’ that must be shown under s 1(1) will 
only pass the seriousness threshold if ‘it has caused … serious financial loss.’ Or, 
to put the same point in another way, the ‘financial loss’ that a corporate claimant 
is required to demonstrate under s 1(2) must be caused by the harm to its reputation 
required under s 1(1), rather than directly by the statement complained of.  
After some early judgments that lacked clarity on this point,119 it seems that this 
causative structure is now being recognized by the courts. HHJ Richard Parkes QC, 
in his judgment in Seventy Thirty, identified this feature of s 1 more precisely than 
had any previous judgment:  
‘… in my view the pronoun ‘it’ in s1(2) must stand for ‘harm’ (that is, ‘harm 
to reputation’). So it is the harm to reputation that must have caused or be 
likely to cause serious financial loss … . It appears, therefore, that the court 
must be satisfied of two separate matters, namely (1) whether publication 
has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the claimant’s reputation, 
and (2) whether that harm has caused or is likely to cause the claimant 
serious financial loss.’120 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
118 HL Deb 23 April 2013, vol 744, col 1365 (emphasis added). 
119 eg Cartus Corp v Siddell [2014] EWHC 2266 (QB) [32]; Business Energy Solutions (n 9) [14]. 
120 Seventy Thirty (n 84) [205]-[206]. 
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As a result, there are three ways in which a for-profit corporate claimant can satisfy 
s 1; namely by proving: 
• that the statement complained of has caused serious harm to its reputation, 
which has caused serious financial loss; 
• that the statement complained of has caused serious harm to its reputation, 
which is likely to cause serious financial loss; or 
• that the statement complained of is likely to cause serious harm to its 
reputation, which is likely to cause serious financial loss. 
The fourth alternative – that the statement complained of is likely to cause serious 
harm to the claimant’s reputation, which has caused serious financial loss – is 
nonsensical.  
In practice, this quirk in causation is unlikely to affect the majority of cases. 
Because ‘serious harm to the reputation of the claimant’ must be caused by the 
defamatory statement, ultimately, the ‘serious financial loss’ that must be shown by 
a corporate claimant will also have been caused by that statement. However, s 1 
makes it necessary to demonstrate that the financial loss caused by the statement 
has flowed through harm to the claimant’s reputation. Clearly, the proposition that 
A has caused B and C is not the same as the proposition that A has caused B, which 
in turn has caused C, even if both are true in most cases.  
The need to show causation flowing through reputational harm to financial loss may 
have implications in some specific situations. As I will explain in section iii. below, 
it might make it difficult for a company to rely on a loss of goodwill as evidence in 
support of its case on s 1(2).121 Two other kinds of case that might be affected are 
worth briefly discussing here: those involving statements that are also damaging to 
an individual or other company associated with the claimant; and those involving 
statements that disparage the claimant’s goods or services. 
                                                 
121 At text to note 250. 
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In Undre, Warby J explained the causative structure of s 1 in terms of the pre-
existing common law principle that a claimant company can only sue in respect of 
a statement that refers to, and is defamatory of, the company itself:122  
‘The issue is … whether the claimant company can show serious financial 
loss consequent on serious harm to its reputation caused by a defamatory 
imputation about the company, contained in the publication complained 
of.’123 
The presumption of harm at common law meant that if a company could show that 
the statement had a tendency to harm its reputation, it would make little difference 
if the same statement also harmed the reputation of someone or something else. But 
that may no longer be the case if s 1 is interpreted to mean that a corporate claimant 
must show that the financial loss caused by a statement was a consequence of the 
statement’s effect on its reputation, rather than the reputation of an individual 
associated with it. This is reflected in Warby J’s conclusion that:  
‘The most potent causal factor [in the financial loss pleaded] was customers 
shunning the business because it was associated with the first claimant, 
whose personal reputation had been harmed. That is not actionable by the 
company.’124  
Similar issues might arise in defamation claims brought by a number of companies 
within the same corporate group. For example, the claims in ReachLocal were 
brought by two companies: the first claimant was the UK trading subsidiary of the 
second claimant, a Dutch holding company.125 HHJ Richard Parkes QC suggested 
that, but for the default judgment that the second claimant had already obtained at 
a previous hearing, ‘there might be an uphill argument to persuade a court that the 
[s 1] threshold had been crossed.’126 It is not clear how significantly the 
interpretation of s 1 described above would add to the difficulties that holding 
companies already faced before the 2013 Act in establishing that defamatory 
statements referred to them.127 The judge in ReachLocal also seemed sceptical of 
                                                 
122 Knuppfer v London Express Newspapers [1944] AC 116 (HL) 121. 
123 Undre (n 110) [40]. 
124 Undre (n 110) [76]. 
125 ReachLocal (n 89). 
126 Ibid, [34]. 
127 See David J Acheson, ‘The Defamation Act 2013: What Exactly is ‘a Body that Trades for 
Profit’? (2015) 20(4) Communications Law 72, 76-77. 
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whether the holding company claimant should have been entitled to a remedy at 
common law, because it was ‘unlikely that anyone to whom any of the [statements] 
complained of [were] published will have understood those words to refer to [it].’128 
But in TheHut.com v Trinity Mirror,129 in which there was also uncertainty as to the 
relationship between two corporate claimants, Nicklin J’s view was that the details 
of that relationship would not be relevant ‘in relation to the issue of reference’ at 
common law, but may raise issues for the claimants ‘in relation to the causation of 
damage’ under s 1(2).130 
Similar issues of causation may arise in cases involving defamatory statements 
which also disparage a company’s goods or services. The common law rule on 
disparagement of goods or services is that ‘if the imputation is as to the product of 
the [claimant’s] business or profession, then it will be the tort of malicious 
falsehood, not defamation, to which the claimant must look for any remedy.’131 
However, statements which at face value criticize a company’s products or services 
may by implication disparage ‘the mode in which [its] business is carried on’, and 
therefore be defamatory of the company itself.132 The s 1 test, if interpreted as 
above, may make it more difficult for a company to rely on this kind of meaning in 
a defamation claim, even where there is clear evidence that the statement 
complained of has caused financial loss. The issue facing the claimant would be 
demonstrating that the financial loss has been caused by harm to its reputation, 
rather than by harm to the reputation of the products or services directly referred to 
by the statement.  
It is not yet clear whether s 1 will be interpreted in this way. In Al-Ko Kober,133 for 
example, the judge made no attempt to distinguish between the financial impact of 
defamatory allegations against the claimant company, and the impact of criticisms 
of its products that had been published at the same time.134 If s 1 does make it more 
difficult for companies to sue in cases such as these, then that will be a positive 
                                                 
128 ReachLocal (n 89) [34]. 
129 The Hut.com v Trinity Mirror North West & North Wales Ltd [2018] EWHC 2480 (QB). 
130 Ibid, [21]. 
131 Thornton (n 21) [34] (Tugendhat J). 
132 Griffiths v Benn (1911) 27 CLR 346 (CA) 350 (Cozens-Hardy MR). See also South Hetton Coal 
Co Ltd v North-Eastern News Association Ltd [1894] 1 QB 133 (CA) 138-39. 
133 Al-Ko Kober (n 86). 
134 See further text to notes 222-226. 
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development. The appropriate cause of action in which to recover losses caused by 
false disparagement of a company’s products or services is malicious falsehood, 
and it is problematic that the law of defamation often provides an opportunity to 
circumvent the more onerous requirements of a claim in malicious falsehood by 
pleading a meaning that is defamatory of the company itself.135 It would seem, 
however, that if the wording of s 1 leads to this beneficial outcome, it will be more 
through luck than judgement on Parliament’s part. 
ii. Seriousness 
The courts have so far been unwilling to elaborate in any detail upon the 
requirement for financial loss to be ‘serious’. In Lachaux, Davis LJ suggested that 
the word ‘serious’, as used in s 1(1), ‘means what it says and requires no further 
gloss.’136 In s 1(2), similarly, ‘serious’ is ‘an ordinary English word, to be given its 
ordinary meaning’.137  
The courts have made it clear, however, that whether financial loss is ‘serious’ will 
‘depend on the context’,138 and in particular will be relative to the size and resources 
of the claimant company in any given case.139 The corporate claimants in both Brett 
Wilson and Seventy Thirty were able to satisfy the serious financial loss test with 
limited evidence of specific losses in part because both businesses relied on a small 
number of clients.140 In Brett Wilson, Warby J accepted that the claimant, a small 
‘boutique’ law firm, could lose ‘tens of thousands of pounds’ by losing a single 
client.141 In Seventy Thirty, HHJ Richard Parkes QC was of the opinion that ‘serious 
financial loss to a company the size of [the claimant] could be caused by even one 
potential client backing off as a result of a review’ containing defamatory 
allegations.142  
                                                 
135 See further Ch5.B., text to notes 71-97. 
136 Lachaux (CA) [44]. 
137 Brett Wilson (n 82) [30]; Pirtek (n 83) [50]. See also Anglia Research Services Ltd v Finders 
Genealogists Ltd [2016] EWHC 297 (QB) [38]. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Thomas Rudkin, ‘Things Get Serious: Defining Defamation’ (2014) 25(6) Entertainment Law 
Review 201, 202-03. 
140 See further text to notes 188-194 (Brett Wilson) and 201-214 (Seventy Thirty). 
141 Brett Wilson (n 82) [29]. 
142 Seventy Thirty (n 84) [210]. 
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Tom Wright points out that the claimant in Seventy Thirty charged an average client 
£10,000, but that its annual turnover was over £700,000 in three of the four years 
prior to the case being heard.143 This suggests that the loss of one client, which the 
judge claimed would constitute ‘serious financial loss’, would amount to ‘a loss of 
turnover of 1.4%’.144 But it would be unrealistic to expect this to mean that 
extremely large and well-resourced corporate defamation claimants such as 
McDonald’s145 or Tesco146 will need to point to losses in the millions of pounds in 
order to satisfy s 1(2). The equivalent loss of revenue for McDonald’s would be 
around $300,000,000.147 According to Rudkin, ‘even larger companies would have 
legitimate grounds for arguing that the sum of £50,000 constitutes serious financial 
loss’.148 If this is correct, which seems likely to be the case, then either the ‘serious’ 
threshold will be set so low for smaller companies as to be meaningless, or the 
threshold will be applied inconsistently relative to the size of claimants’ businesses, 
to the benefit of larger companies. 
In Undre, Warby J held that, where a claimant seeks to plead a specific loss of 
business, the evidence relied on must be of a loss of profit (or an increase in losses). 
Especially where, as in Undre, the claimant operates in an industry where ‘many 
costs may be highly variable depending on turnover’,149 evidence merely showing 
a loss of revenue will not on its own be enough to show that the financial effect on 
the claimant was ‘serious’, because ‘it does not necessarily follow that a reduction 
in “net sales” translates into an equivalent, or any, loss of profit’.150 However, this 
seems likely to be an evidential, rather than substantive, hurdle for claimants; one 
would expect that in almost all cases a serious fall in the claimant’s revenue would 
be reflected in a serious loss of profit. Warby J also claimed in Undre that, when 
assessing whether the claimant had suffered serious financial loss, ‘it might be 
                                                 
143 Ibid, [112]. 
144 Wright (n 94). 
145 See Ch2.C.iv., text to notes 266-274. 
146 See Ch2.C.v., text to note 314. 
147 Based on annual revenue of just over $21bn: McDonald’s Corporation, Annual Report (2018) 14, 
available at <https://corporate.mcdonalds.com/corpmcd/investors-relations/financial-
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148 Rudkin, ‘Things Get Serious’ (n 139) 203. 
149 Ibid. 
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necessary to take into account … the impact of corporation tax.’151 Again, however, 
there will surely be very few cases in which a loss of profit that would otherwise be 
‘serious’ would fall below that threshold after taking tax liabilities into account. 
The potential problems in relation to causation that were discussed above may also 
be slightly aggravated because claimants will need to prove causation in respect of 
sufficient financial loss to meet the ‘serious’ threshold. Even if the claimant has 
suffered serious financial loss overall, if the element of that loss specifically caused 
by the claimant’s reputational injury is not serious, then the claim will not satisfy 
the s 1 test overall.152 For example, the corporate claimant in Oyston v Ragozzino, 
had it not obtained judgment by consent, may have been unable to establish 
causation in respect of sufficiently serious financial loss to meet the s 1(2) 
threshold.153 Assessing damages, HHJ Stephen Davies pointed to a number of 
factors that might have affected the company, which was the entity responsible for 
managing Blackpool Football Club. The club had ‘obviously suffered, and [was] 
still suffering, commercially’ because of its poor performance in competitions over 
several years; and had suffered losses as a result of ‘boycott campaigns and match-
day protests’ by the club’s supporters that were unrelated to the defamatory 
statements published by the defendant.154 As a result of these other factors, the 
judge was ‘unable to conclude’ that the reputational harm caused by the defendant’s 
allegations had ‘anything other than a modest financial impact [on the claimant] at 
most.’155 It may not be entirely clear yet what ‘serious’ financial loss is; but one 
thing that is certain is that ‘modest’ loss is not it. 
 
 
                                                 
151 Undre (n 110) [50], citing British Transport Commission v Gourley [1956] AC 185. 
152 Lachaux (SC) [15]. The wording of s 1 appears to leave open the possibility that harm to the 
claimant’s reputation which causes serious financial loss might nevertheless not be ‘serious harm’, 
but it seems unlikely that this situation will arise in practice.  
153 Oyston (n 87). 
154 Ibid, [34]. 
155 Ibid, [37]. 
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iii. Evidence of financial loss 
In Pirtek, Warby J observed that ‘Financial loss is a more concrete and tangible 
concept than reputational harm.’156 This might normally be the case, but the 
question remains what evidence a claimant company might adduce in support of its 
case on s 1(2). In other words, what will constitute ‘financial loss’ for the purposes 
of the s 1(2) test, and what evidence will be probative of such loss?  
In the House of Lords debate during which s 1(2) was inserted into the Act, Lord 
Faulks expressed his concern that requiring companies to provide specific evidence 
of financial loss could lead to genuine claims being denied ‘when it is not easy to 
produce by reference to a balance sheet an exact equivocation between the damage 
to a reputation and the damage to a company.’157 Although these comments were 
not addressed in full by the Bill’s sponsor Lord McNally, he did suggest that 
‘financial loss’ should be interpreted more widely than the ‘balance sheet’ to which 
Lord Faulks had referred.158 In contrast, the Joint Committee on the Draft 
Defamation Bill recommended that the requirement for corporate claimants to show 
financial loss should be interpreted narrowly. In its report, the Committee suggested 
that the test:  
‘… should focus on whether there has been, or is likely to be, a substantial 
loss of custom directly caused by defamatory statements. This is because 
the impact of a defamatory statement reaches its most serious, and hardest 
to mitigate, where it leads to a material reduction in customer numbers and 
turnover more generally.’159 
With ‘little discussion in the parliamentary process’160 to help interpret s 1(2), when 
the Act first came into force there was understandable uncertainty as to what kind 
of evidence companies would need to provide to satisfy the serious financial loss 
threshold.161  
                                                 
156 Pirtek (n 83) [49]. 
157 HL Deb 23 April 2013, vol 744, col 1375. 
158 HL Deb 23 April 2013, vol 744, col 1380. 
159 Joint Committee Report (n 6) para 115. 
160 Price and McMahon (n 45) 21, para 2.38. 
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Peter Coe identifies four categories of loss that a corporate claimant may be able to 
rely on to satisfy s 1(2): direct evidence of financial loss; spending in mitigation of 
loss; wasted management time or resources in attempted mitigation; and loss of 
business reputation or goodwill more generally.162 This section discusses each of 
these categories in turn, with two differences: I treat inferences of financial loss 
drawn from other evidence as a separate category (Coe treats this kind of evidence 
as falling into his first category); and I combine my discussion of direct and indirect 
spending in mitigation of loss (Coe’s second and third categories).  
Direct evidence of financial loss 
As indicated in the above discussion of the parliamentary debates on s 1(2), the 
clearest way for a corporate claimant to establish financial loss will be to identify a 
loss of custom or other business, and to show its effect on the company’s financial 
performance by reference to a balance sheet or company accounts.  
Some commentators have warned that, if the courts demand this kind of evidence 
of financial loss under s 1(2), corporate claimants may need to rely on expert 
evidence to sue.163 In Undre, Warby J was critical of the nature of the evidence 
provided by the claimant company,164 and suggested that its failure to adduce expert 
evidence had ‘[left] the court in a difficult position’ from which to assess its case 
on financial loss under s 1(2).165 Based on these comments, Adele Ashton and 
Jeremy Clarke-Williams argue that, ‘Without such evidence, a claimant company 
is at risk of failing to establish serious financial loss’.166 However, this probably 
overstates the likelihood that expert evidence will be necessary to satisfy s 1(2), for 
a number of reasons.  
Firstly, financial loss will not need to be quantified with absolute precision under s 
1(2). Because the ‘serious financial loss’ test is a threshold requirement, loss will 
                                                 
162 Peter Coe, ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Treatment of Corporate Reputation in Australia and 
the UK’ in András Koltay and Paul Wragg (eds), Research Handbook on Comparative Defamation 
and Privacy Law (forthcoming, Edward Elgar 2020) 12-13. 
163 eg Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, ‘Worth the Candle? The Government’s Draft Defamation 
Bill’ (2011) 3(1) Journal of Media Law 1, 16; Daniel Bekos and Clare Arthurs, ‘In Tune with the 
Zeitgeist?’ (2011) 161(7447) New Law Journal 8. 
164 Undre (n 110) [46]-[55]. 
165 Ibid, [53]. 
166 Adele Ashton and Jeremy Clarke-Williams, ‘Lachaux Must Go On’ (2017) 76(Nov/Dec) 
Commercial Litigation Journal 22, 24. 
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only need to be quantified to the extent necessary to satisfy the court that it is 
‘serious’. Once that threshold has been passed, the exact amount of loss caused is 
no longer relevant to s 1(2); more precise quantification will only be necessary if a 
company seeks to recover special damages.167 This has been confirmed in a number 
of decisions on s 1(2).168 For example, in Euroeco Fuels (Poland) Ltd v Szczecin 
and Swinoujscie Seaports Authority (‘Euroeco Fuels’), Nicol J held that, although 
the claimants had not pleaded financial loss to the level of specificity required in a 
plea of special damage, because ‘Parliament [did] not confine[] the expression 
“serious financial [loss]” to special loss’, there was still a ‘good arguable case that 
they [would] satisfy the test in s.1(2)’.169 It is also reflected in the fact that the 
claimant in Seventy Thirty, despite being unsuccessful with a special damages 
claim,170 successfully met the s 1(2) threshold.171 
Lord Sumption’s observation in Lachaux that the ‘has caused’ and ‘is likely to 
cause’ tests are ‘functional equivalents’172 also supports the argument that s 1(2) 
cannot require claimants to show that serious financial loss ‘has [been] caused’ with 
the kind of precision or specificity required when pleading special damage. In Lord 
Sumption’s view, the question whether a claimant is likely to suffer serious 
financial loss ‘should be decided on the same basis’ as the question whether a 
claimant has suffered such loss.173 Showing that financial loss ‘is likely to [be] 
cause[d]’ with the precision required for quantifying special damages would be 
impossible, and therefore cannot be required of claimants seeking to demonstrate 
that the statements complained of ‘ha[ve] caused … serious financial loss’.  
Secondly, there would be significant costs implications if it were necessary in all 
cases to adduce expert evidence to satisfy s 1(2). For example, in Gubarev v Orbis 
Business Intelligence Ltd, the corporate claimants estimated their likely costs in 
respect of expert evidence on the financial loss caused by the publication 
                                                 
167 See eg Suresh v Samad [2016] EWHC 2704 (QB) [27]. 
168 Euroeco Fuels (Poland) Ltd v Szczecin and Swinoujscie Seaports Authority [2018] EWHC 1081 
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complained of at over £200,000.174 It is reasonable to assume the courts will want 
to avoid unnecessarily inflating the cost and complexity of litigation if possible.175 
Thirdly, the rule in Ratcliffe v Evans is meant to alleviate the problems that might 
be faced by claimants attempting to show financial loss that is not easy to prove. 176 
For example, where a business suffers a drop-off in custom from the general public 
in circumstances in which it is not possible to identify any specific customers that 
have been lost, the claimant may rely instead on evidence of a general downturn in 
business.177 While losses should be particularized when possible,178 the principle 
established in Ratcliffe is, ‘In a nutshell, [that] the courts will not shy away from 
awarding damages just because the loss is difficult to quantify. The key is that the 
claimant must have done all it reasonably can to address the uncertainty.’179 That 
may include adducing expert evidence in some cases, but in others it will not.  
Finally, the cases on s 1(2) to date suggest that, rather than demanding direct 
evidence of financial loss from corporate claimants, the courts will often be willing 
to find the threshold met by inferring a likelihood of financial loss from other 
evidence. That is the subject of the following section. 
Inferences of financial loss drawn from other evidence 
Based on the small number of successful corporate defamation claims since the Act 
came into force, it seems that courts will be willing in many cases to find that 
corporate claimants have suffered or are likely to suffer serious financial loss by 
drawing inferences from other available evidence. While this is perhaps an 
understandable reaction to some of the issues discussed above with providing direct 
evidence of loss, the strength of s 1(2) as a mechanism for filtering weaker corporate 
defamation claims is being undermined by the courts’ willingness to infer that 
                                                 
174 Gubarev (n 168) [44]. Senior Master Fontaine considered it to be ‘unlikely that expert evidence 
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claimants have suffered or are likely to suffer serious financial losses that they have 
been unable to specifically identify. 
As explained above, although claimants must prove serious harm to reputation 
under s 1(1) by reference to the actual impact of the statement complained of rather 
than its inherent tendency to cause harm, it will not always be necessary to adduce 
direct evidence of that impact, such as by calling publishees as witnesses.180 Serious 
harm to the claimant’s reputation may also be inferred from other evidence.181 In 
Lachaux, Lord Sumption accepted Warby J’s finding that s 1(1) had been satisfied 
‘based on a combination of the meaning of the words, the situation of [the claimant], 
the circumstances of publication and the inherent probabilities.’182 In Lord 
Sumption’s view, ‘There is no reason why inferences of fact as to the seriousness 
of the harm done to [the claimant’s] reputation should not be drawn from 
considerations of this kind.’183 Lord Sumption’s analysis of s 1 only ruled out the 
possibility that a court could find that the test had been met by inference from the 
statement complained of alone.184 The same is true of the serious financial loss that 
corporate claimants must prove under s 1(2);185 in Euroeco Fuels, for example, 
Nicol J could ‘see no reason why “serious financial loss” may not, like other forms 
of “serious harm”, be capable of inference from the evidence.’186   
In all four of the reported cases since the 2013 Act came into force in which a 
corporate claimant has successfully sued in defamation, the court relied in part or 
in full on inferences drawn from this kind of evidence when assessing whether the 
s 1(2) threshold was met.187 In Brett Wilson,188 the first post-Act case in which a 
corporate claimant successfully established liability,189 the claimant law firm 
pleaded a range of circumstances in support of its case on s 1(2), including the 
availability of the statements complained of in Google search results for the firm’s 
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name, and the likely extent of publication to prospective clients; the financial 
impact that losing a small number of clients would have on the firm; and two 
instances in which the defendant’s allegations had been referred to by third 
parties.190 Warby J held that ‘these pleaded allegations taken overall are in my 
judgment sufficient to make out a case of serious financial loss.’191 His view seems 
to have been heavily influenced by the fact that the nature of the firm’s business 
meant that the loss of only a small number of clients would have a significant effect 
on its income. Nevertheless, Rudkin was right to say that ‘there was not an 
overwhelming amount of specific evidence of financial loss although Brett Wilson 
did assert that they had lost some business as a result.’192 Hugh Tomlinson also 
emphasized that the court ‘was prepared to find “serious financial loss” established 
on limited materials’,193 despite the fact that ‘There was no pleaded factual case as 
to any actual drop off in the conversion of inquiries into instructions or as to any 
financial loss actually suffered by the claimant.’194  
Factors that may be considered indicative of a likelihood of financial loss include, 
for example, the inherent seriousness of the allegation; the extent and duration of 
publication; evidence of actual or likely republication;195 the identity of likely 
publishees and their relationship to the claimant;196 and the identity and credibility 
of the defendant publisher.197 But if courts are too willing to find s 1(2) satisfied 
based on inferences from this kind of evidence, there is a risk that they will not 
sufficiently distinguish between the evidence necessary to justify an inference of 
serious harm to the claimant’s reputation, and the evidence necessary to justify the 
further inference that this reputational harm has caused the claimant serious 
financial loss.  
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Tom Bennett argues that, if it is too easy for a claimant to satisfy s 1(2) by pointing 
to the circumstances in which the statement complained of was published, rather 
than providing direct evidence of financial loss, the result would be that: 
‘All that a claimant need provide is sufficient circumstantial evidence for 
the court to infer from it a tendency to cause serious reputational harm. Once 
the court infers such a tendency, the very same limited, circumstantial 
evidence can be used to infer a likelihood of serious financial loss.’198 
Bennett explains that the courts’ willingness to find the s 1 test satisfied by inference 
from the circumstances of publication has led to the possibility that a corporation 
could base a successful defamation claim on an inference that financial loss is likely 
to result from harm to its reputation which itself has been inferred from other 
evidence, rather than proven directly. Bennett is absolutely right to warn against 
allowing companies to meet the s 1 threshold ‘by stacking inferences on top of one 
another, creating an inferential house of cards.’199 As Warby J put it in Bode v 
Mundell, the courts ‘should not allow a willingness to draw inferences to shade into 
a presumption of serious reputational harm. That would undermine the purpose of 
the reform which s 1 sought to implement.’200 
The judgment in Seventy Thirty, on which Bennett was commenting, exemplifies 
this problem. The defendant, a former client of the claimant company’s dating 
agency business, claimed that the company had misled her about its service to 
persuade her to become a member. In addition to suing the company to recover the 
membership fee, she posted critical reviews of its business on Google and Yelp; the 
company brought claims in defamation and malicious falsehood in respect of those 
reviews.201  
Burki’s claims against Seventy Thirty in deceit and misrepresentation were 
successful; the judge found that the company’s managing director had ‘falsely 
represented the size of [the agency’s] active membership … , and induced her to 
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pay a substantial fee on the strength of his deceit.’202 He found that the defendant 
‘wrote her reviews in the belief … that her complaints were well-founded, and not 
with the motive of doing injury to [the claimant], but rather out of a sense of honest 
anger at the way that she felt she had been treated.’203 He found that the credibility 
to readers of the reviews would be limited by the fact that they were ‘neither literate 
nor reasoned’, and that their impact on the claimant would be mitigated by the fact 
that they appeared alongside positive reviews of its business written by other 
clients.204 He found that the allegations made in one of the two reviews complained 
of were either true, or honest opinion.205 But the judge also found that one part of 
one of the defendant’s reviews, which he had held to mean that ‘the business was a 
fundamentally dishonest or fraudulent operation’, had not been proven true.206 
Because this imputation was defamatory, the defendant would be liable for its 
publication, and the claimant entitled to general damages, as long as the serious 
financial loss test was satisfied. 
HHJ Richard Parkes QC found that the company had not proven special damage 
for the purpose of its malicious falsehood claim, because he was ‘unable to conclude 
from the sparse evidence available … that the [false] review was in reality 
causative’ of the loss of any prospective clients.207 He also placed little weight on 
evidence given by the claimant’s accountant that ‘he could see no particular pattern 
in the monthly sales figures … suggestive of a decline in sales which could be 
linked to publication of either review.’208 The defendant’s argument that this 
evidence undermined the claimant’s case on serious financial loss was rejected, 
because the s 1(2) test was not equivalent to a special damages claim,209 and the 
possibility that prospective clients had been lost as a result of the allegation that the 
claimant’s business was fundamentally dishonest ‘could not be ruled out’ on the 
available evidence.210 
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In my view, the judge’s determination not to assess the likelihood of serious 
financial loss on the same basis as he would assess the special damages claim, while 
based on a reasonable justification,211 seems to have led him to exclude from his 
reasoning on s 1(2) a range of factors that contradicted or undermined the claimant’s 
assertion that the statements had caused any actual financial loss. In making this 
decision as to serious financial loss, the judge allowed the claimant, having passed 
the s 1(2) threshold, to establish liability and an entitlement to general damages 
without the need to address those factors weakening its claim, or to provide any 
further evidence of loss.  
Despite the company’s inability to prove that the false and defamatory part of the 
defendant’s statements had caused it any actual loss, and despite the fact that – 
unlike Burki – it was incapable of having suffered any emotional harm,212 HHJ 
Richard Parkes QC described the general damages award of £5,000 as a ‘small’ 
sum.213 It is not a small sum in contrast to the damages awarded to Burki in her 
deceit claim: aside from reimbursing her the membership fee she had paid to 
Seventy Thirty, she was awarded just £500 for distress.214 The effect is that, 
disregarding litigation costs, Tereza Burki was left £4,500 out of pocket and 
uncompensated for her distress after, having been fraudulently induced into paying 
several thousand pounds to a company that had misrepresented its services to her, 
she wrote two critical reviews of that company, one of which was entirely true or 
reasonable, and the other of which was mostly true but also contained some ill-
judged comments going beyond what she could prove.  
Given those facts, Tom Wright’s assessment of the decision as ‘highly 
unsatisfactory’ is an understatement.215 It cannot have been Parliament’s intention 
to allow a corporate claimant to recover damages, whether they are ‘small’ or not, 
in a case involving criticism of the claimant’s proven unlawful conduct, where the 
balance of evidence is against that criticism having had any financial impact on the 
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claimant’s business. In fact, Seventy Thirty seems to be precisely the type of claim 
which Parliament intended s 1(2) to prevent from succeeding. 
As mentioned above, an appeal against the High Court’s ruling in Seventy Thirty 
has now been allowed. At the time of writing, the judgment explaining the Court of 
Appeal’s reasons for allowing the appeal has not been published, meaning that it is 
not possible to tell what its impact on the law might be. It is possible that the 
Supreme Court’s Lachaux judgment on s 1(1) had a strong influence on the Court 
of Appeal’s treatment of s 1(2) in Seventy Thirty. If so, then the first appellate court 
judgment on the serious financial loss test may mark a significant change in 
direction from the approach taken by the High Court. 
If not, then Al-Ko Kober,216 the only successful corporate defamation claim since 
the Supreme Court ruled on Lachaux, suggests that Lord Sumption’s judgment on 
its own may not make much difference to how the s 1(2) test is applied in the High 
Court. The claimant company was awarded summary judgment by Swift J on its 
claims in defamation and malicious falsehood, brought in respect of the defendant’s 
ongoing publication of YouTube videos containing serious defamatory allegations 
against the claimants, which centred around an assertion that the claimant had 
misled the public about the safety standards of its products, and as a result was 
endangering its customers. The statements complained of had already been the 
subject of an interim injunction in malicious falsehood,217 and the defendant had 
twice been found in contempt for breaching that injunction.218 
In the circumstances, Swift J’s decision to grant the claimant summary judgment 
on its claims in defamation and malicious falsehood was perhaps understandable. 
Nonetheless, his reasoning in respect of s 1(2) was wholly inadequate to support his 
finding that the test was satisfied: 
‘In this case no substantial argument was made to the effect that [the s 1(2)] 
requirement was not met. The statements made in the four videos were 
extreme … . The Claimants do not advance evidence of any specific 
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financial loss to date. However, the likely effect of [the defendant’s] 
statements on [the claimant] … in this regard is obvious.’219 
Swift J’s first remark is irrelevant: it is for the claimant to prove that the threshold 
in s 1 has been met, not for the defendant to prove that it has not. He was right to 
say that the statements complained of bore meanings that were very seriously 
defamatory of the claimants. But, in the same paragraph, he had stated that the s 1 
requirement should be applied ‘as explained in the judgment of the Supreme Court’ 
in Lachaux;220 in that judgment, Lord Sumption explicitly declared that ‘Whether 
… financial loss has occurred and whether it is “serious” are questions which cannot 
be answered by reference only to the inherent tendency of the words’, and that the 
same was true in respect of ‘likely’ financial loss.221  
Based on the information provided in his judgment, Swift J’s assertion that it was 
‘obvious’ that the defendant’s statements would cause the claimant financial loss 
also seems questionable as a matter of fact. Given the long history of the case, at 
the time the defamation claim was decided it was over two years since the videos 
complained of were first published; and yet, as the judge observed, the claimant 
provided no evidence that they had caused any specific financial loss. That may in 
part be because the defendant’s allegations, although defamatory, seem to have 
been wildly implausible and lacking any credibility.  
In respect of its claim in malicious falsehood, the claimant relied on s 3 of the 
Defamation Act 1952, which provides an exception to the normal requirement to 
prove special damage in cases where the words complained of are likely to cause 
‘pecuniary damage’.222 That exception was held to apply because the defendant’s 
statements were made in advertisements for a product he had developed as a 
competitor to the claimant’s.223 Swift J appears to have decided that the statements 
were ‘likely to cause serious financial loss’ for the purposes of s 1(2) on essentially 
the same basis. But he did not acknowledge the difference between proving that the 
defendant’s statements were likely to cause financial loss, as required under s 3 of 
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the 1952 Act, and proving that they were likely to cause serious financial loss, as 
required under s 1 of the 2013 Act. Nor did he attempt to distinguish the likely 
financial impact of the defendant’s allegation that the claimant’s product was 
dangerous from the likely impact of the defamatory allegations against the 
company, which I argued above may now be necessary to satisfy the test in s 1.224 
In any event, it is not obvious that the judge was right to hold that either test was 
satisfied in the circumstances of this case, because the defendant’s ‘competing’ 
product (as Swift J described it225) was not actually available for sale to the 
public.226 
Direct or indirect expenditure in mitigation of loss 
The claimant’s successful arguments in relation to s 1(2) in Pirtek were mainly 
based on a combination of the last two types of evidence to be discussed in this 
section. The first component, and the only quantified loss pleaded, was a sum of 
£15,000 spent employing a public relations consultant to help mitigate the loss 
caused by the defendant’s statements.227 Warby J held that this kind of ‘expense 
incurred in an attempt to mitigate loss’ could properly be considered ‘financial loss’ 
for the purposes of s 1(2), as long as the attempt was ‘reasonable’ as in this case.228 
Warby J’s decision to treat spending in mitigation of loss as relevant to the s 1(2) 
test is interesting because it runs counter to the recommendation of the Joint 
Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill that such expenses should not count as 
financial loss for the purpose of the provision that eventually became s 1(2).229 
However, it seems right, both in principle and on policy grounds, that the claimant’s 
direct expenditure in mitigation of loss should, if reasonable, be relevant to s 1(2).  
Expenses incurred as a result of the claimant’s reasonable attempts to mitigate loss 
are generally recoverable in tort, including in corporate defamation claims.230 In 
ReachLocal, for example, the claimant was awarded special damages to 
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compensate for the cost of credits offered to its existing customers to encourage 
them to stay, and of employing a PR consultant for twelve months to manage the 
reputational harm caused by the defendant’s statements.231 It may also be possible 
for a company to claim that the cost of advertising to counteract the effect of a 
defamatory statement was a reasonable mitigating expense.232  
The position as regards indirect costs of mitigation, however, should be different. 
Coe suggests that it may be appropriate to treat staff or management resources that 
are ‘wasted’ on mitigating the consequences of reputational harm as ‘financial loss’ 
for the purposes of s 1(2). Although most staff costs are relatively fixed, employees 
would likely be engaged in activities that were more valuable to the company but 
for the need to mitigate the loss that might be caused by a defamatory statement. In 
New Zealand, it has been ruled that the ‘pecuniary loss’ which corporate claimants 
must show under s 6 of the Defamation Act 1992 ‘can include the opportunity cost 
of the time of staff members in dealing with the effect of the statements.’233 
Adopting a similar approach to the (roughly equivalent) s 1(2) test would also seem 
to be in line with case law on the assessment of damages in other torts, in which it 
has been held that losses of this kind may be recoverable if staff are ‘diverted from 
their usual activities’ in such a way as to cause ‘significant disruption to the 
[claimant’s] business’,234 without it being ‘necessary to show some additional 
expenditure or loss of revenue or profit’.235  
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However, there are good reasons for the courts to be cautious about this kind of 
evidence of indirect expenditure in the context of s 1(2). In Lonrho v Fayed,236 a 
conspiracy case in which the claimant company sought damages for wasted costs 
incurred as a result of harm to its reputation, Dillon LJ expressed sympathy for the 
defendant’s argument that:  
‘… it would be self-serving to allow the mere cost of staff time or payment 
to third parties to investigate and uncover the conspiracy to count as damage 
and warrant the bringing of the action if the acts done by the conspirators 
have caused no other damage to the victim.’237 
On similar grounds, it is submitted that evidence of wasted management costs 
should not be sufficient to satisfy the s 1(2) test on its own. Most prudent companies 
can be expected to have reputation management strategies that include reallocating 
staff from other tasks to minimize or prevent losses from reputational threats as they 
arise. If wasted staff costs alone could constitute ‘financial loss’, there would be a 
real risk that the s 1(2) threshold could be satisfied on the basis of little more than 
a claimant company having responded to the risk of reputational harm posed by the 
defendant’s statements according to standard practices. That would undermine 
Parliament’s decision to require corporate claimants to show serious financial loss 
in addition to serious reputational harm. 
Fall in share price or loss of goodwill 
The other component of the claimant’s case on s 1(2) in Pirtek was an assertion that 
the defendant’s allegations had ‘gravely damaged the Claimant in its business 
reputation and goodwill’.238 This was the final category of loss identified by Peter 
Coe as potentially relevant to s 1(2). The term ‘goodwill’ refers to that part of a 
company’s value which cannot be attributed to tangible or identifiable intangible 
assets; as noted in Chapter 1,239 a company’s reputation will make up a core part of 
its goodwill, but the two are not entirely synonymous.240 For a company with 
publicly-traded shares, a loss of goodwill will be reflected in a fall in the price of 
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its shares, and therefore in the overall ‘market capitalization’ value that investors 
attribute to the company.  
There was disagreement during the drafting of the Act as to whether a loss of 
goodwill or fall in share price should be capable of constituting, or being relied on 
as evidence of, financial loss under s 1(2). On the one hand, Jonathan Djanogly MP 
suggested on behalf of the Government that ‘we see no reason why there should be 
no redress for a defamatory action that has caused a fall in share price.’241 On the 
other, the Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill recommended that neither 
‘mere injury to goodwill’ nor a fall in share price should be treated as relevant to 
the s 1(2) test.242  
There are three ways in which a company might argue that a loss of goodwill caused 
by a defamatory statement is relevant to the serious financial loss test in s 1(2). 
Firstly, it might be claimed that a loss of goodwill in itself constitutes financial loss 
to the company. Secondly, a fall in the value of the company’s goodwill might be 
relied on as evidence of other financial loss. Finally, it might be claimed that the 
loss of goodwill has caused or is likely to cause other financial loss. I will argue 
below that none of these arguments should be accepted, except possibly the third, 
in some limited, specific circumstances. 
A fall in a company’s share price is not a ‘financial loss’ to the company itself, but 
to the owner(s) of its shares.243 Companies are not typically permitted to own shares 
in themselves without cancelling them.244 Moreover, a claimant seeking to rely on 
a fall in share price in support of its case on s 1(2) is likely to face significant 
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difficulties in establishing a chain of causation from the statement(s) complained 
of. Coe argues that: 
‘Establishing a causative link between a defamatory statement and a drop in 
share price would, arguably, be unjusticiable, or … at the very least open to 
strong arguments of remoteness, allied to a lack of certainty and precision, 
as many variable factors can impact upon share valuation at any given 
time.’245 
This lack of reliability was the main reason that, in Collins Stewart Ltd v The 
Financial Times Ltd (‘Collins Stewart’), the High Court struck out a corporate 
defamation claimant’s attempts to claim both general and special damages based in 
large part on a fall in its share price.246  
The argument that a loss of goodwill more generally might constitute financial loss 
rests on the fact that there are some legal contexts in which a company’s goodwill 
is treated as a property interest. But that does not mean that a loss of goodwill will 
qualify as financial loss for the purposes of s 1(2). In Lonrho v Fayed,247 the 
claimant company sued in conspiracy in respect of harm to its reputation, which it 
sought to frame as an injury to its property interest in goodwill in an attempt to 
circumvent the rule that a claimant can only sue for harm to reputation alone in 
defamation. The Court of Appeal made clear that for a company’s goodwill to be 
considered a property interest, such that injury to it could be considered financial 
loss, it must relate ‘to the buying and selling or dealing with customers which is the 
essence of the business of any trading company’;248 it ‘cannot mean some airy-fairy 
general reputation in the business or commercial community’.249 This suggests that, 
to demonstrate that a loss of goodwill constitutes financial loss under s 1(2), a 
claimant would need to introduce evidence of a loss of custom or loss of contracts 
with suppliers, to show that the goodwill in question related to ‘buying and selling 
or dealing with customers’. This evidence would, on its own, probably be enough 
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to prove financial loss, so the characterization of injury to goodwill as financial loss 
would be redundant in this situation. 
Where the claim is that harm to a company’s general trading reputation constitutes 
a loss of goodwill, because reputation is a component of goodwill, this effect is 
compounded by the construction of s 1. In this case, even if a loss of goodwill is 
capable of constituting financial loss, it still cannot satisfy s 1. As described 
above,250 s 1 requires the company to show serious financial loss caused by harm 
to its reputation. It cannot be possible to satisfy s 1 by characterizing an injury to 
goodwill as both harm to reputation and financial loss, because the loss of goodwill 
cannot have caused itself. Therefore, it should not be possible for a corporate 
defamation claimant to rely on a loss of goodwill or a fall in share price as in itself 
financial loss for the purposes of s 1(2). 
There are, as mentioned, two alternative ways in which a fall in share price might 
be relevant to s 1(2). The first is as evidence of other losses that have been suffered 
or are likely to be suffered by the claimant, with the extent to which the share price 
has fallen indicating the seriousness of those losses. The market’s valuation of a 
publicly traded company ‘reflects expectations about [the] firm’s stream of future 
profits’.251 The value of a company’s goodwill is affected by its reputation because 
investors recognize that consumers and other stakeholders will use the available 
information on a company to determine how they should interact with it. Changes 
to the value of goodwill can be caused by the market’s expectation that ‘investors, 
customers, and suppliers [will] change the terms of trade with which they do 
business with the firm’252 in reaction to new information. But the idea that a market 
valuation representing investors’ expectations of long-term profitability could be 
used as a measure of future loss, or even as evidence that any loss is likely, depends 
on the assumption that investors are capable of making these assessments 
accurately, which is not universally agreed upon.253 This was one of Tugendhat J’s 
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objections to using a fall in share price as a measure of damages in Collins Stewart: 
he commented that ‘the reasons why a share is traded at a particular price … are 
unknown, or, at best, matters of conjecture.’254 Rudkin suggests that, as a result of 
the decision in Collins Stewart, ‘companies should be cautious about relying on the 
effects of a publication on share price as the sole measure of financial loss’ under s 
1(2).255 As well as making it difficult for a claimant to show that a fall in its share 
price was caused by the statement complained of, this also means that the market’s 
valuation of a company is too imprecise to be used to measure other financial 
losses.256 If those other losses are sufficiently serious to meet the s 1(2) threshold, 
then one would expect there to be some evidence of them aside from the reaction 
of the market. 
The final way in which a loss of goodwill might be pleaded in support of a 
claimant’s case on s 1(2) would be the claim that, although not financial loss in 
itself, the loss of goodwill is ‘likely to cause’ other financial losses. As Coe notes, 
a company’s claim in respect of a loss of goodwill ‘relates, first and foremost, to 
“reputational” loss that can result in financial loss.’257 A potentially interesting 
observation along these lines was made by Nicol J in Euroeco Fuels: ‘Loss to 
investors is not automatically to be viewed as loss to the company, but it can make 
borrowing more expensive and the raising of equity more difficult.’258  
This might, in some specific circumstances, be a tenable argument. For example, a 
company that was reliant on raising capital through share issues (known as an 
‘equity-dependant’ firm) may be able to demonstrate that a fall in the value of its 
shares was likely to cause serious financial loss.259 But, as Rudkin notes, this kind 
of argument ‘is unquestionably somewhat of a jump to make and may prove 
problematic’ for corporate claimants in practice.260 In Tesla, the claimant attempted 
to advance a similar argument, alleging that the statements complained of had 
discouraged investors from taking up shares in the company when it floated on the 
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UK stock market; the judge took the view that ‘it is not at all clear how a reduction 
in investor confidence, even if it could be shown to be due to the [statements 
complained of], could have contributed to the losses claimed.’261 
One aspect of Warby J’s reasoning in Pirtek is particularly concerning in this 
regard. The judge quoted a passage from the particulars of claim which he believed 
justified his finding that the statements were likely to cause serious financial loss,262 
as follows: ‘The publication of the said words has gravely damaged the Claimant 
in its business reputation and goodwill and has caused the company serious 
financial loss.’263 He went on to explain that:  
‘This is not explicitly framed as a case of “likely” financial loss, but such 
an assertion is implicit in the allegation of damage to “reputation and 
goodwill”. Goodwill is the ability of a business to generate revenue and 
profit.’264  
This seems to suggest that, since reputation has an effect on future revenue, and an 
injury to reputation will be reflected in a loss of goodwill, a company that has 
suffered (serious) injury to its goodwill will automatically be ‘likely’ to suffer 
(serious) financial loss. That is, that satisfying the ‘has caused … serious harm to 
… reputation’ limb of s 1(1) entails that the ‘is likely to cause serious financial loss’ 
limb of s 1(2) is satisfied. If this logic were to be applied in future cases, the effect 
would be to make the additional burden imposed by s 1(2) redundant. 
iv. Summary of the effect of s 1(2) 
In a number of the cases discussed above in which corporate claimants have met 
the threshold in s 1 of the Defamation Act 2013, the courts have drawn inferences 
of both the serious harm to reputation required under sub-s (1) and the serious 
financial loss required under sub-s (2) on the basis of substantially the same 
evidence, or have been willing to infer the latter despite the claimant adducing little 
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or no evidence of specific losses. It is true that the inherent difficulty of providing 
concrete evidence of loss, and of proving causation, will cause problems for some 
corporate claimants if the s 1(2) test is more strictly applied. But Parliament’s 
intention was to make it more difficult for companies to succeed with defamation 
claims. If a corporate defamation claimant cannot prove that it has suffered any 
specific loss, it is difficult to identify a sufficient justification for imposing liability 
on the defendant.  
The claimant-friendly interpretation of s 1(2) to date has undermined one of the 
primary aims of the serious financial loss requirement, which was to provide the 
courts with a stronger mechanism with which they could dispose of less serious 
corporate defamation claims.265 In practice, it seems that the provision has made 
little difference to the courts’ handling of individual cases: almost all of the 
corporate defamation claimants that have failed to satisfy the s 1(2) threshold would 
also have failed to establish liability under the pre-existing common law. 
The decision in Cartus Corporation v Siddell,266 one of the earliest cases in which 
s 1(2) was applicable, is a good illustration. The claimants applied to continue an 
interim injunction restraining the publication of allegedly defamatory statements, 
which had been obtained without notice to the defendant at a previous hearing. 
Nicol J found that the claimants had failed to make the judge at that hearing aware 
of the serious financial loss requirement imposed by s 1(2).267 But he held that doing 
so would have made no difference to the judge’s decision to grant the injunction: 
‘Had his attention been drawn to s 1(2) of the 2013 Act, I have no doubt that 
the Judge would have considered that the potential harm to the Claimants’ 
reputation within the UK was such that they would be likely to prove this 
element of their cause of action.’268 
Similarly, in HRH Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud v Forbes LLC, 
the corporate claimant failed to satisfy the Thornton test,269 and as such the court 
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did not even consider whether it could satisfy s 1(2).270 As discussed above,271 the 
corporate claimant in Undre failed because the statement complained of did not 
refer to272 and was not defamatory of273 that claimant. Warby J stated explicitly that 
the claim would have failed at common law.274 Ultimately, the only difference that 
s 1(2) made in Undre was to add significant complexity to the litigation required to 
dispose of the company’s claim.275 
However, some of s 1’s potential benefits relative to the pre-existing Thornton and 
Jameel thresholds276 are illustrated by the judgment in Alexander-Theodotou v 
Kounis,277 in which the second claimant was a law firm. The statements complained 
of made serious allegations against the firm, which Warby J held were 
‘unquestionably defamatory’ by the standards set in Thornton.278 But the firm’s 
claim was dismissed under s 1(1) because those statements were only published to 
a small number of people, who would already have had a poor opinion of the firm, 
so that despite the inherent seriousness of the allegations they were not likely to 
cause any actual harm to the firm’s reputation.279 Although an application to strike 
out the claim on Jameel abuse grounds would almost certainly have been successful 
on these facts, the defendant made no such application.  
The threshold in s 1 means that a likelihood of actual (serious) harm to the 
claimant’s reputation ‘is now a substantive element in any claim’ for defamation, 
without which ‘no such claim will get off the ground.’280 The burden is on the 
claimant to provide sufficient evidence of harm to satisfy the court that her claim 
should be allowed to proceed; not on the defendant to establish that it should be 
struck out. But s 1 may also be an effective mechanism with which defendants can 
seek to defeat claims at an early stage: in McGrath v Bedford, Eady J explained that 
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defendants ‘need to be alert to the possibility that a claimant will not be able to 
establish [serious harm] and, where appropriate, may raise the point by way of 
preliminary objection prior to serving a defence.’281 
It is important to note that any claims that fail or are struck out under s 1(2) will 
still have been brought, and may only be disposed of after several preliminary 
hearings, or even a full trial.282 For example, the claims in McGrath,283 in which the 
second claimant was a corporation, were the subject of several hearings and 
decisions in the High Court, despite the statements complained of having been 
published in the context of a tender for a contract that the claimant company in fact 
won.284 For potential defendants with limited means, the expense of having a claim 
against them struck out at an early stage, although less than the cost of a full trial, 
is still sufficient to create a significant chilling effect on expression.285 In this sense, 
the effect of the 2013 Act, both in the courts and more widely, may only be 
marginal. 
It is more difficult to assess the impact that s 1(2) might have had on cases decided 
prior to the provision coming into effect, because the parties in those cases would 
have had no reason to introduce evidence or arguments that might have been 
relevant to the s 1(2) test. However, of the cases decided between 2004 and 2013 
which I have studied in more detail elsewhere,286 there appear to have been only a 
small number in which the serious financial loss requirement may have allowed 
corporate claims to be struck out at an earlier stage. In Jameel v Times Newspapers 
Ltd and Citation plc v Ellis Whittam Ltd, permission was granted to appeal against 
High Court decisions striking out the claims,287 despite the paucity of evidence of 
financial loss in each.288 It is possible that permission to appeal would not have been 
granted, and therefore that these claims could have been dealt with more efficiently, 
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at lower cost to the parties, under the new law. The case that seems most likely to 
have been affected by s 1(2) is Howe & Co v Burden.289 In that case, Eady J held 
that there was insufficient evidence to grant summary judgment in favour of the 
defendants, even though he found that the statements complained of ‘do not seem 
to have reached a wider audience or done the Claimants any harm’.290 It is difficult 
to see this decision having been made had the claimant been required to show 
financial loss. However, Eady J’s judgment was handed down in 2004, before the 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Jameel.291 The claim in Howe & Co could almost 
certainly have been struck out using the abuse of process mechanism established in 
that case.   
It is also possible that a small number of the successful corporate claimants in the 
decade prior to the 2013 Act would have faced difficulties in relation to s 1(2). In 
Applause Store Productions Ltd v Raphael,292 claims were brought by a company 
(the first claimant) and its managing director (the second claimant) in respect of 
material posted on Facebook that infringed the second claimant’s privacy, and was 
defamatory of both claimants. All of the claims, including the company’s 
defamation claim, were successful. However, there appears to have been relatively 
little evidence that the statements, which were only available on Facebook for 
sixteen days,293 had caused the claimant company any loss, and little evidence from 
which it would have been possible to infer such loss. The evidence as to the number 
of people who saw the defendant’s posts was ‘not entirely clear.’294 HHJ Richard 
Parkes QC acknowledged ‘the limited extent of proved publication,’295 but inferred 
that ‘a not insubstantial number of people’ were likely to have seen the material.296 
More specifically, the judge ‘[had] in mind a substantial two-figure, rather than a 
three-figure, number’ of likely publishees.297 The second claimant, under cross-
examination, ‘accepted that Applause Store was still the market leader, and … 
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could not say that any contract had been lost as a result of the posting of the false 
material’ by the defendant.298 In fact, ‘No-one in the industry had commented on it 
to him.’299 However, as there was no requirement for the corporate claimant to show 
financial loss, and the defendant did not plead any defence, the ‘only major issue 
on liability [was] whether the Defendant was responsible for [publication]’.300 That 
question having been answered in the affirmative, the claimant company was 
awarded £5,000 in general damages.301 It seems unlikely that, on the evidence 
referred to in the judgment, the company would have been able to satisfy the s 1(2) 
test.  
C. Has s 1(2) made a difference to the cases that reach 
court? 
The discussion above suggests that, although significant uncertainty remains, it is 
unlikely that the serious financial loss threshold will prevent many corporate 
claimants from succeeding with defamation claims that would have been viable 
before the 2013 Act came into force. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
the section will not be effective: as Matt Collins notes, it may be that ‘the increased 
threshold has more symbolic and practical, than legal, significance.’302 By 
‘symbolic and practical’ significance, Collins is alluding to the effect that s 1(2) 
might have on whether companies decide to bring, or threaten, defamation 
proceedings against critics. Referring to s 1 generally, Davis LJ claimed in Lachaux 
that ‘the very existence of the section should of itself operate to deter the issuing of 
trifling and unmeritorious claims in the first place.’303 It is not yet clear how 
effective s 1 will be in this respect. 
Statistics on the number of defamation claims filed each year since 2013 shed little 
light on whether the Act has been effective in deterring trivial claims. After a ‘blip’ 
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in which the number of claims filed unexpectedly rose in 2014,304 the year the 
Defamation Act came into force, the total number of defamation claims issued in 
London (where the majority of such claims are filed) appeared to have fallen 
substantially in 2015305 and 2016.306 The extent to which the 2013 Act was 
responsible for this is not clear, given that there had already been a ‘long term 
downward trend in the number of claims’ since the 1990s.307 It is even more 
difficult to delineate the effect of the serious harm requirement in s 1 of the Act 
from that of other provisions; for example, it has also been suggested that the public 
interest defence in s 4 may, ‘by encouraging journalistic responsibility, [have] 
reduced the number of egregious libels and so the number of actions.’308  
The downward trend now appears to have reversed: the number of claims filed in 
2018 was ‘up by 70% on 2017’309 at 265,310 compared to 156 in 2017, a figure 
which itself was 40% higher than the previous year’s.311 According to a post on the 
Inforrm blog, the apparent upward trend ‘suggests that the Defamation Act 2013 
has not had a significant impact on the number of claims brought. The average 
number of claims per annum in the 3 years before the Act came into force was 164 
and the average for the 5 years after it came into force was 179.’312 The latest 
statistics (for 2018) were released shortly before the Supreme Court’s judgment in 
Lachaux; it was also suggested that a ruling overturning the Court of Appeal might 
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reverse the trend.313 This is a plausible prediction, which possibly fits with prior 
years’ statistics, which show a small reduction in claims filed in 2016, the year after 
the High Court judgment in Lachaux, which – like the Supreme Court judgment in 
that case – interpreted s 1 favourably to defendants.314 
However, the data on defamation litigation that the courts make available is very 
limited and, most importantly in this context, does not distinguish between cases 
involving corporate and natural claimants. Although there were reports suggesting 
that there had been a sharp decline in the number of claims brought by companies 
in the year-and-a-half after the Act came into force,315 those reports were based on 
results from legal databases, which record only (some) judgments handed down in 
court, rather than the number of claims filed.316 Even the official statistics on claims 
filed are unhelpful: as well as the lack of detail about the claims recorded, the 
figures are simply too small and volatile to form the basis of any firm conclusions 
about the state of defamation litigation in the years since the Act came into force.317 
Moreover, statistics on the number of defamation claims filed in the courts cannot 
give an accurate picture of the effect of the law on public discourse about 
companies. As I discussed in Chapter 2,318 the chilling effect on speech can be 
caused by threats of litigation that never reach the public domain, or even by 
publishers’ self-censorship, driven by fear of such threats. These mechanisms mean 
that critical speech about corporations can be silenced without an actual claim ever 
reaching the courts; and the chilling effect of lawsuits that are threatened but not 
filed cannot be captured by statistics from the courts. As Judith Townend points 
out, ‘A lack of incidents in court does not mean that … journalists and writers do 
not think about, or react to the pressures of[,] defamation … law, either as the result 
of direct threats or anticipated threats.’319 However, it is difficult to obtain reliable 
information about companies’ use of defamation threats to silence criticism, or the 
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extent to which these legal threats are illegitimate. Some practitioners have reported 
a reduction in litigation threats by companies since the 2013 Act came into force, 
along with a shift in attention towards critical comments on social media 
platforms,320 but the conclusions that can be drawn from these anecdotal accounts 
are limited. 
Conclusion 
The introduction of a ‘serious financial loss’ threshold for corporate defamation 
claimants in s 1(2) of the Defamation Act 2013 was not a sufficient response to the 
criticisms that had been made of the pre-existing law. In principle, forcing the courts 
to focus on the financial effects of defamatory statements on corporate claimants 
does address to some extent the concerns described in Chapter 1 with companies’ 
ability to sue in defamation even when there were no meaningful reputational 
interests at stake. But this benefit of the threshold will likely only be marginal in 
practice. The courts’ interpretation of the provision to date has been too favourable 
to claimants, and their willingness to allow claimants to satisfy the s 1(2) test 
without providing any direct evidence of financial loss has undermined the strength 
of the test as a mechanism for disposing of weaker corporate defamation claims. It 
is not clear whether the interpretation of the test will improve as the case law 
continues to develop. But even if it does, the law still gives companies the 
opportunity to abuse threats of litigation to silence criticism, because of the cost and 
complexity of the process by which claims that fail to meet the serious financial 
loss threshold will be adjudicated in favour of defendants. As a result, corporate 
defamation claims are still able to have the unacceptable chilling effect on freedom 
of speech that was described in Chapter 2. 
One important effect of including s 1(2) in the Defamation Act 2013 does not seem 
to have been highlighted during the debates, or to have had much influence on 
Parliament’s decision as to what if any provision it should make in the Act for 
corporate claimants. As a by-product of requiring for-profit companies to show 
serious financial loss, with the intention of placing stricter limits on their ability to 
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sue, Parliament in fact gave statutory footing to the corporate right to sue in 
defamation. It had been open to the Supreme Court before the 2013 Act came into 
force to remove that right, and although doing so would have required overturning 
long-standing precedent,321 it was at least possible that the common law position 
could have been reversed by the Court. After the 2013 Act came into force, that was 
no longer the case – the option of removing the right to sue in defamation from 
companies altogether is now open only to Parliament. I will argue in Chapter 5 that 
Parliament should do precisely that. Before making that argument, though, a range 
of alternative options for reforming corporate defamation law will be considered in 
Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
ALTERNATIVE REFORM OPTIONS 
 
 
Introduction 
Having argued in Chapter 3 that introducing a ‘serious financial loss’ threshold in 
s 1(2) of the Defamation Act 2013 was not a sufficient response to the problems 
with English corporate defamation law, in this chapter I consider a range of 
alternative options for reform. The discussion draws on suggestions put forward 
during the reform debates and in the academic literature, and on approaches taken 
in other jurisdictions. Given the arguments made so far in this thesis, and 
Parliament’s intention that the 2013 Act would make the law more favourable to 
defendants, this chapter discusses potential reform options which would be designed 
to benefit defendants, or which would benefit both parties. I will argue that, 
although there are strong arguments for adopting some of the reforms discussed, 
none of them would adequately address the problems with the law. Instead, the most 
appropriate reform would be to remove the right to sue in defamation from 
corporations altogether. The following chapter will provide a justification for that 
approach. 
The reform options discussed in this chapter fall into three broad categories. Part A 
discusses the possibility of amending the substantive law so that corporate 
defamation claims are less likely to succeed. I argue that it would be reasonable to 
require corporate claimants to prove the falsity of defamatory allegations, or to 
prove that the defendant acted with some degree of fault in publishing the 
statements complained of, in order to succeed with their claims. However, the 
former option would make little difference to most cases, and the latter may have 
unintended consequences that it would be preferable to avoid. Part B discusses 
restrictions that could be placed on the remedies available to successful corporate 
claimants. I argue that companies should not be entitled to general damages for 
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defamation, and that there may also be reasons to restrict the availability of special 
damages. I also discuss the possibility of replacing financial remedies with 
‘discursive’ remedies that would, for example, require defendants to correct or 
retract false allegations. While remedies in corporate defamation are ripe for 
reform, the benefits of such reform would be limited in practice because it would 
not address more fundamental problems with the litigation process itself. Part C 
considers proposed reforms aimed at reducing the cost and complexity of libel 
litigation, or preventing companies from using the threat of litigation to silence 
criticism. I argue that the Defamation Act 2013 failed to make substantial 
improvements in this area, but that more ambitious procedural reforms might raise 
issues in relation to companies’ fair trial rights under Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
A. Reforming the substantive law to restrict 
actionability 
The first broad category of potential reform would restrict the circumstances in 
which companies can successfully sue in defamation, by changing the substantive 
tests used to determine the outcomes of individual cases. Parliament chose this 
approach in the Defamation Act 2013, and decided to restrict actionability based on 
whether a claimant company has suffered, or is likely to suffer, serious financial 
loss. As discussed in the previous chapter, the effect of s 1 of the Act was to remove 
the common law presumption of loss.1 But there are other bases on which the cause 
of action might be restricted. In particular, removing either of the two other 
important common law presumptions – of falsity or of malice – would make it more 
difficult for companies to sue, and thereby limit the circumstances in which the 
courts would interfere with defendants’ freedom of speech in order to protect 
companies’ reputational interests.  
The presumption of falsity means that, once a claimant has established that the 
statement complained of is defamatory, it is presumed to be false unless the 
defendant proves otherwise. As such, although the remedy in defamation is for the 
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reputational harm caused by false defamatory imputations, claimants do not 
actually need to prove the falsity of those imputations in court. Instead, the burden 
is on defendants to prove the truth of the statements complained of, or plead another 
defence, to avoid liability.2 The presumption of malice means that defamation is 
essentially a strict liability tort: the claimant does not need to prove that the 
defendant acted with any degree of fault to succeed with her claim.3 The motive or 
intention of the defendant is only relevant to liability in the context of certain 
defences.4  
Together, these presumptions make it ‘relatively easy for a [defamation] claimant 
to establish the requirements of the tort’.5 The ease with which the elements of the 
cause of action can normally be made out is sometimes seen as an important factor 
in the particularly significant chilling effect that defamation law causes.6 As a 
result, the presumptions of falsity and malice have both been identified as aspects 
of corporate defamation law that could potentially be reformed. The logic is simple: 
removing either presumption would mean that corporate claimants would need to 
provide evidence of either falsity or fault, or both, in order to successfully sue. The 
greater difficulty of suing would mean that fewer corporate claims would succeed, 
and likely fewer would be brought in the first place, especially those that were 
relatively weak on their merits. This in turn would alleviate some of the law’s 
chilling effect on speech about companies.  
The discussion of these reform options in the sections below, which begins with the 
proposal to require corporate claimants to prove that defamatory statements about 
them are untrue, is informed by the different approaches taken to both falsity and 
fault in US defamation law. The experience in the US is potentially instructive 
because, although state libel laws are descended from the same common law 
                                                 
2 Defamation Act 2013, s 2. See Elizabeth Samson, ‘The Burden to Prove Libel: A Comparative 
Analysis of Traditional English and US Defamation Laws and the Dawn of England’s Modern Day’ 
(2012) 20 Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 771, 776. 
3 Richard Parkes and others, Gatley on Libel and Slander (12th edn, 2nd supp, Sweet & Maxwell 
2017) para 1.8 (‘Gatley’). 
4 Eric Descheemaeker, ‘Protecting Reputation: Defamation and Negligence’ (2009) 29 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 629, 639-40. The most relevant in this context is the public interest defence 
in s 4 of the Defamation Act 2013: see text to notes 73-83. 
5 Eric Barendt and others, Media Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Pearson 2014) 361. 
6 eg Russell L Weaver and David F Partlett, ‘Defamation, Free Speech, and Democratic Governance’ 
(2005) 50 New York Law School Law Review 57, 73. 
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heritage as English defamation law, the two bodies of law have ‘diverged so greatly 
that nowadays the resemblance is largely superficial.’7 This divergence is primarily 
the result of the constitutional standards imposed on the tort by the US Supreme 
Court in a series of cases beginning in 1964 with New York Times v Sullivan 
(‘Sullivan’).8 The Supreme Court’s defamation jurisprudence establishes that, to 
sufficiently protect the right to free speech guaranteed by the first amendment to 
the US Constitution, the common law presumptions of falsity and malice must be 
set aside in cases involving ‘public figure’ claimants.9 Instead, such claimants are 
required to prove falsity10 and fault11 to succeed with their claims.12 The House of 
Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee (‘CMS Committee’) observed in 
its 2010 report on Press Standards, Privacy and Libel that these first amendment 
protections ‘have made it very difficult for companies – as “public figures” under 
US law – to succeed in defamation cases.’13 Importing equivalent standards into 
English law might therefore help to address some of the problems identified in 
previous chapters. 
Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott argue that the impact of the first amendment on 
US libel laws has led to ‘what can be reasonably described as a fundamentalist 
approach to the value of freedom of expression.’14 For example, the United States 
is alone among significant English-language jurisdictions in repudiating the 
presumption of falsity.15 As a result, there is ‘a heavy burden placed on those who 
argue for reform by reference to American law to prove that, of all the jurisdictions 
in the world, the United States has things right’.16 I argue below that, at least as 
regards corporate defamation law, there are good reasons to think that the US 
                                                 
7 David A Anderson, ‘Defamation and Privacy: An American Perspective’ in Simon Deakin, Angus 
Johnston and Basil Markesinis (eds), Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (6th edn, OUP 2007) 866. 
8 376 US 254 (1964).  
9 The ‘public figure’ standard is discussed in Ch5.C.iii., at text to notes 222-233. 
10 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc v Hepps 475 US 767 (1986) 776-77. 
11 Curtis Publishing Co v Butts 388 US 130 (1967) 155. 
12 Mark A Franklin and Daniel J Bussel, ‘The Plaintiff’s Burden in Defamation: Awareness and 
Falsity’ (1984) 25 William & Mary Law Review 825, 851-58. 
13 Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Press Standards, Privacy and Libel: Report (HC 2009-10, 
362-I) para 164 (‘CMS Committee Report’). In fact, it is not necessarily the case that corporate 
claimants will be treated as ‘public figures’ in the US: see Ch5.C.iii., text to notes 225-231. 
14 Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, ‘Something Rotten in the State of English Libel Law? A 
Rejoinder to the Clamour for Reform of Defamation’ (2009) 14(6) Communications Law 173, 175. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
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approach is in fact preferable to the approach taken in English law. There would be 
sufficient justification for reforming English defamation law to require corporate 
claimants to prove either falsity, or fault, or both. However, each reform option has 
its limitations; neither would be adequate on its own. 
i. Requiring corporate claimants to prove falsity 
The report Free Speech is Not for Sale (‘FSINFS’), commissioned by the NGOs 
Index on Censorship and English PEN, and influential in the debates leading to the 
2013 reforms,17 identified the presumption of falsity as a particularly problematic 
feature of English defamation law, and recommended shifting the burden of proof 
onto claimants to bring the law further into line with the US.18 There is room for 
legitimate debate about the appropriate allocation of the burden of proving truth or 
falsity, but the framing of the issue in the FSINFS report was misleading and 
unhelpful. The report described the perceived problem as being that ‘In libel, the 
defendant is guilty until proven innocent’.19 A similar criticism levelled at English 
law from the United States complained that ‘England’s defamation statute has 
always required the defendant to prove his innocence.’20 Even aside from the 
inappropriate importation of language from criminal law (defamation defendants, 
successful or otherwise, would not be found ‘guilty’ of anything) and the inaccurate 
reference to ‘England’s defamation statute’ (English defamation law has never been 
codified in a single piece of legislation), when presented in this way the argument 
is nonsensical. Followed to its logical conclusion, it would mean that the existence 
of any affirmative defence to a defamation claim would be unacceptable.  
Dario Milo recommends placing the burden of proof on claimants in cases 
involving public interest speech, on the grounds that the presumption of falsity has 
an unacceptable chilling effect on such speech.21 Although Milo does not explicitly 
link his argument to corporate claimants, he does take the position that speech about 
companies will normally count as ‘public speech’.22 The concern is that, even where 
                                                 
17 eg Ministry of Justice, Draft Defamation Bill: Consultation (Cm 8020, 2011) 5. 
18 Index on Censorship and English PEN, Free Speech is Not For Sale (2009) 8, 15 (‘FSINFS’). 
19 Ibid, 2, 8. 
20 Samson (n 2) 777. 
21 Dario Milo, Defamation and Freedom of Speech (OUP 2010) 184. 
22 Ibid, 145. 
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defamatory allegations are true, the process of proving their truth at trial can be 
difficult, expensive, and time-consuming, with no guarantee of success for 
defendants, all of which factor into the law’s chilling effect on speech.23 In the US, 
companies that are classed as ‘public figures’ must prove the falsity of defamatory 
statements to succeed with their claims,24 as must companies classed as ‘private 
figures’ in cases involving statements on matters of ‘public concern’.25 The 
Supreme Court decisions that established these standards were mainly aimed at 
limiting the law’s chilling effect on speech protected by the first amendment.26 The 
CMS Committee recommended that a similar approach should be adopted in 
English law, so that corporate defamation claimants would be required to prove the 
falsity of defendants’ statements to succeed with their claims.27 
The Ministry of Justice rejected this recommendation on the grounds that ‘Proving 
a negative is always difficult, and it may be unduly onerous on a corporate claimant 
to require them to prove the falsehood of the allegations’ complained of.28 The more 
convincing argument is that, while the party best placed to prove truth or falsity will 
vary depending on the nature of the statement complained of,29 claimants would not 
normally be significantly disadvantaged by bearing the burden of proving falsity.30 
As Marc Franklin and Daniel Bussel have observed in the US, given that the 
allegations at issue in a defamation case will by definition relate to the claimant’s 
own conduct, the claimant ‘should be in a better position than the defendant to test 
the truth of a statement made about himself’.31 In contrast, defendants may be 
reliant on the disclosure of relevant evidence by claimants.32 This can be exploited 
by claimants acting in bad faith, as illustrated by the experience of the defendants 
                                                 
23 CMS Committee Report (n 13) paras 130-32; Hilary Young, ‘Rethinking Canadian Defamation 
Law as Applied to Corporate Claimants’ (2013) 46(2) University of British Columbia Law Review 
529, 557. See further Ch2.C.ii., text to notes 172-197. 
24 Garrison v Louisiana 379 US 64 (1964) 74. 
25 Hepps (n 10) 776-77. 
26 See David J Acheson and Ansgar Wohlschlegel, ‘The Economics of Weaponized Defamation 
Lawsuits’ (2018) 47 Southwestern Law Review 335, 337-38. 
27 CMS Committee Report (n 13) para 178. 
28 Ministry of Justice, Consultation (n 17) para 144. 
29 Mullis and Scott, ‘Something Rotten’ (n 14) 175. 
30 eg Mariette Jones, ‘The Defamation Act 2013: A Free Speech Retrospective’ (2019) 24(3) 
Communications Law 117, 120. 
31 Franklin and Bussel (n 12) 859. 
32 Geoffrey Robertson and Andrew Nicol, Media Law (5th edn, Penguin 2008) paras 3-048-49. 
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in the McLibel case,33 who ‘found time and again that [McDonald’s] claimed to 
have very little documentation or none at all in certain areas.’34 The European Court 
of Human Rights held that, because of the cost and difficulty of relying on the 
defence of truth, in the circumstances of that case the presumption of falsity created 
a disproportionate interference with the defendants’ Art 10 right to freedom of 
expression.35 As Milo has argued, ‘The SLAPP strategy is clearly assisted by the 
presumption of falsity.’36 
Although the CMS Committee recommended reversing the burden of proof in cases 
involving corporate claimants, it took the view that the presumption of falsity 
should be retained in other defamation cases.37 Abolishing the presumption of 
falsity in corporate claims specifically would mean that, in cases involving both 
corporate and individuals claimants,38 a defamatory statement might 
simultaneously be presumed false as it pertained to the individual claimant, and 
presumed true as it pertained to the corporate claimant. The extent to which this 
would cause practical problems is not clear. A similar conflict between 
presumptions of truth and falsity can already exist in cases where claimants sue in 
both defamation and malicious falsehood in respect of the same statement.39 In 
Cruddas v Calvert, in which the claimant sued in both malicious falsehood and 
defamation, Tugendhat J acknowledged that ‘it would be theoretically possible’ for 
there to be a different outcome in each claim with respect to the veracity of the 
statements at issue.40 However, that possibility was fairly remote, because ‘it is the 
experience of judges in practice that the burden of proof is very rarely decisive of 
the outcome of an action.’41 
This reveals the more significant problem with the proposal to remove the 
presumption of falsity in corporate defamation law: it would have only a limited 
effect on the disposition of defamation claims in the courts. In most cases, both 
                                                 
33 Discussed at Ch2.C.iv., text to notes 266-274. 
34 John Vidal, McLibel: Burger Culture on Trial (Macmillan 1997) 79. 
35 Steel and Morris v UK [2005] ECHR 103, para 95. 
36 Milo (n 21) 171. SLAPPs are described at Ch2.C.iv., text to notes 259-265. 
37 CMS Committee Report (n 13) para 178. 
38 See further Ch5.B., text to notes 64-70 and 99-103. 
39 See Culla Park Ltd v Richards [2007] EWHC 1687 (QB) [13]. The overlap between defamation 
and malicious falsehood is discussed further in Ch5.B., at text to notes 71-98. 
40 Cruddas v Calvert [2013] EWHC 2298 (QB) [200]. 
41 Ibid, [201]. 
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parties will adduce evidence in support of their respective positions as to the 
veracity of the statements complained of, irrespective of the presumption of 
falsity.42 Milo points out that ‘a rule requiring the claimant to establish falsity only 
really bites … in cases where the evidence is in equipoise.’43 In these cases, in 
which there is sufficient uncertainty as to whether the statement complained of is 
true that the presumption determines the outcome, Milo argues that the importance 
of freedom of speech justifies erring on the side of protecting defendants;44 this 
argument is stronger in cases involving corporate claimants, in light of their more 
limited reputational interests relative to individual claimants.45 
Although there is a legitimate argument to be made for removing the presumption 
of falsity in corporate defamation law, the case for reforming the law that applies 
to individual claimants in the same way is less clear because of the different 
interests typically at stake in their claims; and adopting different presumptions in 
cases brought by corporate and individual claimants might be problematic. As a 
result, and because of the limited practical impact that removing the presumption 
of falsity would be likely to have in most cases, this reform should not be seen as a 
priority. 
ii. Introducing a fault requirement 
Another important aspect of the US constitutional law relating to defamation is the 
Supreme Court’s rejection of the common law strict liability standard. Instead, 
‘public figure’ claimants must prove ‘with convincing clarity’46 that the statement 
complained of was published with ‘actual malice’; that is, ‘with knowledge that it 
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.’47 It would be 
possible to similarly restrict the actionability of corporate defamation in English 
law by removing the presumption of malice so that liability turns on the defendant’s 
fault. 
                                                 
42 Metropolitan International Schools Ltd v Designtechnica Corp [2010] EWHC 2411 (QB) [5]. 
43 Milo (n 21) 167. 
44 Ibid. In Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL) Lord Nicholls advocated (at 
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Given the public interest in most speech about corporations, and their more limited 
reputational interests compared to individual claimants, it would be reasonable to 
argue that introducing a fault requirement would ensure that the law better balances 
the conflicting interests in freedom of speech and corporate reputation. English law 
has already shifted substantially in this direction, not by requiring claimants to 
prove fault as in the US, but by expanding the fault-based defences available to 
defendants speaking on matters of public interest. The Reynolds and section 4 
defences discussed in Chapter 248 can be seen as effectively introducing an element 
of fault into the tests for liability in English defamation law.49  
But this requires the defendant to actually plead the defence, and places the burden 
of proving both that the statement was on a matter of public interest, and that its 
publication was reasonable in the circumstances, on the defendant. As Tugendhat J 
emphasized in Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd, ‘the risk in relation to the Reynolds 
public interest defence lay[s] on [the defendant], and not on the Claimant. It is for 
a defendant to make good his defence.’50 The same is true of the s 4 defence. This 
limits the extent to which fault-based defences can be effective as a response to the 
law’s chilling effect on speech about companies because, ‘by the time the issue of 
defences arises, too light a burden has been placed on the plaintiff and too heavy a 
burden is placed on defendants.’51 As Hilary Young rightly argues, ‘the onus placed 
on defendants chills speech.’52  
This problem is demonstrated by the English courts’ experience with the Reynolds 
defence.53 Shortly after the House of Lords’ decision, it was predicted that the 
defence ‘may be dysfunctional [in reducing the chilling effect] if it makes libel 
litigation more likely, more protracted, and outcomes less predictable.’54 The 
prediction turned out to be prescient. Commentators argued that the defence was 
costly and difficult for media defendants to run, and that its likelihood of success 
                                                 
48 At Ch2.B.ii., text to notes 43-50. 
49 Reynolds (n 44); Defamation Act 2013, s 4. See Descheemaeker, ‘Protecting Reputation’ (n 4) 
639. 
50 Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2009] EWHC 2375 (QB) [244]. 
51 Young, ‘Rethinking Canadian Defamation Law’ (n 23) 577. 
52 Ibid. 
53 As noted in Ch2.B.ii., at text to notes 47-48. 
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was unpredictable.55 Andrew Scott has reported that, at the time of the House of 
Lords’ decision in Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL, in which it was 
considered necessary to ‘restate the principles’ of Reynolds in order to encourage 
lower courts to apply it more flexibly,56 the defence had succeeded at trial in only 
three cases, out of almost twenty in which it had been pleaded.57 
The intense focus on the pre-publication conduct of the defendant necessitated by 
the ‘responsible journalism’ fault standard meant that the defence was ‘often likely 
to be fact-sensitive.’58 Given the chilling effect caused by litigation costs, it was 
argued that in some instances ‘a newspaper which would have had a perfectly good 
defence would prefer to pay damages and settle than mount a Reynolds defence.’59 
As such, despite the defence appearing to be a substantial liberalization of the law, 
in practice it was not as successful as it might have been in addressing the chilling 
effect – which was identified in Chapter 2 as one of the central problems with 
corporate defamation law specifically.60 As Milo explains:  
‘The relative uncertainty as to whether the responsible publication [defence] 
will apply or not, and the parsimonious comfort from the existing 
precedents, augments, or at least does not mitigate, the undesirable chilling 
effect that arises from the presumption of falsity.’61  
Based on interviews with journalists at traditional media organizations, Russell 
Weaver and others argued in 2006 that ‘Reynold’s impact on the English media’s 
ability to report the public interest has been variable’,62 with common concerns 
including its ‘vagueness and uncertainty’,63 the unduly demanding standards 
                                                 
55 Andrew Kenyon, Defamation: Comparative Law and Practice (UCL Press 2006) 226. 
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required of publishers to make use of the defence,64 and the impact on the potential 
financial cost of both litigation65 and the editorial process itself.66 
Moreover, the defence was likely to be even less useful to non-media defendants.67 
Although in principle it was available to any defendant, in practice the criteria 
relevant to the issue whether the defendant acted ‘responsibly’ reflected the kind of 
expectations that would typically be placed on traditional investigative 
journalism.68 The Reynolds defence was therefore even less effective in dealing 
with the law’s chilling effect on less well-resourced publishers: defendants such as 
‘NGOs, satirical entertainment-style news publications, or individual online critics’ 
benefited less from the defence than institutional media defendants.69 Andrew 
Kenyon’s assessment of the likelihood that the defendants in the McLibel case70 
would have benefitted from being able to use the Reynolds defence is telling in this 
regard:  
‘In terms of subject matter, the speech in McLibel probably could come 
within the Reynolds form of qualified privilege. But, in terms of the 
activists’ research and inquiries, it would almost certainly fail to meet the 
10 illustrative factors listed by Lord Nicholls.’71 
In Chapter 2, I identified the increasing tendency for corporate defamation claims 
to be brought against individual defendants or small organizations, and argued that 
the impact of litigation on these defendants was a particularly pronounced problem 
with corporate defamation law.72 Introducing a fault requirement into English 
defamation law, at least in the form of the Reynolds defence, seems not only to have 
been relatively ineffective in addressing the problems with the law generally, but to 
                                                 
64 Ibid, 228-31. 
65 Ibid, 231. 
66 Ibid, 241. 
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have been particularly ineffective in addressing those problems which are most 
pronounced in the context of corporate claims. 
These issues with the cost and complexity of running the Reynolds defence and the 
impact on the chilling effect were discussed at length by the CMS Committee,73 and 
were the main driver behind the attempt to simplify the defence when it was put 
into statutory form in s 4 of the 2013 Act. The simpler and more flexible ‘reasonable 
belief’ standard in s 4 means that the new defence is likely to be applied more 
leniently in cases involving non-media defendants, to take into account their more 
limited capacity to verify the accuracy of allegations before publication.74 The 
Court of Appeal’s judgment in Economou v de Frietas,75 in which the defendant 
was a contributor to media publications rather than a journalist, confirmed that, in 
determining whether a defendant reasonably believed that publishing the statement 
complained of was in the public interest, the ‘particular role of the defendant in 
question’ was a factor that should be considered.76 Andrew Terry and Eileen 
Weinert argue that, as a result of this decision, the complaints made by reform 
campaigners that ‘along with driving up costs, the Reynolds criteria were not being 
applied widely enough beyond traditional investigative journalism’ have largely 
been addressed by the Act; according to Terry and Weinert, ‘That is no longer the 
case.’77 
However, Sharp LJ stressed the ‘particular and hard facts’ of the Economou case.78 
An important element in the relaxed standard of responsibility applied to the 
defendant was the fact that he had been acting analogously to a journalist’s source, 
and therefore ‘may well [have been] entitled to rely on the journalist to carry out at 
least some of the necessary investigation and to incorporate such additional material 
as [was] required, in order to ensure appropriate protection for the reputation of 
others.’79 Her argument that, as a result of the internet, ‘The implications of the 
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publication of false information are, if anything, more serious now than they were 
when Reynolds was decided’,80 and her reference to the danger of ‘fake news’,81 
suggest that there will be a limit to the leniency the courts will be willing to offer 
citizen journalists, bloggers, social media contributors, and other internet publishers 
of the kind identified in Chapter 2 as being particularly vulnerable to the chilling 
effect of corporate threats to sue.82 
The above discussion suggests that, instead of strengthening fault-based defences, 
it would be more beneficial to place the burden of proving some level of fault on 
corporate claimants. The defence in s 4 of the 2013 Act has the effect of imposing 
a fault standard (‘reasonableness’) in defamation claims involving statements on 
matters of public interest, albeit that it requires defendants to prove the absence of 
fault. If one accepts the argument that was put forward in Chapter 2 that most 
defamatory statements about corporations are in fact on matters of public interest,83 
then it follows that in most corporate defamation claims (subject to the s 4 defence 
being pleaded) the defendant’s fault will be relevant to liability. This makes the 
proposal to require corporate claimants to prove fault a relatively modest one; its 
effect would be to free defendants from the necessity of raising a s 4 defence, and 
to shift the burden of proof with respect to the issue of fault on to the claimant. 
As described above, this is the case in US law, which requires ‘public figure’ 
claimants to prove that the defendant was at fault (specifically, that the statements 
complained of were published with ‘actual malice’).84 However, similar problems 
have been identified in the US to those described above in relation to the fault-based 
defences in English law. One common criticism of the Sullivan actual malice rule 
is that it shifts the focus of defamation trials away from the veracity of the 
statements complained of, and on to defendants’ conduct in publishing them. 
Randall Bezanson notes that as a result of Sullivan, ‘As a practical matter, the truth 
or falsity of the challenged statement is no longer pertinent to the libel action.’85 
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This shift can be criticized on the grounds that the truth or falsity of disputed 
statements is probably what matters most in a defamation claim, both to the parties 
and to the public,86 and the focus on fault means that there is often no need for the 
courts to rule on this issue.87 
But the English strict liability standard has the additional benefit of meaning that, 
except in limited circumstances,88 there is no need for the court to enquire as to the 
defendant’s state of mind at the time of publication. Introducing these factors as 
relevant, or even central, to liability requires litigants, for example, to gather 
evidence about the decision to publish and to present arguments as to how that 
evidence should be interpreted in light of the relevant legal standard of fault. The 
actual malice standard ‘is a cumbersome and expensive way of avoiding liability.’89 
It risks substantially increasing the cost of defending a defamation action, whether 
the defendant is successful or not.90 David Hollander argues that the problem with 
the substantive rules set down in Sullivan and subsequent cases is that they ‘were 
designed on the assumption that damage awards, rather than litigation costs, were 
the primary burden on defendants.’91 That assumption does not reflect the reality.92 
While the Supreme Court’s first amendment jurisprudence has significantly 
reduced the probability that publishers will be successfully sued for libel, it has been 
‘markedly less successful … in reducing the chill that results from fear of having 
to defend a libel case’ regardless of the claimant’s likelihood of success.93 
Ultimately, even the introduction of a Sullivan-style fault standard may not 
eliminate the chilling effect of corporate defamation law. Anthony Lewis cites the 
example of Immuno AG v Moor-Jankowski94 to argue that, even with the Sullivan 
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fault standard, ‘unless judges are alert to the need for summary judgment, a large 
and ruthless corporation can bring a meritless libel suit and extract money from the 
defendants by threatening to bankrupt those who resist.’95 The case has some 
similarities to the Singh and Wilmshurst cases discussed in Chapter 296 – it was 
brought in respect of a letter to the editor of the Journal of Medical Primatology, 
and despite successfully defending the suit the defendant reported legal expenses in 
excess of $1m.97 
This case, and others like it, strongly suggest that, while it may make a beneficial 
difference in some cases, the introduction of a fault requirement would not be 
sufficient to resolve all of the problems with corporate defamation law. It may even, 
in some cases, make claimants’ attempts to abuse the cause of action to silence 
criticism more effective, by increasing the financial threat of litigation for 
defendants – especially those with more limited resources. Given that the cost of 
litigation, and its impact on access to justice, has been called the area in which ‘the 
English libel regime can be considered to have been – and to remain – most 
inadequate’,98 any substantive reform that unnecessarily or disproportionately adds 
to costs should not be welcomed.99  
The proposals to reform corporate defamation law by imposing a requirement on 
claimants to prove falsity or fault are both reasonable, and adopting either would be 
justifiable. But neither reform on its own would be sufficient, for the reasons given 
above. Adopting both reforms, together with the ‘serious financial loss test’ in s 
1(2) of the Defamation Act 2013, would effectively mean that for corporate 
claimants the cause of action in defamation would replicate that in malicious 
falsehood, which would render it redundant.100  
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B. Restricting remedies 
The second broad category of possible reform would seek to restrict the remedies 
available to corporate claimants that succeed in meeting the substantive tests for 
liability on which the previous reforms focused. The serious financial loss threshold 
discussed in the previous chapter is relevant to the question of liability, and so it 
has no necessary effect on the remedies to which successful corporate defamation 
claimants will be entitled to.101 
However, it seems reasonable to suppose that, as they are ‘closely related issues’,102 
there will be some amount of overlap between the evidence relevant to whether the 
s 1(2) test has been satisfied and the evidence relevant to the assessment of 
damages,103 and that decisions on quantum might be influenced by the court’s 
assessment of the evidence adduced in support of the claimant’s case on s 1(2). That 
could work in favour of either claimants or defendants. It is possible that the 
requirement to provide evidence of loss under s 1(2) will focus judges’ minds on 
the harmful effect of a defamatory statement on the claimant’s business, and in 
doing so increase the amount of damages awarded to compensate for that harm.104 
Equally, it may be that in some cases, corporate claimants that only cross the s 1(2) 
threshold by a small margin will reveal their inability to specify any large financial 
losses suffered as a result of the publications complained of, and in doing so will 
encourage judges to award relatively small sums by way of general damages.105  
Regardless of whether s 1(2) has any indirect effect on damages awards in corporate 
defamation cases, clearly the provision does not preclude additional reforms 
targeted directly at the remedies available to corporate claimants. In Part B of this 
                                                 
101 Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2019] UKSC 27, [14]; Theedom v Nourish Training Ltd 
[2015] EWHC 3769 (QB) [31]. 
102 Undre v London Borough of Harrow [2016] EWHC 931 (QB) [78]. 
103 Gubarev v Orbis Business Intelligence Ltd [2019] EWHC 162 (QB) [66]. 
104 Alexandros Antoniou, ‘When the Litigation Winner Becomes the Loser: Undeserving Claimants 
and Mitigation of Damages in Libel Claims’ (2018) 10(2) Journal of Media Law 128, 157 (in the 
context of the serious harm test under s 1(1)). 
105 Seventy Thirty Ltd v Burki [2018] EWHC 2151 (QB) may be an example of this kind of case: see 
Ch3.B.iii., text to notes 201-214. Similarly, the award of a substantially lower amount of general 
damages to the corporate claimant (£1,000) relative to the individual claimants (£20,000 each) in 
Oyston v Ragozzino [2015] EWHC 3232 (QB) appears to have been influenced by the weakness of 
its case on serious financial loss under s 1(2): Ch3.B.ii., text to notes 153-155. 
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chapter, I argue that there are good reasons to introduce such reforms. Sections i. 
and ii. argue that corporate claimants should not be entitled to general damages; and 
section iii. argues that there are also problems with the availability of special 
damages for proven financial loss in corporate defamation cases. Section iv. briefly 
discusses the possibility of using ‘discursive’ remedies, such as orders requiring 
defendants to retract or correct defamatory falsehoods, as an alternative to financial 
remedies; but argues that, ultimately, reforming the remedies available to corporate 
defamation claimants would not address the central problems with the current law.  
i. General damages 
The primary remedy available to successful defamation claimants is an award of 
damages;106 once liability has been established, claimants are ‘entitled to substantial 
damages’ without proving any specific loss.107 General damages are intended to 
fulfil three main functions, stated most concisely by Eady J in Cleese v Clark: 
‘The purpose of libel damages is threefold: 
(1) to compensate for distress and hurt feelings; 
(2) to compensate for any actual injury to reputation which has been proved 
or which may reasonably be inferred; 
(3) to serve as an outward and visible sign of vindication.’108 
It is uncontroversial that the first of these three functions is not applicable in the 
case of corporate claimants: ‘Corporations, having no feelings, cannot recover 
damages for humiliation or distress or other injury to feelings.’109 The sections 
below argue that neither of the other two purposes described by Eady J provides a 
convincing justification for awarding damages to corporate claimants, and therefore 
that companies should not be entitled to financial remedies in defamation without 
proof of specific losses.  
                                                 
106 Gatley (n 3) para 9.1. 
107 English and Scottish Co-Operative Properties Mortgage and Investment Society Ltd v Odhams 
Press Ltd [1940] 1 KB 440 (CA) 461; Broome v Cassell & Co [1972] AC 1027 (HL) 1071. 
108 Cleese v Clark [2003] EWHC 137 (QB) [37]. This formulation reflects the judgment of Sir 
Thomas Bingham MR in John v MGN Ltd [1997] QB 586 (CA) 607. 
109 Downtex plc v Flatley [2004] EWHC 333 (QB) [28] (Tugendhat J). See further Ch1.C., text to 
notes 199-203. 
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In respect of the second function of general damages identified by Eady J (that is, 
to compensate for ‘actual injury to reputation’), without evidence that a defamatory 
statement about a company has affected its financial performance, it is difficult to 
say with confidence that it has suffered any injury that an award of damages is 
capable of remedying. As Milo argues, ‘where the claimant’s business reputation is 
injured, such as is necessarily the case where a claim is brought by a trading 
corporation … presumed … damages are anomalous; they constitute a windfall for 
the claimant.’110 
To some extent, English law already recognizes that ‘where a trading corporation 
has suffered no actual financial loss any damages awarded should be kept strictly 
within modest bounds.’111 Unfortunately, the courts’ understanding of what 
constitutes a ‘modest’ amount of damages is entirely unrealistic, especially when 
awards are being made against individual defendants of ordinary means. When the 
Defamation Bill was being debated in the House of Commons, Sir Edward Garnier 
MP suggested that corporate defamation claimants ‘probably attract £20,000 [in 
general damages] at the top end and usually no more than £10,000, so we are not 
talking about hugely extravagant damages claims.’112 This is, generally, true – 
although there are exceptions such as Cooper v Turrell and Metropolitan 
International Schools Ltd v Designtechnica Corp, in which the corporate claimants 
were awarded general damages of £30,000 and £50,000 respectively.113 The 
average amount of general damages awarded to successful corporate defamation 
claimants between 2004 and 2013 (discounting cases in which no general damages 
were awarded) was slightly over £15,000.114 However, once the awards made to 
human claimants and the awards made to corporate claimants in alternative causes 
of action are taken into account, along with the special damages award in Culla 
Park Ltd v Richards,115 the average liability increases to over £40,000, plus costs. 
                                                 
110 Milo (n 21) 229, citing Robert C Post, ‘The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation 
and the Constitution’ (1986) 74(3) California Law Review 691, 697. 
111 Jameel v WSJ (n 56) [27] (Lord Bingham). See also South Hetton Coal Co Ltd v North-Eastern 
News Association Ltd [1894] 1 QB 133 (CA) 148. 
112 HC Deb 24 April 2013, vol 561, col 917. 
113 Cooper v Turrell [2011] EWHC 3269 (QB) [101]; Metropolitan International Schools (n 42) 
[35]. 
114 David J Acheson, ‘Empirical Insights into Corporate Defamation: An Analysis of Cases Decided 
2004-2013’ (2016) 8(1) Journal of Media Law 32, 51-52. 
115 Culla Park (n 39). 
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These awards were almost all made against human defendants, not well-resourced 
media companies. These defendants are unlikely to find much comfort in Garnier’s 
claim that general damages awards in corporate defamation cases are ‘not … hugely 
extravagant’. 
Kenyon suggests that defamation remedies should take into account ‘whether the 
defendant is corporate or individual and has large or small resources’.116 It may be 
significant that the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) jurisprudence on 
the Article 10-compliance of remedies or sanctions in defamation, as well as 
requiring that ‘an award of damages for defamation must bear a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality to the injury to reputation suffered’ by the 
claimant,117 also makes clear that the consequences of liability for the defendant 
must not be so severe,118 or damages awards so unpredictable,119 as to create a 
chilling effect on expression on matters of public interest. In Steel v UK, the Court 
held that the general damages awarded in the McLibel case disproportionately 
interfered with the defendants’ Art 10 rights,120 explaining that the awards of 
£36,000 against one defendant and £40,000 against the other, ‘although relatively 
moderate by contemporary standards in defamation cases in England and Wales, 
were very substantial when compared to the modest incomes and resources of the 
two applicants.’121 
In Gur v Avrupa Newspapers Ltd, Dyson LJ claimed that if the decision in Steel 
‘requires a change to a fundamental and long established principle of our law – that 
the means of a defendant are irrelevant to the assessment of damages for a tort – 
that change can only be made by the [Supreme Court].’122 However, in subsequent 
cases the ECtHR has declared defamation penalties to be in violation of Art 10 
having explicitly compared them to the applicants’ salaries and to the minimum 
wage.123 It is now sufficiently clear that the Court regards a defendant’s means as 
                                                 
116 Andrew Kenyon, ‘Problems with Defamation Damages?’ (1998) 24 Monash University Law 
Review 70, 91. 
117 Tolstoy Miloslavsky v UK App no 18139/91 (ECtHR, 13 July 1995) para 49. 
118 Cumpănă and Mazăre v Romania App no 33348/96 (ECtHR, 17 December 2004) paras 111-16. 
119 Independent News and Media v Ireland (2006) 42 EHRR 46, para 41. 
120 Steel (n 35) para 97. 
121 Ibid, para 96. 
122 [2008] EWCA Civ 594, [25]. 
123 Kasabova v Bulgaria App no 22385/03 (ECtHR, 19 April 2011) para 71; Bozhkov v Bulgaria 
App no 3316/04 (ECtHR, 19 April 2011) para 55. 
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relevant to the question whether a defamation remedy is a proportional interference 
with their Art 10 rights that the Human Rights Act requires English courts to take 
this factor into account.124 It is entirely possible that even a financial remedy which 
is proportional to the harm suffered by a corporate defamation claimant may violate 
Art 10 if awarded against a defendant of limited means.125 
ii. Vindicatory damages 
There are particularly strong arguments for eliminating the third kind of general 
damages referred to by Eady J:126 so-called ‘vindicatory damages’, which 
successful corporate claimants are entitled to on the same basis as individual 
claimants.127 David Rolph has pointed out the ‘lack of clarity’ regarding the 
vindicatory function of damages in defamation.128 He notes that ‘the award of 
damages, particularly the size of the award, is commonly cited as the most 
important factor in securing the vindication of the plaintiff’s reputation.’129 Not just 
the finding of liability and the award of damages, but the amount of damages 
awarded, is seen ‘to serve as an outward and visible sign of vindication.’130 This 
idea of vindicatory damages stems from Broome v Cassell & Co Ltd, in which Lord 
Hailsham explained the rationale for this kind of award as follows:  
‘… in case the libel, driven underground, emerges from its lurking place at 
some future date, [the claimant] must be able to point to a sum awarded by 
                                                 
124 Of course, this would require English courts to recognize when an otherwise ‘standard’ award of 
damages might disproportionately affect a particular defendant. In Robins v Kordowski, Tugendhat 
J stated that, because the claimant was entitled to a maximum of £10,000 damages under the 
summary judgment procedure, ‘the application of the principle in the Steel case to the present facts 
is limited’ ([2011] EWHC 1912 (QB) [85]). 
125 Rónán Ó Fathaigh, ‘Article 10 and the Chilling Effect Principle’ (2013) 3 European Human 
Rights Law Review 304, 307. I explored this argument in slightly more depth in David J Acheson, 
‘The Digital Defamation Damages Dilemma’ (Society of Legal Scholars Annual Conference 2019) 
at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3481760>. 
126 See text to note 108. 
127 Applause Store Productions Ltd v Raphael [2008] EWHC 1781 (QB) [76]. It has even been 
asserted, in a case involving both an individual and a firm as claimants, that ‘the main purpose of 
damages in libel is to mark the seriousness of the libel and to demonstrate publicly that the claimants’ 
reputation has been vindicated’: Robins v Kordowski [2011] EWHC 1912 (QB) [82] (Tugendhat J) 
(emphasis added). 
128 David Rolph, ‘Vindicating Reputation and Privacy’ in Andrew T Kenyon (ed), Comparative 
Defamation and Privacy Law (Cambridge University Press 2016) 296. 
129 Ibid, 296-97. 
130 Cleese v Clark (n 108) [37] (Eady J). 
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a jury sufficient to convince a bystander of the baselessness of the charge 
[ie the defendant’s defamatory statement].’131  
In Dingle v Associated Newspapers Ltd, Lord Radcliffe emphasized this purported 
link between the amount of damages awarded and the future effects of the 
defamation on the claimant’s reputation: ‘A libel action is fundamentally an action 
to vindicate a man’s reputation on some point as to which he has been falsely 
defamed, and the damages awarded have to be regarded as the demonstrative mark 
of that vindication.’132  
This functional view of vindicatory damages as having a beneficial effect on the 
attitudes of people toward the claimant in the future is ‘unique to defamation’,133 
and contrasts with the more widely applicable notion of vindicatory damages, 
which sees them as ‘attesting to, affirming and reinforcing the fundamental nature 
of the interest [infringed by the defendant] and its inherent value.’134 This 
conception of vindicatory damages, which is based on claimants’ dignitary 
interests,135 makes little sense in the context of corporate defamation law. 
Vindicatory damages must be awarded to corporate defamation claimants for the 
more functional purpose of helping to mitigate future losses.136  
But there are problems with awarding a company damages for this purpose. Firstly, 
to the extent that the defamatory publication complained of is liable to cause future 
financial losses to the claimant, the appropriate remedy ought to be compensatory 
damages. There is a risk of double counting if the long-term effects of a defamatory 
statement are addressed by awarding both compensatory damages to make good 
future losses and vindicatory damages to prevent such losses by demonstrating that 
the defamatory allegation was unfounded.  
                                                 
131 Broome (n 107) 1071. 
132 Dingle v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1964] AC 371 (HL) 396. 
133 Supreme Court Procedure Committee, Report on Practice and Procedure in Defamation (July 
1991) ch XXIII, para 9. 
134 Jason N E Varuhas, ‘The Concept of ‘Vindication’ in the Law of Torts: Rights, Interests and 
Damages’ (2014) 34(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 253, 255. 
135 Kit Barker, ‘Private and Public: The Mixed Concept of Vindication in Torts and Private Law’ in 
Stephen G A Pitel, Jason W Neyers and Erika Chamberlain (eds), Tort Law: Challenging Orthodoxy 
(Hart 2013) 77-78. 
136 For example, in Downtex (n 109) [35]-[39], Tugendhat J rightly disregarded the vindicatory 
purpose of damages in a case in which, in between the publications and the verdict, the corporate 
claimant had restructured and no longer traded under the same name.  
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Secondly, it is not clear whether an award of vindicatory damages, and particularly 
the size of such an award, actually has the desired effect of improving the claimant’s 
reputation in the future. As Rolph notes, ‘There is understandably widespread 
scepticism about whether an award of damages for defamation can ensure the 
vindication of a plaintiff’s reputation.’137 Arguably, a successful claim will be 
sufficient on its own to achieve vindication for some claimants,138 particularly 
where a truth defence has been rejected, but courts have disagreed on this point. On 
one view, ‘It seems … inescapable that the existence of a prior reasoned judgment 
… is at least capable of providing some vindication of a Claimant’s reputation.’139 
But in Cairns v Modi,140 Lord Judge LCJ explained that, although ‘There will be 
occasions when the judgment will provide sufficient vindication, … whether it does 
so is always a fact-specific question.’141 The fact that the court has rejected an 
attempted truth defence is sometimes seen as a reason to increase the amount of 
vindicatory damages awarded, to counteract the defendant’s continued insistence 
that the allegations complained of were true.142 The court’s reasons for finding the 
defendant liable may not make much difference either way, if one accepts Eady J’s 
assertion that ‘What most interested observers will want to know is, quite simply, 
“how much did [the claimant] get?”’143  
But the sum awarded for vindication is not assessed with any great precision, and 
typically is not even identified separately from the overall damages award.144 Hilary 
Young points out that there is ‘no evidence of what amount will send a signal 
sufficient to restore reputation’;145 instead, courts ‘essentially award an arbitrary 
amount.’146 Young’s criticism is borne out by the sums awarded to corporate 
claimants in recent years. In Metropolitan International Schools Ltd v 
                                                 
137 Rolph, ‘Vindicating Reputation and Privacy’ (n 128) 307. See also Kenyon, ‘Problems with 
Defamation Damages?’ (n 116) 73. 
138 Applause Store (n 127) [76]. This did not prevent the judge awarding £5,000 to the corporate 
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143 Cruddas v Adams [2013] EWHC 145 (QB) [43]. 
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Designtechnica Corp, having provided reasons for holding that the statements in 
question were false, Tugendhat J nevertheless declared that ‘the sum necessary to 
demonstrate the falsity of the allegations complained of in this case is £50,000.’147 
In Creative Resins International Ltd v Glasslam Europe Ltd, Eady J claimed that 
an award of £15,000 ‘ought to leave no doubt in the minds of anyone who has read 
the article in question that the allegations are demonstrably false’,148 although the 
claimant had not provided any evidence of actual damage.149 In Jon Richard Ltd v 
Gornall,150 the statement complained of was only published to a small number of 
senior managers at the department store through which the claimant company did 
the majority of its business.151 Smith J awarded a declaration of falsity,152 which he 
made ‘without any doubt or qualification’,153 but he ruled that the declaration of 
falsity and the judgment against the defendant were not sufficient to vindicate the 
claimant’s reputation.154 Had damages not been capped at £10,000 under the 
summary judgment procedure,155 according to Smith J the appropriate award of 
damages would have been £75,000.156 He explained that ‘the Court can never know 
whose minds have been poisoned’,157 even though the department store to which 
the statements were published had conducted an investigation and confirmed in 
writing to the claimant that it was satisfied the defendant’s allegations were 
untrue.158  
My intention here is not to argue that any of these awards was more or less 
appropriate than the others. Empirical research would be necessary to discover 
whether the size of damages awards has any effect on future audiences’ perceptions 
of claimants. My point is that, in the absence of any evidence as to whether or not 
vindicatory damages have their intended effect, they should not be awarded to 
                                                 
147 Metropolitan International Schools (n 42) [35]. 
148 Creative Resins International Ltd v Glasslam Europe Ltd [2006] EWHC 3159 (QB) [26]. 
149 Ibid, [24]. 
150 [2013] EWHC 1357 (QB). 
151 Ibid, [37]. 
152 Ibid, [29]. Declarations of falsity and other discursive remedies are discussed in Ch4.B.iv. below. 
153 Ibid, [24]. 
154 Ibid, [44]. 
155 Defamation Act 1996, s 9(1)(c). 
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157 Ibid, [43]. 
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corporate defamation claimants. Given the chilling effect that large damages awards 
can have on speech,159 it is obviously problematic that vindicatory damages are 
routinely awarded, often in the tens of thousands of pounds, without any real sense 
of whether they actually work as intended. While there may be other reasons to 
continue to award this kind of damages to individual claimants, they relate to the 
dignitary and emotional harms that can be caused by defamatory statements, and 
are therefore inapplicable to claims brought by companies. The interference with 
defendants’ Art 10 rights that is caused by awarding these damages to corporate 
claimants cannot be justified solely on the basis of speculative assertions about their 
vindicatory effect. 
In summary, there is no good reason to award general damages to a corporate 
defamation claimant that is unable to provide proof of specific losses, especially 
where – as is increasingly the norm – the defendant is not a well-resourced media 
company. If the corporate right to sue is retained, a finding of liability should not 
automatically entitle a claimant company to a financial remedy. 
iii. Special damages 
In addition to the issues with corporate defamation claimants’ entitlement to general 
damages described above, the availability of special damages can give rise to 
serious problems, in particular the risk that defendants can be intimidated by 
claimant companies making speculative claims for very large sums of money. 
Unlike damages for individual claimants’ non-pecuniary injuries, which are 
restrained to some extent by comparison to previous defamation awards and 
standard awards for ‘pain and suffering’ in personal injury cases,160 the extent of 
the financial loss that might be recoverable by a corporate claimant is limited only 
by the size of its business.161 
Based on their research on intimidatory litigation in the United States,162 George 
Pring and Penelope Canan observe that ‘Large claims of monetary injury, out of 
                                                 
159 See Ch2.C., text to notes 166-191. 
160 John v MGN (n 108) 612-14. 
161 Thomas B Kelley and Steven D Zansberg, ‘Why Courts Should Require Plaintiffs Claiming 
Losses to Prove that Falsity Caused Them’ (1997) 15 Communications Lawyer 8, 8. 
162 Discussed at Ch2.C.iv., text to notes 259-265. 
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proportion to any real harms done, are a hallmark of SLAPPs.’163 Such claims 
significantly increase the financial threat of unsuccessfully defending a lawsuit, as 
well as adding to the potential cost and complexity of litigation. A clear example of 
the problems that might be caused by large special damages claims in corporate 
defamation cases can be seen in Collins Stewart Ltd v The Financial Times Ltd, in 
which the claimant sought special damages of over £230,000,000.164 Even for a 
publisher with the resources of the FT, a damages claim of this magnitude must 
raise the spectre of bankruptcy. It is not unheard of for a publisher or individual 
defendant to be bankrupted by the cost of unsuccessfully defending a defamation 
lawsuit. In 2000, the magazine LM was forced to close after being sued for libel by 
the television production company ITN and two of its reporters.165 In the United 
States, the media company Gawker filed for bankruptcy166 after a jury awarded 
$140m damages in a privacy lawsuit brought against it by Terry Bollea (better 
known as Hulk Hogan).167 Most recently, Katie Hopkins was forced to apply for 
insolvency168 after successfully being sued for libel.169 None of these defendants is 
at all sympathetic,170 but the point stands. 
The main reason that Collins Stewart’s special damages claim was so large appears 
to have been that the company was huge to begin with. Naturally, the potential 
losses that might be caused by an injury to reputation will be larger in real terms for 
companies that have larger turnovers. But it is also likely that there is a greater 
public interest in the freedom to criticize larger companies without facing the threat 
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of a costly defamation suit.171 In the decade-worth of corporate defamation cases 
mentioned above,172 Collins Stewart was one of four in which special damages in 
the millions of pounds were pleaded.173 The 2013 Act did nothing to prevent the 
potential for criticism of companies to be chilled in this way, so it is reasonable to 
think that similar claims will continue to be made from time to time. For example, 
the two corporate claimants in Gubarev v Orbis Business Intelligence Ltd, at the 
time of writing still awaiting a trial,174 pleaded a total of approximately €2,000,000 
in special and general damages.175 The first claimant in Optical Express Ltd v 
Associated Newspapers Ltd set out a claim alleging £21,000,000 of financial loss;176 
the combined costs of reaching a settlement177 were approximately £1,000,000.178 
The claimant company in Liberty Fashion Wears Ltd v Primark Stores Ltd initially 
advanced ‘what on the face of it was a greatly inflated and implausible special 
damage claim’179 for ‘just under £13 million’ in its letter before action;180 although 
the claim was struck out as an abuse of process, the defendant had by that stage 
incurred over £100,000 in costs.181  
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, in Media 24 Ltd 
v SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd,182 might raise some interesting ideas in this 
context. The claimant company sought both general damages, and special damages 
‘in the form of lost profits’, in an action for defamation.183 The defendant argued 
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that a claim for special damages could not be made in defamation; the claimant’s 
economic loss could only be recovered in an action that required proof of the 
defendant’s fault. Brand JA agreed that the policy reasons for holding a defamation 
defendant strictly liable for harm to the claimant’s reputation might not be adequate 
justification for also holding her strictly liable for the claimant’s economic loss.184 
He observed that the availability of special damages in defamation gave rise to the 
potential for ‘excessive claims for loss of profits by major corporations which 
intimidate newspapers by their sheer magnitude.’185  
The direct relevance of this South African case to English defamation law is limited 
by the significant differences between the two legal systems, but it nonetheless 
raises intriguing possibilities for reform in this jurisdiction. The case led to 
speculation that it was ‘almost inevitable that liability for special damages for 
defamation will, at some point, be queried in the English courts’.186 It would be 
worth carefully considering whether malice should be required for a company to 
obtain special damages in a defamation claim.  
The general principle in English tort law that, once liability is established, a 
claimant is entitled to recover all losses flowing from the defendant’s unlawful 
act187 has been described as ‘profoundly unsatisfactory’.188 Whether or not this is 
justifiable as a general assessment, the principle is particularly problematic when 
applied to corporate defamation, because the law’s peculiarly claimant-friendly 
elements mean that a critic of a large company might be liable for huge losses even 
though that company does not need to prove that their criticisms are untrue, and 
even if those criticisms are made in the honest belief that they are true.189 In this 
context, the preferable policy would be to preclude companies from being 
automatically entitled to recover financial losses suffered as a result of defamatory 
publications – especially since those companies that can prove falsity and malice 
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would be able to obtain compensation for the same losses through a claim in 
malicious falsehood.190 However, it may be unrealistic to expect this proposal to 
gain much traction, given that it would entail creating an exception to such a 
fundamental principle of English tort law. If the corporate right to sue in defamation 
is retained, therefore, critics of large companies will continue to face the chilling 
effect of huge potential damages claims. 
iv. Discursive remedies 
Another proposal for reforming defamation remedies, which proponents normally 
recommend adopting alongside restrictions on financial compensation like those 
discussed above, is to expand the availability of non-financial ‘discursive’ remedies 
such as court-ordered corrections, retractions, or apologies. The basic argument in 
favour of expanding discursive remedies as an alternative to general damages is that 
it would remove the ‘windfall’ problem described above,191 and reduce the chilling 
effect of large damages awards, while still allowing for the vindication of corporate 
reputation in appropriate cases. Reforms along these lines have periodically been 
proposed by commentators in the US for several decades,192 but were also 
advocated by a number of contributors to the 2013 debates in England, some of 
whom argued that the reform would be particularly welcome in claims brought by 
corporations.193 For example, Mullis and Scott argued that companies should be 
limited to discursive remedies unless they were able to prove special damage.194 
At present, English courts can only award remedies of this kind in very limited 
circumstances. A ‘declaration of falsity’ remedy is available under s 9 of the 
Defamation Act 1996, but only to claimants who have been granted summary 
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judgment under s 8 of that Act, on the basis that there is no defence to the claim 
with a realistic prospect of success. In a recent case,195 Warby J claimed that the 
remedy had only actually been awarded once;196 in circumstances in which the 
claimants, faced with US-based defendants who refused to acknowledge the 
proceedings,197 had provided sufficient evidence to the court to prove the falsity of 
the defamatory allegations against them.198 Declarations of falsity were also made 
in Jon Richard Ltd v Gornall199 and Robins v Kordowski,200 but Warby J’s broader 
observation about the infrequent use of these remedies is still valid. The 1996 Act 
also allows courts granting summary judgment in favour of claimants to make an 
order requiring the defendant to publish ‘a suitable correction and apology’.201 As 
with the declaration of falsity remedy, the limited circumstances in which this 
provision is relevant means that the power has been used only infrequently.202 
A variety of different discursive remedies could potentially be introduced 
alongside, or as an alternative to, the traditional financial remedy for successful 
corporate defamation claimants. The court itself could be given the power to make 
a declaration asserting the falsity of the statement complained of or that the 
defendant acted wrongfully in publishing it; or the court could order that a 
correction, retraction, or apology be published by the defendant. Of course, any 
remedy involving a declaration that the statement complained of was false, whether 
by the court or the defendant, could only be appropriate if its availability were 
restricted to cases in which claimants had proved falsity.203 
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A power for the court to order the defendant to publish an apology for publishing a 
defamatory statement would not be a suitable option in cases involving corporate 
claimants. This is partly because any compelled apology would arguably be 
meaningless,204 and partly because, as Hilary Young puts it, ‘the very concept of 
apologising to a corporation is so different from the typical sense of apologising 
that … it is somewhat misleading to speak of “apologising” to a corporation at 
all.’205 It seems implausible to see corporations as capable of benefiting from an 
apology, compelled or otherwise, since they ‘cannot feel vindicated or relieved or 
feel forgiveness.’206  
Other kinds of discursive remedy, such as those requiring defendants to correct or 
retract defamatory statements, have the benefit of being directly aimed at redressing 
the falsity of the allegations, the aspect of defamation cases in which legitimate 
claimants – and the public – have the greatest interest.207 Gary Chan, for example, 
points out that ‘a judicial declaration of the falsity of the allegations directly 
vindicates reputation as compared to the more tenuous link between monetary 
damages and the vindication of reputation.’208 However, in common with the lack 
of understanding of the impact of vindicatory damages on audiences,209 there are 
open questions regarding the effectiveness of discursive remedies in reversing 
reputational harm. It is possible that they might in some cases actually aggravate 
the harm by repeating the initial allegation.210 As Cass Sunstein has observed, 
‘corrections of false impressions can be futile; they can also actually strengthen 
those very impressions.’211 Given the centrality of reputational injuries to the 
purpose of defamation law, it might be surprising that little effort has been put into 
investigating whether the law actually works; that is, whether claimants are ‘able to 
correct the false perceptions created by the defamatory statements about which they 
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sued.’212 David Ardia is right to argue that this ‘points to a significant blind spot in 
the scholarship and commentary concerning the law of defamation.’213  
Where a remedy involves a declaration made by the court itself, ‘We simply cannot 
assume that a court’s decision will reach the same audience that saw the defamatory 
falsehood in the first place or that it will have the hoped-for effect on what people 
believe’ about the claimant.214 In fact, a recognition that in many cases a court ruling 
will not have the same degree of influence on the claimant’s reputation as the 
original publication has been used as a justification for the availability of 
vindicatory damages,215 despite the comparable lack of evidence regarding the 
efficacy of that alternative.216 There are also obstacles to ensuring the effectiveness 
of remedies in which the defendant is ordered to publish a correction or retraction 
of the defamatory statement, for example there may be difficulties with determining 
a reasonable form for the corrective statement, or an appropriate place, manner, or 
time for the defendant to publish it.217 The task of identifying an appropriate 
discursive remedy in a given case is further complicated by variation in the likely 
effect of these remedies in cases involving media and non-media defendants.218 
Where awarded against media defendants, Mullis and Scott raise the additional 
issue that ‘satisfactory performance of this remedy would require to be overseen by 
some regulatory mechanism.’219 
The Defamation Act 2013 introduced a new discursive remedy: s 12 gives the court 
the power to order a losing defendant to publish a summary of its judgment.220 In 
Monir v Wood, Nicklin J identified problems with ensuring the effectiveness of that 
remedy, similar to those described above.221 The Art 10 interference involved in 
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forcing the defendant to publish a summary of the court’s judgment could not, in 
his view, be justified ‘when there is no realistic prospect that by doing so it will 
come to the attention of any of those to whom the original libel was published’.222 
Since that could not be guaranteed in the circumstances, Nicklin J refused to grant 
the order, instead suggesting that the claimant was ‘likely to secure vindication of 
his reputation through the publicity this judgment is likely to receive through other 
channels.’223 
As mentioned above, most proponents of discursive remedies see them as an 
alternative to general damages.224 By reducing the compensation normally awarded 
to successful claimants, discursive remedies are seen as a way of mitigating the 
chilling effect on freedom of speech that results from publishers’ fear of the 
financial implications of losing a defamation lawsuit.225 Shortly after the 2013 Act 
was passed, it was suggested that ‘damages might be lower when [s 12] orders are 
made, if vindication is seen to arise through publication of the judgment summary 
itself and not through the award of damages.’226 However, awarding the first order 
under s 12 in Rahman v ARY Network Ltd,227 Eady J appeared to see the remedy 
mainly as a mechanism for enhancing the vindicatory effect of the damages that 
had previously been awarded to the claimant,228 and was equivocal about whether 
courts awarding s 12 orders and damages at the same time should normally reduce 
the quantum of damages to reflect the vindication offered by the s 12 summary.229 
Similarly, in Turley v Unite the Union, Nicklin J ordered the defendants to publish 
a summary of his judgment, but explained that ‘the vindicatory function of damages 
[was] particularly important’ in his decision to award £75,000.230 These cases, in 
combination with Monir, suggest that the s 12 remedy may not be particularly useful 
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as a way of limiting the impact of general damages awards on defendants’ freedom 
of speech.231 
The possibility of limiting corporate claimants to discursive remedies in cases 
where there is no proof of specific loss was suggested to the Joint Committee on 
the Draft Defamation Bill,232 and considered with a degree of sympathy in its 
Report.233 But the Committee identified a significant problem with the reform: 
‘… it would not prevent corporations using the threat of litigation to silence 
publishers, since the chilling expense of a libel claim would be replaced by 
the chilling expense of fighting a declaration, which would often be 
similarly costly and complex to resolve.’234 
The Committee’s point is illustrated by the Rahman case discussed above. The 
claimant in that case was awarded £185,000, an unusually large sum of general 
damages; but even that amount was dwarfed by the costs awarded against the 
defendant, which were provisionally set at £900,000.235 
In general, and in common with the substantive reforms discussed above,236 reforms 
focusing on remedies will not be sufficient to address the chilling effect, because in 
practice the majority of the cost of being sued (or of the fear of that cost) results 
from the litigation process itself, rather than from the damages or other remedies 
awarded at the end of that process. As Gavin Phillipson pointed out in relation to 
the lack of procedural reforms in the 2013 Act, ‘it is important to be clear about the 
limits of what can be done to prevent … abuses of the law by reforming the content 
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of the law.’237 The discussion below, in the final part of this chapter, turns to 
potential reforms that directly target the problems with costs and procedure which 
facilitate the abuses to which Phillipson was referring. 
C. Litigation costs and procedural reforms 
The third broad category of reform option would target the procedures used to 
handle defamation claims in the courts, or the rules by which litigation costs are 
assessed and allocated between parties. As discussed in Chapter 2,238 the high cost 
of defending defamation claims is one of the most important factors contributing to 
the law’s chilling effect on speech about companies. Given the limited extent to 
which reforms to the substantive law or to remedies can be expected to reduce the 
cost of defending defamation claims, as discussed in Parts A and B of this chapter, 
reforms that directly address the cost and complexity of litigation might be expected 
to be a more appropriate and effective way to ameliorate the law’s chilling effect 
on speech.239  
The discussion of potential procedural reforms in this part is relatively limited in its 
scope, because litigation costs and procedure are complex subjects that would in 
themselves require thesis-length treatment to explore in full.240 The reform options 
discussed are therefore limited to those that would retain corporate defamation in 
its existing form as part of the law of torts, with claims resolved through adversarial 
litigation in the courts. The key point I intend to convey is that it would take very 
substantial, and possibly fundamental, changes to the current system to remove the 
ability for companies to abuse the right to sue in defamation by threatening 
litigation for the purpose of silencing legitimate criticism. Changes that substantial 
do not seem likely to happen in the near future; and, as I will argue in section iv., 
they may be incompatible with companies’ fair trial rights under Art 6 ECHR. 
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Arguments in favour of procedural reform are typically motivated in particular by 
the heightened threat to freedom of speech posed by corporate defamation claims 
involving an inequality of arms between claimants and defendants. For example, 
Milo argues that the McLibel case, discussed in Chapter 2,241  
‘… shows how some types of defendant – particularly citizen-critics or 
community and local media, and especially where they are commenting on 
large multinationals or wealthy public figures – require the law’s assistance 
to vindicate their rights to freedom of expression.’242  
The McLibel case is an obvious example of the capacity that libel litigation has to 
interfere with defendants’ freedom of speech,243 despite being an extreme outlier.244 
But even in cases without this disparity between the resources of corporate 
claimants and the defendants they sue, the total cost of defending a defamation 
claim can become so disproportionate that it violates the defendant’s Art 10 
rights.245 Milo argues that the solution is for the courts to engage in active case 
management in cases involving public interest speech, and to be alert to the 
potential for defamation claims to disproportionately interfere with defendants’ 
speech rights:246  
‘… if a claimant launches vexatious litigation or abuses the process of the 
court in a defamation claim, or there is evidence that the claimant instituted 
the claim for the purpose of stifling legitimate criticism, courts should mark 
their disapproval in the costs order.’247 
In Milo’s view, this approach would ‘to a large extent ameliorate the chilling effect 
that large costs awards have on freedom of expression.’248 Gary Chan, similarly, 
argues that ‘any civil costs issues should preferably be addressed by modifying the 
length of defamation proceedings and costs assessment as far as possible’;249 where 
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criticisms of corporate defamation law relate to procedural issues, ‘the solution … 
should not be to deny or restrict all corporations that right to sue under the 
substantive tort law.’250  
Chan’s argument is not unreasonable, but the different relative interests in both 
reputation and speech at stake in defamation claims brought by corporate claimants 
as opposed to individual claimants – discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 respectively – 
suggest that substantive restrictions on the corporate right to sue are in fact justified 
on their own terms. Issues relating to the cost and complexity of litigation add to 
the law’s chilling effect on speech, but they are not the only problems with the law 
that need to be addressed. As such, procedural reforms like those Chan and Milo 
propose may be a necessary component of broader reforms, but they would not on 
their own be a sufficient response to the problems identified in the first two chapters 
of this thesis. 
i. Procedural reform and the Defamation Act 2013 
The costs issue was highlighted repeatedly in the parliamentary debate on the 2013 
Act.251 The CMS Committee, for example, noted that ‘The cost of [defamation] 
litigation has a direct bearing’ on freedom of expression,252 and argued that the 
problem ‘urgently need[ed] to be addressed’.253 However, procedural reforms and 
changes to the costs regime did not feature heavily in the Act. In its consultation 
paper on the Draft Defamation Bill, the Ministry of Justice explained its intention 
to address these aspects of the law through separate legislation.254  
The Government was referring to ongoing consultation on implementing the 
recommendations made in Lord Justice Jackson’s Review of Civil Litigation 
Costs,255 which applied to civil claims in general, in the specific context of 
defamation and other ‘publication’ claims.256 Lord Justice Jackson’s 
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recommendation that the ‘success fees’ and ‘after the event’ insurance premiums 
used to fund conditional fee agreements (‘CFAs’) should no longer be recoverable 
from the losing party was given effect in most civil claims by s 44 of the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (‘LASPO’). But these reforms 
were delayed in respect of defamation claims because of concerns about their 
possible effect on access to justice, especially for claimants with limited means 
attempting to sue well-resourced media companies.257 Those concerns led the 
government to seek advice on potential alternative reforms from the Civil Justice 
Council Working Group on Defamation Costs, which published its report shortly 
before the Defamation Act 2013 was passed.258 The Ministry of Justice 
subsequently published a consultation paper, drawing on the Working Group’s 
report, which proposed costs protection measures intended to protect poorer parties 
from ‘the fear of exposure to the substantial costs that they might be ordered to pay 
to the other side’.259 The government’s intention was that the reforms to the CFA 
regime recommended in the Jackson Review would be brought into effect in 
defamation claims after suitable costs protections had been introduced.260 However, 
many of the responses to that consultation were critical of the proposed measures,261 
and the government did not revisit the issue of costs in defamation cases until 
2018.262 
As a result, the only explicitly procedural reform in the Defamation Act 2013 was 
the removal of the presumption in favour of trial by jury in s 11.263 The rationale 
for this provision was that jury trials take longer and are more expensive for litigants 
than trials heard by a judge alone.264 Although the reform is certainly welcome, in 
practice it will have very little impact in most cases: even under the pre-existing 
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presumption in favour of jury trials, juries have rarely been used in the last two 
decades.265 Further, Simon Singh pointed out in his evidence to the Joint Committee 
that the mutual agreement that his case against the British Chiropractic Association 
should be heard by a judge alone did not prevent the preliminary rulings in that case 
from taking several years and costing the parties a combined total of about 
£250,000.266  
A number of commentators criticized the lack of procedural or costs-based 
measures in the 2013 Act.267 Mullis and Scott, for example, argued that, as a result 
of the Act’s overwhelming focus on the substantive law:  
‘… it will remain the case that the sheer cost of bringing and defending libel 
claims will deny some litigants access to justice to vindicate their 
reputations and some publishers the right fully to express themselves as they 
might otherwise choose.’268 
As mentioned above, the government returned to the issue of defamation costs in 
2018. But the approach it eventually decided on was more limited than those 
discussed while the 2013 Act was being debated; in particular, the proposal to 
introduce costs protections for less wealthy litigants was eventually abandoned.269 
The provisions in s 44 of LASPO were brought into force in defamation claims in 
April 2019, so that CFA success fees are now non-recoverable.270 However, ATE 
insurance premiums will still be recoverable; the government explained that the 
‘ATE regime enables parties with a good case to litigate and discharge their Article 
10 rights … without the fear of having to pay potentially ruinous legal costs if their 
case fails.’271  
These reforms have been in effect for too short a time to allow their impact to be 
properly assessed, but they are unlikely to completely resolve the problems with the 
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cost of corporate defamation litigation, especially considering that the main target 
for reform is the use of CFAs to finance claims.272 As David Howarth observed 
during the debates preceding the 2013 Act, the proportion of corporate claimants 
that actually use CFAs to fund their claims is not clear,273 so the impact of reforms 
to the CFA regime on corporate defamation cases in particular may be limited. What 
is clear, however, is that companies large enough to use litigation as a way to silence 
criticism will have sufficient resources to do so without recourse to this kind of 
funding agreement.  
The extensive consultation on, and delay in implementing, costs reforms in 
defamation cases illustrates the difficulty of finding a solution to these problems 
within the existing litigation framework. As Jackson LJ pointed out, ‘In the context 
of a common law jurisdiction … there are limits on what can be achieved. 
Adversarial litigation is an inherently expensive process.’274 This inherent cost of 
adversarial proceedings is exacerbated by some aspects of defamation law 
specifically. For example, defamation cases tend to differ from one another on their 
facts more than other kinds of claim, and outcomes are therefore less predictable;275 
the substantive law is complex and in places arcane, making it more likely that the 
parties will need specialist lawyers who often ‘charge very high fees’;276 and cases 
often turn on fine points of interpretation, such as disputes as to the meaning of a 
statement and whether that meaning is defamatory of the claimant, which are 
frequently resolved through separate preliminary hearings.277 In Banks v 
Cadwalladr, Saini J expressed frustration that the complexity of disputes on these 
questions ‘diverts [the court] from what should be a simple task in most cases and 
calls into question whether our normal adversarial processes … are the appropriate 
way in which to resolve disputes as to meaning.’278 Because of these features of 
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defamation law, the high cost of litigation in this area ‘may simply be an intractable 
problem.’279 
It is difficult to envisage a workable set of reforms which could reduce costs so 
significantly that even more impecunious defendants might consider the financial 
risk of defending a company’s defamation claim to be acceptable. This is all the 
more so because, as explained in Chapter 2,280 the most important factor driving the 
chilling effect of corporate defamation law is not the actual cost of defending a 
claim, but the publisher’s perception of the likely cost. Procedural reforms would 
likely need to be drastic in order to overcome the existing perception of libel 
litigation as excessively costly, complex, time-consuming, and unpredictable. 
Otherwise this kind of reform can only go so far in helping to alleviate the law’s 
chilling effect.  
In addition to calls to reduce defendants’ litigation costs generally, there are two 
particular proposals that are worth discussing: the argument for introducing 
additional mechanisms with which claims can be resolved at an early stage of the 
litigation, or strengthening those that already exist; and the possibility of allowing 
defendants to counter-sue corporate defamation claimants in certain circumstances. 
The following sections discuss these two proposals in turn, before section iv. 
discusses the limits of procedural reforms in light of claimants’ right to a fair trial 
under Art 6 ECHR. 
ii. Mechanisms encouraging early resolution of claims 
The most obvious objective of reform in this area would simply be to reduce the 
typical cost of defending defamation claims brought by corporate claimants, 
especially (although not necessarily exclusively) when the claim is unsuccessful. 
One way of achieving this goal is to introduce or strengthen mechanisms for 
defeating weaker claims at an early stage of the litigation, thereby avoiding the need 
for full trials, which can be long, complex, and expensive for litigants. 
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280 At Ch2.C.ii., text to notes 176-177. 
207 
 
Although recent decades have seen a number of substantive and procedural 
developments intended to relieve the financial threat faced by defendants,281 even 
the streamlined hearings involved in utilizing mechanisms designed to avoid a full 
trial can be extremely expensive.282 The editors of Gatley on Libel and Slander note, 
for example, that an unsuccessful application to strike out on Jameel abuse 
grounds283 ‘may prove costly: it is not unusual for Jameel-based applications to 
involve in-depth scrutiny of the germane facts, circumstances and evidence.’284 
Phillipson explains the implications that this has for attempts to counter the abuse 
of defamation litigation using mechanisms that allow the early resolution of weaker 
claims: 
‘Wealthy individuals or large corporations may issue proceedings even if 
their lawyer advises them that they would be highly likely to succumb to a 
strikeout application. Such claimants may simply calculate that the case is 
unlikely to get that far – that the recipient of the threatening letter will 
publish the desired retraction or simply desist from further criticisms, 
fearing that once proceedings are issued, even to have the case struck out 
may cost tens of thousands of pounds.’285 
One of the main justifications for the substantive reform in s 1 of the Defamation 
Act 2013, discussed in Chapter 3, was that the ‘serious harm’ and ‘serious financial 
loss’ tests would provide the courts with an additional mechanism with which to 
dispose of weaker claims (ie those that would not meet the new thresholds).286 
Unfortunately, it does not appear that s 1 is likely to be particularly effective in this 
respect.287  
There has been uncertainty since before the 2013 Act came into force as to the 
procedure by which disputes relating to the threshold requirements of reputational 
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harm or financial loss would be dealt with, and in particular when it would be 
appropriate to determine these issues in preliminary hearings, and when they should 
be left to trial instead.288 This question has the potential to give rise to something of 
a dilemma: Mathilde Groppo explains that the costs implications of the court’s 
approach to a s 1 dispute will not be clear until after that dispute is resolved: 
‘Where the serious harm requirement is not satisfied, the resolving of the 
issue at an early stage prevents an unnecessary accumulation of costs. 
However, where the serious harm requirement is satisfied, … the costs 
burden is not relieved. Worse, it is increased by the extensive adducing of 
evidence and cross-examination, and by the additional preliminary issue 
hearing.’289 
As pointed out by Athelstane Aamodt, ‘preliminary hearings where claimants 
would be required to produce evidence of serious harm so as to satisfy the test 
would have … the effect of encouraging very costly satellite litigation, in an area 
that is already costly enough.’290 It was also anticipated that requiring claimants to 
provide evidence in support of their cases on s 1 might lead to front-loading of costs 
towards the start of proceedings.291 Both of these predictions were reflected in some 
of the early post-Act cases, in which preliminary hearings on s 1 ‘became costs-
laden mini-trials of the facts, with parties struggling to nail the elusive concept of 
“serious harm”.’292 In Theedom v Nourish Training Ltd, for example, the judge 
estimated that the parties’ costs had reached £100k on the claimant’s side and £70k 
on the defendant’s for the preliminary serious harm phase of the dispute alone.293  
The striking out of the company’s claim in Undre v London Borough of Harrow is 
a good example of the potential for the serious financial loss test to add to litigation 
costs.294 To assess whether the corporate claimant had satisfied the s 1(2) test, 
Warby J engaged in a detailed discussion of its evidence of financial loss, despite 
having held that it had failed to satisfy the requirement at common law for the 
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statement complained of to refer to the claimant.295 While the same evidence was 
relied on in support of the claimant’s case on damages, it would not have been 
necessary for the judge to examine that evidence given that liability had not been 
established.296 
In his judgment for the High Court in Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd, Warby J 
expressed the view that, in cases in which the defendant contends that the claim 
against them was too trivial to satisfy the serious harm requirement, ‘it will usually 
be preferable for it to be tried as a preliminary issue’.297 This was consistent with 
other cases in which Warby J had tentatively stated a preference for resolving s 1 
disputes in pre-trial hearings,298 including where the claimant was a body trading 
for profit, and as such would also have had to satisfy s 1(2).299 However, there had 
also been cases in which a preliminary hearing was considered to be 
inappropriate.300 
In the Court of Appeal, Davis LJ held that preliminary hearings on the issue of 
serious harm would not normally be appropriate: ‘Courts should ordinarily be slow 
to direct a preliminary issue, involving substantial evidence, on a dispute as to 
whether serious reputational harm has been caused or is likely to be caused by the 
published statement.’301 In reaching this decision, Davis LJ noted the potential for 
parties to abuse the cost of complex pre-trial hearings, although his focus was on 
situations in which an inequality of arms favoured the defendant. He argued that 
careful consideration of the necessity of preliminary hearings would ‘discourage 
well-resourced defendants from seeking to batter into submission less well-
resourced claimants by use of interlocutory process’.302 The same principle applies 
where the distribution of resources between parties favours a corporate claimant 
over a less wealthy critic. 
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The Supreme Court judgment in Lachaux does not address these procedural 
questions; on one view, therefore, it ‘does not apparently disturb or detract from the 
guidance by the Court of Appeal that disputes of fact arising from the serious harm 
test which require evidence should be resolved at trial of liability and not by 
preliminary issues trials’.303 However, Groppo disagrees, arguing that ‘because [the 
Supreme Court] disagreed with the Court of Appeal and instead endorsed Warby 
J’s approach, … it is to be expected that it is the guidance given by Warby J which 
will prevail’.304  
The former view seems the more plausible, and the Court of Appeal’s guidance on 
procedural issues should be followed even though the Supreme Court preferred 
Warby J’s interpretation of the substance of s 1. However, Lord Sumption’s silence 
on the issue of procedure will, at the very least, lead to a period of uncertainty as to 
which of the above positions is correct. It is also not necessarily the case that the 
approach to the issue of serious financial loss in cases involving corporate claimants 
should be the same as that taken to disputes relating to the serious harm threshold 
in individual claims; inevitably, further litigation will be necessary to clarify that 
point as well. 
Regardless of how this uncertainty is eventually resolved, two points will hold true. 
The first is that neither approach is ideal; both will, in some cases, lead to an 
escalation of costs. The second is that Parliament’s decision to introduce an 
additional issue on which the outcome of a corporate defamation claim might turn 
– that is, whether the statement complained of caused the claimant serious financial 
loss – will impose the cost of resolving disputes about that issue on litigants in every 
case in which they arise, whether at a preliminary hearing or at trial. The nature of 
the evidence relevant to s 1(2) is such that resolving these disputes may be complex 
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and costly,305 which presents claimants with an unfortunate opportunity to increase 
the financial risk of litigation to attempt to pressurize defendants into agreeing a 
settlement.306 
A related procedural reform proposal that was put forward several times in the pre-
2013 debates would have required corporate claimants to obtain the permission of 
the court before bringing a defamation action. Permission would be refused unless 
the claimant could prove that the statement complained of had caused it financial 
loss (some variations of the proposal also allowed the court to take other factors 
into account in deciding whether to permit the claim to be brought).307 The Joint 
Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill believed that this reform:  
‘… would encourage robust and decisive action by the courts to prevent 
trivial and abusive litigation from being commenced at all, let alone 
continued for years … Publishers who know that the corporation must face 
judicial scrutiny before bringing a claim may feel better protected against 
empty threats and more able to defend their position.’308  
However, this proposal suffers from the same problems as those discussed above: 
a permission stage would still be expensive enough, and its outcome sufficiently 
uncertain for the defendant, for the threat of litigation to chill the speech of many 
critics.309 And if a claimant successfully obtained permission to pursue its claim, 
the procedure ‘would create unnecessary duplication and additional costs for both 
parties.’310 Introducing a mandatory permission stage for corporate claimants 
would impose these additional costs even in cases in which defendants would not 
have chosen to challenge the claim at a preliminary stage; for example, cases 
expected to turn on issues that are normally left to a full trial, such as a public 
interest defence.311  
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iii. Mechanisms allowing defendants to counter-sue corporate 
claimants 
One particularly interesting option for procedural reform would be to introduce a 
mechanism to allow defendants to countersue claimants who bring abusive claims 
with the intention of bullying their critics into silence – the so-called ‘SLAPPs’ 
discussed in Chapter 2.312 The idea of ‘anti-SLAPP’ laws is to make the risk of 
abusive litigation significant enough that it outweighs the economic benefits offered 
by such litigation. Unlike individual claimants who may be motivated to sue by 
non-economic concerns, for a trading company the decision to sue in response to 
criticism ‘is first and foremost a business decision, requiring careful analysis of 
whether litigation will serve the economic interests of the corporation.’313 This 
sensitivity to economic incentives means that anti-SLAPP mechanisms may be a 
particularly effective way to address the problem of corporate misuse of defamation 
and other claims, but one potential benefit of this kind of reform is that it would not 
need to be limited to claims brought in defamation, or to claims brought by 
companies.314  
Noting that the courts’ existing powers to strike out abusive claims are not 
necessarily enough to provide a disincentive to those claimants seeking to chill 
critical speech with the mere threat of litigation,315 Mullis and Scott suggest that:  
‘A more proactive option … would be for defendants to be allowed some 
means to counter-sue the claimant both to recover costs expended and to 
obtain damages on account of the breach of expression rights. The prospect 
that the defendant might “SLAPP-back” would immediately see a 
prospective claimant pause to reconsider the advisability of bringing an 
intimidatory action.’316 
It may be that this option would be particularly beneficial for the individual or small 
organization critics who, it was argued in Chapter 2,317 are made vulnerable to 
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abusive corporate defamation claims by their relative lack of resources for legal 
advice or litigation.318 
Potential models for anti-SLAPP legislation can be found in various other 
jurisdictions. These laws have been adopted most extensively in the US, where a 
significant number of states have enacted anti-SLAPP legislation.319 This is in part 
because the concept of SLAPPs has gained the most popular traction in that 
jurisdiction, and in part because of the strong first amendment tradition of 
protecting public interest speech.320 However, Canadian law might be more 
instructive to look at than US state anti-SLAPP laws, because of the closer 
resemblance between English and Canadian defamation law.321 Ontario’s 
Protection of Public Participation Act 2015 (‘PPPA’), the subject of a recent article 
by Hilary Young,322 introduced an anti-SLAPP measure which is surprisingly 
favourable to defendants. A defendant only needs to satisfy the court that the 
proceedings have been brought in respect of expression on a matter of public 
interest to establish a presumption that the suit will be dismissed. That presumption 
will only be overturned if the claimant can show that there are grounds to believe 
the claim would be successful, and that the harm for which a remedy is sought is 
sufficient to outweigh the public interest in the defendant’s speech.323 The PPPA is 
also defendant-friendly as regards costs, creating a presumption that the plaintiff 
will bear all of the costs unless the court considers it ‘appropriate in the 
circumstances’ to depart from that presumption.324  
However, there are potential problems with the proposal to introduce a counter-suit 
mechanism along the lines of the PPPA. For example, Andrew Scott notes ‘the 
difficulty in distinguishing between bona fide actions brought to assert legal rights 
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or defend interests and other actions that are designed to chill public 
participation.’325 As pointed out by the originators of the concept, Pring and Canan, 
‘SLAPPs normally do not advertise themselves as such.’326 If a counter-suit law 
were to be effective in practice, then courts would be required to identify abusive 
lawsuits on a case-by-case basis. This may not be a realistic expectation: 
‘Whether, in any given case, a libel action is strategically aimed to silence 
critics or is designed to vindicate injured reputation (or a combination of the 
two) is an extraordinarily difficult question.’327 
Even if it were possible to reliably identify problematic claims, the courts would 
also need to be willing to do so.328 English courts already tend to be fairly 
conservative in criticizing even those lawsuits that are widely regarded as being 
abusive.329 It seems likely that this conservatism would limit the effectiveness of an 
anti-SLAPP law; and that the more punitive the law was for claimants, the slower 
judges would be to characterize claims as abusive. In Ontario, Young points out 
that ‘the serious consequences of a successful PPPA motion mean that courts are 
sometimes interpreting its provisions unduly narrowly.’330 The small organizations 
and individuals (often self-represented in court) that are most disproportionately 
affected by the cost of being sued would be particularly likely to face an uphill 
struggle overcoming this judicial conservatism. 
iv. Procedural reform and Art 6 ECHR 
There is another significant limit to the capacity of procedural reform to address the 
problems with English corporate defamation law: the obligations imposed on the 
courts by the right to a fair trial in Art 6 ECHR, which is enjoyed by corporations 
as well as natural persons.331 In this section I argue, firstly, that Art 6 does not 
require there to be a domestic legal right for corporations to protect their 
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reputations; but that, secondly, if there is such a right in domestic law then Art 6 
does place limits on the procedural reforms that could be made to corporate 
defamation law. Those limits would likely prevent the adoption of an anti-SLAPP 
law as protective of defendants as the Ontario legislation discussed above, which 
Young notes does not need to satisfy comparable standards, because the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms ‘provides few fair trial protections in the civil 
litigation context.’332  
Lord Lester’s evidence to the Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill argued 
that preventing companies from suing in defamation ‘would be a breach of Article 
6 read with Article 14’.333 The relevant part of Art 6 reads as follows: 
‘In the determination of his civil rights and obligations … , everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.’ 
Article 14 prohibits states from discriminating ‘on any ground such as sex, race, 
colour, … or other status’ in the way in which they protect Convention rights. Lord 
Lester’s argument was that the Art 6 right to a fair trial guarantees effective access 
to the courts for the protection of applicants’ right to reputation,334 and that failing 
to allow companies the right to sue in defamation would constitute discrimination 
in the protection of that right of access, presumably on the ground of companies’ 
‘other status’, contrary to Art 14. I argue here that Lord Lester’s view was mistaken. 
Art 6 only guarantees a right of access to the courts in respect of existing domestic 
‘civil rights’; it does not guarantee the existence of any particular substantive right 
in domestic law.335 The Court has held that it ‘may not create through the 
interpretation of [Art 6] a substantive right which has no legal basis in the State 
concerned’.336 In Fayed v UK, the applicants complained about the limits imposed 
on their ability to protect their reputations by a statutory qualified privilege 
defence.337 The Court ruled that whether Art 6 is engaged by a restriction on the 
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right to sue in defamation depends on whether that restriction is ‘substantive’ or 
‘procedural’. If a restriction is substantive (ie ‘delimit[ing] the very content of the 
applicants’ right to a good reputation’) then it does not engage Art 6, because it 
removes from domestic law any ‘civil right’ to which the Article could apply.338 As 
Gray J rightly held in Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Ltd (No 6),339 the ECtHR 
judgment in Fayed does not establish ‘a legal right to a good reputation’ under Art 
6.340 
It follows that the complete removal of the corporate right to sue in defamation 
would not engage Art 6. If Art 6 is not engaged, then Art 14 is irrelevant because it 
only has effect in circumstances where another Convention right is engaged.341 It is 
also worth noting that, even if Art 14 was relevant, it is unlikely to protect applicants 
against discrimination on the basis of their corporate form. Lord McNally, who also 
gave evidence to the Joint Committee on this point, was unable to identify ‘any 
cases where it has been said that it would be incompatible with Article 14 to treat 
legal persons differently from natural persons.’342 Further, it is permissible for 
member states to treat certain persons differently if there is an ‘objective and 
reasonable justification’ for doing so.343 Chapters 1 and 2 set out justifications for 
differential treatment of corporate defamation claimants that are more than 
sufficient to meet this standard. 
However, if the right to sue is retained in English law, then the manner in which 
corporate defamation claims are adjudicated will need to conform to the minimum 
standards of procedural fairness set by Art 6. The right to access the courts may be 
restricted to pursue a legitimate aim in the public interest, but there must be ‘a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim 
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sought to be achieved’.344 The protection offered by Art 6 extends beyond mere 
access to the courts; it also provides guarantees in relation to ‘the conduct of the 
proceedings.’345 These rights cover preliminary hearings as well as those which 
ultimately determine the outcome of a dispute, and also continue after the court 
rules on a substantive claim to the assessment of damages346 and to the execution 
of the judgment, which ‘must … be regarded as an integral part of the “trial” for the 
purposes of Article 6’.347 
Because the Convention ‘is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or 
illusory but rights that are practical and effective’, Art 6 requires that throughout 
the various stages of proceedings a litigant ‘be able to present [its] case properly 
and satisfactorily’,348 and to have it ‘duly considered by the trial court.’349 It 
imposes on the court ‘a duty to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, 
arguments and evidence adduced by the parties, without prejudice to its assessment 
of whether they are relevant’.350 In order that litigants can contest their opponents’ 
arguments as well as present their own, ‘the concept of fair trial also implies in 
principle the right for the parties to a trial to have knowledge of and comment on 
all evidence adduced or observations filed’.351 Importantly, this right cannot be 
disregarded for the purpose of ‘sav[ing] time and expedit[ing] the proceedings’.352 
One of the most important goals of the procedural reforms discussed above would 
be to ensure that defendants were able to defeat trivial or abusive claims as quickly 
and inexpensively as possible; the extent to which it would be possible to achieve 
those goals will be substantially limited by claimants’ rights under Art 6 to have 
their arguments, and their responses to defendants’ arguments, fully examined and 
assessed by the court.  
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In short, Art 6 ECHR does not require the UK to ensure that its domestic law 
provides corporations with a right sue in defamation. But, as long as a substantive 
right to reputation exists for companies in English law, Art 6 guarantees a right of 
access to an ‘inherently expensive’353 adversarial process with which they can 
protect that right. 
Conclusion 
There are strong arguments in favour of reforming a number of aspects of English 
corporate defamation law. Despite the introduction of a ‘serious financial loss’ 
threshold in the Defamation Act 2013 (and especially considering the courts’ 
interpretation of that threshold described in Chapter 3), the presumptions of falsity 
and malice in the substantive law mean that it is too easy for many corporate 
claimants to establish liability and place the burden on critics to defend their 
statements.  
If defendants are unable to avoid liability, the remedies awarded to corporate 
claimants are also problematic. In particular, companies’ entitlement to substantial 
presumed and vindicatory damages means that the general damages awarded to 
corporate defamation claimants are often disproportionate to the actual injuries 
suffered. Given that there is no need for a claimant to prove that the defendant was 
at fault in publishing the statements complained of, and given the increasing 
tendency for corporate defamation claims to be brought against relatively 
impecunious individual defendants, claimants’ automatic entitlement to recover 
specific financial losses consequent on the publication of defamatory statements 
potentially leaves ordinary people liable for huge losses even when their criticism 
of a company is honest and well-intentioned. There may be merit in exploring the 
potential use of discursive remedies as an alternative to financial compensation, but 
even when these alternatives are available the courts seem wedded to the idea that 
substantial damages awards are an appropriate remedy, despite the lack of evidence 
in support of that position. 
                                                 
353 Lord Justice Jackson (n 274). 
219 
 
More fundamentally, reforms to the substantive law or to remedies would not 
address the problems caused by the litigation process itself. While any reforms that 
would reduce the cost and complexity of defamation litigation would be welcome, 
it is difficult to envision those problems being eliminated if corporate defamation 
claims continue to be dealt with within the existing framework of the law of torts. 
As Mariette Jones has argued in relation to the reforms introduced in the 
Defamation Act 2013: ‘Since the reforms did not change the nature and 
classification of defamation as falling under private law, it comes as no surprise that 
cost and complexity remain issues vexing this area of law.’354 Ultimately, as long 
as corporations retain the right to pursue defamation claims against critics through 
adversarial litigation in the courts, many of the problems that those claims cause for 
freedom of speech are likely to be intractable. I will argue in the next, and final, 
chapter of this thesis that the solution is to deny corporate claimants the right to sue 
in defamation entirely. 
                                                 
354 Jones (n 30) 123. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
DENYING COMPANIES THE 
RIGHT TO SUE IN DEFAMATION 
 
 
Introduction 
In this final chapter, I will argue that the most effective and most conceptually 
satisfying option for reform would be to remove the right to sue in defamation from 
companies entirely. The potential for this reform to leave some companies with 
little effective protection for the reputational interests identified in Chapter 1 is 
acknowledged, but I argue that this is likely to be true in fewer cases than often 
thought; and that, on balance, leaving companies without a remedy in this small 
proportion of cases would be preferable to the consequences of companies’ 
entitlement to sue for freedom of speech that were described in Chapter 2. 
As argued in Chapter 3, the introduction of a ‘serious financial loss’ threshold for 
corporate defamation claimants in s 1(2) of the Defamation Act 2013 was not a 
sufficient response to those free speech issues. In Chapter 4, I argued that alternative 
options for reform which stop short of removing the corporate right to sue entirely 
would also fail to address the problems with the law. Reforms to the substantive 
law that restrict companies’ ability to sue, or restrictions on the remedies available 
to corporate claimants, would not adequately address the problems caused by the 
cost and uncertainty of litigation for defendants; and there are limits to what could 
be achieved with reforms targeted directly at those procedural issues, because the 
existence of a right to sue for companies brings with it fair trial rights under Article 
6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, including the right of access to an 
inherently expensive adversarial procedure for resolving claims. 
Part A of this chapter clarifies the justification for treating corporate and individual 
defamation claimants differently even though some of the criticisms of corporate 
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defamation law discussed in this thesis could also be made of the law applied to 
individual claimants. Part B argues that there are normally sufficient alternative 
ways in which companies can protect their reputations against false allegations, and 
that their right to sue in defamation is therefore unnecessary in most cases. The final 
part of this chapter addresses the scope of the proposed reform. It argues that all 
non-human claimants should be denied standing in defamation, including entities 
such as charities and small businesses which are often excluded from proposals to 
restrict the corporate right to sue in defamation. 
A. Treating corporate and individual claimants 
differently 
It might be argued that the chilling of public interest speech discussed in Chapter 2 
is not a problem that is unique to corporate defamation law: the threat of defamation 
claims also chills speech about powerful or wealthy individuals, and such 
individuals can and do use the law to stifle legitimate criticism of their activities. In 
fact, by far the most frequently cited example of a litigant abusing defamation 
claims to hide wrongdoing is Robert Maxwell.1 The ‘inequality of arms’ that is 
frequently highlighted by critics of corporate defamation law can equally arise in 
cases brought by individual claimants, some of whom may be ‘wealthier than most 
corporations.’2 It is reasonable to question whether removing the corporate right to 
sue specifically is an appropriate response to these problems. As Sir Edward 
Garnier MP asked during debate on the 2013 Act, ‘What is the difference between 
complaints about financial wealth or strength in the hands of individuals being used 
                                                 
1 eg Russell L Weaver, ‘British Defamation Reform: An American Perspective’ (2012) 63(1) 
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 97, 108-09; David Hooper, Reputations Under Fire: Winners and 
Losers in the Libel Business (Little, Brown and Company 2000) 41-44; Douglas W Vick and Linda 
McPherson, ‘Anglicizing Defamation Law in the European Union’ (1996) 36 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 933, 967; Tom Bower, Maxwell: The Final Verdict (Harper Collins 1995) 78; B 
J Brown, ‘Latent Effects of Law: The Defamation Experience’ (1992) Singapore Journal of Legal 
Studies 315; David J Acheson and Ansgar Wohlschlegel, ‘The Economics of Weaponized 
Defamation Lawsuits’ (2018) 47(3) Southwestern Law Review 335, 373, 376. 
2 Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill, Written Evidence Volume III (2010-12, HL 203, 
HC 930-III) Ev 36, p 147 (The Law Reform Committee) (‘Joint Committee Evidence vol III’). 
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to bully defendants, compared with financial wealth in the hands of corporate 
claimants being used to do that?’3  
A number of points could be made in response. Firstly, if it is, in the words of the 
Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill, ‘unacceptable that corporations are 
able to silence critical reporting by threatening or starting libel claims which they 
know the publisher cannot afford to defend’,4 then it is no less acceptable simply 
because some other claimants can use the same tactic to suppress criticism.  
Secondly, in some instances ‘a corporate claim [that] is viable, but artificial’5 can 
be used by powerful individuals to enhance the chilling effect of their own 
defamation claims. The addition of a claim in the name of a company associated 
with the individual claimant can increase the cost and complexity of litigation, and 
add to the financial risk of losing for the defendant. In Jameel v Times Newspapers 
Ltd, Sedley LJ warned of the need for ‘caution’ in allowing companies to claim 
alongside their owners or directors:  
‘If every libel claimant is able to draw in his wake a string of companies 
claiming that they have been injured because their proprietor has been, 
English libel litigation, already something of a honeypot, will become a 
goldrush.’6 
Moreover, businesses that are structured as corporate groups are uniquely able to 
inflate costs by adding together several claims, each brought by a distinct entity 
within the same overall group. Even if only one company within the group is 
actually entitled to sue in respect of the statement(s) complained of, the ability to 
join claims by related companies forces defendants to spend time and resources 
applying to strike out those brought by inappropriate claimants. The potential 
complexity of these disputes as to corporate claimants’ standing is illustrated by 
Gray J’s decision in Turkot v Oxus Gold plc7 that the question whether one of the 
two corporate claimants was entitled to sue should not be left for a jury, because it 
was ‘overwhelmingly likely that the documents which will have to be considered 
                                                 
3 HC Deb 24 April 2013, vol 561, col 917. 
4 Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill, Report (2010-12, HL 203, HC 930-I) para 114 
(‘Joint Committee Report’). 
5 Triplark Ltd v Northwood Hall (Freehold) Ltd [2019] EWHC 3494 (QB) [13] (Warby J). 
6 Jameel v Times Newspapers Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 983, [36]. 
7 [2006] EWHC 3361 (QB). 
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… will be lengthy and complex’.8 In some cases, it may even be necessary for the 
court to hear expert evidence as to the relationship between companies;9 as 
explained in Chapter 3, this imposes substantial additional costs on litigants.10 Since 
complexity is one of the key factors driving up the cost of libel litigation, the 
possibility of being faced with multiple claims brought by different companies 
within a group increases the anticipated cost of litigation for defendants, and in 
doing so aggravates the chilling effect of corporations’ threats to sue.  
There were a number of defamation cases in the decade before the 2013 Act came 
into force that were made significantly more complex by the addition of corporate 
claimants to claims brought either by individuals or by related companies.11 The 
2013 Act does not seem to have addressed this problem.12 For example, in 
TheHut.com v Trinity Mirror, the defendant complained of a lack of clarity in the 
particulars of claim as to the relationship between the two corporate claimants, both 
of which were owned by the same parent company.13 The second claimant appears 
to have existed solely to manufacture products for the first claimant to market and 
sell.14 There is an obvious question as to what could possibly be gained by the 
additional claim by the second claimant, given that its success will have been 
wholly reliant on the first claimant’s business; by contrast, the cost of its claim, in 
terms of the increased complexity and expense of the litigation, is clear.  
In Chapter 3, I argued that the test in s 1 of the 2013 Act may be interpreted in a 
way that makes claims of this kind less likely to succeed, although it is not yet clear 
from the cases that this will always be true.15 In any case, these claims can still be 
brought, and the evidence and argument on the issue of causation that would be 
necessary for defendants to defeat them might be substantial. Undre v London 
                                                 
8 Ibid, [15] (Gray J). 
9 See eg Gubarev v Orbis Business Intelligence Ltd [2019] EWHC 162 (QB) [43]. 
10 Ch3.B.iii., note 174 and accompanying text. 
11 eg Adelson v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 701; Atlantis World Group of 
Companies NV v Gruppo Editoriale L'Espresso SpA [2008] EWHC 1323 (QB); Collins Stewart Ltd 
v Financial Times Ltd [2004] EWHC 2337 (QB); McGrath v Dawkins [2013] EWCA Civ 206. See 
David J Acheson, ‘Empirical Insights into Corporate Defamation: An Analysis of Cases Decided 
2004-2013’ (2016) 8(1) Journal of Media Law 32, 51-52. 
12 eg Gubarev (n 9); Hope not Hate Ltd v Farage [2017] EWHC 3275 (QB) (Hope not Hate is 
discussed in more detail below at text to notes 289-299). 
13 The Hut.com v Trinity Mirror North West & North Wales Ltd [2018] EWHC 2480 (QB) [7]-[8]. 
14 Ibid, [10]. 
15 See Ch3.B.i., text to notes 122-130. 
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Borough of Harrow (‘Undre’),16 in which claims were brought by a company and 
its individual owner, is an illustration. The company’s claim was struck out on the 
basis that the statements complained of had not referred to it;17 but the judgment 
suggests that the preliminary trial of this issue also involved significant argument 
in relation to meaning,18 financial loss,19 and causation.20 As Warby J recognized, 
even this process of striking out a company’s claim can potentially be complex, 
time-consuming, and costly for litigants.21  
Thirdly, although this is not universally the case, in general corporations seem more 
likely than even wealthy individuals to have the necessary resources to pursue 
litigation. Fiona Donson claims that ‘Business generally has the kind of money 
required to undertake a legal action and the ready supply of lawyers needed to 
advise it’.22 It has also been argued that, regardless of their size, for-profit corporate 
claimants are likely to benefit from their litigation costs being tax-deductible: 
‘Not only [do] companies tend to have deep pockets but the cost of bringing 
a libel action [is] likely to be set off against the company’s profits for tax 
purposes and the Value Added Tax [can] be reclaimed, neither of which 
advantage tend[s] to be available to non-corporate defendants.’23 
Finally, as I argued in Chapter 1, the competing interests of individual defamation 
claimants, which might justify tolerating some chilling of speech as a necessary 
cost of protecting reputation, are more compelling than the interests at stake for 
corporate claimants. Defamatory statements are not capable of causing companies 
the kind of dignitary, emotional, or privacy-related harms that they can cause to 
individuals.24 Because companies’ reputational interests are more limited, the 
importance of ensuring their protection can only justify tolerating a more limited 
chilling effect on speech. Conversely, I argued in Chapter 2 that the speech chilled 
                                                 
16 Undre v London Borough of Harrow [2016] EWHC 931 (QB). 
17 Ibid, [32]. 
18 Ibid, [34]-[38]. 
19 Ibid, [42]-[55]. 
20 Ibid, [56]-[74]. 
21 Ibid, [77]-[80]. 
22 Fiona Donson, Legal Intimidation: A SLAPP in the Face of Democracy (Free Association Books 
2000) 14. 
23 David Hooper, Kim Waite and Oliver Murphy, ‘The Defamation Act 2013 – What Difference 
Will It Really Make?’ (2013) 24(6) Entertainment Law Review 199, 200. 
24 See Ch1.B., text to notes 195-252. 
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by corporate defamation claims is likely to be public interest speech;25 the chilling 
effect problem is ‘most acute’ in this context.26  
Peter Coe argues that, if significant restrictions are placed on companies’ ability to 
sue in defamation relative to individual claimants, the resulting ‘inequality’ of 
treatment would be an ‘injustice’.27 But corporate claimants are already treated 
differently from individuals in some respects. As the Joint Committee observed, the 
courts take into account companies’ more limited reputational interests when 
assessing damages;28 the Committee was right to point out that ‘it does not follow 
that corporations should in other respects have the same rights as individuals to sue 
for defamation.’29  
Companies are denied standing altogether in a number of other torts that provide 
remedies for injuries caused by defendants’ speech, on the grounds that the interests 
protected by those torts cannot be enjoyed by corporations in the same way as by 
individuals. For example, companies cannot sue in misuse of private information,30 
because they do not have the personal interests in privacy that the tort is supposed 
to protect.31 Companies are not entitled to the civil remedies available under the 
Protection from Harassment 1997.32 The fact that a company cannot be a ‘data 
subject’ for the purposes of the Data Protection Act 201833 is also significant, given 
the increasing use of claims alleging unlawful processing of personal data as an 
alternative to defamation claims for protecting claimants’ reputational interests.34 
                                                 
25 At Ch2.B., text to notes 51-153. 
26 Dario Milo, Defamation and Freedom of Speech (OUP 2008) 162. 
27 Peter Coe, ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Treatment of Corporate Reputation in Australia and 
the UK’ in András Koltay and Paul Wragg (eds), Research Handbook on Comparative Defamation 
and Privacy Law (forthcoming, Edward Elgar 2020) 10. 
28 Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL [2006] UKHL 44, [27]. However, it is arguable that 
the degree to which damages are reduced for corporate claimants is not sufficient: see Ch4.B.i., text 
to notes 111-125. 
29 Joint Committee Report (n 4) para 110 (emphasis omitted). 
30 OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1 (HL) [118]. 
31 R v Broadcasting Standards Commission (ex p BBC) [2001] QB 885 (CA) [17] (Lord Woolf MR), 
[48] (Lord Musthill). See generally Tanya Aplin, ‘A Right of Privacy for Corporations?’ in Paul 
Torremans (ed), Intellectual Property and Human Rights (Kluwer Law International 2008). 
32 Protection from Harassment Act 1997, s 7(5). A representative action can be brought by a 
corporate entity, but it is only available to prevent harassment of individuals associated with the 
company, not of the company itself: Smithkline Beecham plc v Avery [2009] EWHC 1488 (QB) 
[40]-[43]. 
33 Data Protection Act 2018, s 3. 
34 eg HH Prince Moulay Hicham Ben Abdallah Al Alaoui of Morocco v Elaph Publishing Ltd [2017] 
EWCA Civ 29, [44]; David Erdos, ‘Data Protection and the Right to Reputation: Filling the “Gaps” 
226 
 
These examples show that there are already a number of protections offered to 
claimants’ personality interests in English law that are, without any significant 
controversy, categorically denied to corporate entities. As Vanessa Wilcox 
explains: 
‘… although it is true that a company has whatever rights the law says it can 
have and technically these could be all the rights available to natural 
persons, the current practice is to expand the law only insofar as is consistent 
with the tort in question (and the interests it seeks to protect) and the nature 
of companies (i.e. whether they can conceivably suffer the sort of damage 
in question).’35 
There is no need, in principle, for companies to have equivalent rights to individuals 
to protect their reputational interests in defamation law. As argued throughout this 
thesis, there are in fact good reasons, both in principle and in practice, to offer less 
protection to companies’ reputations than is available to individuals. 
A plausible argument has been presented by several commentators that, when 
companies were initially held to be entitled to sue in defamation in the late 
nineteenth century, the differences between the reputational interests of companies 
and individuals described in Chapter 1 were not sufficiently understood or taken 
into account.36 These early decisions extended a line of cases recognizing the right 
of partnerships to sue in respect of allegations with a tendency to affect their ability 
to obtain credit or carry on a business.37 Fiona Patfield argues that this extension of 
the cause of action from partnerships to corporate claimants ‘occurred at a time 
when the judges were not yet comfortable with the legal and actual character of 
incorporated … associations.’38 
                                                 
After the Defamation Act 2013’ (2014) 73 Cambridge Law Journal 536; Jennifer Agate, ‘Data 
Protection in Media Litigation’ (2016) 21(2) Communications Law 46. 
35 Vanessa Wilcox, A Company’s Right to Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss (Cambridge University 
Press 2016) 95 (emphasis in original). See also John Armour, ‘Companies and Other Associations’ 
in Andrew Burrows (ed), English Private Law (3rd edn, OUP 2013) para 3.17. 
36 Those differences are discussed at Ch1.B., text to notes 195-252. 
37 Cook v Batchellor (1802) 3 Bos & P 150 (slander); Foster v Lawson (1826) 3 Bing 452 (libel). 
An even earlier decision had applied criminal libel laws to a statement about the East India 
Company, which was effectively a partnership: R v Jenour (1740) 87 ER 1318. 
38 Fiona Patfield, ‘The Origins of a Company’s Right to Sue for Defamation’ (1994) 45(3) Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly 233, 233. 
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Patfield’s criticism is well-illustrated by Watson B’s judgment in Metropolitan 
Saloon Omnibus Co v Hawkins,39 the case in which a company’s right to sue was 
‘first asserted unambiguously’.40 Watson B observed that partnerships had 
previously been held to have standing to sue in their own right, and argued: 
‘… suppose the firm becomes incorporated, … is the law to afford no 
protection to them? One of the safeguards to individuals against libel is the 
remedy by action; and I cannot conceive a proposition more dangerous than 
this, that because a company is incorporated they have no appeal to a court 
of justice if they are libelled.’41 
Hawkins was decided before the House of Lords’ seminal decision in Salomon v 
Salomon & Co,42 which recognized for the first time that a corporation has a legal 
personality distinct from its members. The fact that Watson B referred to the 
claimant company as ‘they’, and equated its right to sue with the interests of its 
individual members in being protected from libels, supports Patfield’s argument 
that the corporate right to sue in defamation was established before the courts 
understood the nature that the modern corporation would come to have as a 
consequence of the Salomon decision. 
The Court of Appeal’s decision in South Hetton Coal Company Ltd v North-Eastern 
News Association Ltd,43 which has been described as ‘the main foundation of the 
modern rules concerning the ability of the company to sue for defamation’,44 was 
also made before Salomon was decided. In South Hetton, the Court held that a 
trading corporation could sue in defamation without proof of special damage, 
relying mainly on Hawkins and earlier cases in which the courts had held that 
partnerships or firms were entitled to sue on that basis.45 Lord Esher concluded that 
‘the law of libel is one and the same as to all plaintiffs’, and that the presumption 
of loss applies to all claims, whether brought ‘by a person, a firm, or a company.’46  
                                                 
39 Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Co Ltd v Hawkins (1859) 4 H & N 87. 
40 Paul Mitchell, The Making of the Modern Law of Defamation (Hart 2005) 43. 
41 Hawkins (n 39) 93. 
42 [1897] AC 22. 
43 South Hetton Coal Co Ltd v North-Eastern News Association Ltd [1893] 1 QB 133 (CA). 
44 Patfield, ‘Origins of a Company’s Right to Sue’ (n 38) 241. 
45 eg Machester Corp v Williams [1891] 1 QB 94; Thorley’s Cattle Food Co v Massam (1880) 14 
Ch D 763. 
46 South Hetton (n 43) 138. 
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All three Lords Justices in South Hetton recognized the public interest in the subject 
of the defendant’s statements, which related to the conditions of the housing 
provided by the claimant company for its workers, in relation to the question 
whether a fair comment defence was capable of being put to the jury. But the 
claimant’s standing to sue was treated as an entirely distinct issue;47 the Court did 
not consider whether the public interest in speech about companies, or any other 
policy consideration, might weigh against the corporate right to sue. David Rolph’s 
criticism of these decisions is difficult to find fault with:  
‘… the courts in the late nineteenth century … erred by simply extending 
the right to sue in defamation to corporations without adequately reflecting 
on the nature of corporate reputation and the desirability of allowing 
corporations to have recourse to defamation law. It is not every right and 
incident of a natural person that is automatically extended to a corporation. 
... Likewise, it did not follow ineluctably that, because individuals could sue 
for defamation, corporations should be allowed to do so as well.’48 
Given the questionable basis on which it was initially determined that companies 
were entitled to sue in defamation, it is reasonable to re-examine the corporate right 
to sue without attaching much weight at all to the fact that it has been a feature of 
English defamation law for over a century. 
This argument for reconsidering the corporate right to sue in modern defamation 
law is made stronger by other developments in the law since the nineteenth-century 
cases discussed above; and, in particular, by the fact that individual reputation is 
now protected in many cases under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (‘ECHR’), whereas corporate reputation is not.49 As Gavin Phillipson has 
argued, ‘given the new Article 8-focused view of defamation, it seems clear that it 
is incoherent to treat corporate claimants – [which] have neither personal integrity, 
feelings nor dignity – identically with natural persons.’50 The influence of the 
Convention on domestic defamation law highlights the significant differences 
                                                 
47 eg ibid, 139-40. 
48 David Rolph, ‘A Critique of the National, Uniform Defamation Laws’ (2008) 16 Torts Law 
Journal 207, 220. 
49 See Ch1.B.i., text to notes 230-255. 
50 Gavin Phillipson, ‘The “Global Pariah”, the Defamation Bill and the Human Rights Act’ (2012) 
63(1) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 149, 185. See also Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, 
‘Reframing Libel: Taking (All) Rights Seriously and Where it Leads’ (2012) 63(1) Northern Ireland 
Legal Quarterly 5, 18. 
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between the interests of corporate and individual claimants, and makes it more 
apparent that treating their claims in ‘one and the same’ way can no longer be 
justified.  
B. Alternative remedies available to corporate 
defamation claimants 
It was claimed several times during debate on the Defamation Act 2013 that 
abolishing the corporate right to sue in defamation would lead to cases in which 
companies are denied any effective remedy for real damage caused by false 
allegations.51 For example, although the Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation 
Bill considered that there was ‘merit in continuing to explore’ the possibility of 
completely removing the right to sue from corporations, it declined to recommend 
that approach, in part because of concern that: 
‘… it would fail to take adequate account of the harm that a serious and 
irresponsible libel can cause to a corporation’s business. Where a libel leads 
to serious loss, there is no adequate alternative remedy to a libel claim.’52  
The opposite argument, made by those advocating removal of the corporate right to 
sue, asserts that there are sufficient alternative remedies available to companies 
harmed by false allegations. 53 In this section, I argue that, although not conceptually 
satisfying, in practice this is a reasonably strong argument. In many cases, torts 
other than defamation – especially malicious falsehood – offer companies 
appropriate and sufficient protection against false allegations.  
Some critics of corporate defamation law have asserted that corporations can use 
mechanisms other than litigation – and particularly ‘counterspeech’54 – to rebut 
                                                 
51 eg Joint Committee Report (n 4) para 112; Jenny Afia and Phil Hartley, ‘Lord Lester’s Defamation 
Bill 2010: A Practical Analysis’ (2010) 2(2) Journal of Media Law 183, 190; Alastair Mullis and 
Andrew Scott, ‘Worth the Candle? The Government’s Draft Defamation Bill’ (2011) 3(1) Journal 
of Media Law 1, 16. 
52 Joint Committee Report (n 4) para 114 (emphasis added). See also Jameel (n 28) [102] (Lord 
Hope). 
53 eg Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Press Standards, Libel and Privacy: Report (HC 361-I 
2010) para 178 (‘CMS Committee Report’); English PEN and Index on Censorship, Free Speech is 
Not For Sale (2009) 10 (‘FSINFS’).  
54 Deven R Desai, ‘Speech, Citizenry, and the Market: A Corporate Public Figure Doctrine’ (2013) 
98 Minnesota Law Review 455, 469. 
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false allegations. For example, the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee (‘CMS Committee’) partly justified its proposals for restricting the 
corporate right to sue on the grounds that companies are often able to ‘counter 
falsehoods and unfounded criticism through publicity campaigns.’55 Similarly, 
Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott claim that ‘larger corporations may often have 
other means available – for example through advertising or by utilising 
sophisticated public relations machinery to access the public sphere through the 
media and other routes – to counteract inaccurate claims.’56 
The argument that companies can use their own speech to counter specific 
defamatory falsehoods is not entirely convincing. It is not necessarily true in all 
cases;57 and, as Mullis and Scott imply, it seems particularly unlikely to reflect the 
options available to smaller companies,58 which may not have the resources 
necessary to respond to false allegations with ‘rehabilitative advertising or public 
relations campaigns’.59 Even for companies that are capable of mounting such 
campaigns, it is not clear how effective they are likely to be.60 In Jameel v Wall 
Street Journal Europe SPRL (‘Jameel’), Lord Bingham doubted the strength of a 
similar argument because, in his view, ‘protestations of innocence by the impugned 
party necessarily carry less weight with the public than the prompt issue of 
proceedings which culminate in a favourable verdict by judge or jury.’61  
In common with the debate on vindicatory damages discussed in the previous 
Chapter,62 these declarations by judges and legislators about the extent to which 
corporate counterspeech is an effective remedy for the harm caused by false 
allegations all appear to be made without reference to any supporting evidence, or 
even any recognition that they rely on empirical claims that are in principle testable, 
                                                 
55 CMS Committee Report (n 53) para 176. 
56 Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, ‘Something Rotten in the State of English Libel Law? A 
Rejoinder to the Clamour for Reform of Defamation’ (2009) 14(6) Communications Law 173, 179. 
See also Joint Committee Report (n 4) para 110. 
57 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 209. 
58 eg Joint Committee Report (n 4) para 110; Peter Coe, ‘Treatment of Corporate Reputation in 
Australia and the UK’ (n 27) 5. 
59 Joint Committee Evidence vol III (n 2) Ev 51 (Media and Communications Committee of the 
Business Law Section of the Law Council of Australia). 
60 Norman Redlich, ‘The Publicly Held Corporation as Defamation Plaintiff’ (1995) 39 St Louis 
University Law Journal 1167, 1170. 
61 Jameel (n 28) [26]. 
62 At Ch4.B.ii., text to notes 126-159. 
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but in fact untested – and may be wrong. For example, Lord Bingham’s claim that 
litigation is ‘necessarily’ more effective than counterspeech does not account for 
the possibility that the decision to sue will ‘backfire’ on a company, by drawing 
attention to the defamatory allegations and evoking public sympathy for 
defendants.63 It would take empirical research to provide some insight as to which 
of these competing claims is more accurate. As I argued in relation to vindicatory 
damages, however, in the absence of any clear evidence one way or the other, we 
should be cautious about relying on these claims in support of laws that have a 
demonstrable negative effect on freedom of speech.  
It may be possible for an individual who is closely associated with a company to 
sue in respect of defamatory statements about the company itself, if an ordinary 
reader would understand those statements to refer to, and be defamatory of, her 
individually.64 Where allegations are made against small businesses, it seems more 
likely that the individuals who own or manage them would have viable alternative 
claims,65 because those individuals are more likely to be seen as having personal 
control over and responsibility for the activities of the company.66 There will also 
be some individuals who are closely connected to larger companies in the public 
imagination,67 such as, for example, Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook. It has been 
claimed that in many cases the ability of these individuals to sue in a personal 
capacity is sufficient to allow companies to vindicate their reputations against 
falsehoods, without needing the ability to pursue defamation claims themselves.68  
                                                 
63 eg Tesla Motors Ltd v BBC [2013] EWCA Civ 152, [44]; Peter Coe, ‘The Defamation Act 2013: 
We Need to Talk about Corporate Reputation’ (2015) 4 Journal of Business Law 313, 329; Truda 
Gray and Brian Martin, ‘Defamation and the Art of Backfire’ (2006) 11(2) Deakin Law Review 115; 
Sue Curry Jansen and Brian Martin, ‘The Streisand Effect and Censorship Backfire’ (2015) 9 
International Journal of Communication 656. 
64 Knupffer v London Express [1944] AC 116 (HL) 120. 
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In conceptual terms, this argument is not particularly convincing. A company’s 
reputation is distinct from the reputations of its owners, directors, or employees; 
and the individual right to sue of a person associated with a company is distinct 
from the company’s right to sue, even in cases where the same statement harms the 
reputations of the company and the person simultaneously. The purpose of a 
defamation claim brought by an individual ought to be to vindicate her personal 
reputation, not the reputation of her company.69 The obvious correlate of this point 
is that such claims can only be of limited value to the company itself, because any 
vindication of its reputation that the claim achieves will be as an indirect result of 
the vindication of the individual claimant’s reputation, and because the individual 
claimant would not be permitted to recover damages for any losses suffered by the 
company.70 
In terms of legal remedies potentially available to corporations themselves, it is 
most commonly claimed that malicious falsehood provides an adequate alternative 
to defamation for companies to sue in respect of false statements.71 The Libel 
Reform Campaign, for example, recommended ‘exempt[ing] large and medium-
sized corporate bodies and associations from libel law unless they can prove 
malicious falsehood.’72 To sue in malicious falsehood, a claimant must prove that 
the statement complained of was false;73 that the defendant published it maliciously, 
in that they knew of or were reckless as to its falsity,74 or were motivated by an 
intention to injure the claimant;75 and that the publication caused the claimant 
special damage.76 ‘Special damage’ is limited to pecuniary loss;77 injury to 
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reputation will not, in itself, be sufficient to meet the requirement.78 Malicious 
falsehood claims most obviously arise from disparaging statements made by 
claimants’ commercial rivals,79 but there is no need for there to be any particular 
relationship between the parties.80 
The suggestion that allegations impacting on the business reputation of a company 
are best dealt with in malicious falsehood rather than defamation has been criticized 
on the basis that having to prove falsity, malice, and special damage in the former 
makes it significantly more difficult for claimants to make out their claims; and that 
as a result limiting corporate claimants to suing in malicious falsehood might 
prevent companies with legitimate claims from succeeding in court.81 Three points 
could be made in response to this argument.  
Firstly, the claim that proving these elements would be prohibitively difficult for a 
significant amount of legitimate corporate claimants may be slightly overstated. 
The law in fact allows for those requirements to be set aside, or moderated, in 
various circumstances. For example, malice may in some cases be inferred from 
‘the nature of the [defendant’s] unfounded claim’; the statement complained of 
‘may be so unfounded that the particular fact that it [was] put forward may be 
evidence that it [was] not honestly believed’ by the defendant.82 As discussed in 
Chapter 4,83 proving falsity is unlikely to be a significant additional burden for 
claimants in malicious falsehood compared to defamation: although the falsity of 
statements is presumed in defamation, that presumption is rarely determinative of 
the outcome of cases, and most claimants will adduce evidence of falsity anyway.84 
In most cases the need to prove falsity ‘adds only marginally’ to the burden of 
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proving malice, because in practice the evidence required to prove malice ‘will 
generally encompass evidence of … falsity’.85 
The requirement for special damage is subject to an exception, in s 3 of the 
Defamation Act 1952, in cases involving publications in a permanent form that ‘are 
calculated to cause pecuniary damage to the plaintiff in respect of any office, 
profession, calling, trade or business held or carried on by him’.86 The word 
‘calculated’ in this context refers to the likelihood that the statement will cause 
pecuniary damage, rather than the defendant’s intention, and requires claimants to 
show that such damage is ‘more likely than not’.87 If the exception in s 3 applies, 
then ‘the absence of a claim in respect of special damage’ is rendered ‘wholly 
irrelevant’ to liability.88 This effectively removes any requirement to identify 
specific financial losses (except for the purpose of assessing quantum89) in most 
claims brought by trading corporations: ‘All that is required … is identification of 
the nature of the loss and the mechanism by which it is likely to be sustained.’90 
The test in s 3 is in fact less burdensome than the threshold for companies to sue in 
defamation since the 2013 Act came into force, in the sense that it does not require 
claimants to show that the loss likely to be caused by the defendant’s statement was 
‘serious’. 
Secondly, the cause of action in malicious falsehood may offer claimants other 
advantages relative to a claim in defamation.91 For example, there is no requirement 
for a claimant to show that the statement complained of bore a defamatory 
meaning;92 and the fact that the ‘single meaning rule’ used in defamation is not 
applicable in malicious falsehood means that claimants can recover damages for 
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losses caused by the effects of false allegations on some, but not all, of its 
customers.93 Malicious falsehood claims are also available in respect of false 
statements about the claimant’s ‘business, property or other economic interests’,94 
such as those disparaging its goods or services, as well as in respect of allegations 
against the claimant company itself. 
Finally, the fact that it is generally more difficult to sue in malicious falsehood than 
in defamation does not in itself indicate that the requirements of the claim in 
malicious falsehood are too onerous, as opposed to the law of defamation being too 
lenient to claimants. The discrepancy between what claimants need to prove in 
defamation and malicious falsehood has also been pointed to as an argument for 
making defamation claims more onerous for corporate claimants.95 Given the 
prevalence of concerns about the effect that corporate defamation claims can have 
on public interest speech, in my view the additional burden imposed on claimants 
in malicious falsehood relative to defamation is an argument in favour of restricting 
companies to suing in the former tort. I argued in Chapter 4 that, in principle, it 
would be entirely reasonable to require corporate defamation claimants to prove 
falsity, loss, and fault.96 But, as Tony Weir pointed out in 1972, a company ‘can 
obtain compensation for any loss it can prove to have resulted from a false statement 
improperly made by the defendant … under the rubric of malicious falsehood’.97 
There is no good reason why it ought to be absolved of the need to prove any of the 
elements emphasized by Weir by bringing a claim in defamation instead. 
In common with the argument pointing to the ability of individuals associated with 
a company to sue in their own names, the fact that in some cases disparaged 
companies may have alternative claims in malicious falsehood, or any other cause 
of action, has little in principle to do with whether they should be entitled to sue in 
defamation. The two torts ‘have developed with different characteristics; they make 
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different demands on the parties; and they offer redress for different things.’98 
However, in practice, both arguments are in fact stronger than they initially seem: 
corporate defamation claimants do often have alternative remedies with which to 
vindicate their reputations, whether through other causes of action or through 
defamation claims brought by associated individuals. 
Most companies that succeed with defamation claims in the courts do so alongside 
individual claimants. Between 2004 and 2013, there were findings of liability in 
twelve reported corporate defamation cases; in nine of those cases, the corporate 
claimants sued alongside associated individuals, whose claims in respect of the 
same or substantially similar publications were also successful.99 Many of the 
corporate claims in these cases do not appear to have achieved anything substantial 
that could not have been achieved through the individual’s claim alone. For 
instance, in Applause Store Productions Ltd v Raphael, the meaning attributed to 
the statements complained of by the claimant company was ‘that as a result of [the 
individual claimant’s] conduct [as falsely alleged by the defendant] the company is 
not to be trusted in the financial conduct of its business and represents a serious 
credit risk.’100 As the sting of this allegation is entirely ‘consequential’ on the 
defamatory imputations against the individual claimant,101 the company’s 
reputation would have been vindicated by its director’s successful claim. 
Nevertheless, HHJ Richard Parkes QC awarded the company (which had not 
proven any actual loss102) £5,000 in general damages, in addition to the individual 
claimant’s award of £15,000.103 
In many cases, companies themselves also have viable alternatives to their 
defamation claims. In the decade preceding the 2013 Act, of the three successful 
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corporate defamation claimants that did not sue alongside an individual claimant, 
two would probably have been able to make out claims in malicious falsehood if 
necessary.104 The same theme has continued since the 2013 Act came into force. In 
Pirtek (UK) Ltd v Jackson, the claimant was also awarded default judgment in 
respect of its malicious falsehood claim.105 The corporate claimant in Al-Ko 
Kober Ltd v Sambhi succeeded with a claim in malicious falsehood,106 and sued 
alongside an individual whose claim under the Data Protection Act succeeded in 
respect of the same publications;107 in fact, the company’s claim in defamation was 
not added until after an injunction against further publication had been awarded in 
the malicious falsehood and data protection actions.108 The claimant in Seventy 
Thirty Ltd v Burki, in contrast, was not successful with its alternative claim in 
malicious falsehood.109 However, as I argued in Chapter 3, in my view the judge 
was wrong to find in favour of the company in respect of its defamation claim, so 
the decision reached on its malicious falsehood claim was the preferable 
outcome.110 The verdict in favour of the claimant has since been reversed by the 
Court of Appeal, although at the time of writing the Court’s judgment has not been 
published.111 
The claimant law firm in Brett Wilson LLP v Person(s) Unknown may have been in 
a more difficult position. It had acted for the Law Society in its litigation against 
Rick Kordowski in relation to the Solicitors from Hell website, which had resulted 
in orders being made to close the website down.112 Subsequently, Brett Wilson LLP 
was itself targeted on a new website with a similar name, but it was not possible to 
ascertain the identity of the party responsible for publishing the new website. Warby 
J, ruling that the firm’s defamation claim could be brought against ‘person(s) 
unknown’, expressed the view that ‘the reason why the defendants are not present 
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or represented at this hearing is that they wish to remain anonymous, and are 
“hiding”. They have decided, in my judgment, to avoid engaging with the court 
process.’113 In the particular circumstances of this case, given that no specific 
defendant could be identified, it would presumably have been impossible for the 
claimant firm to prove that the statements complained of had been published 
maliciously, and therefore an action in malicious falsehood would not have been 
viable.114 The judgment contains no reference to any statements on the defendant’s 
website that referred to specific individuals, so the firm would also have been 
unable to benefit from the indirect vindication of its reputation that might have 
resulted from successful individual claims. 
There may be rare cases, such as Brett Wilson, in which corporate claimants are 
forced to pursue defamation claims as their ‘last chance’ to obtain vindication 
against particularly intransigent defendants.115 A similar example is Metropolitan 
International Schools Ltd v Designtechnica Corp,116 the only reported case in the 
decade before the 2013 Act in which a corporate claimant succeeded with a 
defamation claim and may not have had a viable alternative for vindicating its 
reputation in the courts.117 In that case, the US-based defendant had chosen not to 
respond to the claim (apart from by removing the statement complained of from its 
website).118 Claimants in cases like this may, if the corporate right to sue in 
defamation is removed, be left without a legal remedy for their reputational injuries. 
But there have been two such claimants in all of the reported corporate defamation 
cases in the last fifteen years. 
In practice it seems that companies often can rely on causes of action other than 
defamation to protect their reputations against false allegations. If in most cases 
companies can achieve at least some vindication without recourse to defamation 
claims, then it becomes questionable whether the corporate right to sue in 
defamation is really necessary to ensure sufficient protection for companies’ 
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reputational interests. Under Art 10(2) ECHR, restrictions on freedom of speech are 
only permissible if ‘necessary in a democratic society’.119 Corporate defamation 
law imposes significant restrictions on defendants’ freedom of speech, as well as 
having a chilling effect on the freedom to criticize companies more generally, for 
the purpose of protecting companies’ reputations.120 If it is not necessary for that 
purpose, then its impact on freedom of speech is unjustifiable. 
i. Potential for corporate claimants to abuse alternative legal 
remedies 
The converse of the argument that companies can often rely on causes of action 
other than defamation to protect their reputations is that, because of these alternative 
claims, removing companies’ right to sue in defamation would not be an effective 
way to address the chilling effect of corporate defamation law. If companies have 
alternative options allowing them to sue in respect of reputational harm, then they 
can abuse those alternative options to chill legitimate criticism in the same way they 
can currently use defamation claims.121 To some extent this is true; however, in this 
section I argue that it is not a convincing argument for retaining the corporate right 
to sue in defamation. 
Reforms to the law of defamation in Australia in 2005, which will be discussed 
further below,122 removed the right of most companies to sue in defamation.123 One 
of the main motivations for those reforms was the perception that large companies 
were using the threat of defamation claims to chill critical reporting on their 
activities.124 A year after those reforms took effect, Mark Pearson reported 
anecdotal evidence that journalists felt able to be more robust in their criticism of 
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large corporations.125 This sentiment was echoed in evidence given to the Joint 
Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill (in the UK) five years later that ‘the 
corporations provision has had a significant liberalising effect on the ability of the 
Australian media to report on the activities of corporations.’126 But others were less 
confident that the reforms had alleviated the significant chilling effect on 
newspapers’ reporting about business that had been identified in empirical studies 
before they were enacted:127 in a study conducted after the reforms, Andrew 
Kenyon and Tim Marjoribanks identified a similar chill on reporting of the 
corporate sector.128 They pointed to the threat of lawsuits asserting other causes of 
action, or brought by individuals associated with companies, as possible 
explanations for the continued chilling of speech about corporate activities.129  
David Rolph has argued that the Australian law removing the right to sue from 
companies may also have had the unintended consequence of making it easier, in 
some cases, for them to suppress critical speech, in particular by obtaining pre-
publication injunctions.130 Rolph cites the case Beechwood Homes (NSW) Pty Ltd 
v Camenzuli,131 in which a corporate claimant, unable to sue in defamation, opted 
instead to file claims for injurious falsehood (equivalent to malicious falsehood in 
English law) and a statutory cause of action related to fair trading. In doing so, it 
was able to obtain an injunction prohibiting publication of the statements 
complained of, even though that remedy would not have been awarded had its claim 
been for defamation, because of the traditional aversion to prior restraints in that 
tort.132 Rolph rightly argues that this decision risks undermining the free speech 
benefits of the Australian law that removed companies’ right to sue in 
defamation.133 However, it seems unlikely that the same outcome would be reached 
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in England, where the rule in Bonnard v Perryman134 against awarding pre-
publication injunctions in (most) defamation cases ‘applies equally to claims of 
malicious falsehood’.135 As such, Rolph’s argument that the approach taken to 
corporate defamation reform in the Defamation Act 2013 was preferable to that 
adopted in Australia (insofar as that argument is based on the claim that the 2013 
Act ‘avoids’ this consequence of the Australian reforms136) is mistaken.137  
The broader argument, that it may be possible for corporations to stifle criticism by 
threatening to sue in causes of action other than defamation, is not unreasonable. 
One recent English case that seems to illustrate the potential problem is 
Pharmacy2U Ltd v The National Pharmacy Association,138 in which the claimant 
(P2U) applied for an order that would require the defendant (the NPA) to identify 
all recipients of a notice it had sent to its members for further distribution to their 
customers. The claimant alleged that the notice, which was critical of its business 
practices, infringed the trade mark in its brand name. Master Clark refused to grant 
the order, expressing concern that disclosing the recipients’ names would allow the 
claimant company to use threats of litigation to ‘“pick off” the individual members, 
without ever having to submit to a judicial determination of the merits of its 
claim.’139 He went on: 
‘These concerns are reinforced to a degree by P2U’s conduct to date. When 
it first wrote to NPA in December 2017, it alleged that the statements in the 
Notice were untrue, and threatened claims for defamation and malicious 
falsehood. Following NPA’s solicitors’ response, these were withdrawn.’140 
The NPA chairperson at the time was also threatened with a defamation suit,141 and 
has expressed his belief that the company ‘thought [it] would have better luck 
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threatening an individual, rather than an organisation’, and that it was forced to 
change its legal strategy to one claiming trade mark infringement when it ‘had to 
accept that everything in the notice was true and [it] couldn’t sue for defamation.’142 
If companies are denied standing in defamation, it may be that many will use the 
same tactic, and seek to stifle criticism with other types of claim. 
However, there is a reason that P2U initially threatened to sue in defamation. As 
Rolph notes, companies in Australia that ‘have been compelled to rely on 
alternative causes of action’ have not usually done so successfully.143 For a number 
of reasons, defamation claims are particularly conducive to being used to silence 
legitimate criticism.144 Claimants suing in defamation benefit from a number of 
rules which make it easier for them to construct a claim that can plausibly be 
presented as having some chance of succeeding in court.145 For example, the 
presumption of malice effectively makes defamation a strict liability tort, removing 
in most cases the need for the claimant to demonstrate the defendant’s fault;146 and 
the presumption of falsity also favours claimants.147 As explained in Chapter 2, the 
complexity of defamation law results in costly and unpredictable litigation, which 
enhances the effectiveness of companies’ threats to sue critics.148 Claimants are able 
to use the ‘single meaning rule’ to generate extensive technical argument in the 
preliminary stages of litigation.149 The Defamation Act 2013 did not address these 
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elements of the law; and although it did abolish the presumption of harm, the serious 
financial loss test in s 1(2) has generally been interpreted favourably for 
claimants,150 and may in some cases have provided companies with an additional 
way to increase the complexity of litigation.151 Even if the abuse of defamation 
lawsuits by companies is only part of a broader problem with their abuse of 
litigation generally, it is the most serious part of that problem, and it warrants 
addressing in its own right.  
As well as the potential for companies to abuse laws other than defamation, the 
CMS Committee also identified the possibility that ‘corporations wishing to exploit 
libel laws to stifle criticism’ could ‘[make] use of an individual as a “front person” 
to act for them in defamation litigation’ as a ‘practical difficult[y]’ with removing 
the corporate right to sue.152 In a recent example of this strategy being used, Richard 
Tice, a director of the Brexit Party (which is registered as a private company153), 
threatened to sue MEP Alyn Smith for defamation after he referred to the Party as 
a ‘shell company that’s a money-laundering front’.154 Despite the unambiguous 
authority precluding political parties from suing in defamation,155 and the fact that 
Smith’s statement referred directly to the Party itself, Tice’s lawyers asserted in 
their letter before action that ‘any viewer who was aware that Mr Tice was the 
chairman of the Brexit Party would conclude that you were alleging that Mr Tice is 
himself running a money laundering operation’,156 and Smith issued an apology.157 
But, in a statement released in response to Smith’s apology, Tice declared that he 
would ‘not hesitate to take action against those who make false claims about the 
Brexit Party, and by implication those of us who run it’,158 which raises the 
suspicion that the central concern motivating the threat to sue Smith was with his 
criticism of the Brexit Party, which is precluded from suing in its own name.  
                                                 
150 See Ch3.B.iii., text to notes 156-264. 
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152 CMS Committee Report (n 53) para 175. 
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For the removal of the corporate right to sue to effectively address the chilling effect 
of legal threats, the courts would need to be aware of the risk that the reform could 
be undermined if individuals associated with companies could too easily sue in their 
own names in respect of critical statements directed at companies themselves. It 
may not always be easy, or even possible, for courts to distinguish the kind of 
individual claims discussed in the previous section, which are legitimately brought 
to protect the reputation of an individual but which also offer some indirect 
vindication for a company’s reputation,159 from claims brought in the name of an 
individual for the primary purpose of protecting the reputation of a company with 
which they are associated. However, cases such as Duke v University of Salford, in 
which a university’s claim was struck out on the basis that it was actually brought 
to protect the reputations of individual managers,160 suggest that, if necessary, the 
courts would be capable of identifying individual claimants’ attempts to circumvent 
a rule barring companies from suing in their own names. Similarly, there are a 
number of cases that illustrate the courts’ capacity to identify attempts by corporate 
claimants to sue in respect of reputational harm in causes of action other than 
defamation.161 There will be cases in which companies are able to effectively stifle 
legitimate criticism by threatening to sue in a cause of action such as malicious 
falsehood, or by threatening a defamation suit by an individual proxy. But that is 
no reason for them to retain the ability to sue in defamation in their own right, which 
is even more effective – and far more frequently used – as a tool with which to 
silence critics. 
C. The scope of the proposed reform 
One important question has yet to be answered: which claimants should be denied 
standing to sue in defamation? In what remains of this chapter, I argue that the 
answer to that question should be: all entities other than individual human beings. 
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The Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill recognized the ‘enormous 
variety in the size, available resources and influence of corporations.’162 The 
arguments for denying companies standing that have been presented so far in this 
thesis will not necessarily be equally convincing across the wide range of possible 
contexts in which defamation claims might be brought by corporate claimants.163 
Given that defamation cases often vary significantly on their facts,164 it might be 
argued that rather than denying standing entirely to a whole class of claimants, 
examining the particular circumstances of each individual case would be a fairer 
and more reasonable way to identify and address problematic cases. Gary Chan, for 
example, cautions against taking ‘a blunderbuss approach to deny all or some 
corporations their claims in defamation’ based on issues, such as an inequality of 
arms between the parties, that exist in only some cases.165  
For Dario Milo, who advocates reforms to strengthen the protection of ‘public 
speech’ in defamation law, the identity of some corporate claimants will be 
indicative of the public interest value of speech in their cases. He suggests that 
‘most critical speech about large corporations will … as a matter of general 
principle’ warrant the enhanced protection from defamation claims that he argues 
should be given to public interest speech.166 However, Milo argues that the 
claimant’s identity ‘can be no more than a point of departure; it would be incorrect 
to elevate the status of the claimant to a threshold enquiry conclusive of the public 
nature of the speech’ at issue in the case.167 The argument I will put forward below 
is that Milo does not go far enough in treating the fact that a claimant is a (large) 
corporation as merely indicative of the need to protect the defendant’s speech from 
defamation claims. Instead, the fact that a claimant is a corporation (of any size) 
should be the determinative factor that precludes it from suing in defamation. 
 
                                                 
162 Joint Committee Report (n 4) para 118. 
163 See generally Acheson, ‘Empirical Insights’ (n 11) 39-40. 
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166 Milo (n 26) 145 (citation omitted). 
167 Ibid. 
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i. Categorical vs case-by-case approaches to deciding standing 
The above discussion suggests that there are two broad approaches that might be 
used to restrict companies’ ability to sue in defamation to protect public interest 
speech.168 The first, which I will call the ‘categorical’ or ‘definitional’ approach, 
uses a relatively simple rule to define a category of cases in which the right to sue 
will be restricted. That restriction applies in all cases that fall within the relevant 
category, regardless of the specific circumstances of each individual case.169 The 
second, which I will call the ‘case-by-case’ or ‘circumstantial’ approach, requires 
courts to assess the particular circumstances of each individual case, taking into 
account various factors that might be relevant to whether it is appropriate to 
recognize the claimant’s standing. I will avoid the term ‘ad hoc’ balancing, which 
is used to describe this latter approach in some literature, because it implies that 
courts will carry out these case-by-case assessments in an unprincipled way.170 On 
the contrary, the exercise will be guided by principles developed in the relevant 
case law.171 As Eric Barendt notes, these two approaches are not completely distinct 
from one another.172 The application of a categorical rule to individual cases will, 
of course, require some examination of the circumstances of those cases, depending 
on the criteria by which the category in question is defined.173 
The key advantage of the definitional approach is that it makes it easier to predict 
in advance how a given case is likely to be dealt with by the courts.174 In effect, the 
categorical rule is used as a heuristic or proxy; allowing a simpler and less fact-
                                                 
168 This account is based on Barendt, Freedom of Speech (n 57) 205-26, which in turn draws on 
Melville B Nimmer, ‘The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to 
Libel and Misapplied to Privacy’ (1968) 56(4) California Law Review 935.  
169 Barendt, Freedom of Speech (n 57) 205. See also Nimmer (n 168) 944. To clarify, categorical 
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170 Thomas I Emerson, ‘Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment’ (1963) 72(5) Yale Law 
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171 Milo (n 26) 139. 
172 Barendt, Freedom of Speech (n 57) 226. 
173 See eg the discussion of the US ‘public figure’ test at text to notes 222-233 below. 
174 Eric Barendt, ‘Balancing Freedom of Expression and the Right to Reputation: Reflections on 
Reynolds and Reportage’ (2012) 63(1) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 59, 55-56. 
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sensitive test to stand in for a detailed assessment of the relative merits of individual 
claims and their likely effects on freedom of speech. This predictability allows 
publishers to make more informed decisions about whether to publish defamatory 
allegations in the first place.175 As discussed in Chapter 2, publishers’ uncertainty 
about the outcome of potential defamation litigation is a significant driving force 
behind the ‘chilling effect’, which can keep important information about corporate 
activities hidden from the public.176 This kind of uncertainty in the law ‘is always 
unfortunate, but it is particularly pernicious where speech is concerned because it 
tends to deter all but the most courageous … from entering the market place of 
ideas.’177 By reducing uncertainty, the use of clear and predictable categorical rules 
to protect public interest speech can be an effective way to alleviate the law’s 
chilling effect on publishers. 
The alternative ‘case-by-case’ or ‘circumstantial’ approach has the benefit of 
reducing the likelihood that the rigid application of a bright-line rule will lead to 
unjust outcomes in some cases. It allows courts more flexibility to decide the 
outcome of a given case on the peculiar features of that case, which one would hope 
would facilitate fairer decisions.178 However, one of the arguments in favour of the 
definitional approach is that this is not always true in practice. Definitional 
balancing reduces the discretion that judges have to take case-specific factors into 
account, thereby guarding against the perceived risk that they ‘might be inclined … 
to place undue emphasis on the particular harm suffered by the [claimant] and so 
might ignore the long-term effects on free speech brought about by an award of 
damages.’179 
                                                 
175 Frederick Schauer, ‘Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the Chilling Effect’ (1978) 
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English defamation law has not historically protected public interest speech using 
categorical rules;180 instead, courts typically approach the issue on a case-by-case 
basis.181 The same is true of the approach that the European Court of Human Rights 
(‘ECtHR’) takes to analysing cases in which there is a conflict between reputation 
and freedom of expression.182 The ECtHR’s Art 10 case law does identify broad 
categories of speech, such as political speech, that are considered generally to 
deserve greater protection than other categories, such as commercial speech;183 and 
similar categories have been recognized in English law.184 But these ‘categories’ of 
speech are not used as the basis of categorical rules.185 Even in cases involving 
‘political’ speech, the most-protected category in the ECtHR’s ‘hierarchy’, the type 
of speech at issue is not the only factor that might influence the outcome of the case: 
‘the possibility that this factor may be decisive [in the outcome of the case] does 
not excuse the court from an intense focus upon the facts’.186 Instead, the type of 
speech at issue is one factor that courts will consider when assessing the relative 
importance of speech and reputation in the particular circumstances of each 
individual case.187  
It has rightly been pointed out that, because the ECtHR engages in case-by-case 
balancing to resolve conflicts between speech and reputation, the extent to which it 
would be consistent with the UK’s Convention obligations for the English courts to 
adopt a definitional approach in defamation cases may be limited.188 However, this 
does not represent a barrier to adopting a definitional approach with respect to 
corporate claimants, because their reputational interests, unlike those of individual 
claimants, do not engage Art 8 of the Convention.189 In corporate defamation 
                                                 
180 McCartan Turkington Breen v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 277 (HL) 301 (Lord Cooke). 
181 See Defamation Act 2013, s 4(2); Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL) 196-
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184 eg R v Secretary of State for the Home Department (ex p Simms) [2000] 2 AC 115 (HL) 126; 
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [147]. 
185 Reynolds (n 181) 204. 
186 Rocknroll v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWHC 24 (Ch) [31] (Briggs J). 
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188 eg Barendt, ‘Balancing Freedom of Expression and the Right to Reputation’ (n 174) 67. 
189 See Ch1.C.i., text to notes 230-255. Jan Oster also argues that the ECHR requires the interests in 
corporate reputation and freedom of expression to be balanced on a case-by-case basis (Jan Oster, 
‘The Criticism of Trading Corporations and their Right to Sue for Defamation’ (2011) 2(3) Journal 
of European Tort Law 255, 263, 266, 270). But the argument is based on his view that A1P1 provides 
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claims, the balance to be struck is between defendants’ fundamental free speech 
rights and companies’ reputational interests devoid of such significance.190 The law 
can and should give the former categorical priority over the latter.  
ii. Derbyshire as a categorical rule denying standing to some 
claimants  
There is one important instance in which English defamation law uses a categorical 
rule to deny standing to a whole class of potential claimants. That is the principle, 
established in Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd 
(‘Derbyshire’),191 that a local authority does not have the right to sue in defamation. 
Lord Keith’s judgment for a unanimous House of Lords noted that authorities such 
as Hawkins192 and South Hetton,193 discussed above,194 ‘clearly establish[ed]’ that 
trading companies were entitled to sue in defamation.195 However, as a 
governmental body the claimant was in a ‘special position’196 that ought to preclude 
it from having the right to sue: 
‘There are … features of a local authority which may be regarded as 
distinguishing it from other types of corporation, whether trading or non-
trading. The most important of these features is that it is a governmental 
body. Further, it is a democratically elected body’.197  
To clarify, the Derbyshire rule is categorical not because it provides absolute 
protection for the defendant’s speech, but because the rule applies in any case where 
the claimant is a government body, regardless of any other feature of the case, and 
solely because the claimant falls within that category. As Milo puts it, ‘The rules 
that prohibit the government from suing for defamation effectively carve out 
                                                 
companies with a Convention right to reputation; as I argued in Chapter 1, that view is mistaken 
(Ch1.B.ii., text to notes 129-151). 
190 See Barendt, Freedom of Speech (n 57) 226. 
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194 At text to notes 36-48. 
195 Derbyshire (n 191) 544-47. 
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enclaves of speech that are classic instances of public speech. Accordingly, this 
speech enjoys the greatest protection from defamation law.’198  
According to Lord Keith, allowing local authorities to sue in defamation was likely 
to violate defendants’ Art 10 rights, because ‘there was no pressing social need that 
a corporate public authority should have the right to sue in defamation for the 
protection of its reputation.’199 To the contrary, ‘It is of the highest public 
importance that a democratically elected governmental body, or indeed any 
governmental body, should be open to uninhibited public criticism.’200 The 
Derbyshire principle therefore demonstrates that it may be appropriate to restrict 
the right to sue of an entire class of claimants, because of the need to protect the 
public interest in defamatory statements about those claimants.  
The principle is also significant because of the argument that its scope should be 
extended so as to restrict the ability of a wider range of corporate entities to sue in 
defamation, which was put forward several times during the Parliamentary debates 
on the Defamation Act 2013.201 The argument was that the increasing tendency for 
governmental functions to be carried out by private companies could justify 
extending the Derbyshire principle beyond bodies that would traditionally be 
regarded as ‘governmental’.202 Ian Loveland argues that companies which ‘choose 
to pursue profit by providing public services … should expect to be subject to 
vigorous (and well-protected) media scrutiny’,203 because ‘citizens can claim a 
legitimate interest in being informed of the integrity and competence of such 
organisations’ activities.’204  
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The courts have shown at least some willingness to extend the Derbyshire principle 
beyond directly elected government authorities, including to political parties in 
Goldsmith v Bhoyrul.205 In British Coal Corporation v National Union of 
Mineworkers the principle was extended to a government body which was not 
democratically elected;206 and in Sunderland Housing Co Ltd v Baines, Eady J 
suggested that there may be an argument for applying the principle to a housing 
association.207 However, the same judge refused to rule that a university was 
precluded from suing in defamation in Duke v University of Salford.208 
In Chapter 2, I discussed Baroness Hale’s judgment in Jameel,209 which drew on 
the Derbyshire decision in support of the argument that the common law 
presumption of loss should be abolished for corporate defamation claimants. 
Baroness Hale noted that the question whether non-governmental trading 
organizations should be required to demonstrate loss was not put to the House of 
Lords in Derbyshire,210 and argued that: 
‘We cannot know whether Lord Keith, had the matter been in issue, would 
have accepted the invitation to require that corporations produce at least 
some evidence to support the likelihood that their pockets would indeed be 
injured in some way.’211 
Baroness Hale’s reasoning here is based on a rather unconvincing reading of Lord 
Keith’s Derbyshire judgment. As pointed out by both Lord Bingham and Lord Scott 
in Jameel, Lord Keith’s approval of South Hetton as it related to trading companies’ 
right to sue was an important step in the reasoning by which he reached his 
conclusion as to the standing of government bodies.212 In Shevill v Presse Alliance 
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SA,213 in which Lord Keith joined the majority,214 the House of Lords also accepted 
without comment that a for-profit corporation could benefit from the presumption 
of damage as a defamation claimant. Lord Keith’s argument was that it is the 
democratically elected, rather than corporate, nature of local authorities which, 
along with their exercise of governmental functions, justifies greater protection for 
speech about their activities.  
Fiona Patfield has argued, to the contrary, that the justification for protecting the 
freedom to criticize private companies ‘can only be strengthened by the fact that 
there is no popular election of corporate management and that in large companies 
the power of individual shareholders is very small.’215 This point is not 
unreasonable: it is important to hold powerful institutions accountable for their 
actions, whether that is through the ballot box or another mechanism. But extending 
the Derbyshire principle to private companies on this basis would be to depart 
significantly from the reasoning that led Lord Keith to that principle in the first 
place. 
Parliament declined to legislate to extend the Derbyshire principle in the 
Defamation Act 2013. In the House of Lords, Lord McNally explained the 
government’s position that ‘for the moment we should rest on common law to deal 
with this matter.’216 It would not be surprising to see the courts gradually extend the 
Derbyshire principle to statements about private companies’ conduct of public 
functions, even after Parliament decided against doing so in legislation, especially 
because one of the main reasons for that decision was the view that it was better to 
leave it to the courts to determine the scope of the privilege. This would be a 
welcome development. But it would have only a relatively minor effect on 
corporate defamation law overall, because the expanded privilege would still only 
cover statements about a small proportion of companies, and would likely only 
cover some speech about that small group of companies. It would not help to protect 
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the public interest in open communication about the normal activities of private 
corporations.217  
But the categorical approach taken in Derbyshire offers a good model for a broader 
reform that would protect the public interest in critical speech about companies 
more generally. Of course, denying standing to a class of claimants with a 
categorical rule means defining the category of claimants affected. As the 
discussion of Derbyshire above indicates, the category need not necessarily include 
all corporate claimants; in the section below, however, I argue that it should. 
iii. Category should be defined to include all non-human 
claimants 
Any rule that draws a line between classes of case that will be treated differently 
from one another – such as those involving different kinds of claimant – will, to 
some extent at least, give rise to three problems: uncertainty, arbitrariness, and over- 
or under-inclusiveness.218 A rule will be ‘uncertain’ if there are cases in which it is 
not possible to predict in advance how it will apply; in this context, if it is not clear 
whether a particular claimant will fall within the category defined by the rule. The 
problems of arbitrariness and over- or under-inclusiveness are closely related, and 
both are inevitable results of increasing the certainty of a rule by making it more 
specific.219 A rule will be ‘arbitrary’220 if it draws a precise line between classes of 
case at one point on a continuum of points, any of which would be equally 
suitable.221 A rule will be ‘under-inclusive’ if it does not apply in some cases even 
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though it should; and ‘over-inclusive’ if it does apply in some cases even though it 
should not.  
The sections below illustrate how reforms that apply to some, but not all, corporate 
claimants can lead to each of these problems, using examples of tests used in 
corporate defamation cases in the United States, Australia, and England 
respectively. By comparison to the problems identified with each of those tests, I 
argue that the rule proposed here – that standing should be denied to all claimants 
other than human beings – minimizes the problems of uncertainty and arbitrariness; 
avoids the under-inclusiveness of most alternatives; and is over-inclusive only to a 
modest extent that can reasonably be accepted in light of the rule’s benefits. 
Uncertainty – US ‘public figure’ standard 
In the discussion of potential substantive reforms in Chapter 4, I described the 
constitutional principles applicable in defamation cases involving ‘public figure’ 
plaintiffs as a result of the US Supreme Court’s decisions in New York Times v 
Sullivan and subsequent cases.222 The significant first amendment protections given 
to defendants in these cases mean that the question whether a plaintiff qualifies as 
a ‘public figure’ assumes huge importance: in fact, ‘The divide between public and 
private status for a defamation plaintiff can be – and frequently is – the 
determinative factor in whether a plaintiff can succeed’.223  
The Sullivan Court’s decision to make the plaintiff’s status determinative of the 
degree of first amendment protection given to the defendant was largely intended 
to limit the need for courts to engage in complex and unpredictable balancing 
exercises when deciding defamation cases.224 However, applying the ‘public figure’ 
test in individual cases can itself be a complex and unpredictable exercise that 
sometimes requires detailed examination of a variety of case-specific factors.225 
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This leads to uncertainty as to which companies will be treated as public figures, 
and therefore face the substantial hurdles set up by Sullivan if they sue for 
defamation; and presents publishers with the risk that expensive litigation will be 
necessary to resolve the issue. This uncertainty undermines the effectiveness of the 
substantive rules as a way to address the law’s chilling effect on speech about 
companies.226 
Norman Redlich notes ‘the absence of a clear analytic framework, let alone 
authoritative guidance from the Supreme Court’ on how lower courts should 
determine whether corporate plaintiffs qualify as public figures.227 This is in large 
part because the Court has not directly ruled on the status of corporate plaintiffs. It 
had the opportunity to do so in the 1985 case Dun & Bradstreet, Inc v Greenmoss 
Builders, Inc,228 but in deciding that case it did not challenge the agreement of the 
parties and the state courts to treat the plaintiff as a ‘private figure’.229 The Dun & 
Bradstreet decision has not been overturned despite strong criticism,230 meaning 
that corporate defamation plaintiffs can in principle be either public or private 
figures for first amendment purposes. It is left to state courts, and lower federal 
courts, to determine the status of various corporate plaintiffs, but these courts ‘vary 
in their approach’ to that exercise.231 In a recent article examining how the Supreme 
Court’s defamation jurisprudence is applied in cases involving corporate plaintiffs, 
Matthew Bunker concludes that:  
‘… the corporate public figure doctrine is in a state of serious incoherence. 
Courts around the country, with no Supreme Court guidance, have wildly 
varying methodologies for the status determination.’232 
The practical effectiveness of the protection that the first amendment provides 
against corporate defamation claims relies to a large extent on how reliable speakers 
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perceive it to be. The variety of different ways in which courts apply the law in 
individual cases: 
‘… is not simply a doctrinal muddle; it can have serious consequences for 
the ability of corporate critics to hold corporations accountable and to 
challenge and censure perceived corporate misdeeds. The breathing space 
provided for critics by the actual malice standard is seriously undermined 
when the status determination is in such disarray across jurisdictions.’233 
Some of the strongest arguments for denying companies standing to sue in 
defamation point to the chilling effect on speech that is caused by publishers’ 
uncertainty about the legal implications of criticizing companies, and their fear of 
the costly litigation that might be necessary to defend their criticisms. The category 
of claimants that is denied standing should not be defined using a rule such as the 
‘public figure’ test in US law, which may or may not apply to a given corporate 
claimant depending on a range of factors that might vary significantly from case to 
case. The complexity and uncertainty of the litigation that might be necessary to 
determine that a corporate claimant did not have standing would undermine the 
effectiveness of the rule denying standing in the first place. 
Arbitrariness – Australian ‘excluded corporations’ 
Removing the right to sue from corporations was ‘one of the key reforms’ in the 
Australian national uniform defamation laws of 2005.234 Australian defamation law, 
in common with the law in the US, is derived from the English common law; before 
the national reforms, corporate defamation claimants were treated in substantially 
the same way in Australia as they were in England.235 The removal of right to sue 
in defamation from companies was motivated by similar arguments to those 
advanced in this thesis.236 It was targeted at the types of case which were considered 
to be most problematic, mainly because of concerns that a rule denying standing to 
                                                 
233 Ibid. See also Lisa Magee Arent, ‘A Matter of “‘Governing’ Importance”: Providing Business 
Defamation and Product Disparagement Defendants Full First Amendment Protection’ (1992) 67 
Indiana Law Journal 441, 444: uncertainty about corporate plaintiffs’ status ‘create[s] an atmosphere 
which discourages speech critical of a business’s agents and operations.’ 
234 Matt Collins, ‘Five Years On: A Report Card on Australia’s National Scheme Defamation Laws’ 
(2011) 16(4) Media & Arts Law Review 317. 
235 Barnes & Co Ltd v Sharp (1910) 11 CLR 462 (Aus HC). 
236 Attorney General’s Task Force (n 124) 13-14. 
257 
 
small businesses and non-profit organizations would be over-inclusive.237 Certain 
categories of ‘excluded corporations’ therefore retained the right to sue, but those 
categories were precisely defined so as to avoid the uncertainty and case-sensitivity 
of a rule like the US ‘public figure’ test. 
The pertinent section of the uniform legislation reads as follows: 
‘A corporation is an excluded corporation if: 
(a) the objects for which it is formed do not include obtaining financial 
gain for its members or corporators, or 
(b) it employs fewer than 10 persons and is not related to another 
corporation, 
and the corporation is not a public body. …’238 
As noted above, the Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill in the UK heard 
evidence from the Law Council of Australia that, overall, the reform was 
‘liberalising’ media coverage of corporate activities.239 But the Committee was also 
told of problems with the law: the most significant issue reported was ‘a general 
consensus that the current corporations provision gives rise to serious anomalies, 
principally because of the arbitrary nature of the definition of “excluded 
corporations”.’240 That is, there was broad agreement among relevant law firms that 
the scope of the Australian ban on corporate defamation claims was problematic. 
This concern has also been raised in academic commentary on the Australian 
reforms. In David Rolph’s view, ‘The criticism that the bright-line exclusion based 
on the number of employees is arbitrary is unanswerable. It is clearly so.’241 Matt 
Collins, similarly, argues that ‘There is obvious force in the criticism that a 
delineation based on the number of employees a corporation has at any particular 
time is arbitrary’;242 it means, for example, ‘that corporations with nine full-time 
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employees but very high profits retain the right to sue for defamation, while 
struggling corporations with eleven full-time employees do not.’243 
The primary criterion used to differentiate those companies which now cannot sue 
from those which still can – their number of employees at the time of publication – 
is inevitably imperfect because, as the Joint Committee observed in its report, ‘there 
may not be a link between the commercial power of a corporation and the number 
of people it employs.’244 It might be possible to use a threshold based on a more 
direct measure of companies’ financial power, such as turnover, profit, or assets, to 
distinguish between ‘large’ and ‘small’ companies. For example, the European 
Commission defines ‘small and medium-sized enterprises’ (‘SMEs’) on the basis 
of an employee number threshold supplemented by ceilings on annual turnover or 
balance sheet total (which ‘reflects the overall wealth of a business’).245 However, 
detailed examination of evidence, and possibly expert evidence, may be needed to 
apply a similar threshold in individual cases to identify ‘smaller’ companies that 
would retain the right to sue in defamation. The Commission’s criteria for 
categorising a business as an SME become considerably more complex when it is 
part of a group of related entities,246 which is not uncommon for corporate 
defamation claimants.247 More importantly, using a threshold of this kind might 
make it difficult for publishers to predict in advance whether a given company 
would be entitled to sue.248 The primary reason for adopting a bright-line rule to 
deny standing to companies is to provide certainty to publishers, thereby alleviating 
the law’s chilling effect on their speech. 
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In its consultation paper on defamation reform in Northern Ireland, where the 
Defamation Act 2013 does not apply, the Northern Ireland Law Commission 
requested views on ‘introduc[ing] a bar on corporate claims equivalent to that 
introduced’ in Australia, as a possible alternative to a reform replicating the s 1(2) 
threshold in English law.249 Although respondents preferred the latter approach, 
again the only criticism of the Australian law explicitly mentioned in Andrew 
Scott’s report on Reform of Defamation Law in Northern Ireland, which was 
produced on the basis of responses to the Law Commission consultation, was a 
criticism of its scope: ‘the Australian approach … was considered somewhat 
arbitrary in design and liable to lead to ancillary litigation regarding its 
parameters.’250 In 2019, the Australian Council of Attorneys-General conducted a 
consultation to review the operation of the 2005 reforms, including the corporations 
provision.251 In its report on that consultation, it noted that: 
‘Very few stakeholders supported broadening the right of corporations to 
sue. The vast majority of stakeholders supported either narrowing or 
recasting the “excluded corporations” test to further restrict the types of 
corporations able to sue for defamation, or maintaining the current test.’252 
The Council recommended clarifying the definition of excluded corporations, and 
also restricting their right to sue by making them subject to a ‘serious financial loss’ 
test based on s 1(2) of the English Defamation Act 2013.253 
Under-inclusiveness – the ‘body that trades for profit’ test in s 1(2) of the 
Defamation Act 2013  
Parliament chose to limit the ‘serious financial loss’ threshold in s 1(2) of the 
Defamation Act 2013 to cases in which the claimant was ‘a body that trades for 
profit’. Certainty was a motivating factor in the choice of this test, as was (in 
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common with the Australian reforms) the desire not to include some kinds of 
claimant.254 Lord McNally, the sponsor of the Bill in the House of Lords, argued 
that the term ‘body that trades for profit’ was a ‘much clearer and simpler definition’ 
than that used in the Lords’ previously proposed amendment,255 which had referred 
to ‘a body corporate; other non-natural legal persons trading for profit; or trade 
associations representing organisations trading for profit’.256 Lord McNally also 
explained that ‘A vaguer formulation … would have risked inadvertently catching 
other bodies, such as charities, which are not the subject of concern.’257 Criticism 
of the Australian employee-number threshold’s arbitrariness was the main reason 
that test, or a similar test that would also have excluded smaller companies as well 
as charities from the scope of s 1(2), was rejected.258 
It would be fair to say that the ‘body that trades for profit’ test in s 1(2) is clearer, 
and its application to individual cases more predictable, than the standards used in 
either Australia or the US.259 Notwithstanding some initial disagreement among 
commentators shortly after the Act was passed,260 it is clear that charities (even 
those that raise money through commercial activities) will not fall within the scope 
of s 1(2).261 But the more serious problem with the scope of the s 1(2) test is that it 
is under-inclusive: defamation claims brought by entities which are excluded from 
the requirement to show serious financial loss under s 1(2), such as charities and 
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other not-for-profit organizations, can stifle contributions to debate on matters of 
genuine public concern.  
The Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill recommended that charities be 
exempt from the requirement for corporate claimants to prove financial loss 
primarily because it did not ‘anticipate them being able or willing to exploit the 
inequality of wealth that under[lay its] recommendations on corporations more 
generally.’262 It is undoubtedly true that not-for-profit entities are less likely to 
abuse defamation laws to silence criticism than for-profit corporations.263 But the 
chilling effect of defamation claims brought by not-for-profit organizations is still 
substantial enough to justify removing the right to sue from these claimants as well 
as from trading companies. Since it is only the ‘non-distribution constraint’ (that is, 
the prohibition on not-for-profit organizations distributing profits to their members) 
that distinguishes between the two kinds of entity,264 the not-for-profit category still 
‘captures a wide-ranging assortment of organizations’,265 some of which may have 
substantial resources, and a willingness to use them to stifle criticism.  
There was an obvious example that ought to have given the Committee pause: 
British Chiropractic Association v Singh,266 which was one of the most significant 
cases driving the reform efforts in the first place,267 and which the Committee 
referred to several times in its report.268 As the British Chiropractic Association is 
a not-for-profit entity, it would not have been subject to the requirement to show 
serious financial loss under s 1(2).269 Another defamation claim pursued by a non-
profit entity shortly before the 2013 Act was passed (although after the Joint 
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Committee published its report), in Duke v University of Salford,270 also imposed a 
substantial burden on the defendant,271 despite the claim being described by Eady J 
as ‘wholly unreal, and indeed an abuse of the court’s process’ because the 
statements complained of actually criticized members of the University’s 
management.272 The only other not-for-profit entities whose attempted defamation 
claims were ruled on by the courts in the decade preceding the Act were the Law 
Society, which failed to bring a representative action on behalf of its members;273 
an unincorporated charity that was held not to have standing to sue in its own 
name;274 and a housing association which sued in respect of statements that 
‘relate[d] primarily to’ an associated individual claimant.275  
The Church of Scientology was also raised during parliamentary debate276 as an 
example of a not-for-profit body with a history of aggressive use of defamation 
laws, ‘as a matter of deliberate policy, … to deter serious criticism’.277 These 
examples demonstrate that excluding charities and other not-for-profit 
organizations from the scope of a reform designed to address the chilling effect of 
corporate defamation claims would preserve the opportunity for some corporate 
claimants to abuse the threat of litigation to silence good-faith criticism of their 
activities, and would therefore be under-inclusive.  
It could be argued that the reform advocated here, which would deny standing to 
all claimants other than human beings because of a small number of problematic 
defamation claims brought by not-for-profit bodies, would instead be over-
inclusive. Charities, NGOs, and other not-for-profit bodies are more likely than 
other corporate claimants to have the broader, non-financial interests in reputation 
identified in Chapter 1;278 and injuries to those reputational interests seem less 
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likely to cause the financial loss necessary to ground an alternative action in 
malicious falsehood. If the right to sue in defamation were removed from all non-
human claimants, there would inevitably be some cases in which charities were left 
with no adequate legal remedy for reputational injuries caused by false 
allegations.279 But there is no good reason to think that there would be many cases 
in which this was true.280 In the six years since the 2013 Act came into force, there 
have been two reported judgments in cases involving a non-human claimant other 
than a ‘body that trades for profit’. Since the claimants in those cases were excluded 
from scope of s 1(2), but would be included in the scope of the reform proposed 
here, it is instructive to examine them here. 
In Cooke v MGN Ltd, one of the first cases in which the serious harm test in s 1 of 
the 2013 Act was applied, the second claimant was a not-for-profit housing 
association.281 It sued (alongside its chief executive) in respect of the sole paragraph 
in which it was mentioned282 in a story that covered almost three pages of the 
defendant’s newspaper,283 despite the defendant publishing a correction in the next 
edition,284 in a ‘more prominent’ position than the relevant paragraph in the original 
article.285 The corporate claimant’s case on s 1 relied on an assertion that it was 
‘dependent on grant and contract income’ which might be affected by the statement 
complained of.286 But it was ‘not aware of any contract being lost’ when the case 
was heard, half a year after that statement was published,287 and was unable to 
convince Bean J that a likelihood of serious harm to its reputation could be inferred 
from other evidence.288  
The claimants in the more recent case Hope not Hate Ltd v Farage might be more 
sympathetic.289 Hope not Hate ‘is split between a charitable trust and a limited 
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company’,290 both of which sued politician Nigel Farage in respect of a comment 
he made during a radio interview, alleging that the charity ‘masquerade[s] as being 
lovely and peaceful but actually pursue[s] violent and very undemocratic means.’291 
The case was settled with a retraction of the allegation by Farage.292 The allegation 
was seriously defamatory, and its retraction was in the interest of the public as well 
as the charity itself. However, it is open to question whether the charity’s 
defamation action was entirely proportionate to the harm that the statement might 
have caused.  
It is not clear that the statement complained of had any actual effect on the charity’s 
income or other activities;293 it apparently sought to rely on an inference from the 
seriousness of the statement to satisfy the threshold in s 1 of the 2013 Act.294 The 
charity’s accounts for the year ending 31st December 2017 (which corresponds quite 
closely to the period between publication and settlement) make no mention of 
Farage’s allegation, or of the legal action against him.295 While a comparison with 
the previous year’s accounts show a fall in the charity’s income, this appears to 
have been caused by reduced income from restricted grants; the charity’s income 
from unrestricted grants and donations rose from the previous year. It has been 
reported by The Guardian that Hope Not Hate’s ‘charity arm had a total income for 
2015 of just over £700,000.’296 Its income for 2017 was over £900,000, despite the 
legal action over Farage’s allegation being unresolved for almost the whole year. 
Nor do the (less extensive) accounts of the related limited company, also a party to 
the lawsuit against Farage, include any reference to the defamatory statement 
having any financial effect.297  
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It could reasonably be argued that the reputational interests that the claimant 
charities were seeking to protect were not financial in nature, and that denying them 
the right to sue in defamation would have left them without a remedy for the harm 
Farage’s statement may have caused to their ability to pursue their charitable 
objects more broadly. Nevertheless, their claim was for damages of up to 
£100,000,298 an amount which seems wildly excessive in the circumstances. Even 
though the case never got to trial, the company’s chief executive has claimed that 
Farage’s legal costs were ‘in excess of £100,000’.299  
A similar impression is given by the claim in Life 2009 Ltd v Lambeth LBC, which 
was settled by a statement in open court.300 The claimant, ‘an incorporated 
charity’,301 sued in respect of statements posted on Twitter suggesting that it had 
given false information on its application to participate in the Lambeth Country 
Show. Those statements were republished in various media outlets.302 They had 
been published by the Council to explain its decision to withdraw the charity’s 
permission to participate after the first day of the Show; that decision formed the 
basis of additional claims in breach of contract and, under the Human Rights Act 
1998, for unlawful interference with the claimant’s right to freedom of 
expression.303 The limited information revealed by the statement in open court 
suggests that the core of the charity’s complaint was in relation to being ejected 
from the Show without explanation, and that the Council’s misleading statements 
about the incident, and its failure to correct them, aggravated that initial complaint. 
While it does seem as though the Council’s approach to the situation was 
problematic, the false impression given by the statements complained of – that the 
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claimant ‘did not have permission to be at the Show, or had submitted inaccurate 
information in its application’304 – hardly seems to go to the core of the charity’s 
values or to be likely to affect its ability to perform its functions. 
Since the law is inevitably an imperfect mechanism for resolving disputes, it must 
be accepted that some injustice would result either from a rule denying not-for-
profit bodies the right to sue, or from a rule allowing their claims. There will either 
be cases in which organizations such as Hope not Hate are compelled to respond as 
best they can to damaging falsehoods in the public sphere; or there will be cases in 
which important speech on matters of public interest is chilled by defamation claims 
by organizations like the British Chiropractic Association. As Schauer points out, 
‘attention must … be paid to the consequences of the over- and under-inclusion’ of 
a given rule, and to the relative harm that would be caused by those 
consequences.305 If the three claims discussed above are at all typical of defamation 
claims brought by not-for-profit organizations, then the harm that would be caused 
by prohibiting such claims seems unlikely to be particularly serious. In contrast, it 
is clear that the interests of defendants, and the public interest in freedom of speech, 
can be harmed significantly by the ability of not-for-profit bodies to sue in 
defamation.306 
The rule proposed here also minimizes uncertainty. As the discussion of the US 
‘public figure’ test above indicated, the broader chilling effect of defamation law is 
best addressed through reforms that are clear and predictable in their application. 
The ‘body that trades for profit’ test in s 1(2) of the Defamation Act 2013 is 
reasonably clear and predictable, but there has been some debate as to its scope;307 
for example, there was some initial uncertainty between the parties in Cooke as to 
whether the serious financial loss requirement applied to the claimant housing 
association.308 The fact that the line between human beings and all other potential 
claimants is almost certainly the easiest line to draw in individual cases means that 
it is the clearest and most predictable test available. Denying all corporate claimants 
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the right to sue would help to reduce the likelihood that expensive litigation would 
be necessary to resolve uncertainty about the standing of entities close to whatever 
other dividing line might be drawn. It would therefore most effectively address the 
chilling effect that fear of such litigation might have on speech. 
The rule advocated here is also arguably the least arbitrary option available. As 
Mullis and Scott note, ‘Inevitably, any line drawn will be artificial’;309 but it is 
submitted that the most consistent and conceptually coherent line available is that 
which separates human and non-human claimants. Young notes that the ‘essential 
distinction … between human and non-human’ claimants is that ‘defamation 
implicates such different reputational interests for humans and non-humans.’310 
Although charities’ reputational interests may be less strictly financial in nature 
than those of for-profit companies, they have even fewer interests in common with 
individual claimants.311 As argued in Gatley on Libel and Slander: 
‘Bodies that trade for profit cannot sustain harm to their social relations nor 
suffer distress. The only real harm they can sustain is financial. … Charities 
and similar bodies are in a similar position. They have no immortal soul 
worthy of protection.’312 
All corporate defamation claimants, even non-profit corporate claimants, are unlike 
individual claimants in that the interests protected by their defamation claims 
should not be treated as engaging their fundamental rights under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. In contrast, defamation claims brought by any kind 
of corporate claimant will interfere with defendants’ Convention right to freedom 
of expression. In other words, the over-inclusiveness of a reform restricting the right 
to sue of all corporate claimants will only affect their non-Convention interests in 
reputation, which would be preferable to the effect on defendants’ Convention 
rights that results from the under-inclusiveness of reforms targeted at only some 
corporate claimants. 
                                                 
309 Mullis and Scott, ‘Lord Lester’s Defamation Bill’ (n 263) 14. 
310 Hilary Young, ‘Public Institutions as Defamation Plaintiffs’ (2016) 39(1) Dalhousie Law Journal 
249, 270. 
311 eg Joint Committee Report (n 4) para 110: ‘Irrespective of their size and available resources, all 
corporations are different from individuals in that they do not have feelings.’ 
312 Gatley (n 91) para 2.8. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
A. Summary of thesis conclusions 
This thesis set out to assess whether English defamation law strikes an appropriate 
balance between the competing interests in reputation and freedom of speech in 
cases involving corporate claimants. The overall conclusion is that, despite the 
reforms introduced in the Defamation Act 2013, it does not. The reform that would 
most appropriately reflect those competing interests would be to remove 
companies’ right to sue in defamation entirely. 
The interests at stake in defamation claims brought by individuals are different from 
those at stake in claims brought by corporate entities. As explained in Chapter 1, 
corporate claimants – unlike many individual claimants – are not protecting a 
fundamental right to reputation under the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Rather, their reputational interests are merely instrumental to their ability to pursue 
their trading or other objects. In contrast, defendants in corporate defamation cases 
are by definition sued in respect of their exercise of the fundamental right to 
freedom of speech.  
Further, Chapter 2 argued that the statements complained of by corporate 
defamation claimants are almost always on matters of public interest. As such, 
defendants’ speech interests should be given greater weight in defamation cases 
involving corporate, as opposed to individual, claimants. This reinforces the 
argument presented in Chapter 1 that less weight should be afforded to the 
reputational interests of corporate claimants. If both of those arguments are 
accepted then, compared to the balance struck in defamation claims brought by 
individuals, the law applied to corporate defamation claims should account for both 
the higher value of speech and the lower value of reputation in that context. This 
suggests not only that defamation law should provide less protection to the 
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reputations of corporate claimants, but that it may be appropriate for it to provide 
substantially less protection to those claimants. Tony Weir expressed this sentiment 
effectively when he wrote that ‘To prefer the interest in maintaining the corporate 
image to the right of the citizen to say what he reasonably believes to be true is a 
grim perversion of values.’1 The evidence set out in Chapter 2 suggests that, before 
2013, in many cases the law did in fact prefer the corporate interest in reputation to 
the free speech rights of critics. 
In s 1(2) of the Defamation Act 2013, Parliament attempted to rebalance the law in 
favour of defendants by introducing a ‘serious financial loss’ threshold for 
corporate claimants. At the centre of this thesis was a thorough critical examination 
of that reform, and of the courts’ approach to applying the s 1(2) test in corporate 
defamation cases since the Act came into force. The results of that analysis indicate 
that the serious financial loss threshold may benefit defendants in some cases, by 
providing a mechanism with which weaker claims can be challenged and struck out 
at an early stage of proceedings. But the 2013 Act will probably make only a 
marginal difference to corporate defamation law overall, especially if the courts 
continue to interpret and apply s 1(2) in a way that is unduly favourable to 
claimants, as they have done in a majority of the cases to date in which the provision 
has been relevant. The s 1(2) test may also have the counter-productive effect of 
introducing complex issues relating to loss and causation into corporate defamation 
litigation, and thereby increasing the cost of even successfully defending a 
company’s defamation claim.  
There are other problems with the substantive law that the 2013 Act did not address, 
particularly the lack of any requirement for the defendant to have been at fault and 
the presumption that defamatory statements about a company are false; as well as a 
tendency for successful corporate claimants to be awarded inappropriate and 
disproportionate remedies. Even after the Defamation Act 2013 came into force, 
therefore, English corporate defamation law still fails to strike an appropriate 
balance between the interests in reputation and speech. 
                                                 
1 J A Weir, ‘Local Authority v Critical Ratepayer – A Suit in Defamation’ (1972) 30 Cambridge 
Law Journal 238, 240. 
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More fundamentally, the analysis offered in this thesis suggests not only that 
English corporate defamation law does not appropriately balance the interests at 
stake in individual cases, but that in its current form as a part of the law of torts, it 
cannot do so. The adversarial litigation process itself has a disproportionate impact 
on defendants, allows corporate claimants to abuse the threat of litigation, and 
creates an unacceptable chilling effect on speech about companies and their 
activities. 
In light of the public interest in the freedom to speak critically about companies and 
their activities, and given that corporate defamation claims continue to have the 
capacity to chill speech on these subjects, it is reasonable to ask what benefit the 
corporate right to sue provides. The answer, it seems, is very little. In most cases, 
corporate defamation claimants in fact have alternatives to bringing defamation 
claims that offer sufficient protection against the reputational harm caused by false 
allegations. In other words, most companies do not actually need to be able to sue 
in defamation. As a result, there is even less justification for accepting the negative 
consequences of their right to sue for freedom of speech. 
As such, companies should be denied standing to sue in defamation. This rule 
should not be limited to any particular category of corporate claimants, and no 
exception should be made for small businesses or not-for-profit entities. While it is 
true that, in general, defamation claims brought by these types of claimant are less 
likely to give rise to serious free speech concerns, they are still capable of doing so. 
Attempting to target larger companies, or to exclude some corporate claimants from 
the scope of the reform proposed, would create uncertainty and risk being under-
inclusive, both of which would have undesirable consequences for freedom of 
speech. Moreover, regardless of their size or the objects for which they were 
formed, all non-human claimants lack the dignitary interests in reputation that 
justify protecting individual reputation as a fundamental right under Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Therefore, the right to sue in defamation 
should be removed from all non-human claimants. 
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B. Limitations and opportunities for further research 
There are a number of limitations to the argument presented in this thesis that it was 
not possible to avoid. Perhaps the most significant is that the analysis of s 1(2) in 
Chapter 3 was undertaken in the context of a developing body of case law that has 
remained unsettled since the Act came into force. In particular, there is a significant 
amount of uncertainty as to how the Supreme Court’s judgment in Lachaux v 
Independent Print Ltd2 will affect the application of the s 1(2) ‘serious financial 
loss’ test by trial courts; and at the time of writing the Court of Appeal’s judgment 
in Seventy Thirty Ltd v Burki, allowing the defendant’s appeal against the High 
Court verdict in favour of the corporate claimant,3 remained outstanding.4 As a 
result, there is a limit to the certainty with which predictions can be made about 
how the s 1(2) test will affect the outcomes of corporate defamation cases in the 
future. Nonetheless, the analysis of the existing case law in this thesis clarifies some 
areas of dispute, and reveals limits to the effectiveness of the 2013 reforms that will 
survive any shift towards a more defendant-friendly interpretation of s 1(2) that 
might result from those recent appellate decisions. 
In addition to the uncertain state of the substantive law in this area, it is also difficult 
to find reliable information that offers any real detail about the litigation that is 
pursued in the courts. Other commentators have noted the paucity of data made 
available by the courts.5 This makes it prohibitively difficult to examine the 
corporate defamation claims that are filed in court, but that are not the subject of 
any reported judgments. Similarly, transcripts of the decisions made by Masters in 
the High Court, and the decisions of County Courts, are rarely made public. This 
means that there is very little information available in relation to some corporate 
defamation claims that are resolved in the courts, even when they result in 
substantial awards of compensation to claimant companies.6  
                                                 
2 [2019] UKSC 27. 
3 Seventy Thirty Ltd v Burki [2018] EWHC 2151 (QB). 
4 See Ch.3.B., note 81 and accompanying text. 
5 Judith Townend, ‘Closed Data: Defamation and Privacy Disputes in England and Wales’ (2013) 
5(1) Journal of Media Law 31. 
6 See Ch3.B., text to notes 90-93. 
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In Chapter 2, I explained that corporate defamation law can have a chilling effect 
on speech about companies even when no claim is actually pursued in the courts. 
Companies’ threats of litigation can in themselves be sufficient to pressure speakers 
into retracting critical statements; and publishers’ awareness of the risks involved 
with criticizing companies can deter them from speaking in the first place. These 
phenomena are difficult to study and, as noted in Chapter 2, there is a particular 
lack of empirical evidence in relation to the chilling effect of corporate defamation 
law specifically. There was sufficient anecdotal evidence before the 2013 Act to 
recognize that the chilling of speech about companies was a significant problem, 
even if it was not possible to measure that problem precisely. But there have been 
no studies to date examining the extent of the chilling effect that the law continues 
to have after the 2013 reforms. 
One related theme emerged in the course of researching this thesis which I believe 
is worthy of closer study: namely, the frequency with which judges’ decisions in 
defamation cases are guided by confident pronouncements that are empirically 
testable, but in support of which no empirical evidence is offered. The context in 
which this tendency is most apparent is when judges are assessing the amount of 
general damages necessary to ‘vindicate’ a claimant’s reputation.7 It is extremely 
concerning that tens of thousands of pounds are regularly awarded against 
defendants for the purpose of signalling to future audiences that their allegations 
against the claimant were false, when the courts appear to disagree substantially as 
to how large an award will be sufficient to serve that purpose – or even whether the 
amount of damages awarded has any effect whatsoever on how the claimant is 
perceived. Informal conversations with colleagues in psychology departments 
suggest that it would be relatively simple to test these questions in an experimental 
setting. That this has not yet been attempted, given the serious interference with 
defendants’ free speech rights that is justified by reference to the vindicatory effect 
of large compensation awards, is surprising. This is a gap in our understanding of 
how best to resolve defamation cases that I intend to address in the future. 
                                                 
7 See Ch4.B.ii., text to notes 126-159. 
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C. Possibility of reform 
Although the academic contribution made by this thesis is valuable in its own right, 
the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5, and the overall conclusion, does make a concrete 
recommendation for how the law should be reformed. It is reasonable to ask 
whether the proposed reform is realistically achievable, and if so how it might be 
achieved. The Defamation Act 2013 made substantial and wide-ranging reforms to 
this area of law, and came about as the result of a process of consultation and debate 
that lasted nearly five years.8 Although the corporate right to sue was a frequent 
target of criticism throughout that process, Parliament ultimately chose to put that 
right on a statutory footing for the first time. If it is true that ‘Statutory reform of 
libel laws … is a once-in-a-generation phenomenon’,9 then given that less than 
seven years have passed since Parliament rejected the approach advocated in this 
thesis, the prospect of English defamation law being reformed in the near future so 
as to deny companies the right to sue may seem fanciful. 
Douglas Vick and Linda Macpherson cite an observation made in the 1990s, by the 
authors of Carter-Ruck on Libel and Slander,10 of a pattern of statutory reforms to 
defamation law happening roughly once every fifty years.11 But the Defamation Act 
2013 bucked this trend, coming less than twenty years after the previous legislative 
reforms in the Defamation Act 1996. Vick and Macpherson suggest that the 
periodic need for statutory intervention arises ‘when one generation’s 
accommodation of [the competing interests in reputation and freedom of speech] is 
subjected to the pressures of the next generation’s social, economic, and 
technological transformations.’12 The impetus behind the 2013 Act was in part due 
to the extent to which communication technology had developed, even in the 
relatively short period of time since the 1996 Act. For example, the Joint Committee 
                                                 
8 See generally James Price and Felicity McMahon, Blackstone’s Guide to the Defamation Act 2013 
(OUP 2013) ch 1. 
9 Andrew Scott, ‘‘Ceci n’est pas une pipe’: The Autopoietic Inanity of the Single Meaning Rule’ in 
Andrew T Kenyon (ed), Comparative Defamation and Privacy Law (Cambridge University Press 
2016) 55. 
10 Peter F Carter-Ruck, Richard Walker and Harvey N A Starte, Carter-Ruck on Libel and Slander 
(4th edn, Butterworths 1992). 
11 Douglas W Vick and Linda Macpherson, ‘An Opportunity Lost: The United Kingdom’s Failed 
Reform of Defamation Law’ (1997) 49(3) Federal Communications Law Journal 621, 622-23. 
12 Ibid, 622. 
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on the Draft Defamation Bill claimed that ‘Modern means of communication 
represent perhaps the biggest challenge facing the operation of the law on 
defamation.’13 The Committee stressed that the law ‘must adapt to modern 
communication culture,’14 including, if necessary, through statutory reform. 
Just days before this thesis was submitted, the organization Index on Censorship, 
which along with English PEN played a crucial role in generating the momentum 
behind the 2013 reforms, issued a press release announcing the launch of a ‘research 
project into the use of vexatious legal threats against journalists’, and expressing 
frustration that the reforms introduced in the Defamation Act 2013 had not 
prevented ‘powerful individuals and companies [from] bring[ing] libel actions or 
us[ing] other vexatious legal threats designed to stifle investigative journalism’ in 
the UK.15 As with any law reform agenda, whether defamation reform becomes a 
pressing concern again in two years’ time or twenty years’ time is a matter of 
political will. 
It is plausible to think that the increasing pace of change in media and 
communications technology, and of social change more generally, will present 
more frequent opportunities for statutory reform of defamation law in the future. If 
the criticism of the approach taken in s 1(2) of the 2013 Act offered in this thesis 
continues to hold true, then Parliament may opt for a more decisive approach to 
corporate defamation reform when the opportunity next arises. 
There are also other jurisdictions in which defamation reform processes are 
ongoing, or where there have recently been calls for reform. For example, in 
January 2019, the Scottish Law Commission opened a consultation on defamation 
reform in that jurisdiction,16 and sought comment on the approach that should be 
taken to claims brought by for-profit companies.17 The Commission also invited 
                                                 
13 Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill, Report (2010-12, HL 203, HC 930-I) 4. 
14 Ibid, 3. 
15 Index on Censorship, ‘Urgent Reforms Needed to Protect Journalists from Vexatious Legal 
Threats’ (3 January 2020) at <https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2020/01/urgent-reforms-needed-
to-protect-journalists-from-vexatious-legal-threats-index-on-censorship/>. 
16 Scottish Law Commission, Defamation in Scots Law: A Consultation (January 2019) at 
<https://consult.gov.scot/justice/defamation-in-scots-law/> (‘Scottish Law Commission, 
Consultation’); Report on Defamation (Scot Law Com no 248, December 2017) at 
<https://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/files/7315/1316/5353/Report_on_Defamation_Report_No_248.
pdf>. 
17 Scottish Law Commission, Consultation (n 16) paras 64-74. 
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views on the possibility of removing the right to sue from larger companies 
altogether, although its position was that it would be ‘a radical step to strip such 
bodies of the rights they currently enjoy, especially as they currently enjoy a similar 
right in almost all other jurisdictions.’18 A consultation on defamation reform was 
run by the Law Commission of Northern Ireland in 2014,19 and a subsequent report 
published in 2016.20 Although no reforms have yet been implemented, there does 
appear to be growing pressure to do so.21 In the Republic of Ireland, where the last 
statutory reform of defamation law was in 2009, calls for further reform also seem 
to be gaining momentum.22 
Given that the responses to a recent review of the operation of the Australian 
uniform defamation laws were overwhelmingly in favour of retaining (and 
expanding the scope of) the provision barring corporations from suing,23 it is not 
unimaginable that a similar reform could be introduced in England, or in one or 
more other common law jurisdictions in the near future. That, in my view, would 
be a very welcome development. 
                                                 
18 Ibid, para 73. 
19 Northern Ireland Law Commission, Consultation Paper: Defamation Law in Northern Ireland 
(NILC 19, 2014). 
20 Andrew Scott, Reform of Defamation Law in Northern Ireland: Recommendations to the 
Department of Finance (2016) at <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67385>. 
21 eg ‘Government Commits to Report on Defamation Regime in Northern Ireland’ (News Media 
Association, 18 July 2019) at <http://www.newsmediauk.org/Latest/government-commits-to-
report-on-defamation-regime-in-northern-ireland>. 
22 eg ‘Minister Pledges to Reform Defamation Law in 2020’ (Law Society of Ireland Gazette, 14 
November 2019) <https://www.lawsociety.ie/gazette/top-stories/minister-pledges-to-reform-
defamation-law-early-in-2020/>. 
23 Council of Attorneys-General, Review of the Model Defamation Provisions: Background Paper 
(November 2019) 10, at <https://www.justice.nsw.gov.au/justicepolicy/Documents/review-model-
defamation-provisions/defamation-final-background-paper.pdf>. 
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